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THE PHAEDRUS OF PLATO.

WITH

ENGLISH NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS

BY W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.

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THE

PHAEDRUS OF PLATO.

WITH

ENGLISH NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS

BY

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Φιλόμουθος ὁ φιλόσοφος πῶς ἔστιν.—ἈРИΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ."
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PHAEDRUS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP. I.—ON THE EROTIC DISCOURSES OF Socrates</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP. II.—ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ISOCRATES, AND HIS RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP. III.—THE EROTICUS OF CORNELIUS FRONTO</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ERRATA.

Page 11, note, line 21, for Plut. Men. read Plut. Mor.
— 37, note, line 12, for φορά' δίδους read φοράς δίδους
— 55, note, line 31, a comma is needed after ‘the form so called’
— 61, note, line 15, for έσωσόμε, read έσωσόμενος,
— 64, note, line 4, for Ruhn. and Tim. read Ruhn. ad Tim.
— 107, note, line 32, for diacritic read diacritic.
— 122, note, line 37, for ἢλην read ἢλην
— 143, note, line 7 from the bottom, delete comma after γράφει.
— 162, line 23, for which that desire read which desire
— 167, line 22, for the existing read the then existing
— 168, bottom of the page, for notions read notices
PREFACE.

Of this edition of the Phaedrus it may be said, and with better reason than Porson says of his Hecuba, "tironum usibus destinata est." The Introduction and the first Appendix were read, together with much that is now left out, by way of prolegomena to lectures delivered to University students in the year 1859; and the notes, though not reduced to their present form until the year following, had in substance been written for the same hearers. The second Appendix, on Isocrates, was composed in 1861, also for oral delivery, though to a somewhat different audience. Very little has been added either to the notes or the dissertations; but pains have been taken in the correction of errors, and the omission or abridgment of controversial matter. The edition would probably have seen the light some years earlier, but I had laid it aside, together with one of the Gorgias framed on the same plan, in the hope of recasting both and adapting them to a more comprehensive scheme, which for various reasons is now abandoned. If this present 'opella' should be found useful to those for whom it is principally designed, the Gorgias will probably follow it at no long interval.

In editing this dialogue, I have made no new collation of manuscripts; but the text has of course been carefully compared with the Various Readings, especially those of the 'Clarkian' or 'Bodleian,' as given by Gaisford,—readings which are often suggestive, even when false. Of original emendations
but few have been introduced, and those not, I trust, very violent. For instance, in page 92 (260 c), for the received προσενέγκειν, I have suggested πρός γ' ἐνέγκειν. Ibid. for the readings, evidently corrupt, of the codices, I have restored from Hermeias ὁδ κρέιττον γελοῖον καὶ φίλον ἢ δεινὸν καὶ ἐχθρὸν [εἰναι]. The ejection of εἶναι, which is not found in these scholia, I have contented myself with recommending. Its absence might be defended by 238 ε, κρέιττον δὲ καὶ ἵσον ἐχθρὸν.

In p. 100 (263 λ), τῶν δυτῶν has been taken into the text from one MS., in place of the too long received τῶν τοιούτων.

In p. 55, I have ventured to adopt a happy suggestion of my friend Dr. Charles Badham, whose name will frequently occur in these notes. Instead of the received ἐκ πολλῶν ἵνα αἰσθήσεως I read ἵνα', a daring change, for which I can give no reason except the reason of the case.

One nearly certain emendation has been overlooked. The invocation to the Muses, in p. 237 λ, is thus quoted in the Homeric Allegories of Heraclitus: ἄγετε δή, ὁ Μόοςαι, εῖτε δ' ἔφδης εἴδος λαγείας εἶτε διὰ γένος τι μούσικόν ταύτην ἐσχετε τὴν ἑπωνυμίαν, κ.τ.λ. (P. 149, ed. Mehler.) Here λαγείας is of course wrong; but Cobet has rightly inferred that τὸ Διονύσων, which stands very awkwardly after μούσικόν in the received text, ought to be ejected as a gloss upon γένος τι μούσικόν, which is the true reading of the passage. This, I think, is rather confirmed than refuted by the order of the words given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, εἶτε διὰ γένος τὸ Διονύσων μούσικόν (de Demosth. § 7, p. 969, Reiske), which is apparently a transitional reading.

In the matter of orthography, I have followed to a considerable extent the practice of the so-called Atticists. For instance, ἐλευνός, ἐράκα, κλῆω are invariably read in place of the common forms, ἐλευνός, ἐράκα, κλείω. In elision, I have stopped very far short of Hirschig's and Cobet's practice, having yet to be convinced that all Attic writers are equally averse to the so-called 'concourse of vowels.' This dogma was certainly not held by the ancient critics. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, one of the earliest and best witnesses to Attic practice, assures us that while
writers in the γλαφυρά καὶ θεατρικὴ λέξις, of which Isocrates was a master, shunned as much as possible the σύγκρονοις φωνητοὺς, those of an austerer type rather courted it; and he quotes instances of this collision from Demosthenes himself, which, as he thinks, increase the σημεῖας of the passages in which they occur. Dion. Hal. de Isocr. Jud. § 2, vol. v. p. 588, Reiske. Ibid. vi., pp. 964, 1069, 1076, 1090 (de adm. vi dicendi in Demoeth. §§ 4. 38. 40. 43).

Of Plato's practice in this respect Dionysius gives us no direct information, but from § 3 of the Judicium de Isocrate, we may fairly, I think, infer that it was a mean between that of the smooth, or polished, and that of the 'austere' school. To his testimony add the following, from one of the more judicious of the rhetoricians of the Empire. περὶ δὲ συγκρούσεως φωνητῶν ὑπέλαθον ἄλλοι ἄλλοι. Ἰσοκράτης μὲν γὰρ εφύλασσε συμπλήσσειν αὐτά, καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ. ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὡς ἢ τινες συνέκρουναν καὶ παντάπασι δεῖ δὲ οὕτως ἢ τινὶ ποιεῖν τὴν σύνθεσιν, ἀτέχνως αὐτὰ συμπλήρωσον καὶ ὡς ἢ τινες παντελῶς φυλάσσονται τὴν συνέκρουσιν τῶν γραμμάτων λειτουργοῖ μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἢ ώστε ἢ σύνθεσιν, ἀμουσοτέρα δὲ καὶ κοφή ἀτέχνως, πολλῆς εὐφωνίας ἀφαίρεθα, τὴν γενομένην ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως, κ.τ.λ. (Demetrius περὶ ἐρμηνείας, c. 68, in vol. ix. p. 34 of Walz's Rhetores Graeci.) Any one who will compare Hirschig's text with that of Bekker will perceive my motive for introducing these quotations.

In interpreting this dialogue it has been my duty to refer to my predecessors; in particular to Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum. From the first, when I have differed, it has been with reluctance; for no editor has so fine a sense of Platonic usage. Ast's larger Commentary is full of learned illustrative matter, excerpts from which appear in these notes. He also earned the thanks of editors of the Phaedrus by publishing the Scholia Hermiae entire in his edition of 1810. Many extracts from these will be found in this edition; for amidst a heap of Neoplatonic rubbish, they contain occasional learned and even sensible remarks. Th-
are also not without their use in fixing the text of disputed passages, for the 'lemmata' which they contain differ, sometimes for the better, though sometimes also for the worse, from the received readings. The text of Hermeias', as given by Ast, sorely needs revision, and I have had to make some obvious corrections in the passages quoted.

In illustrating the subject-matter of the dialogue, frequent reference has been made to the valuable and interesting essays of Leonhard Spengel; nor must I omit to mention a very painstaking and learned, though not well-written, monography on the Phaedrus, by the late Professor Krische of Göttingen. There is also a clever analysis of the dialogue by Sallier, in the French Academy of Inscriptions for 1736, of which the poet Gray's Argument is an abridgment. The notes written by Gray himself are so much to the purpose, that one regrets that they are not more numerous. Some of them the reader will find quoted in this edition: and also a few adversaria of Godfrey Hermann,—possibly published elsewhere, but taken by me from the margin of his copy of Heindorf's Phaedrus, which was bought, at the sale of his books, for the Public Library of this University.

The dates given above will show that in preparing this edition I have made no use of some valuable additions to Platonic and the kindred branches of literature which have recently appeared. This, I am aware, is no recommendation; but I have not of late had the time necessary for a careful comparison of my own views either with those of Mr. Grote, in his great work on Plato and the Socrates, or of my friend Mr. Cope in his learned Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Aristotle; or, lastly, with those of Professor Lewis Campbell, who, in his edition of the Sophistes and Politicus, has treated of the "dialectical method" with much judgment and ability.

I cannot end these observations better than in the words of a

---

1 He was contemporary with Simplicius, Damascius, and the other survivors of the Platonic succession, who were silenced by the edict of Justinian, A.D. 529. See Gibbon, c. xi.
veteran interpreter, whose writings gave a great stimulus to the study of Plato in Germany in the early part of the century. "In scriptore tali qualis Plato est, permulta inveniri quae sua quisque ratione intelligat atque judicet, per se patet; quocirca haud mirabor, si varia, partim etiam iniqua, de meis annotationibus judicia in medium prolata videro."

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
February, 1868.
INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

ON THE SUBJECT AND INTENTION OF THE PHAEDRUS.

Few of the Platonic dialogues have provoked so much controversy as the Phaedrus. This distinction it owes, partly to the complexity of its structure and the variety of its contents, and partly to the interest attached to it in consequence of a generally believed tradition that it was the earliest offspring of its author's philosophical genius. Hence have arisen two questions, neither of which, perhaps, can be said to have received a final answer. (1) What is the main scope and purpose of the dialogue, and what the relation its several parts bear to each other? (2) What is its relation to other dialogues? Is it to be regarded as a preface to the whole series, or to any assignable part of the whole series; or is its office that of a supplementary and subordinate, rather than of a vital and integral part of the system implied or developed in the Platonic writings?

That the first of these questions, that which relates to the leading idea of the dialogue, has been answered very variously, is evident from the bare enumeration of the different headings which the Greek commentators have prefixed to it. Φαίδρος ἡ περὶ καλοῦ—Φ. ἡ περὶ ἐρωτος—Φ. ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς—περὶ τάγαθου—περὶ ψυχῆς—περὶ τοῦ πρώτου καλοῦ—περὶ τοῦ παντοδαποῦ καλοῦ—such are the titles by which scholars or philosophers have recorded their several impressions.1 None of these second titles possess the slightest authority; for we may be quite sure that the only one prefixed by the author

1 Krische, über Platons Phaedrus, pp. 3, 4, where the references are given: "Hujusmodi additamenta a recentioribus esse profecta, jam Proclus significavit ad Plat. Polit. p. 350. 24—καθάπερ ἄλλαι τῶν ἔπιγραφῶν, προσβέσεις ὀδηγεῖ τῶν νεωτέρων." Ast ad Protag, init.
was that by which the dialogue was known to his disciple Aristotle, who quotes it by the sole name Phædrus. The discrepancy of view implied in these contradictory headings is no proof that the problem defies solution, but may be regarded as an intimation that we must look for such solution rather to Plato himself than to his commentators. That the Phædrus is a mere congeries of poetical descriptions, of brilliant metaphysical speculations, acute logical discussion, and satirical literary criticism, is a supposition which no one who has read one of the more considerable Platonic dialogues with attention will easily entertain. That it was not so regarded by its author, is pretty evident from his own testimony; for he tells us that "every written composition should resemble a living creature in its structure: it should have an organized body of its own, lacking neither head nor foot, but possessing a centre and extremities, adapted each to the other and in perfect keeping with the whole." This precept we cannot suppose to have been consciously violated by its author in the very dialogue in which it occurs, a dialogue in which his literary ability shines with greater lustre than perhaps in any other of his compositions.

The Phædrus may fairly be described as a dramatized treatise on Rhetoric. The popular treatises on this art and their authors are held up to ridicule both in this dialogue and in the Gorgias: but in the Phædrus Plato furnishes us with a scheme of a new and philosophical rhetoric, founded partly on 'dialectic,' and partly also on psychology,—the science which distinguishes the principles of human action, and the several varieties of human character upon which the orator has to work, in producing that "Persuasion" which is acknowledged to be the final cause of his art. Ἄρτι τὴν πείθους ἐννοεῖ τοῖς ἐννοούσις is a definition which Plato virtually accepts in common with his opponents; but, unlike them, he follows out the principle to its logical results, which, as he shows, had escaped the notice of all teachers of Rhetoric from Tisias down to his own time.

For this exposition he prepares the way by an elaborate dramatic introduction. A speech of Lysias is read by Phædrus, and severely criticized by Socrates. The speech is an address of a lover to a youth whose favour he tries to win, and its merit is supposed to consist in the originality of the thesis it enforces, ὡς μὴ ἔρωτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἔρωτι δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι. Socrates finds the discourse full

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² Rhet. iii. 7, 11, ed. Oxon.
³ Phædr. p. 264 c.
⁴ Plato's definition is to the same effect: λόγον διόνυσον τεχνῆς ψυχωμογία σφεν. 271 p.
⁵ p. 230 b—236 b.
INTRODUCTION.

of tautology and deficient in invention. His young friend, unable
to deny the justice of the criticism, insists that Socrates shall make
a better speech on the same theme. This, after coquetting awhile,
Socrates consents to do, and so far fulfils his engagement as to
prove satisfactorily that it is better for the ἱππομενος to reject the
proposals of his ἱπποτικός. This done, he suddenly breaks off, horror-
struck at the impiety of which he had been guilty in putting a vile
meaning upon the sacred name of Love. He would gladly depart;
but an inward voice commands him first to make his peace with
the offended son of Aphrodite—a “god and goddess-born.” He will
follow the precedent given by Stesichorus, who, struck with blind-
ness for reviling the fair Helen, composed a palinode, in which he
proved her good as fair, and thereupon straightway regained his
sight. He, Socrates, will recite a palinode: in which due atone-
ment shall be made to the injured majesty of Eros. Then follows
that famous rhapsody on Love, which Socrates describes as “a kind
of mythic hymn,” but which is quite as remarkable for its philo-
 socophic as for its literary and poetical merits. It has accordingly
made a deep impression upon successive generations of Platonic
students, some of whom have erroneously regarded it as the really
important portion of the Phaedrus, to which the elaborate discussion
on rhetoric which follows it is to be interpreted as merely accessory.
In the course of the subsequent conversation, the second λόγος
ἰτικός is more than once referred to by Plato, but without any
reference to the passion of which it professes to treat, or to the
matter, speculative or mythical, which it contains. It is used by its
author for one purpose, and one only—to exemplify the dialectic-
rhetorical theory evolved in the sequel of the dialogue.

Readers of the Gorgias naturally ask, How is it that Plato devotes
a work so elaborate as the Phaedrus to the illustration of that art of
rhetoric which in the former dialogue he pointedly condemns; which
he pronounces to be no art, but a mere trick acquired by practice
(ἄλογον τράγμα, τριβή, ἵπποτικα), destitute of all scientific principle,
and capable of subserving none but the most unworthy ends? Those
who adhere to the tradition that the Phaedrus is a juvenile com-
position, are compelled to suppose that Plato, when he wrote the
Gorgias, had survived the illusions of his youth—had, in fact,
changed his mind, and ceased to regard Rhetoric as worthy the

6 P. 237 n—241 d.
7 P. 243 n.
8 P. 242 n.
9 A less favourable view is taken by Col. Mure, who calls it “an eloquent mysti-
fication.” A more indulgent phrase-maker might call it a “romance of the soul.”
1 As Ficinus. See his “Argument,” prefixed to the English reprint of Becker.
2 Which begins p. 237 n. and continues to the end of the dialogue.
INTRODUCTION.

attention of a philosopher. This opinion appears to me quite untenable. In the first place, the supposed second thoughts of the Gorgias are by no means the better thoughts. The view adopted in the Phaedrus is both more moderate and more deep and true than the narrow and passionate special-pleading of the Gorgias, a dialogue (as I may attempt to show hereafter) not improbably composed while the wound inflicted on Plato's feelings by the unrighteous doom of his master was still but half healed. In the second place, there are two passages in the Phaedrus, in which an unprejudiced eye cannot fail, in my opinion, to detect an allusion to the deprecatory language employed in the Gorgias. In Phaedr. 260 ε, Socrates exclaims: "I seem to hear the approaching steps of a band of antagonist arguments (λόγοι): loudly protesting that Rhetoric is no art, as she lyingly pretends, but an ἄτεχνος τριβή." These personified λόγοι can be none other than those with which we are familiar in the Gorgias. No one before Plato ever used the phrase ἄτεχνος τριβή, nor is there any dialogue except the Gorgias in which the import of the terms τριβή and ἕμπειρα, as distinguished from τέχνη, is explained. In that dialogue the utmost pains are taken by Socrates to render them intelligible to the untutored apprehension of Polus, whereas here their meaning is assumed as self-evident. The distinction is repeated in p. 270 b, and there, as here, allowed to pass without comment or objection.

Lastly, if we refer to dialogues which we know for certain to contain the deliberate opinions of Plato's riper years, we find him assigning to Rhetoric much the same rank as that which it holds in the Phaedrus. In the Politicus (p. 304 ά), for instance, he speaks of Rhetoric as an art of co-ordinate dignity and importance with the arts of the General and the administrator of justice: and he describes the functions devolving upon the rhetor in a well-ordered commonwealth, in terms which are but the application of a passage in p. 276 ε of the Phaedrus. This passage of the Politicus is interesting in itself, and throws much light not only upon the Phaedrus, but on that very curious feature in Plato's writings, the frequent use of the philosophical mythus. "To what art," it is asked, "are we to assign the office of persuading the vulgar, by a method mythological rather than didactic?" "This function also," says the younger Socrates, "we must appropriate to Rhetoric." To the same effect speaks Phaedrus in this dialogue, where he describes the office of eloquence, as τὸ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ἐν λέγεις πέρι μεθολογεῖν.  

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3 Polit. 304 c.
4 P. 270 b. Compare Phaedrus, τῷ δὲ (φυσά) λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμωσι (προσφέρων) πείθο ἦν ἐν βουλή καὶ ἄρετήν παραδώσειν (p. 270 b). There is an
INTRODUCTION.

These passages, taken in connexion, explain what might otherwise seem obscure; viz. Plato's motive for selecting Love as the theme both of Lysias' speech which he condemns, and of the two counter speeches of Socrates. They at the same time account for the discrepancy, in one point of view real, in another only apparent, between the mode in which Rhetoric is handled in the Gorgias and in the Phaedrus. In the Gorgias the ῥήτωρ and the demagogue are identified, and the Rhetoric which Socrates assails is that of the Agora and the Law Courts. But in the ideal Monarchy which is sketched in the Politicus, as well as in the ideal Aristocracy of the Republic, there is no room for either Pleader or Demagogue. Eloquence is thenceforth to exert her powers in what Plato conceived to be the nobler task of swaying and moulding the affections of the citizens into conformity with the principles of a State founded in righteousness. She was to be the handmaid at once of Philosophy and of Political, or, what in the ancient view was the same thing, of Ethical Science. Πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον ξυνακοπειρά τὰς ἐν τῇ πόλις πράξεις... κεκωρίσται πολιτείας τὸ ρήτορικὸν ὡς ἐτερον εἴδος ἐν, ὑπηρέτη μην ταύτη (Pol. I. I.); or, as Aristotle, entirely in the spirit of his master, remarks: "Rhetoric is properly an offshoot of Dialectic, and of the science of morals, which is Politic properly so called."

Now, setting aside political uses, which are not contemplated in the Phaedrus, the Rhetoric of which the Erotic Discourse is an example is precisely that which Plato describes. As its author explains, the discourse commences with a definition framed on dialectical principles. Having determined Love to be a Madness, it proceeds to investigate the varieties of Madness, and singles out that special variety to which Love belongs. It is, therefore, an example of a Rhetoric which is an "offshoot" of Logic or Dialectic; for Dialectic it is which teaches us how to define "per genus et differentiam." It is also a μυθολογία περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἄλλων ὅπν ἄλγες πέρι—"a mythical discourse touching Justice and other topics of Socratic discourse." It relates to Justice; for that virtue, according to the Platonic Socrates, consists in the Due subordination of the lower appetites to the Reason, aided, not thwarted, by the im-

ambiguity in the word μυθολογία, which may bear the general meaning 'fabular,' 'sermonicari.' Heindorf denies that it has any more special meaning in this passage; but I think the context, coupled with the parallel passage in the Politicus, would justify the restricted and more usual meaning. Compare Rep. 377 c.

5 συμβαίνει τὴν ρητορικὴν ὁλον παραφυσὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ψήφα πραγματείας, ἢν δικαίων ἐστι προσαγρεῖσαι πολιτικὰ. Rhet. i. 2, § 7.

6 Pp. 263 d, 265 e.

7 Rhetor sine dialectica nihil firmi doceret potest. Et ο contra Dialecticus sine rhetorica non afficit auditores. Utrumque vero conjungens docet et persuadet. Luther in Epist. ad Gal. c. 5.

VOL. I.
INTRODUCTION.

Pulsive or irascible principle; and this subordination is figured by the charioteer holding well in hand the restive steed, while he gives the rein to his nobler and upward-striving yoke-fellow. It may also be justly said to embrace the other customary topics of Socratic discourse; for we recognize, under but thin disguises, all the peculiarities of the Platonic psychology: the immortality, antecedent and prospective, of the soul, its self-moving or self-determining properties, ("freedom of the Will"), its heavenly extraction, its incarceration in the flesh, and the conditions of its subsequent emancipation; finally, that singular tenet of ἀδιάμετρος which, in the Phædo and elsewhere is insisted on as one of the main props of the doctrine of immortality; and that not less characteristic doctrine of ideas or archetypal forms with which the theory of ἀδιάμετρος is bound up. The speech is, moreover, manifestly psychagogic, to borrow Plato’s term: designed, that is, to sway the Will of the hearer: πλάτει τὸν ψυχήν των μέθον, μᾶλλον ἕ τα σώματα ταῖς χερσίν, as the licensed mythologer is said to do in the Republic (b. ii. 377 c). It is an instance of that species of rhetoric which alone seemed to Plato desirable or salutary: a rhetoric which, mutatis mutandis, answers sufficiently well to our eloquence of the pulpit, as distinguished from the eloquence of the bar, the senate, or the hustings. It is intended to prove, by a living example, that the art which, as ordinarily practised, was a tool in the hands of the designing and ambitious, is capable of being turned by the philosopher to the better purpose of clothing in an attractive dress the results of his more abstruse speculations; and also of stimulating the minds of his disciples, if only by working in them that wonder which, as Plato elsewhere says, and as Aristotle said after him, is the fountain of all philosophy. In one word, the Erotic Discourse may be regarded as a master-piece of its author’s myth-making genius: the exemplary specimen of an art of which he has left us many other instances, but none so brilliant and elaborate.

In one respect, indeed, this discourse may be said to differ from similar philosophical myths which are scattered in the Platonic

8 See Appendix I. p. 164.
9 Hence the decided preference of Isocrates over Lysias (in the debate). Lysias wrote for the oratory, Isocrates for the closet, and bad as the philosophy may have been, there was in his speeches undoubtedly "philosophia quaedam," which is wholly wanting in the business-like speeches of Lysias. It evidently suited Plato’s purpose to speak as civilly of Isocrates as he could, if only by way of depressing the rival λόγοι. Political sympathies may also have had their weight, for Isocrates was an aristocrat and "laudator temporis acti."
1 Compare 277 b, c—a passage which is a description of the ἐρωτικὸς λόγος and the principles on which it was framed. Note esp. the clause, ποικίλα μὲν ποικίλους ψυχὴ καὶ παραρροιάν διὸν λόγου, ἀπλοῦς δὲ ἀκρῆ.
writings; it is, in most of its parts, a deliberate allegory, in which
the thing signified is designed to be intelligible to the instructed
hearer or reader. This is not always nor usually the case with the
Platonic myths, in most of which the sign and the thing signified are
blended and sometimes confused, as in myths properly so-called; so
that it is hard to say how much is (supposed) truth and how much
fable. This distinct allegorical character has led some modern
writers to regard the Erotic Discourse in the light of a mythical
poem to a course of philosophy hereafter to be developed in a
graver and more didactic manner by means of dialogues as yet
unwritten; while other writers, for similar reasons, have treated the
entire dialogue as a composition answering to an inaugural lecture,
published by Plato on the occasion of opening his school in the
Academy after his return from Sicily. The first of these hypotheses
is adopted by Schleiermacher; the second by C. F. Hermann; the
former of whom regards the Phaedrus as a preface to the entire
series of Dialogues; the latter as a preface only to those composed
after the date before mentioned. I am unable to adopt either view.
First, because, as it seems to me, the mythical representations in the
Phaedrus presuppose, on the part of its readers, a certain familiarity
with the cardinal points of the Platonic morals and psychology,
which it was impossible that any circle of Athenian readers could
have possessed at the beginning of Plato's professorial life.
Secondly, because both theories will be found incompatible with
that unity of design which should characterize a work of high liter-
ary art, and which, if we are content to look upon it as a treatise
on Philosophical Rhetoric, does really characterize the Phaedrus.
Thirdly, because, as we have seen, such hints as Plato himself has
voiced as to give us, point in the direction indicated; and Plato's
intimations of his own meaning, even when slight and cursory, and

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2 As instances of this fusion, take the mythic account of a state of retribution
after death at the end of the Gorgias, and that of the migration of souls, &c., in
the tenth book of the Republic, also the splendid description of the process of
Creation in the Timaeus.

3 That the Phaedrus of the dialogue is supposed to be something of a Platonist,
is evident not only from his want of curiosity as to the meaning of the many fine
things said in the Erotic Discourse, but from his familiarity with other Platonic
distinctions, such as that between pure and mixed pleasures (258 x). "It is plea-
ures like these," says Phaedrus, "which alone make life desirable (the pleasures of
hearing and reading discourses), not those which are necessarily preceded by pain
and uneasiness, which is the characteristic of nearly all the pleasures of the body,
on which account the latter are deservedly styled 'slavish.'" The distinction, ex-
pressed in this off-hand manner by Phaedrus, is in the Philebus given as the result
of a careful metaphysical analysis (Phileb. 31 seqq.). The same theory of mixed
pleasures is also implied in the description of the throbbing and pain attendant on
the growth of the wing-sprouts in the Erotic Discourse, p. 251.
still more when, as in this dialogue, quite explicit, are of more value than the theories of his most ingenious expositors.

We may add to these reasons the not unimportant one, that Aristotle seems to have taken a view of this dialogue similar to that which we have adopted. His three books of Rhetoric are, in effect, an expanded Phaedrus. He accepts Plato’s views of the subordinate relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic, and of the necessity of a thorough dialectical training to the future orator. He accepts also the view that he who would work effectively on mankind must first acquaint himself with human nature, with the springs of action and the varieties of character, so as to know by what arguments such and such classes of men are most easily swayed; and he agrees with Plato in condemning as unscientific the τέχνης or Arts of Rhetoric which existed in great numbers in his time. Like Plato too, he regards rhetorical figures and the arts of style (σχέσεως λόγους) which composed the body of the popular treatises, as mere accessories to a philosophical theory of Rhetoric, not as essential or integral parts of the science. His second book is, in great part, but a working out of the three precepts laid down in the Phaedrus.1 “Any one,” says Plato, “who really means to give us an Art of Rhetoric worthy of the name, must first accurately describe the human soul: telling us whether it is one and uniform, or whether it admits of as many varieties as the body. Secondly, he must tell us how the different parts of the soul act, also how they are affected, and by what agencies. Thirdly, he must be able to classify (διακρίνειν) the different kinds of arguments, as well as the different modifications of soul, and the affections of which these are susceptible, and then fit the several arguments to the several mental constitutions, and show why such and such souls are necessarily wrought upon by such and such discourses.” With these three conditions of a τέχνη πραγματοσκοπίων Aristotle faithfully complies. His first book contains a classification (διακρίνειν) of the different πίστεως or modes of producing persuasion; his second embraces (1) a careful analysis of the παθήματα—the affections of which human nature is susceptible, and also of the causes by which such affections are called forth; (2) a descriptive catalogue of the various modifications of human character, and the sort of arguments adapted to each.2

The third part of Rhetoric, the Præcepta bene scribendi, to which

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1 p. 271.
2 Thus the 2nd chapter treats of anger, its causes and the modes of allaying it. The 4th of φλάσα and μῖσος, the 5th of Fear, the 6th of Shame, &c. Again, in the 12th chapter he describes the γῆρα of young men, in the 13th of old ones, in the 14th of persons of middle age: after which he describes the effects upon the character of nobility, wealth, power, &c.
INTRODUCTION.

Socrates allows a certain subordinate value, but which, when severed from dialectic and psychology, he pronounces rank quackery⁶, is altogether evaded in the Phaedrus. Socrates approaches the subject⁷ only to dismiss it with a few characteristic remarks on the greater value of oral, i.e. conversational, as compared with written instruction. These remarks are introduced by a singular mythus, the scene of which is laid in Egypt, the supposed mother-land of written discourse. The moral of the tale is, that the art of writing operates on the memory and intellect rather as a sedative than as a stimulant; that it fosters the conceit of wisdom, δόξος-σοφία, rather than wisdom itself. This, it may be observed, is a view of his own art not likely to be taken up by a young writer; and the passage, so far as it goes, may be used as an argument against the early date of the Phaedrus. It is evidently Plato's object to extol the art of Dialectic at the expense of Rhetoric; and we find in this portion of the dialogue a justification of the oral exercises which, as we learn from other sources, formed part of the teaching of the Academy, and which were ridiculed and disparaged both by the teachers of Rhetoric and the comic poets⁸. Aristotle, however, though, as we have said, he also treats the εὐπαιρία as an accessory rather than an essential part of a systematic Rhetoric, devotes to it a considerable portion of his third book; in which he handles the subject with his usual good sense, and in a manner more entertaining than might have been expected. His estimate of the Sicilian school of rhetors agrees with Plato's; and the third chapter of his third book περὶ ψυχρᾶς λέξεως is filled with instances of their bad taste.

This view of the Phaedrus may offend those who are in the habit of looking upon its theory of Love as one of the most sublime and characteristic mysteries of Platonism. But the question now before us is not the importance of the subject-matter, but the place which the Discourse on Love was designed by its author to fill in the general scheme of the Dialogue, and what is the point of view from which we can contemplate the Phaedrus with satisfaction, as a living and harmonious whole (ζητέω σωστός). Now that Plato himself professed to hold an humbler view of the use of mythical compositions than that which has found favour with later Platonists, we may satisfy ourselves by reference to his own words⁹. "Shall we say," exclaims Socrates, "that the philosopher who possesses clear conceptions of Justice, Beauty, and Goodness, will exhibit less discretion

⁶ 268 a.
⁷ 274 b.
⁸ As particularly by Epictetus ap. Athen. ii. 59 c. Meineke iii., p. 370.
⁹ p. 276 c.
INTRODUCTION.

than the husbandman in disposing of these his precious seeds of truth?" "Surely not," says Phaedrus. S.—"He will not then set himself, by way of a serious occupation, to write his thoughts in water, or be content with sowing them in ink with his pen, in the form of discourses, which are incapable of defending themselves against assailants, or even of conveying a complete idea of the truth." Ph.—"That is most unlikely." S.—"It is so; and it will therefore be by way of pastime that he will sow his seed in such soil, writing, when he writes at all, for the purpose of laying up precious memorials against oblivious age; for himself in case he live to be old, and for all that pursue the same philosophic career. He will look fondly on these tender growths of his genius, and will find in them a choice substitute for the coarser recreations of the vulgar." Ph.—"Such pastime, Socrates, is as noble as those of the multitude are poor and contemptible: happy he who is able thus to amuse himself, who can weave stories (μυθολογία) about Justice and the other matters upon which you discourse!" In this passage we may read Plato's explanation of his own purpose in writing, and of his practice of interweaving subtle dialectical controversy with discourses half playful, half serious, in which philosophical truth is blended with poetic fiction in varying proportions. Literary skill was not the attainment on which Plato most prided himself, or which he most admired in others. He wore it "lightly, like a flower," esteeming poetry and eloquence as dust in the balance when weighed against philosophic insight and dialectical subtlety. The man he was prepared to run after (κατόπιστα μετ’ ἵχνοιν ὄστε θεοῦ) was one who knew how to collect and divide, to elevate common notions into scientific conceptions, to separate genera into their species by strict rules of art, to find the One in the Many and the Many in the One,—in a word, the consummate dialectician.

The original passage of which this is a part is well worthy of consideration. It professes to give us the key to Plato's philosophical method, and more than one of his dialogues may be viewed as a commentary upon it. In the Sophistes and Politicus he has given us elaborate specimens of his art of Division, διαίρεσις, or, as we should call it, Classification, with which in the former dialogue he has interwoven a refutation of the Eleatic or Eristic Logic, which was based on a principle antithetic to his own.

1 Compare Timaeus 59 d, where he speaks of the unrepeinted pleasure (ἀμέτα-μέλησον ἥδον) afforded by speculating on physics, in accordance with τὴν τῶν ἐν οἴνοις μεθ᾽ ἰδέας. This will be a philosopher's recreation (παρὰ μέτριος καὶ φιλόσοφοι), in the intervals of his dialectical exercises.

2 p. 266 n.
INTRODUCTION.

PART II.

ON THE PROBABLE DATE OF THE PHAEDRUS.

The notion that the Phaedrus was the earliest of Plato's philosophical productions rests mainly, if not entirely, so far as external evidence is concerned, upon a passage of Diogenes Laertius, who lived in the third, and one of Olympiodorus, who lectured on Plato and his philosophy in the sixth century after Christ. The passage of Diogenes occurs in the twenty-fifth chapter of his life of Plato (b. iii. § 38), a chapter containing six or seven unconnected notices of more or less interest, but of which two at least are demonstrably erroneous. After speaking of the tradition that the books of the Laws were left by Plato at his death ἐν κηρῷ, i.e. written on wax tablets, and that his scholar Philippus of Opus, the reputed author of the Epinomis, first wrote them out fair, Diogenes proceeds as follows: Εὑφορίων δὲ καὶ Παναίτιος εἰρήκασι, πολλάκις ἑτραμμένην εὑρήσθαί τιν ν ἄρχην τῆς πολιτείας, ἢν πολιτείαν Ἀριστοτέλος φησὶ πάσαιν σχέδιον ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόροις γεγράθαι ἀντίλογοι. λόγοι δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαίδρον καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μειρακίδες τι τὸ πρόβλημα. Δικαίωσις δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς γραφής διὸν ἐπιμείβεται ὡς Φορτικὸν. "Euphorion and Panaetius have stated that the opening sentence of the Republic was found with

3 The following chronological table will assist the reader:—

Plato was born B.C. 427 or 429.
— became acquainted with Socrates 407 or 409 an. ret. 20.
— left Athens mortuo Socrate 399 — 28 or 30.
— said to have returned thither 395 — 32 or 34.
— began to teach in the Academy 386 perch. — 40 or 42.

4 Aristotle is made to say that the diction of Plato is intermediate between that of prose and poetry; evidently a misrepresentation of Rhet. iii. 7. 11, where the philosopher speaks only of the Phaedrus, in which he says that this style was adopted ironically (μετ' εἰρήναις). He is also represented as having been the only one of Plato's audience who had patience to hear to the end the dialogue περὶ ψυχῆς, i.e. the Phaedo. The genuine tradition on which this preposterous story is founded is well known and sufficiently probable. It was an oral discourse περὶ τέχνης, not the reading of the Phaedo, which thinned the philosophic circle.

5 Vulg. λόγος, corrected by Cobet in his ed. of D. L.

6 Of the authorities here quoted

- Aristoxenus was a disciple of Aristotle, flor. circ. 320 B.C.
- Dicaearchus do. do. — 326—287
- Euphorion a poet and historiographer — 240
- born 274, d. 221

Panaetius flor. circ. 143

The last is called "gravissimus Stoicorum," Cie. de Off. ii. 14. 51. He was a Platonizing Stoic however—"Semper in ore habuit Platonem," de Fin. iv. 28. 79; "dissentit in nonnullis a Platonico suo," Tusc. i. 32. 69, e.g. with reference to the Immortality of the Soul.
INTRODUCTION.

the words written several times over, and each time in a different order, which Republic, Aristoxenus says, was almost entirely contained in the Antilogica of Protagoras; there is also a report that the first dialogue he (Plato) wrote was the Phaedrus: for indeed the subject of that dialogue is one which a very young man would naturally choose. But Diocarchus censures the style of the entire dialogue, which he thinks in bad taste. In this passage Diogenes agrees perfectly with the statement of Olympiodorus, who says in his life of Plato, τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦτον πρῶτον γράφαντος διάλογον, ὃς λέγεται. In other words, the belief that Plato wrote the Phaedrus first was a common rumour, founded on the juvenile character of its πρόβλημα—its theme, or subject proposed for discussion,—which those who accept the tradition suppose to be Love. Others think that the story was borrowed from Diocarchus, in which case it is conceivable that the “report” was an inference founded on his impression of the dialogue, which he deemed unworthy of an adult Plato. And this seems to be Schleiermacher’s view, which is not on the whole improbable. However this may be, the rumour was unknown to Cicero, who was familiar with the writings both of Aristoxenus and Diocarchus, especially with the latter, whom he repeatedly quotes. In the Orator, c. xiii. 41, occurs the following passage: “Isocrates videtur testimonio Platonis aliorum judicia debere contemnere. Est enim (ut scis) quasi in extrema pagina Phaedri his ipsis verbis loquens Socrates: ‘Adolescens etiam nunc, o Phaedre, Isocrates est: sed quid de illo augurer libet dicere. Quid tandem inquit ille. Majore mihi ingenio videtur esse quam ut cum orationibus Lysiae comparetur. * * * * Inest enim natura philosophia in hujus viri mente quaedam.’ Haec de adolescente Socrates auguratur. At ea de seniore scribit Plato, et scribit aequalis, et quidem, exagitator omnium rhetoricorum, hunc miratur unum.”

We are compelled to infer from this passage that Cicero conceived the Phaedrus to have been written when Isocrates had reached at least his full maturity (senior); in other words, long after the time at which the conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus is feigned to have taken place. Plato himself was but six years the junior of Isocrates, and, therefore, could not have been a young man at a time

7 φορτικὸς seems to mean ‘inflated,’ ‘turgid,’ ‘overdone,’ ‘pompous.’ φορτικὸς καὶ ἵπποργας occur together in Dion. Hal.
8 Perhaps because Aristotle says, ὃς οἱ νέοι ἄρωτοι. Krieche über Platonis Phædrus, p. 5. But the καί οἱ ραθμοὶ ἔρως seems to have been confined to grown-up men.
9 It is also the view of Cobet, who punctuates accordingly in his ed. of Diogenes.
1 Phaedr. p. 279 a.
INTRODUCTION.

when Isocrates would be justly described as "senior," a term which a Roman would not have applied to any one much under fifty years of age. At any rate, Cicero supposes a considerable interval to have elapsed between the imagined conversation and the actual composition of the Phaedrus; but the interval must have been very short, if the dialogue was written in Plato's youth. Of the accuracy of Cicero's statement I give no opinion; but I think we may fairly allow it to counterweigh that of Dicearchus, or Aristozenus, or whoever may have been Diogenes's authority for the story he has handed down.

If now we consider the internal evidence of the dialogue, we shall find that (with an exception hereafter to be mentioned ¹) it favours the later rather than the earlier date. We have already seen that the Phaedrus lays down the theory of a dialectical method, of which the Sophistes and Politicus contain elaborate examples. These dialogues profess to be a continuation of the Theaetetus, which we know from internal evidence to have been written at least six years after the death of Socrates; and the entire trilogy may have taken up some years in its composition ². The dialogue which, in another part of its contents, the Phaedrus most resembles, is the Symposium, and this is known, from internal but conclusive indications, to have been a somewhat late work ³. The similar vein of Erotic speculation in these two dialogues indisposes us to separate them by any long interval of time. Whether we consider the topics handled or its general construction, the Phaedrus seems to class itself naturally with the Theaetetus ⁴, the Phaedo, the Symposium, and other considerable dialogues which occupied Plato's pen during the maturity of his manhood. Its place with reference to the Republic we cannot venture to fix; though, as the doctrine of the threefold division of the Soul, and the functions of the so-called irascible principle in the mental economy are clearly figured in the Erotic allegory, it seems highly probable that the Phaedrus was written at any rate after Plato's views on this subject had become known in philosophic circles.

Those, on the other hand, who hold to the tradition of the early date of the Phaedrus, have to explain the fact, that it is far superior as an effort of literary skill to the Lysis, the Laches, the Charmides, and even the Protagoras; which they as well as their opponents consider to have been written during the life of Socrates.

² See Appendix II.
³ It probably did so. The Politicus is written in a "later manner" than the Theaetetus.
⁴ See inter alia Stallbaum's Prolegomena ad Symp.
⁵ If I may venture on a guess, I should put it after the Theaetetus, and before the other two.
They have also to explain how it is that in these dialogues Plato touches upon none of the topics which are handled in the Phaedrus, and which must have employed the mind of its author for some considerable time at least before he gave the result of his speculations to the world. The Lysis is a conversation on Friendship; the Laches, a treatise on Valour; but of both these the positive results are meagre, and the doctrines by no means characteristically Platonic, but rather such as Xenophon or any other follower of Socrates might have gleaned from the teaching of his master. In the Charmides, which is an advance upon the Lysis and Laches in point of composition, notions are put forward which are incompatible with Plato's later opinions—the virtue of σωφροσύνη, for instance, is handled in a manner far from satisfactory; and even the Protagoras, though the most perfect specimen of his early manner, conducts us to none but negative results. It leaves us dissatisfied with the Socratic theory of Virtue, but neither substituting a better, nor indicates in what direction we are to look for it. In maintaining therefore the early date assigned to the Phaedrus by tradition we should be driven to suppose that Plato in his first published work had presented the world with ideas and speculations which he afterwards allowed to slumber for some twenty years; vouchsafing no explanation of allegories which are quite intelligible to us, but which must have seemed mere enigmas to those to whom his leading doctrines were unknown.

In this attempt to fix approximately the date of the Phaedrus, no account has been taken of the Pythagorean matter which is found in the Erotic Discourse. Stallbaum and others have built much on this; for it is a well-known tradition that Plato owed the Pythagorean elements which enter into his scheme of philosophy, to his intercourse with the members of Pythagorean brotherhoods resident in Sicily and lower Italy; countries which he did not visit until some time after the death of Socrates. The argument hence derived is not without its weight, though it has been pressed somewhat too far by Stallbaum. It is, however, highly probable that the fondness for myth and allegory which appears nowhere in the purely Socratic—that is, as I venture to call them, the early—dialogues, but which eminently distinguishes those acknowledged to be later, was a taste which Plato derived from this ingenious and fantastic school. The cosmical speculations which are implied in the Erotic mythus

6 Cic. de Repub. i. 10. 16. De Fium. v. 29, 87.
7 The apologue put in the mouth of Protagoras is only a seeming exception; for no one can fail to perceive that it is a composition altogether different both in form and spirit from the true Platonic mythus.
are of Pythagorean origin, though in many of the details Plato seems to have introduced considerable variations.

Arguments have also been drawn from the notices of Lysias scattered in this dialogue, compared with what we know from other sources of the biography of that Orator. We should infer from four passages in the dialogue, that the reputation of Lysias as a λογογράφος had reached its highest point when the Phaedrus was written. He is styled “the ablest living writer,” and appears to have been envied and decried in consequence. One of the public characters of the day having occasion to abuse him, had called him, says Phaedrus, λογογράφος. The word properly denoted one who composed for pay speeches to be delivered by others, particularly by plaintiffs or defendants in the law courts. Antiphon, of whom we read in the eighth book of Thucydides, was the first who adopted this practice, and it is well known that all the extant speeches of Lysias, save one, were composed to be spoken by others. There is no doubt that some discredit attached to this profession of a λογογράφος, at least sufficient to deter a man of wealth and good connections from engaging in it. Now it is well known that Lysias, though a ‘metec,’ was a member of a wealthy family. At the age of fifteen (b.c. 443) he had left Athens for Thurii, where he settled as a κηροτέχνης, and resided in affluence until the year 411. In that year he was driven out by the oligarchal or Lacedaemonian party, which had been strengthened by the disastrous ending of the Sicilian expedition. He returned direct to Athens, where his father Cephalus resided. There, as we learn from the opening page of the Republic, he made the acquaintance of Socrates and his friends, though he was not one of the Socratic circle, as his brother Polemarchus seems to have been. Living in affluence, as a member of a wealthy house, it is not likely that he would practise either as a teacher of rhetoric or as a writer of speeches, during the first years of his sojourn in Athens after his return. A man of literary tastes we may suppose him to have been, for we are told that, during his abode at Thurii, he had studied rhetoric under the Sicilian professor Tisias. He may, therefore, have written as an amateur (ὡς ἱδρυτης); but that alone would not have justified Plato in calling him δεινότατος τῶν μον γράφεων, still less in making him the prominent figure in an

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8 Δυσίας δεινότατος δυ τῶν μον γράφεων (Phaedr. init. 228 λ). Δυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα παῖς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἔτι φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ἀσπερ ὁ ἀδελφός αὐτοῦ Πολεμαρχος τέτραπεταῖς, γράφων (257 ψ). Δυσίαν τις τῶν πολιτικῶν ἑλοιδόριος, καὶ ἐνέδωκε λογογράφον (ib. c). εἶτε Δυσίας εἶτε τις ἄλλος τάπανος' ἐγραφεῖν δ' γράφειν ἠ δημοσίαν κέντως τιθέναι, σύγγραμμα πολιτικῶν γράφων (277 ψ.).
9 He was feared, says Thucydides, θὰ δέξαν δεινότητος. Compare Plato's δεινότατος τῶν μον γράφεων.
11 Grote, H. G. x. 530.
INTRODUCTION.

important dialogue like the Phaedrus. During the domination of the Thirty (A.C. 404) a change came over his fortunes. He was despoiled by them of a large portion of his property, of which however he retained enough to enable him to contribute nobly in aid of Thrasybulus and the exiles. It was after their return that he appeared for the first time in an Athenian court of justice. In the oration against Eratosthenes, spoken 403, he expresses great diffidence in his own powers, being, as he tells us, a novice in public business and public speaking, and he denies that either he or his father Cephalus had ever brought or defended an action. The speech is one of his best; and this leads to the conclusion that he had cultivated his talent of public speaking during his long residence at Thurii, where he appears to have been a considerable personage. But of his written speeches this against Eratosthenes appears to be the earliest. "Quorum aetatem eruere possumus eae omnes post XXXviratum conficiembantur," says his biographer Taylor. As Lysias was deprived of the rights of citizenship shortly after he had acquired them, he was prevented from mounting the bema or appearing in the law courts: hence he devoted himself to the composition of speeches for others, as the only means he had left of retrieving his fortunes. His fame as a Logographus was therefore acquired late in life; for he was fifty-five years of age at the trial of Eratosthenes, and fifty-nine at the trial of Socrates in 399. He worked at this profession during the last twenty-five years of his life, and died at the age of eighty (B.C. 378).

These data are more consistent with the late than the early composition of this dialogue: at any rate, they seem to prove that Plato did not write the Phaedrus while still a stripling (μειράκεων), or about B.C. 406, when he was twenty years old; for at that date Lysias had not begun to employ himself as a Logographus, and could still less have risen to the head of that profession.

2 §§ 3, 4, Bekk.
3 The oration pro Polystrate was delivered in Oly. xcii. 4. B.C. 409. But its authenticity is denied. Comp. c. Eratosth. § 3, ου' ἐμανοῦ τῷ πάποι αἰτεὶ άλλ' άτρικα πράγματα ἐπὶ ἄραγισμαι... καταγγείλειν.
4 Plato opened the Academy B.C. 388 or 386.
5 We must therefore understand Plato's epithet δεινότατοι τῶν εὐν γράφειν, as put in the mouth of Socrates, to be a πρόληψις—a liberty of which he would not have scrupled to avail himself in composing a dialogue the time of which was placed so far back as that of the Phaedrus must have been. To explain away the anachronisms of Plato, is a favourite amusement of his commentators—a task πολλης σχετική δεδομένης—and we may add, οὐ πάνεν εὔνεισιν ἀνθρώποι.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΪΔΡΟΣ.
ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.
ΦΑΙ. Ναι, παρ' Ἑπικράτει, ἐν τῇ δή τῇ πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίᾳ τῇ Μοροχίᾳ.
ΣΩ. Τις οὖν δή ᾗ ἡ διατριβή; ἡ δήλον ὦτι τῶν λόγων ὡμᾶς Δυσίας εἰσίστα.
ΦΑΙ. Πεύχει, εἰ σοι σχολή προϊόντει ἀκούειν.
ΣΩ. Τι δη; οὐκ ἂν οἶει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πράγμα ποιήσασθαι τό σήν τε καὶ Δυσίαν διατριβὴν ἀκούσα; ΦΑΙ. Πρόσαγε δή.
ΣΩ. Δένοις άν.
ΦΑΙ. Καλ μήν, δε Σώκρατες, προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή. ὃ γάρ τοῦ λόγου ἦν, περὶ οὖν διετρίβομεν, οὐκ οἷον ὄντων τρόπον ἐρωτικός. γέγραφες γάρ δῆ ὁ Δυσίας πειραμένον τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ' ἐραστοῦ δέ, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ δή τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψεται. λέγει γάρ ὄς χαριστέον μη ἐρωτεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ ἔρωτε.
ΣΩ. Οὐ γενναίον, εἴθε γράψεις ὡς χρῆ πένης μᾶλλον ἡ πλούσιος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἡ νεωτέρῳ, καὶ οὗτος ἄλλοι ἐμοί τε πρόοσεται καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἀν ἀστειώ καὶ δὴνοφελείς εἶλεν οἱ λόγοι. ἢγων' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιστεθήσῃ ἀκούσα, ὡστ' εἶναι βαδίζων ποιή τοῦ περίπατον Μεγαράδε, καὶ κατὰ Ἡρώδικον προσβάς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπίστη, οὗ μή σου ἀπολείψθω.
ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, δε βέλτιστε Σώκρατες; οἴει με, ἂ Δυσίας | ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν συνεθείκε, δεινότατοι 228 τοῖς ἄν τῶν ἐν γράφεις, ταύτα ἑιδώτων ὄντα ἀπομη-

μοεύσεις ἀξίων ἐκείου; πολλοῦ γε δέω. καὶ τοῖς ἑβουλο-

μην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

have succeeded to the 'Morychian man-

sion,' possibly on the death of its former

occupant. Hence the point of Socrates's

question, ἣ δεῖν δι τῶν λόγων ὡμᾶς

Δυσίας εἰσίστα. The character of the

entertainments had changed with the

change of possessors.

κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The entire passage is
to be found Isthm. i. 1, Μάτερ ἐμά, το κτός, χρύσαις ὁδήμα, Πρύγα καὶ ασχο-

λίας ὑπέρτερον θάνατοι.

D. ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἀστείον ʾwould indeed

be charming and a boon to the public.'

Inf. 242 B, ἢ εὔβεβεία αὐτῶν πάνω ἄστεια,

'quite refreshing.' Stallbaum's idea of

a double meaning is gratuitous.

'Ἡρόδικον' Sch. ιστράτη ἦν καὶ τὰ γυμ-

νάσια ἔχω τείχους ἐποίητο, ἢρχόμενος ἀπὸ

τῶν διαστήματος ὥς μακροῦ ἄλλα συμ-

μέτρου, ἐχρι τοῦ τείχους, καὶ ἀναστρέφων.

In Protag. 316 D he is styled ὁ Σήλυμ-

βριανής, τοῦ θέρειν Μεγαρών, and his
mode of treatment is satirically characterized in Rep. iii. 438 a. There was also an Herodamus of Leontini, a brother of Gorgias, a physician, like his namesake in the text. Gorg. 448 n.

228. ἂν γὰρ—εἰ δὲ ἢδα] ἂν γὰρ are here equivalent to ἄλλα ἐτέλεσθε, as in Eur. Phoen. 1307, ἂν γὰρ ἔρρησεν ὁ λατρεύων τὸν διὸ τὸ διάγνωσμα συνεχεῖται, τὸν δὲ τὸν παρεστάτη τὸν ἔγνωσε. and in other passages quoted by Elmsley on Herod. 481. The ἐπαναλαβθένων which follows is an instance of a principle used adverbially: ‘repeatedly,’ ‘over and over again,’ as teleutov is presently used for eis tēn.


ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ I have adopted the suggestion of Stephanus, notwithstanding Stallb.'s defence of the vulg. τῷ, for οὕτως (see above). His explanation of the repeated ἀλλα is ingenious and probably right. ἐδώ, ἐδώ! may be supposed to have been the inward ejaculation of Phaedrus on meeting one who 'shared his enthusiasm' for literature. At any rate this is better than to suppose with Steph. that Plato wrote ἐδώ μὲν ὅταν, which is frigid in the extreme. Synesius, Encom. Calv., ἐδώ γὰρ ἐδώ εἰσών: p. 56, ed. Turneb.

c. ἐθρήσκητα] Comp. Xen. Symp. viii. 4, καὶ θαυμάζῳ ἐπισκόπαθεν ὃς ἦν ὁρμήσατος, εἰς ἡν ὑπάτῳ μνεῖν εἰς τῷ παρόν: ἐβλησάντες ἦν τῷ γὰρ ἄρτῳ, ἦλα πρᾶσμα: and transl. 'he coyly hung back,' like a prudish beauty. Slightly different is the meaning of διαθρήσκω in Theocr. xvi. 99, Φυλετιά μεν ἔκ, σαφὲς εἶδος, καλὸν, διαθρήσκων ἦδα.

ὁ ὁδὸς] ‘entreat him therefore yourself to do at once that which he will presently do whether or not.’

ὅκω] For ὅκως, as Rep. 567 ὅ quoted by Heind.
ΦΑΙ. Οὐτωσὶ τοῖνοι ποίησεν τῶν ἀντι γάρ, ὡς Σῶ- δρατεῖς, παντὸς μᾶλλον τὰ γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχεδόν ἀπάντων, οἷς ἐβή διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μυ, ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἐφεξής διέμει, ἀρέσκεις ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.

ΣΩ. Δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὡς φιλότης, τί ἀρα ἐν τῇ ἀριστερά ἔχεις ὑπὸ τὸ ἐματίω. τοπαζώ γὰρ σε ἔχεω τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἔστων, οὐτωσὶ διανοοῦ πρὶ ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ σε πάνω μὲν φιλῶ, παράνοις δὲ καὶ λυσίων ἐμαυτῶν σοι ἐμελετεῖν παρέχεων οὐ πάνυ δεδοκαται. ἀλλ' Ε ἰδί, δείκνυ.

ΦΑΙ. Παιε. ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἔλπιδος, ὡς Σῶκρατεῖς, ἢν εἴχον ἐν σοὶ ὡς ἐγγυμμασώμενος. ἀλλ' ποῦ δὴ βούλεις καθιζόμενοι ἀναγωγέων;

ΣΩ. Δεῦρ ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τῶν Ἰλισσόν ἱμαίες, 229 εἶτα ὅπου ἄν δοξή ἐν ἡγυγίᾳ καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙ. Εἰς καρόν, ὡς εἶδες, ἀνυπόδητος ὃν ἔτυχον ὑπὲρ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἀεὶ. ῥάστην οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἱέναι, καὶ ὡς ἁρδές, ἀλλ' τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ἀραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἱμέρας.

D. διαφέρειν—[?] Comp. Rep. ν. 455 c, τάστα τὸ τῶν ἀνθρών γένους διαφορέσσας ἔχει ἃ τῶν γυναικῶν. So with other quasi-comparatives, as ἐναντίων, ἐμπολικοῦ, and the like. See Madvig, Gr. Gr. § 91.

Δείξας—[ἀντίθ.:] 'yes, but first let me see what you are holding in your left hand beneath your cloak; I strongly suspect it is the very speech in question.' Hirschig alters πρώτον into πρῶτον, following Hermès, but comp. Rep. 398 ο, δὲν μὴν γα πρῶτον τί λέγεις. Phaedras held the volume in his left hand, employing his right in holding together the folds of the himation which were flung over his left shoulder (διαβαλόμενος ἐπι- δέξια διεύθησα, according to the phrase in Thracet. 175 ε).

ἐμαυτῶ—δεδακταί] 'I have no intention of hearing you rehearse your lesson.' —ἐμελετόντας ὂν— to practise upon or at the expense of another. Theocr. iii. 36, ἐκεῖ τὸ μει ἐνδιαθετητέντων.

Ε. δείκνυ] V. δείκνυ. I have followed Hirsch, in restoring the Attic form, though with some hesitation. The Hellenic δείκνυ is used by Alex, a poet of the middle comedy and Plato’s contemporary. Hence Cobet goes too far in saying that these forms “sub Memm- dri etatem propullularunt.” Vr. Lectt. p. 317.

ΣΩ. Πρόσεγγε δή, καὶ σκόπει ἁμα ὅπου καθιζομέθα.

ΦΑΙ. Ὠρᾶς οὖν ἐκείνη τῆς ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον;

ΣΩ. Τί μὴν;

Β ΦΑΙ. Ἐκεῖ σκιά τε ἐστὶ καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον, καὶ πόσα καθίζομεθα η, ἃν Βουλώμεθα, κατακλιθήσας.

ΣΩ. Προάγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙ. Εἰπὲ μοι, ὡς Ὀκράτας, οὐκ ἐνθέγας μέντοι πολεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τῆς Ὀρείθνιαν ἀρπάσαι;

ΣΩ. Λέγεται γάρ.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐνθέγας; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτα φαίνεται, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραι παῖζειν παρ’ αὐτά.

Ο ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν ὅσον δόει· η τρία στάδια, ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀγρας διαβαίνομεν καὶ ποῦ τίς ἐστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πάντων νεώτηκα· ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὡς Ὀκ- ρατας’ οὗ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθω ἀληθές εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀπιστοτὴν, ὡστερ οἱ συνοι, οὐκ ἂν ἀτόπος εἶν; εἶτα σοφιζόμενας φαίνει ἀπὸ τῆς πνεύμα Βο- ρέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σῶν Φαρμακεία παιξομαιν διάκαιον διαλέγας ἑνζεις, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσαις λεγοῦν δι’ τοῦ Βο- ρέου ἀνάρπαστοι γεγονόντα. ἢ εὖ Ἀρείου πάγου λέγεται

Β. κατακλιθήματι] So the Codd., κατα- κλιθήματι being the only form allowed by the stricter Atticists. See Cobet, N. Lect. p. 240.

c. διαβαίνομεν] Perhaps διαβάλομεν. They are ascending the stream, which they probably crossed near the temple of Agra or Artemis Agrotera. Comp. the reply of Phaedr., ὁδ πάνω νεώτηκα.

δοστερ οἱ συνοι] There is much of this rationalizing vein in Euripides, derived perhaps from his contemporary Metrodorus, a friend and disciple of Anaxagoras, who had himself expressed an opinion that Homer’s poetry was in a great measure allegorical. This view was carried by Metrodorus to extravagant lengths; he explained, for instance, Zeus, Hera, and Pallas as symbols of certain “physical substances or elemental arrangements” (φύσεως ὑποστά- σεις καὶ στοιχείων διακοσμήσεις). Diog. Laert. B. ii. c. 3, § 11. This he did, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ὀμήρου—οἱ, a book in which λαος εὐθὺς διελεκτρά, πάντα εἰς ἀλληγορίας μετάγας. It is probable that the sarcastic epithets in the text, λαος θεων, κ.τ.λ., refer either to this author, or to some imitator who made the Attic myths his specialty. The explanation of the fable of Boreas is evidently a tempting cue to a rationalist of this school.

ὅ ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου—ἡπράσθυν] This clause is not noticed by Hermas in his paraphrase, and seems to Heindorf misplaced. Ast defends it on the ground that Plato meant to ridicule the arbitrary cha-
γάρ αὖ καὶ οὕτως ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐνθείδε ἡπάσθη. ἔγω δὲ, ὦ Παϊδρέ, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαριέντα ἠγοῦμαι, λιν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάντων εὐνυχοῦς ἀνδρὸς, καὶ ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν, ότι δ’ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἰπποκενταύρων εἴδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὕτης τὸ τῆς Χιμαιρᾶς, καὶ ἐπιρρῆ δὲ ὅχλος τοιούτων Γοργώνων καὶ Πηγάσων, καὶ ἄλλων ἄμηχάνων πλῆθε τε καὶ ἀποτικα τερατολόγων των ψυκῶν ἐνδογοντος Εὐσέβειας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἐκαστον, ὡς ἀγροίκων τινὶ σοφία χρώμενον, πολλῆς αὐτῶ σχολῆς δεσπε. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ σχολῆ. τὸ δ’ ἀὕτω, ὦ Φίλε, τοῦτο τόδε. οὐ δύναμαι τω κατὰ τὸ Ἀλκιβίδην γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτῶν γελοῦν δὴ μοι φαίνεται. τοῦτο 230 ἐτί ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. οἶδεν δὴ χαίρειν ἑάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομίζομεν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἄλλα ἐμαυτῶν, εἰτε τι

tions. This however is no interpretation, but another version of the myth. The words seem to me to be Plato’s, whatever his object in introducing them; and I cannot think with Heind, that they would stand better after the speech of Phaedrus (Πλ.). supra) beginning Εἰπὲ μοι, ἐπαρθενεῖα. The office of the mythologer is humorously said to be to ‘rectify,’ or ‘integrate’ by restoring to their proper shape the monsters he has to do with. In the seq. I have preferred the dat. sing. to the vulg. πλῆθυ τε καὶ ἀποτικα, which stand in most MSS. The change is in reality no change as regards the letters, and relieves the otherwise cumbrous sentence. πλῆθυ ἀποτικα occurs Thesæt. 194 A.; Tim. 30 ν. τὸ προσβιβάζων κατὰ τὸ ἐδώς to force into agreement with probability, προσβιβάζω being of course fut. ἅγγισθαι σοφία seems to mean an untutored, ill-regulated ingenuity, like that of certain modern interpreters of prophecy, hieroglyphics, Sarmatic inscriptions, &c. &c. οὐ δύναμαι τι] “Pour les sages de l’antiquité le γραβη σεαντων n’était guère qu’une maxime morale, une règle de conduite, un moyen de fonder et d’en-tretenir dans l’âme la justice et la tempérance. ce n’était pas une méthode dans l’acceptation philosophique du mot. Ce n’est que dans les temps modernes que le ‘Connaiss toi toi-même’ a été compris dans toute la portée de sa signification à la fois speculative et pratique.” C. Waddington, Essais de Logique, p. 310. This remark goes a little too far; for it can hardly be said that the author of the Theaetetus and the Republic was unaware of the speculative importance of a scientific psychology. The self-knowledge of Socrates consisted in the rigorous examination of the notions of his own mind rather than of its operations and faculties, and chiefly of those notions which relate to moral distinctions; ‘primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis . . . aevos, vitam communem adduxit.” Cic. Acad. i. 4. 15. 230. πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομίζομεν] “acquiescing in the popular belief; or, as Bp. Thirlwall suggests, “complying with the common usage about them.” Theologians have pointed to this passage as false and jejune; while others have gravely applauded it, as implying a pious preference of authority to reason in religious matters. So true is it “que le sens commun n’est pas chose si commune qu’on le pense.” The mythical matter in question is harmless; hence there is no inconsistency between this passage and those in the Republic and
elsewhere in which immoral myths are condemned.

With this compare Repub. i. 588 c, where the lower part of man's nature is compared to a "motley and many-headed monster, some of whose heads resemble those of tame, others those of wild creatures." Aesch. Prom. 358, ἐκατογιγάδραυν πρὸς βλαιο-

In 660 BC, Plato's etymologizing vein breaks out here for the first time in the dialogue. As ἐπιτρόπως means inflamed, 'burning with pride or passion' (A. v. 222, ὅπως ἐν ἄλλη ἐπιτρόπῳ ἀληθῶς μοῦ, ὅ ἐπιτρόπος denotes modestly, unassuming simplicity, as in Plut. Mor. i. 43 b, οἰκίσας καὶ ἀλαζονίας ἀπο-

Menander also uses the subst. ἀτυφία, explained by a grammian as = ταπεινο-

μεταξὺ τῶν πόλεως "Gallorum a pro-

Illustrates the formula from Lucian, with whom ἀποτρέπων is frequent. Dial. Mor. in. 912, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ πόλεως τῶν εἰκῶν ὅλης τελευτήσεις ἰδεῖν;

Called κατάγωγον 259 a. Both words are explained by the Greek Lexicographers in the same terms, κατάγωγος, παραξενεύς, ἀναξένης. Herod. i. 181, ἀπόστασις καταγωγής των ἔθεων ἀναποστήμων.

The spot in question is easily discovered by the visitor at the present day; there is indeed but one place answering the conditions, and it answers them perfectly. On the left side, as one ascends the stream, the steep but not high banks retire and form an oval recess girt by rocks, in which are still visible certain small square niches, where doubtless stood the θύατρον, little images of Pan and the Nymphs, like those which adorned one face of the rock of the Acropolis. The area thus enclosed is crossed by a thread of water issuing from a now nearly choked source (the πηγή of the text). A tree of by no means ample dimensions grows there. It is, if I mistake not, the only tree in the neighbourhood; and though the green turf has disappeared from the 'gentle slope,' the rocks still yield a grateful shelter from the sun. The Ilissus, in May 1856, contained quite sufficient water to 'wet the feet' of the pedestrian; in fact in this part of its course it was nowhere quite dry, though the season had been one of unusual drought. Its rills (ἐλάττα) still answered to the description in the text: they were χαρέτες καὶ καθάρα καὶ διαφάνες, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραι πολλὲς παρ' αὐτά (sup. 220 b), Col. Leake, who does not notice this precise spot, remarks that "the most popular part of the worship of the terrane gods was that of Pan and the Nymphs, who presided over rivers, fountains, and caverns, and appear to have had many sanctuaries on the banks of the Ilissus." Athens i. p. 463. A temple of the Muse Ilissae stood some half mile lower down the stream. The plane (re-

represented now by a sorry poplar) seems to have disappeared in Cicero's time; as I understand him, he doubts its ever having existed; "nulli videtur non tam ipsa aqua quam describatur quam Platonicus oratione crevisse:" de Ort. i. § 28. This, one hopes, was an unreasonable sally of Academic scepticism; for no tree was more prized by the Athenians than the plane, which was planted even in the Agora, and magnificent specimens of which are still found in other parts of Greece, though the tree has ceased to exist in the neighbourhood of modern Athens. It usually grows near fountains and at river-heads, the huge roots being often laid bare by the gushing water which seems to issue from them, καὶ ὧν πληκτὸν θέον μὲν
πλάτανος αὐτῇ μᾶλ` ἀμφιλαφηθς τε καὶ ψηφήλη, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ψῆς καὶ τὸ σώσικνόν πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἄκμην ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τοῦ τόπων. ἦ τε ἀδ πηγὴ χαριετάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου μεθα ἄνθρωπον ὑδατος, ὡς ἂ τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήριασαν. Νιμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχελώου ἵππον ἀπὸ τῶν κορών τε καὶ

ἐγραυν ἔθηρ. The epithet ἀμφιλαφή of Cicero I. 1.

τοῦ τε ἄγνου τῷ ὕψῳ τοῦ τε ἄγνου διὰ τὸ δ. κ.τ.λ., quoting this passage. He cites two lines of a comic poet (Chionides):

καὶ μην μα τὸν Δίδ οὐδέν εἰτε γε μοι δοκέ

ἄγνου διαφέρειν ἐν χαράδρα πυκνότατος.

On which Meineke observes: "Recte ἐν χαράδρα. Dioscor. I. 136: ἄγνοι ἦ λάχνοι παρά παραμοίῳ παρέχουν ταῖς πόδις καὶ χαράδρας φύωμεν, The agnum castus or vites is usually described as a φοτόν, not a δέινδρον. But Pliny distinguishes two kinds. "Major in arborēm salicis modo assurūt." "Non multum a salice . . . distat vites, follorum quoque aspecto, nisi odor, gratior esse. Prima album forem mittit cum purpureum, quae et candida vocatur: nigra quae tantum purpureum. Nasenbur in palustribus campis. "Graeci lygon vocant, alii agnó, aliam mammatum Theosphoros Atheniensium castitatem custodientes his fallus, alii sterno. . . . Ν. H. xxiv. 38. The plant would thus seem to owe its reputation to a false etymology. καὶ ὧν ἀκμήν—ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον] Commentators are at issue about the force of ὧς in each clause. The second ὧς, it is agreed, must be understood in the sense of 'quomodo,' as preceding παρέχου ἄν, a potential, not a conjunctive. The first ὧς is regarded by Stahl, as exclamatory, by Ast as relative. The former translates thus: "et unde est, erubescit in the scholastic Blüthe in einer Weise, wer er den Ort im höchsten Grade mit Wohlgeruch zu erfüllen vermöge" Ast, on the contrary, has the following: "Verba ita sunt intelligenda: τοῦ τε ἄγνου τῷ ψῆς καὶ τὸ σώσικνόν πάγκαλον καὶ (int. τοῦ πάγκαλον ἄκρων ὥς τι νευτίς πάχαν) ἀκμήν ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης: Germ., and (suppl. gar schon ist auch daffent, dass der höchsten Blüthe steht, dass es den Ort zum wohlduftend.

ston mačē." In the latter case ὧς ἂν παρέχου must = ὡς παρέχου, which is hardly possible. παρέχου ἂν commonly means 'it will make'—'it cannot fail to make'—'it may well make,' and the clause in which it stands seems to form the apodosis to the former. In this there would be no difficulty, if the first ὧς could be understood as causal, or quasi-causal, like the Lat. ut followed by ita. 'And being (or, as it is) at the height of its flowering (ἀκμὴν ἂττ. for ἄτταν), it cannot fail to make the spot the most fragrant imaginable' (ἐν ἐνωδέστατον). On the whole perhaps Stahl's rendering, cumbrous as it seems, and untranslatable as it is, will seem to most persons to give the true construction; though I confess I should be glad to see an analogous instance of an exclamatory followed by a relative ὧς. Heinö's proposed emendations, ὡς ἂν . . . ἂν, ut . . . ita, or, καὶ ὧς ἂν ἀκμήν . . . ὧς . . . seem to me equally inelegant. He however seems to think that the first ὧς may mean ut, and in that case there can be no great harshness in the suppression of the corresponding ita, which is all that is required in my version. Those who are still dissatisfied may if they please consult Ast's gigante note, Comm. p. 242. ὧς γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήριον['judging by the foot'] I dip into it. Most of the copies have ὡς. ye, but ὡς ye is given by one MS. and by Aristaeus in his almost literal citation of the entire passage, Ep. i. 3, p. 8, as quoted by Heinö. Comp. Herod. ii. 135, μεγάλα κεηθαντα χρήιας, ὡς ἂν ἐδο τις ῥοδόν, ἀνὰ ἄν ὧς γε ἂ τριαμενα τοιἀσση στικθῶν: and Rep. v. 475 b, ἐσπαστοίτε κε, ὧς γέ καὶ φιλοτρόποι τιθείαι. Cicero refers to this passage in describing the coldness of a tributary of the river Libris: "Nec enim ullam hoc frigidius illeum aditus . . . ut vix pede tenēre id possint, quod in Phaedro Platonis ficti Socrates." Legg. ii. c. der höchsten Blüthe steht, dass es den Ort zum wohlduftend.

Ἀχελώον] The personification of fresh
ο ἀγαλμάτων ἑοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ' αὖ θαύμαζε, τὸ εὐπνοόν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητόν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδὺν θερμών τε καὶ λε-γυρῶν ὑπηχεῖ τῷ τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψό-τατον τῷ τῆς πόλει, ότι ἐν ἡρέμα προσάντει ἰκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέιτι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὡστε ἁριστά σοι ἑξενάγηται, οἱ φίλη Φαιδρε.

ΦΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ γε, θαυμάσιε, ἀτομώτατος τις φαίνει, ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, δέ λέγεις, ἐξεγονομένω τωι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχω-ρῶ ἐοικας; οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεος οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ' ἔχω τεῖχοις ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξεῖναι.

ΣΩ. Συγγνώμως μοι, οἱ ἁριστε, φιλομαθής γάρ εἰμι. τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὖν μὲ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἔν τῷ ἀστει ἀνθρώπων. οὐ μέν οὖν δοκεῖς μοι τὴν ἐμῆς ἔξοδον τὸ φάρμακον εὑρισκέναι. ὀσπέρ γὰρ

water according to Herms, διὰ γὰρ τοῦ μεγίστου τοῦτον τοῦτον ποταμοῦ δῆλον τοῖς ἐφόροις ὑπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἔσται. So frequently in the poets.

ἀπό τῶν κορών τι καὶ ἐγκυμάσεως] 'to judge by the puppets and the images.' "κάρας Ἀττίκης ἱεραμάτων ἐξ ερικιλλα-νείας, πλαγνεύσας." Ruhmken. ad Tim. L. L. P. γ. κακοπλάθαι. These puppets or dolls (old Eng. babies) were doubtless votive offerings; the ἐγκυμάτων were probably images of marble, like the small Phaon which was brought from a shrine in the rock of the Acrópolis, and now stands in the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge.


ἀπερχεῖται τωι] 'as you say, you are exactly like some stranger in the hands of a guide,' or 'cicerone.' Ast quotes Lucian. Sceyth. § 4, ὀ τοιε με παρα-λαβανης ἐνενυσμένον καὶ δεῖξάν τα καλά; λεγει τωι 'ἀνθρωποι.

οἶχος, κ. κ. κ.] Lat. 'idea.' Eng. 'this comes of your never absenting yourself, &c.' That Socrates never set foot with-out the walls was not literally true, as the Lyceum, his favourite haunt, lay outside the city. He also occasionally frequented the Academy, as we find from Lysias, Init. But these were exceptions which 'proved the rule.' In the Crito he is said to have once attended the Isthmian festival. His στρατής, being involuntary, were of course no exceptions.

d. τὰ μὲν οὖν — ἐθέλει διδάσκειν] 'the fields and trees you see will teach me anything,' that is, 'I can't get them to teach me' as if they had the power of refusal. Soph. 252 η, τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐννυσμένον, "some will blend, others refuse to blend," speaking of the ἐννυσμένον, a quasi-personification. This use of ἐθέλει is so common as hardly to need illustrating. It is frivolous to dispute whether it is or is not equivalent to διδάσκειν in such cases.


εὐπερ γὰρ οἱ] If the οἱ is to stand, we
οί τά πεινώντα θρέμματα θαλλόν ἢ τών καρπῶν προσεί-
οντες ἄγουσι, οὗ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βιβλίως
τήν τε Ἀττικήν φαινεῖ περίμεσις ἀπασαν καὶ ὅποι ἂν ἐν
ἄλλοςε βοῦλη. νῦν ὥν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεύρ ἀφικόμενος
ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακείσεσθαι, σὺ δὲ ἐν ὅποιοι σχήματι
οὐε βάστα ἀναγνώσεσθαι, τοῦθ’ ἐλομένος ἀναγιγνωσκε.
ΦΑΙ. Ἕ Ακονε δή.
Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς
νομίζω συμφέρει ἢμῖν γενομένων τούτων ἀκήκοας: ἄξιο
δὲ μὴ διὰ τούτο ἀνυχῆσαι | διὸ δειμαὶ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐρασθὴς 231
ὡς συνεικονίζων συν τῷ τινὶ τοῦ τύχανον. ὡς ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τότε μεταμείλετο ἐν ἄν
ἐν ποιήσωσι, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωσιν τοὺς
δὲ οὐκ ἑστὶ χρόνος ἐν ὃ μεταγνώσει προσήκει. οὐ γὰρ
ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ’ ἐκόντες, ὡς ἂν ἀριστα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων
βουλεύσατον, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τῆς αὐτῶν εἰς ποιόσιν.
Ἐχὲ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐρωτεῖς σκοποῦσιν οὐ τὰς ἀκαθός διέθευτο
τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ ἕποιήκασιν εἰ, καὶ ἐν
ἐξοχὸν ποιόν προστίθεντες ἤγορανται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀπο-
δεδοκέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν οὕτε
τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τούτο ἢ ἑστὶ προφασίζεσθαι,
οὔτε τοὺς παρελθησόντας πόνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὔτε τὰς
πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς ταῖτισασθαῖ. ὡστε
have a confusion of constructions: Onere
οἱ τὰ πεινώντα θρέμματα ἄγουσιν τραλλὸν
. . . προσείοντες ἄγουσιν αὐτά. προ-
σείοντες τινὶ τι may mean either to tense
or to scare by waving an object before
the eyes. Of the latter sense we have
an instance in Thuc. vi. 86, ὡς ἔδωκε
τινὰ προφάσεις ὑφὲν, where however,
as here, the object is to allure (ἐπά-
γισθαι).
Ἐ. ἔγω μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακείσεσθαι
κατακείσθαι is the reading of the Bodl.
and some of the best MSS. Steph. gives
κατακείσεσθαι, and so Hirsch. The pre-
sent used to be justified by Arist. Vesp.
177, ἀλλ’ εἰσών μοι τὸν ὄνομ ἐξέχων
δοκῶ, “I have a mind to, &c.,” as if
δοκεῖ μοι had been found. But this
reading was condemned by Elmsl., and
is now abandoned in consideration of
the context. In Menand. ap. Meine.
p. 287, ἐφαπατιαὶ μοι δοκῶ τὸ δίκιον,
ἐπιστὶσθαι is an Attic future. In Arist.
Plut. 1186, κατακείσεσθαι is now read for
κατακείσεσθαι. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν] Concerning this
speech or epistle see the Introd.
231. ὡς ἐκεῖνοι μὲν | Who the ἐκεῖνοι
were had been explained in a pre-
vious communication. They are of course
the ἐρωτεῖς, as contrasted with the writer,
who describes himself as οὐκ ἐρασθῆ
ἄν.
ὁ ἄν—βουλεύσατο | in such sort
as they will best provide, &c.; i.e. as the
best way they know of promoting their
own interests.
ν. αἰτίασθαῖ | There is no justification
for the change of tense here. Dr.
Badham proposes ἐπατιασθαί, comparing
Ep. vii. p. 320, ἐν vro ἄρα τὸ μέλος τῆς
πορείας . . . ἐπιστὶσεσθαι, οἷοι δόμοι κατὰ
ἀποφεύγοντα τοὺς, and adding “uti si
ἀποφεύγομεν scrissimet perinde falsis-
set.” But αἰτίασθαί might stand—to
allege, i.e. in explanation of the neglect
περιηγημένων τοσούτων κακών οὔδεν ὑπολείπεται ἀλλ' ἡ
ποιείς προθύμως ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοὶς οἰσιντά πράξαντες χα-
ρεισθαι. Ἐπι δὲ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιον τοῦς ἐρώντας περὶ
πολλοῦ ποικεσθαι ὅτι τούτους μᾶλιστα φασὶν φιλεῖν δὲν ἂν
ἐρώσθη, καὶ ἐτοιμὸι εἰσὶ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔρ-
γων τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπεχθανόμενου τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρίζονται,
ῥάδιαν γνώναι, εἰ ἄληθη λέγοντων, ὅτι ὅσοι ἂν ὅπερον
ἐρασθῶσι, ἐκεῖνοι αὐτῶν περὶ πλεῖον ποιοῦσιν, καὶ
ὅδηλον ὅτι ἐὰν ἐκεῖνοι δοκή καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιή-
σουσιν. Καὶ τοῦ πῶς εἰκὸς ἐστι τοιούτων πράγμα προέσθαι

Εἰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες συμφορᾶς, ἥν οὐδ' ἂν ἐπικεχύρισεως οὐ-
δεὶς ἐμπείρος ὅποστρέφει; καὶ γάρ αὐτὸλ ὁμολογοῦσιν
νοσεῖς μᾶλλον ἡ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρο-
νοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνασθαι αὐτῶν κρατεῖν. ὡστε πῶς ἂν
ἐφ' ἐφοροῦσαντες τῶν μαλάκως ἐχειν ἡγήσασθαι, περὶ ὅν
οὐτὸ διακείμενον ἢ βεβολοῦνται; Καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν
ἐρώτων τῶν βέλτιστων αὑρῶν, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἂν σοι ἡ ἐκλεῖσις
εἰν' εἰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ σαυτῶν ἐπιτυγχάνοντοκ, ἐκ
Ε πολλῶν. ὡστε πολὺ πλεῖων ἐλπίς ἂν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὤντα
τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σής φιλίας. Εἰ τοῖνοι τοῦ νόμου
τῶν καθεστηκότα διδοικάς, μη πυθομένων τῶν ἀνθρώ-

of which they are guilty after their passion has cooled (ἀκριβῶς τις ἐνθυσίας παρώνων). On the frequent confusion of infinitives in -σασθαι with the aer. in-
-σασθαι, see Cobet, N. L. p. 629, who also suggests ἀκριβῶς here. Ast calls
attention to the δυνασθαι, προσφα-
τικότα — ὑπολογίζεσθαι — ἀκριβῶς. This
artifice of style recurs frequently in
the present speech. It is very common
in Isocrates, and in the speeches of Thuc-
cydides, and Xenophon is somewhat too
fond of it also.

c. ἔκεινος — ποικεσθαι] 'they will
prize the new love more than the old.'
The 'new love,' being less familiar to
the apprehension, is denoted by the
pronoun which implies distance. On the same
principle, in 232, ὅποι ἂν τοῖς εὐφοροῖς
γένοσιν, ἄλλα τοῦς μὴ ἐθέλοντας (ὑπ-
ηκονικοὶ) μεταχειρισθῆναι, ὡστε τῶν
συνόντων δὲ ἄφε

D. εἰ ἐφοροῦσαντες] 'when they
have returned to their right mind.' Either
βεβολοῦνται at the end of the sentence is
corrupted, or some lost infinitive went
before it. "Patet loco sensum esse qui eam
insania laborantes de amore tam inique
judicat." Budh. βεβολείναι περὶ τῶν
is scarcely Greek, and yields no sense.
I had thought of ἀπολογεῖντα ( supra
αἰτίων ἀπολογοῦσιν νοσεῖν), but this is
too violent a change. Perhaps Heind.'s
βεβολείναι might stand, 'how in
their sorer mind can they approve of a
course they have adopted in such a state
as the one supposed,' i.e. in moments of
aberration. Stalb.'s defence of βεβολ-
είναι is conclusive, and his translation
"quae ita affecte amico cupidum" would
require &... βεβολείναι.

E. τοῦ νόμου τῶν καθεστηκότα] 'public
opinion,' 'the established maxims of so-
icity.' Germ. tr., 'die herrschende
Meinung.' Hermelis, who also under-
πων ὄνειδος σοι γένηται, εἰκὸς ἐστί τοὺς μὲν ἔρωτας
οὕτως ἄν οἰομένους | καὶ υπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐγλύουσθαι ὅσπερ 232
αὐτοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ἐπαρθήναι τῷ λέγειν καὶ φιλοτιμοῦμέ
νους ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἀπαντας ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς
πετόνται τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἔρωτας, κρείττους αὐτῶν ὄντας,
τὸ βέλτιστον ἄντι τῆς δύσης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
ἀφείσθαι. Ἐτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἔρωτας πολλοὺς ἀνάγκῃ πυ-
θέσθαι καὶ ιδεῖν ἀκολουθοῦντας τοὺς ἐρωμένους καὶ ἔρ-
γον τοῦτο ποιομένους, ὅστε ὅταν ὁβθόνι διαλεγόμενοι ἐπὶ
ἄλληλοις, τότε αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἡ γεγενημένης ἡ μελλούσης
ἐστεθαί τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεών τῶν δὲ μὴ ἔρωτας
οὐδ’ αἰτιάσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες
ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν ἡ διὰ φιλίαν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δὲ
ἄλλην τινὰ ἠδοημί. Καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ σοι δεός παράστηκεν
ἡγομένῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φιλίαν συμμένει, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν
τρόπῳ διαφορὰ γενομένης κοών ἀμφότεροι καταστήσαν
τὴν συμφοράν, προεμένου δὲ σου ἃ περὶ πλείοντος ποιεῖ
μεγάλην ἂν σοι βλάβην γενέσθαι, εἰκότως ἂν τοὺς ἔρω-
τας μᾶλλον ἄν φοβοῦλοι. πολλά γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐστι τὰ λυ-
πόντα, καὶ πάντ’ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῶν βλάβην νομίζοντες γίγνε-
σθαι. διόσπερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἐρωμένων
συνουσίας ἀποτρέψουσι, φοβοῦμεν τοὺς μὲν οὐσίαν
κεκτημένος, μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλλονται, τοὺς δὲ
πεταιδευμένους, μὴ συνέσει κρείττους γένωνται τῶν δ’

stands ἴμοσ to mean τὸ νεομιμησθενον, denies that any disgrace attached in
public opinion to the relation in question, quoting Aesch. e. Tim. in proof that mer-
cenary amours were alone infamous at
Athens : ὃ δὲ Θελῶν ἐν τοῖς νύμοις .
tοῖς ἀληθευομένοι τὸ ἐπειθείας πετήθηκα,
δεῦλον καλώσας ἐφραί. The speech of
Aeschines alluded to is one of the foulest
chapters in the record of Athenian de-
pravity.

232. ἐπιθυμεῖν τῷ λέγειν] τὸ is found in
a few MSS. and approved by Buttmann and C. F. Hermann. Badh. with
great ingenuity conj. ὅ τῷ ἔχειν, ἐλ asserts itself, and to the ear, and λέγειν is itself flat,
Stallb.’s int. “co quod dicunt” is suffi-
ciently frigid, and can scarcely be got
from the Greek. ἐπαρθήναι τῷ λέγειν, I
apprehend, could only mean ‘are excited
by speaking’ (dat. instrum.). The verb ἔχειν in re amatorîd is common enough,
and this is in my judgment the best
reading hitherto proposed.

καὶ φιλοτιμοῦμένους—πετάλνα] ‘and
in the vanity of their hearts give all men
to know that their labour has not been
spent in vain.’

b. προεμένου δὲ σου] ‘when you have
sacrificed or surrendered all you most
prize.’ Sup. 231 ε. τοιοτὸν πρῶτα προ-
έσα, i.e. honour.
1) ἀλλ’ τι κεκτημένων ἁγαθῶν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκάστου φιλάττουται. πείσαντες μὲν οὖν ἀπέχθεσθαι σε τούτοις εἰς ἐρήμιαν φίλων καθιστάσαν εὰν δὲ τὸ σεαντὸν σκοπῶν ἀμένον ἐκείνων φρονήσῃ, ήξεις αὐτοῖς εἰς διαφοράν. οὖν δὲ μὴ ἔρωτες ἐτυχοῦν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄρετὴν ἐπραξαν δὲν ἐδέωτο, οὐκ ἀν τοῖς συνοῦσι φιλονεῖ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἐδέωτας μισοῦν, ἡγούμενοι ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν ἅπεροράσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ ἀφέλεσθαι. ἦστε πολὺ πλεῖον ἔλπις εἰ φιλέαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἡ ἔξθαν γενήσεσθαι. Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐρώτων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἃ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἐμπεριοὶ ἐγένοντο, ὥστε ἄδηλον αὐτοῖς εἰ ἐτι τότε βουλήσανται φίλοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας παύσαν—233 ταῖς τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν, οἱ καὶ πρότερον ἄλληλοι φίλοι ὄντες ταῦτα ἐπραξαν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀν ἐν θάρσοι ταῦτα εἰκὸς ἑλλήνῳ τὴν φιλέαν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημέα καταλειφθὼν τῶν μελλόντων ἔστησαν. Καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτίων ςοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένων ἡ ἔραστή, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βελτίων ταῦτα λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ προτόμενα ἐπαινοῦσι, τὰ μὲν δεδοίτες μὴ ἀπέδωται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ χεῖρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν γεγυνώσκοντες. τοιαύτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται: δυστυ-

D. τελευτώστε, κ.τ.λ.] ‘thus if they prevail with you to break with all these, you are left without a friend in the world, whereas if you are alive to your own interest, and have more sense than your advisers, you will have to quarrel with them.’ ὃς δὲ — ἀφελείον— Those who never loved, but are indebted to their own merits for the success of their suit, so far from being jealous of those who seek the society of their favourite, will rather dislike those who shun it, deeming themselves slighted by these last, but benefited by the attentions of the former. See note on 231 D. The repeated use of ἐκεῖνος in this refined sense, as in 231 A, 233 B, and elsewhere in this speech, savours of affectation.

E. τῶν ἄλλων ὅπειρον [This use of ἄλλως is familiar enough. ‘Before they were acquainted with your disposition and that of your connexions as well,’ 233, ταῦτα ἐπραξαν] ἄρα ἐπραξαν ἐν ἐδέωτο, 232 D. (In 234 A, ἐπαράβασις is used in the same sense.) In the next clause ταῦτα is the antecedent to ἐξ ἀν. μνημέα ] ‘pledges, earnest.’ “Μνη-μεία μνημέων non solum referunt ad praeterrimum tempus cujus memoriam conservat, sed etiam ad futurum, in quod memoriae rei conservatur.” So Ast, in reply to Hein., who conj. σημεία. He quotes Lys. de Rep. Ath. init., ἐνομίζομεν — τὰς γεγυνώσκεις συμφοβὰς πλὴν μνη-μεία τοῦ πάθει καταλειφθάν ὑπὸ μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθυμομένως ἐτύχας πολλοῖσι ἐπι-θυμεῖς. The memory of past happiness is supposed to operate as an assurance of enjoyment to come.

D. τοιαύτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται] the following are some of Love’s feats, performances by which he exhibits his power; the true sense of ἐπιδείκνυται,
χοῦτας μὲν, ἄ μὴ λύτην τοὺς ἄλλους παρέγει, ἀνιμὰ λοιπὲς νομίζειν εὐτυχοῦται δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ήδονῆς ἁξία παρ᾽ ἑκένων ἐπαύνον ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν. ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔλεες τοῖς ἐρωμένοις ἡ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύουν συνεσκομαί σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μελλοῦσαν ὠψellungειν ἐλέεθαι, οὗτ ὑπ᾽ ἔρωτος ἠττάμενος ἀλλ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναφοροῦμεν ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδεῖας ὁλίγην ὀργὴν ποιοῦμεν, τῶν μὲν ἀκούσιν πονηρώμενα ἔχων, τὰ δὲ ἐκούσια πειρώμενον ἀποτρέπειν ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐπομενὴς τεκμηρία. Εἰ δὲ ἄρα σοι τούτο παρέστηκεν, ὡς οὖν οἶνον τε ἰσχυρὰν ἰσχύοντας γενέσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τῆς ἐρωτοῦ τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρὴ ὅτι οὐτ᾽ ἀν τοὺς νίκεις περὶ πολλὸν ὑ ἐποιοῦμεθα οὔτ᾽ ἀν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὔτ᾽ ἀν πιστῶς φίλους ἐκεκτημεθα, οἵ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιάτης γεγονώσαι ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐπιθυμημάτων. Ἐτε δὲ ἔρωτας τοῖς δεσμάσεις μάλιστα χαρέσεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μὴ τοὺς βελτίστοις ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀποροτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλεióτην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἰσονται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἱδίαις δα-

but missed by the interpreters. Presently εὐτυχοῦται is put absolutely.

*When Fortune smiles, Love makes things unpleasing to themselves to be approved by the objects of her favor!* ἑκένων = τῶν εὐτυχοῦτων, the persons last named, and therefore newer to the apprehension than the δυναμόντες, whose case has been already considered.

ὡστε πολὺ μᾶλλον, κ.π.λ.] ἔλεειν with a dat. is unheard of, though Hirsch. interprets "quapropter miseriari amasios magis optet quam ipsa invidere." On the other hand, ἐρωμένοις, the reading of Steph., has next to no MS. authority. There seems, therefore, no alternative to Stallb.'s interpretation, "Quocirca in eos qui amantur multo potius convenit, ut corum misericritis, quam ut ipsa invideas," unless we accept Ast's hypothesis, that τοῖς ἐρωμένοις is a gloss. This is not very probable, though Ficinus omits the two words in his version. It is also remarkable that for ἀφότος some MSS. have ἀφότος, a vacillation which seems to Ast to prove that the text is not intact. Dr. Badham suggests τοῦ ἐρωμένου, which he constructs with ἔλεειν and ζηλοῦν. But this would make the lover the object "of compassion rather than of envy," whereas it is evidently the beloved who suffers from the folly of his admirer, however the vulgar may 'envy' his supposed good fortune.

C. διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυράν, κ.τ.λ.] Stallb. draws attention to the imperfect balance of this and the following clause. The balance was apparently intended to be perfect; I suspect therefore that τάχει originally stood in the text between σμικρὰ and ἰσχυράν, corresponding to μεγάλα βραδεία in the following clause.

D. "Ετε δὲ ἔρωτα—πληρωμάτες" Observe the redadetio ad absurdum—to Pagan apprehension doubtless a complete one. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἱδίαις δα-

[233, B] These particles occur in company ζ. 458 D, and elsewhere.
Επάνως ου τοις φιλοις ἀξίων παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσαυτόντας καὶ τοὺς δεόμενους πλησιμοῦνς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσι καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἥζοντι καὶ μᾶλιστα ἠσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἰσόνται καὶ πολλὰ ἄγαθα αὐτοῖς εὑρόνται. ἀλλὰ ἰσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεόμενοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μᾶλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένοις οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐρωτεύοντας.

234 μόνον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίωσι· οὐδὲ ὁσίον τῆς σῆς ώρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες προσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἁγάθων μεταδώσουσι οὐδὲ οἱ διαπράξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες ἁγιασμόνες πρὸς ἀπαντάς σιωπήσονται· οὐδὲ τοῖς ὄλγοις χρόνον σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὄμοιος διὰ παντός τοῦ βίου φιλοις ἐσυμίσκοι· οὐδὲ οἱ τινες πανομένοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἥξιος πρόφασι τηθύσουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ πανομένους τῆς ώρας, τότε τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς ἐπιδείκονται. Σὺ οὖν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο, καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐρώτας οἱ φιλοι νουθετούν ὡς ὁσίοις κακοί·


ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἤζοντα] This phrase, a frequent one in Plato, is used by those who seek advice, relief, or hospitality. Rep. 489 c, ἐπὶ λαβῶν τιθέμενοι Ἰών. Ἱβ. 3, ὅπος ἐμπέσας περιέχει παρασκευής τοῖς συνήθεις ἔργον ἢ τὸν παραδοτάς, ἡ παράδοτας ἢ τὰς πλατείας τὸν παραδότας, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀναφέρει ἢ τὸν ἰδίους ἢ τὸν παραδότας, τοὺς ἀναφέρει ἢ τὸν ἰδίους. It denotes simple begging in Symm. 203 b, προσαυτόντας, οἷον δὲ εἰσχύλες ὁσίης, ἀρίστης, καὶ ἢν περὶ τῶν θυρας. In Rep. 304 b, the religious quacks of the day—the ἄγρυται καὶ μαμεῖες—are said ἐπὶ πλατείας τιθέμενοι Ἰών. As an example of the custom at ἐκούσια, we may take the case of Philippus the professed buffoon, who presents himself unbidden at the door of the men's apartment in the house of the rich Callias, and upon the latter's entry into the apartment he at once looked in and presented his petition. Xen. Conv. i. 13. An organized clientele, like that of the 'nema salutantis' at Rome, had no existence in Athens.

234. ὀδόθη τινες—ἐπιδείξονται ἢνως (will you grant favours) to those who, when their passion begins to abate, will seek to pick a quarrel, but rather to those who, when they have ceased to enjoy your charms will then display the virtue that is in them. Such must be the sense if πανομένοι is retained. The ὄρα can only be that of the ἐφάμενου, the ἔρωτης having long ceased to be ἐν ὄραι. Comp. Plut. Ages. 3h, ὁρᾶον ἐν τῷ ἄυστρῳ ἄνθρωποι παράκλητες εἰς ἄναμμα ἢ πολιτές. The difficulty of the passage consists in this unusual phrase πανομένους τῆς ώρας, as if he had said πανομένους τῆς ἀπολαύσεως τῆς σῆς ὄρας. But it is more strange than to say πανομένους τῆς ὄρας for ληπτόνωσι, which Stall. has admitted into his text on the authority of one MS. and Figurinus. The conjectures πανομένους, ἐπαυράμενους, γυναικών, ἀπολαύσαμοι do not give the required sense. The time referred to is not that succeeding fruition, but that which comes after fruition has entirely ceased. Godfrey Hermann, in the margin of his copy of Heindl, proposes πανομένους, a conjecture (if any is required) better than the foregoing. Mr. Shilte suggests πανομένους, which gives nearly the same sense, as does another conj. πανομένους.

VOL. I.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

τοῦ ἐπιτυχεύματος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν οὐδεὶς πάποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμφατο ώς διὰ τοῦτο κακὸς βουλευομένοις περὶ ἑαυτῶν.

Ἰσος μὲν οὖν ἂν ἔρωι με εἰ ἀπασὶ σοι παρανό τοῖς μὴ ἔρωσι χαρίζεσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ οὔδ' ἂν τὸν ἔρωτα πρὸς ἀπαντᾶσε σε κελέευν τοὺς ἔρωτας ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντε χάριτος ίσης ἐξιον, οὔτε σοι βουλομένω τοῖς ἄλλους λαμβάνεις ὅμοιος ὑπνατόν· δει δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὡφέλειαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι.

'Εγὼ μὲν οὖν ἵκανα μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα: εἰ δὲ τι σοι ποθεῖν, ήγούμενος παραλειπόμεθα, ἐρώτα.

Τῇ σοι φαίνεται, ὃ Σῶκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ υπερφυῶς τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι εἰρήμεθα;

ΣΩ. Λαμβάνως μὲν οὖν, ὃ ἐταίρη, ὡς τε με ἐκπληγήσαι· καὶ τούτῳ ἕγω ἔπαθον διὰ ότι, ὃ Φαίδρη, πρὸς σε ἀποβλήτας, ὅτι ἔμοι ἐδόκεις γινόμεθα ὑπ' τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγκαστικῶν. Ἦγοουμένος γὰρ σε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔμε ἐπέτευχων περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοι εἰπόμενον, καὶ ἐπόμενος συνεβάκησα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Εἴειν οὐτω ὃ δοκεῖ παῖζεν;

ΣΩ. Δοκικώ γὰρ σοι παῖζεν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐσπονδακέναι;

ΦΑΙ. Μηδαμῶς, ὃ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλ' ὃς ἀληθῶς εἰπ' ἐπὶς Διὸς φιλῶν, οἷς ἂν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἔτερα τοιοῦτων μείζων καὶ πλείων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ; καὶ ταύτη δεῖ υπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τῶν

c. τῷ λόγῳ λαμβάνοντι [This is the reading of the Bodl. and several other MSS. Vulg. τῷ λαμβάνοντι. λόγῳ λαμ-

βάνοις is of frequent occurrence in Plato; Legg. i. 639 c, oi λόγῳ τι λαβόντει ἐπιτίθειν καὶ προθέμειν φιλοσ. ἡ ἐπα-

νών. Πρ. 653 b, μὴν δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνοις—said of children incapable as yet of reasoning. Here the words may mean, 'to him who takes a rational view of the matter.' Comp. Thuc. iii. 38, τὸ διότι λαμβάνεις ἐλέες; ir. 17, λαβεῖν τοῖς λόγοις μὴ πολεμίσει. Plut. Aliib. c. 18, ὅργῇ καὶ φόβῳ τῷ γεγονοῦς λαμ-

βάνοις. Badh.'s conj. τῷ γ' οὖν λαμβάνοντι has much to recommend it; 

οὕτω implying, 'as one among many,' τῷ λαμβάνοντι, 'to the recipient,' gives however all the sense absolutely required by the context.

Ε. Διὸς φιλῶν] Schol. Herm. φιλῶν τὸ Ζεὺς λέγεται καὶ Εὐνόι καὶ Κτήσιος 

(see ἑρετικ. Soph. Ant. 487). More frequently Διὸς is omitted from the ad-

juration, as in Gorg. 500 b, καὶ πρὸς Φιλίππα, ὃ καὶ Καλλικράτη.
λόγον ἐπαινεθήναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔκειν μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρωγγύλα καὶ ἄκριβως ἔκκατα τῶν ὄνομάτων ἀποτελόμενα; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συνχωρητέουν χάρων σήμερον, ἐπεί ἔμε γε ἐλάθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς 235 οὖν δεῖ· τῷ γὰρ ῥητορικῷ αὐτοῦ μόνῳ τοὺς νοοῦς προσεῖναι τούτῳ δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὸν ὄμην Λυσίαν ὁπίσθι ἱκανων εἶναι. καί δὴ οὐν μοι ἐδεξαν, ἐν φαίδρε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἀλλὰ λέγεις, δις καὶ τρὶς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὐ πάντων ἐπιτρών τοῦ πολλά λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἢς οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ ποιητῶν καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιδεσθαι ἐπὶδεικτάμενον, οὐ οἶδα τε ὅν ταῦτα ἑτέρους τε καὶ ἑτέρως λέγων ἀμφότεροι εἰσεῖν ἁρίστα. 

Β. ΦΑΙ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ἐν Σάκρατες. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ] Ἡσα. ποιητὴς καὶ ὑπότονος λέγει τῶν ῥητορικῶν, ταῖς γὰρ καὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοισιν. Inf. 236 b, παρ' ἱστοῦ ποιητὴν ἀνασκόπειν. 

ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρωγγύλα καὶ ἄκριβως —ἀποτελομένα] ἀρχαῖος λόγος οὗτος καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιήτου ἀξίωμα. Hor. Ep. ad Pis. 441, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐναλλάκτη, ἐν σωματίων. 

Propert. iii. 32, 42, 42, Incipit jam angusto versus includere lorn. Ast brackets the words καὶ ἄκριβες, on the ground that they are absent in Hermencès, and in the text quoted by Plutarch, de recta und. rat. 45 a, (ὅ Πάτων) τὴν ἀναγεγέραν αὐτῶν (λυσίαν) ἐστιν καί δι' τῶν ὄνομάτων ἀναγεγέτο ἐκείνου καὶ ἀποτελομένων. Heinl. also objects to the adverb, as coming somewhat flatly after two adjectives. Badh.'s con. ἀποτελομένων is supported by Hermencès, who has δὲ οὐκ ἐδεξαν σαφῆ καὶ στρωγγύλα καὶ ἀποτελομένων δηλοῦν, κ.τ.λ. I agree, however, with Stallb. in preferring the text as it stands. Plato probably thought the ἄκριβες of Lysias excessive and pedantic. In the Theaet. 184 b, he seems to apologise for the comparative negligence, as it may have seemed to his contemporaries, of his own style: τῷ δ' εἶναι τῶν ὄνομάτων καὶ ἰδεῖν καὶ μὴ δ' ἄκριβειας ἔχειν διότι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὖν ἄγνωστα, ἄλλα μᾶλλον τοῦ τούτου ἐστὶν ἀνέλειπτον. 

235. τῷ γὰρ ῥητορικῷ] "Ad elocu-
μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἔχει τῶν γὰρ ἐνότων ἀξίως ῥηθῆναι εἰν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλουσεν, ὡστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνων ἐφημένα μηδέν ἂν ποτὲ δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλεῖον καὶ πλεῖον ὁ λόγος.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἐγὼ σοι οὐκέτι οἷς τε ἔσομαι πείθεσθαι παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἀνδρεῖς τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξονι με, εάν σοι χαρι-ξάμενος συνχωρῶ.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνες οὗτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ὁ ἀκτίκος;

ΣΩ. Νῦν μὲν οὖν οὗτος οἷς ἔχω εἰπεῖν δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τῶν ἀκτίκος, ἦ τοῦ Σατροῦτος τῆς καλῆς ἦ Ἀνακρόντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τῶν, πόθεν δὲ τεκμαρ-μένος λέγει; πληρὲς ποις, ὁ δαμιών, το στήθος ἔχων αἰσθανόμαι παρὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἔτερα μὴ χειρὶ. ὅτι μὲν οὗν παρὰ γε ἐμαυτῷ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννοηκά 

εὖ ὀῤῥα, συνειδὸς ἐμαυτῷ ἀμαθάναι. λείπεται δὴ, ὁμαί, ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρώσθαι μὲ δίκην ἀγγείοις ὑπὸ δὲ νοθείας αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἐπιλεύσθηαι ὅπως τοι καὶ ὃν τῶν ήκονοι.

'if the speech has a merit, it is precisely that which you deny it; of the topics implied in (naturally suggested by) the subject-matter, and capable of worthy treatment, there is not one which he has omitted.' The latter clause may be analyzed thus: αὔτ' ὑπὸ τοῦ πράγματι καὶ αἷστ' ἔχων βιβλία βιβλήμα. So in effect Ast, who quotes Thuc. iv. 53, τι ἐν τι καὶ πώ ἐν ἐκλέγον ἐν εἰδίκει οἰκη-γοροῖς: Aesch. F. L. p. 122, ἡσυχαί γὰρ οὐδέν τῶν ἐνότων εἰπεῖν, ὃς γ' οἷοι, παρέλειπον.

'In this passage, “It is observable,” he says, “that Soc. whenever he would discourse affirmatively on any subject, or when he thought proper to raise or adorn his style, does it not in his own person, but assumes the character of another. Thus, for instance, he relates the beautiful fable [of the choice] between Virtue and Pleasure, after Pro- dius” (Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 21); “he treats of the miseries of human life in the words of the same Sophist; he describes the state of souls after death from the information of Obryges, one of the Magi” (Axioc. 371); “he makes a panegyric on Wine in the style of Gorgias” (Xen. Symp. ii. 267); “and here he does not venture to display his eloquence till the Nymphs and Muses have inspired him. This is consistent with that character of simplicity and humility which he assumed.” Works, ed. Matth. ii. p. 310. Add, among other instances, Crat. 396 d, where Socr., wondering at his unwonted skill in etymology, pretends it has come to him from some mysterious source: ἡλικησέν τοι αὐτων προσέπ- πταιεν ἄρτι, ὥς οὖν ἀνθέν. c. Νῦν μὲν οὖν οὕτως] ‘without further consideration.’ The use of οὕτως with another adv. αὐτὸς, ἀπλῶς, ἀπρέμα, ἡλικησέν, is familiar to readers of Plato, who will find ex. in Ast’s Lex. Pl. ii. p. 405. ᾧ καὶ συγγραφέων τῶν] ‘or it may be from some prose writers.’
D. μηδὲ ἐν κελεύω ἑπτα[ ] Pherecr. ap. Athen. p. 335 4, μηδὲν εἶχεν, ὥς ἀληθῶς, μηδὲν ἢ αἰτὶ παρῄσκες μαι. R. S. 

παρέσκει. ὑπὸσχεῖς] Bekk. after the Boll, ἐνέγκα ὑποσχέσθης εἰσὶν, which is mere gibberish; others have ἐνέγκα. I have adopted Baidh's suggestion, "quum verbum ὑπόσχεσιν non intelligenter scriba, εἰσίν de suo adjectum." The final εἰς ἐν ὑποσχέσιν all admit to be a duplicit of the initial syllable of εἰσὶν. Stallb, imagines a duplic lexica, ἑν καὶ ἐπιστη (whence, he supposes, the ὑποσχήσις of one or two MSS.) and ὑπόσχεσις εἰσίν, thinking it indifferent which we adopt. But ὑπόσχεσις εἰσίν cannot mean 'sustine dierece,' for which we should undoubtedly require the mid. ὑπόσχεσι. The active ὑπόσχεσι may mean 'submit to me as to a judge,' or simply, 'produce,' 'present us with,' a better speech,' as if he had said προτεινον. Arist. Pac. 87 b, ἀλλ' εἴδον δι' οὗ ὑπόσχεσιν τὴν ἐγκεκεφαλίσθη. The phrases ὑπόσχεσις ὥρας, εἰσίθεναι, ἵναι, δίκαια are familiar. In Gorg. 497 b, ὑπόσχεσις Σωκράτει εἷργαξα, δ.π. permitte. Except in this last sense, it would be difficult to find an instance of ὑπόσχεσις without an accus. following. Wox, in a long note on Soph. Antig. (ii, p. 77 seq.) seems first to have suggested ὑπόσχεσις εἰσίν, which he improperly translates 'sustine dierece, in te recipe dierece,' in which Stallb. follows him. The barbarism ὑποσχήθητι of the vulg. is probably an old interpretamentum of ὑπόσχεσις which the scribe misunderstood for ὑποσχέσιν. The duplication of the εἰ may be compared with that of οὗ in 246 c, where for the vulg. πλαταιμανοῦ αὐτὲ Bekk. rightly reads πλαταιμανοῦ αὐτὲ.

καὶ σοι ἔγω—ἀναθέσειν] The oath of the nine archons, to which Phaedrus alludes, has perplexed writers on Attic antiquities. According to Pintarch (Solon, c. 25) every archon, before admission to office, took oath, εἰ τι παρα-
I am indebted for some of the above remarks, we are presented with a new solution of the difficulty, professing greater completeness than any that have preceded it. The eminent scholar whose name is appended to the paper in question, contends that, the oath having originally had a bona fide purpose, it is necessary to suppose that the penalty was one within the power of an exarchon to raise. The dimensions of the statue were to be equal, not those of the offender, but of the bribe received by him. We know from Dinarchus (adv. Demosth. 60) that the punishment of bribery was a fine exceeding tenfold the money received by the offender: the relative value of gold to silver at Athens in the time of Solon appears to have been as 10:1; hence the archon was required to set up an image of gold equaling in weight the sum supposed to have been received in silver. In this case we must suppose ἑισωστάσιον to have originally stood in the text of the oath, and ἱσωστάσιον to have been substituted, apparently by Plato, in whose time the same form occurs in a dead letter. To me, I confess, the ingenuity of this hypothesis appears to exceed its credibility, but others may form a different opinion.

π. αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ δ λόγος ἡμῶν ἔστιν. τίνα δὲ λέγεται, κ.τ.λ. 'who,' asks Socr., 'could argue that the cool is to be preferred to the impassioned sitor, without lauding the good sense of the former and ensuring the absurdities of the latter; or if he did overlook topics so trite and obvious, what else could he find to say?' Of such commonplacesthe less said the better. They require no invention, but only the power of arrangement. If a speaker would earn the praise of invention, he must have something to say more recondite than platitudes like these.' Struck by the justice of this criticism, Phaedr. will allow Socr. to take for granted the truism that a man who is in love is in a less healthy state of mind than one who is free from that passion; but, says he, 'produce arguments more and better than those contained in the remainder of the speech, and you shall stand in wrought gold at Olympia by the side of the great image set up by the Cypselidae.' Of this image Hierocles says that it was actually erected by the sons of Periander, the son of Cypselus, on the occasion of recovering the tyranny of Corinth. Better authorities, as Aristotle and Strabo, attribute the offering to Cypselus himself, who, it is added, made his subjects pay a tax for ten years towards defraying the enormous expense. The 'golden statue' of Gorgias, at Delphi, Pausanias found to be a gilt one, though Pliny gravely assures us that "Hominum primus et aurae statuam et solida Gorgias Leonitius Delphis in x x pl. citat Olympiade. Tantras erat docendae artis oratoriae quassaturs!" N. H. xxxiii. 24. Still more fabulous is the account in Valerius Max., viii. ad fin., "Gorgiae Leonitio ... universa Gracia ... statuam solido in auro posuit: cum cacte-rorum ad id tempus auratas collocasset." The word σφυφράς (distinguished from σφυφράς, cast) does not necessarily imply more than a statue covered with plates of beaten gold; though we read of ὄλυσφορα or ὄλυσφηρα ἄγαλ-ματα composed entirely of the precious metal, "nulla inanitate," as Pliny, 1.1, expresses it. Compare Müller, Handb. der Archäol. §§ 240. 2; 307.
τὴν ἐὕρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν ἐπανετέων, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλεπῶν εὑρεῖν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τῇ ἐὕρεσιν.

ΦΑΙ. Συγχωρῶ δ' λέγεις: μετρίως γάρ μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκείναι. ποιήσω οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ οὕτως: τὸ μὲν τῶν ἐρωτᾶ τοῦ μὴ ἐρωτηματικοῦ μᾶλλον νοσεύν δώσω σοι ὑποίκωθει, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἐτέρα πλεῖον καὶ πλείονοι ἀξία εἰσόν τῶν Ἀνωτέρω παρὰ τὸ Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὑλιμπιά ἐσταθὲν.

ΣΩ. 'Εσποῦδακας, τῇ Φαίδρε, οτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμην ἐρεσκήλην σε, καὶ οὐ εἰς ἐγὼ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ἐπιχειρήσεις εἰπέων παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνην σοφίαν ἔτερον τι ποικιλώτερον.

ΦΑΙ. Περὶ μὲν τούτων, τῇ φίλε, εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβᾶς ἐλλυπᾶσαι ὑπῆρθεν μεν γάρ σοι παινὸς πᾶσιν ὕπως οἷος τε εἰ, ὅνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κομμῶν φυτικῶν πράγμα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ποιεῖν, ἀνταποδωδοῦντες ἄλληλους, καὶ μὴ


Marmoreusque tibi, Deo, versicoloribus aphis
In morem picta stabili Amor pharetra.

So Horace, Stabis marmoreus sub trabe citren.


Marmoreusque tibi, Dea, versicoloribus aphis
In morem picta stabili Amor pharetra.

So Horace, Stabis marmoreus sub trabe citren.

βούλων με ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἐκείνο τὸ εἰ ἐγώ, ὁ Σώκρατες, Σωκράτης ἀγνώ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέξασαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἐθρύπτετο δὲ ἀλλὰ διανοηθῆτη ὅτι ἐντεύθεν οὐκ ἀπιμεν, πρὶν ἂν σὺ εἶπης ἃ ἔφησα ἐν τῷ στήθει ἔχειν. ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνῳ ἐν ἑρμία, ἰσχυρότερος δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δὲ ἀπαντῶν τούτων ἔφης ὁ σοὶ λέγω, καὶ μηδαμώς πρὸς βίαν βουληθῆς μᾶλλον ἦ ἐκὼν λέγειν.

Σ. 'ἈΛ', ὃ μακάριε Φαίδρε, γελοῖος ἐσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

Φ. Ὡσθ' ὃς ἔχει; παύσαι πρὸς με καλλωπιζόμενοι σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω δ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν.

Σ. Μηδαδωμί ποίνων εἰπής.

Φ. Ὡς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω, ὃ δὲ μοι λόγος ὥρκος ἔσται. ὁμιμεν γάρ σοι—τίνα μέντοι, τίνα θεῶν; ἡ βουλεῖ τὴν πλάτανον ταύτην; ἢ μὴν, εάν μοι μὴ εἰπης τῶν λόγων ἐναντίον αὐτῆς ταύτης, μηδεπότε σοι ἑτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδεως μήτ' ἐπιδείξεις μήτ' ἔξαγγελαι.

Σ. Βαβαί, ὃ μαρέ, ὃς εὖ ἀνεύρεσ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἀνδρὶ φιλολόγῳ ποιεῖν δ ἄν κελεύῃς.

Φ. Τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει; Σ. Οὐδέν ἔτι, ἐπειδή σὺ γε ταῦτα ὠμοίωμα, πῶς γὰρ ἄν οἶδα τ' εἰπν τοιαύτης τούτης ἀπέχεσθαι; Φ. Λέγε δὴ.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

ΣΩ. ΟÎσθ’ οίνῳ ὡς ποιήσω;
ΦΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι;
ΣΩ. 'Εγκαλυφάμενος ἔρω, ἵν’ ὦ τὰ τάχιστα διαδράμω
τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ, βλέπων πρὸς σέ, ἵν’ αἰσχύνης δια-
πορῶμαι.

ΦΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὅπως βουλεῖ ποιέ.
ΣΩ. 'Αγετε δή, ὁ Μούσαι, εἶτε δὲ φοβῆς εἴδος λύγειαν,
εἶτε διὰ γένους μουσικὸν τὸ Λυκών ταύτην ἔσχετε ἐπινυ-
μίαν, ξύμι μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου, ὅν με ἀναγκάζει ὁ
βέλτιστος ἐπόρος λέγειν, ἵν’ ὦ ἔταιρὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον
δοκῶν τοῦτῳ σοφός εἶναι, νῦν ἐτ’ μᾶλλον δοξῆ.

'Ην οὔτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα καλὸς,
tοῦτῳ δὲ ἤσαν ἔρασται πάνω πολλοί. εἰς δὲ τις αὐτῶν
ἀιμύλως ἦν, ὅς ὀδύνεος ἤττον ἔρων ἐπεπείκει τὸν παῦδα
ὡς οὖν ἐρήμῃ, καὶ ποτὲ αὐτὸν ἀνάλειψαι τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ,
ὡς μὴ ἐρώντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρωτός δέοι χαρίζεσθαι. Ἐλεγε τε
ἀδε.’

Περὶ παντός, ὁ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς

237. διαπορώμαι.] A deponent, not dis-
tinguishable in sense from διαπορώ or
the simple ἄπορο, for which ἀπορώμαι
is sometimes found. We have also the
true passive ἀπορώμενον in Soph. 248 a,
and ἀπορομένου, ib. 250 e, denoting
the subject of a controversy or difficult
investigation, τὸ περὶ ἃ ἄπορον τις.
'Αγετε δή, ὁ Μούσαι.] The motive
of this ‘dithyrambic’ invocation (inf.
238 b) is of course to give a colour of
probability to the artificial and stilted
style of the proem of the first speech of
Socrates, and still more to that of the
second speech, the μυθικὸς θεωρός, so alien
from the ordinary simplicity of the
speaker. It is to this part of the
dialogue that Aristotle alludes, Rhet.
iii. 7. 11, where he says that a high-
flown poetic diction is admissible in
prose, 1. when the feelings of the audi-
ce have been wrought to a high pitch by
the speaker, or, 2. when such
style is adopted μετ’ εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ
Γοργίας ἐποίης, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαϊ-
δρῳ. This criticism, for its taste and
discernment, stands in favourable con-
trast with that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
who is sorely scandalized by the ‘turbid
and obscure, and disagreeably poetical
style’ which, as he thinks, is a grievous
change for the worse from the grace-
fulness of the introductory scene.

Λύγεια.] A stereotyped epithet of the
Muses. Socrates affects to doubt whether
it was derived from the dryness of their
notes, or from the name of a race devoted
to their service. Herm. θνῶσ… τῶν
Λυκών… οὕτως ξύμι λαυκικότατον ἔστιν,
ὅταν μὴ έν τοῖς πολύμεροις παναρτατί
μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῶν στρατευ-
μάτος λαυκικοσθείν, τὸ δὲ ἄθεον, πολέ-
μοικότος τῶν λαυκών,—a reputation, it is
hardly necessary to say, which the
Ligurians owe to the ingenuity of Greek
etymology. The tmesis ξύμι μοι λα-
βεσθε is of course a designed poetism.

Β. Ἡν οὔτω δή] The conventional
mode of beginning a fable, answering to
our ‘once upon a time.’ Aristoph. Vesp.
1182, οὕτως ποτ’ ἐν μίθῳ καὶ γαλάζω, where see
the Schol. Germ. ‘Es war einmal.’
Lyris 216 0, τὸ μῆτ’ ἄγαθον μῆτε κακὸν
φιλον οὕτω ποτ’ ἀγάθους τἄγαθος,
‘that that which is neither good nor
bad may once in a way become endeared
to the good.’

Περὶ παντός, κ.τ.λ.] This is the proem
to a speech which professes, like that of Lysias, to uphold the thesis ὡς μὴ ἐρωτήσῃ πολλὸν ἢ ἐρωτήσῃ. Instead of plunging in medias res, as Lysias had done, Socr. seeks in the first instance to define the terms of the question. What is ἐρως? All allow that it is an ἐνθυμεῖν—an appetite or desire. But this is an insufficient though a true description, for there are many ἐνθυμεῖαι. Neither is it enough to add that Love is an ἐνθυμεῖν τῶν καλῶν, a desire of beautiful objects, for many desire beautiful objects who are not in love. How then are we to distinguish ἐρως from other ἐνθυμεῖαι τῶν καλῶν, and what is its true nature? Socrates sets about the inquiry thus. There are two principles of action in man, the desire of pleasure and the desire of excellence. Of these the first is innate, the second acquired; the second a rational, the first an unreasoning principle. When the rational principle is in the ascendant, the result is that state of mind which we call ἄφθορον—temperance, or moderation, or self-government; when the appetite bears sway, its usurpation is branded with the name ἄβραχος—licentious or excess. But as ἄβραχος only ἐνθυμεῖα magnified, there are many ἐνθυμεῖα as there are many ἀγαθοὶ, differing in nature or in name, according to the name and nature of their several objects. Thus the desire of food, when it becomes excessive, is styled γαστρεμαχία, gluttony; the desire of drink under the same circumstances becomes a vice which all know. Love, it is assumed, is one of these forms of excess: it is the Excess which corresponds to the Desire of the Beautiful.

Not however of all that is beautiful: but especially of corporeal beauty. It is therefore the desire of beauty combined with carnal appetite, existing in such intensity as to triumph over all the restraints imposed by the antagonistic principle. Its name corresponds to its nature: for the word ἔρως is near of kin to βάψη, βασμα, and ἀφρασέως—one proof among many that names were given by those who saw deep into the nature of things. (Crat. 401 b.) Such seems the purport of this dialectico-dithyrambic σχέψις, in which jest and earnest are oddly but not inharmoniously blended. It is characteristic of Plato both in this respect and in the psychological distinction of the two ἴδεα or forms of mental being, upon which the definition is made to rest. Of this conception of ἔρως, we shall see hereafter what its author really thought: but meanwhile it answers its purpose: it is a true accounting of the passion against which Socr. is about to inveigh; and it is something less vile than the cold calculating desire, the ‘passionless prudence,’ recommended by the unloving suitor of Lysias.

c. τὸ εἰληφεῖν ἀναθέλειν] The verb ἀναθέλειν signifies to ‘give back,’ hence to ‘pay,’ i. e. to give in consideration of a previous gift. In phrases like the present it denotes the relation between cause and consequence, a result answering to a foregone cause. ‘They pay the natural penalty,’ or, more generally, ‘the natural result follows.’ Cousin: ‘Il en résulte ce qui était inévitable.’ The act. 175 ι, πάλιν ὡς τὰς ἀντιστροφὰς ἀναθέλειν = ‘the tables are turned.’
D. επέκτιστον δέξα, εφεμέρυν τοῦ ἄριστου] Cons. "Le goût révéle du bien." In 233 d the better horse is styled ἀληθινός δέξας ἐταίρος.

Ε. στασιά[τεστ] The comparison of a mental struggle to a sedition or civil war is frequent in Plato: as in Rep. iv. 442 Ε, ὑφημεν το θυμόειδεν ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στασίς τὰ ὑπάλλ σὺ πρὸς τον λογιστικοῦ.

238. τολμηλεσ] Vulg. πολυμερες. τολμηλεσ, which is the reading of the Boeckh and others, is found also in Stobaeus, Flor. ii. p. 469 Gaisl. The difference in sense is but slight. Comp. Politic. 287 c, κατὰ μέλι τοιων αὐτῶν οἷον ἵνα μειώση κατατασμα, ἐπειδὴ διὰ αὐτὸν κατατασμα, where the speaker alludes to a classification similar to that which follows here.

καὶ τόσως—ἐπερημίζη, κ.κ.λ.] "Celle de ces formes qui se trouve le plus en évidence sort à qualifier la personne qui elle se manifeste." Cons. επερημίζη κατατασμα] Rep. 367 c, τῶν μεγατῶν ἁγαθῶν, ὡς τῶν τε ἀπωβατῶν ... ἅπ. αὐτῶν ἠκολούθα σὲ πρὸς τον κατατασμα, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν. Here itr. 'no very valuable possession.' In the next clause τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμίων, of course, the appetites different from the 'ruling passion' which 'swallows all the rest.' The 'reason of the best' nearly answers to the 'moral reason' of the moderns.

Ε. τῆς δὲ δυναστευόμενης] "Videtur requiri praeecessit, ut ordine sit: πρὸς θλι σὺ ὡς ἀναθέματα καλεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς δὲ δυνα στευόμενης ἑς προσήκει." Badd. Stoll., who adopts δ for γ from a single MS. of Stob, considers the order to be, πρὸς τὴν της δὲ δυναστευόμενης ὡς προσήκει (τοὺς) καλείσθαι, treating the former clause καὶ τάλα δὲ τῶν τάσων ... ὡς προσήκει τον καλείσθαι or
δή καλείσθαι, perhaps τῆς ἀνδροσιν. may be taken as expegeptic or liminary of the preceding ἐπιθυμίας, and equivalent to ἃ ἐσθι ἀνακοίμησιν. The sense will thus be that there can be little doubt as to the names of the same class belonging to appetitos akin to the two just mentioned, whichever of these may for the time be dominant; there can be no doubt, I say, how such names ought to be called, "Nomolos nomina appelloleans, h. c. poneundo est," me Asi renders it.

c. ἑρρωμένως ῥαβδεία, κ.τ.λ.] "In Trinov. Stob. abest ἑρρωμένως. Verba ἑρρωμένως κινήσασα (nam visùs vittisum est) interpretatio fuit participi rhabdeia. Hesych. ἱλαζόντο ἄρμαν, ἑρρωμένως ἐκνούτα. G. Hermann, MS. in mag. This is ingenious but not convincing. Hermes reads nearly as in the text, but seems to have omitted ὅποι αδ and construed ἐπὶ σ. ὄραλα with ἑρρωμένως ῥαβδεία. For the sense see the paraphrase in note on 239 a.


The he quotes J. Pollux i. 19, θεάλητος, φαινόλητος, νυμφάλητος, μοσάλητοι, εἰς Πανιε ἄλλου θεοῦ κατάχαι ἣ κατεγέμινον. Also Eur. Hiph. 141, σὺ τὰς νεκρὰς, εἰς κόλα, εἰς Ἐπάνω κατὰχαι ἣ κατεγέμινον. Also Festus identifies the νυμφάλητοι with the Latin Lymphati, considering Lymphs and Nymphs to be the same. Hesych., in accordance with the present passage, has the gloss: "νυμφάλητοι, οἱ κατεγέμινοι Νήμασι, μάρτιος ἔν δέ και ἐπιτεσσερικοῖ." The Nymphs and Muses seem originally to have been the same. Hence the temple of the Muse at Elisides near the scene of this dialogue. Comp. infra, p. 278 b, and note.

ἀποτράπατον] It is more proper to
Elen, ὣς φέρωτε. ὃ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὃν περὶ οὖθεν θυμεῖται. θάλαττες δὲ δὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγομεν, τὸς ὁφέλεια ἡ βλάβη, ἀπὸ τὸ ἐρότατο καὶ μὴ τῷ χαριζομένῳ ἔκεκτος συμβιβάζεται.

Τῷ δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ δουλεύοντες τῇ ἦδονῇ ἀνάγκη σου τὸ ἐρωτόμενῳ ὡς ἤδικον ἑαυτῷ παρασκευάζειν, νοοῦντι δὲ πάν ἡδυ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνων, κρείττον δὲ καὶ ἴσον ἐχθρόν. οὕτε δὴ κρείττω | οὐτε ἴσοχομένοι ἐκῶν ἑραστῆς παιδικὰ ἀνέχεται, ἦττω δὲ καὶ ὑποδεέστερον αἰὲ ἀπεργάζεται. ἦττον δὲ ἀμαθῆς σοφοῦ, δειλὸς ἀνδρεῖος, ἀδύνατος εἰπών ῥητορικῷ, βραδὺς ἀγγύς. τοσοῦτων κακῶν καὶ ἐπὶ πλειόνων κατὰ τὴν διάλυσιν ἑραστὴν ἐρωτόμενω ἀνάγκη γυναικών τε καὶ φύσει ἐννοτών, τῶν μὲν ἱδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν, ἡ στέρεσθαι τοῦ βαραυτικά ἱδέας. φθονερῶν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἀλλῶν συνωστῶν ἀπείρουσα καὶ ὄφελίμον, θεῖν ἃν μάλιοτε ἀνήφρονο, μεγάλης αἰτίων εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς θείας ἐφοριμωτάτος εἰς. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὅν, ἢ ἑραστῆς παιδικῇ ἀνάγκῃ πόρ-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ρωθεὶς εἰργείς, περίφροβος ὅποτ' τοῦ καταφρονήθηναι τά
tε ἄλλα μηχανάσθαι ὅπως ἄν ἢ πάντ' ἁγροῦ καὶ πάντ' ἀποβλέπουν εἰς τὸν ἑαυτόν, οἴος ὁν τῷ μὲν ἠδοςτος,
εἰς τό δὲ βλαβερῶτατος ἄν εἰπ. ἔτι μὲν οὐν κατὰ διά
νοιαν ἐπιτρέποτε τε καὶ κοινῶνων οὐδαμῇ λυστηλῆς ἄντηρ
ἐχον ἔρωτα.

Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἦσιν τε καὶ θεραπεῖαν οἴον τε καὶ
ὡς θεραπεύει οὗ ὃν γένηται κύριος, ὁς ἔδει πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἠνάγκασται διώκειν, δεὶ μετα ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὁφθη-
σται δὲ μαθητῶν των καὶ οὗ στερεόν διώκειν, οὐδ' ἐν
ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένον ἀλλ' ὑπὸ συμμυγής σκιᾶς, πό-
νων μὲν ἄνδρειων καὶ ἑρωτών ἔξω κρίνειν, ἐμπεριον
dὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάρτου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίως χρώμασαι καὶ
κόσμοις χρῄζει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον, οὐσα τε ἄλλα τούτων
ἐπεταίρα, πάντα ἐπιτρέποντα. ἀ δήλω καὶ οὗκ ἄξιων πε-
ρατέρω προβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν κεφαλαίων ὑρίσασμάν εἶν
ἀλλ' ἐπεταίρα, τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον σώμα ἐν πολέμω τε καὶ ἐλ-
λαίοις χρείας ὅσα μεγάλα οἱ μὲν ἐπερθοὶ ταρακώσων, οἱ ὃ
dὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἐρασται φοβοῦνται. Τούτῳ μὲν οὐν ὁς
δήλων ἐστεῖν.

c. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν τ' οὕτως λέγειν. οὐ 

thus we see that in respect of his mental cul-
ture he can hardly have a less desirable 
guardian or companion (compare ὅμα
τε καὶ ἑπιστρεπτειν inf. d) than a lover.

Having proved this, Socr. proceeds to 
show that the influence of a lover will 
be equally beneficent as regards, 1. the 
physical condition; 2. the estate of the 
πνεύμα.

As regards the first, the lover will 
prefer an effeminate weakling to a manly 
and robust person—one bred in the 
chequered shade to a youth hardened 
by exposure to the clear sunshine, &c. 
Observe that the mark of effeminacy 
among the Greeks is intolerance of heat, 
not, as in more northern climates, of 
cold. Eur. Bacch. 456, Λευκὴν δὲ χρόλαν 
ἐπὶ παρασκευὴν ἔχεις ὡν ἡλίου βολαί-
σιν, ἄλλ' ὡς ψυκτικής, ἤχον Ἀφροδίτης 
καλλίνθη θηραμέων. Απεικόνισε Ερε.
vii. 555 d, ὅταν... ἔχει ἔξω πύρινα, 
ζωικοὺς, παρασκευήν ἐν μέσῃ πλω-
σίᾳ ἐνεκτειρίζετο τελικά λέει 

σέρκας ἀλλοτρίως, τὸν ἐπιστάτα τε καὶ 
αὐτοῖς μετέχει, κ.π.λ. καὶ for συμμυγή 
σκί, Pers. Sat. v. 60, Tune clausus trans-
isse dies, inventae palatium, which 
however is hardly to the point. The 
modern Italians have a proverb, 'Dove 
non entra il sole, entra il medico.' On 
sυμμυγή see K. G. Herm. remarks, "oppor-
tinitur hælo καθαρῷ, ut solis lux commixta eam umbra intelligatur." MS. ubi supra. 

[πρωτόν [πρώτον] Ηerm. οἰκείως χρώμα 

λέγει τὸν ἄνω γνωσμάτων... ἐν τοῖς 

ἀνυπόλομοις οἱ ἄναυτρα. Hence 
d. ἀλλοτρίως χρώμασι,] "with false or 
artificial colours and ornaments, for lack 
of such as are native." Comp. Gorg. 
465 ο, ττχθαί καὶ χρώμασι καὶ λεοτορ 
καὶ ἑθομένων ἅπαστα, ὅταν τοιού 
ἀλλο-

τριον κάλλος ἐφελκουμένον τοῖς 

οἴκειοι τοῦ δια τῆς γνωσματικῆς ἀμέλειας. 

χρῄζει (used only in the dative sing.) is a 
Homeric word first introduced into prose by 
Plato. ἑρχεται, κ.τ.λ. περιποιεῖν. Plutarch (Mor. 511 d) quotes 
this passage from the Phaedr., substitut-

ing however σχήματος for the κόσμος 
of the received text, apparently by a slip 
of memory.
Τὸ δ’ ἐφεξῆς ῥήτευον, τίνα ἢμών ὄφελεσαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην ἐπεί τὴν κτήσεως ἢ τοῦ ἐρώτησεν ὦμιλία τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεῖα παρέξεται. σαφές δὴ τούτῳ γε παντὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ, ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εἰνοουσίων καὶ θεωσίων κτημάτων ὄρφανον πρὸ παντὸς εὐξαίτ’ ἂν ἐπαίνε τῶν ἐρώτησεν. πατρός γὰρ καὶ μητέρας καὶ ἄργενην καὶ φίλων στέφεσθαι ἄν αὐτὸν δέξατο, διακλιώτας καὶ ἐπιτιμητὰς

240 ἡγομένοις τῆς ἡδονῆς | πρὸς αὐτὸν ὄμιλίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀνύηται γ’ ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἡ τυφός ἀλής κτήσεως οὐτ’ εὑραίτον ὦμοιος οὔτ’ ἀλούτα εὐμεταχείριστον ἦγησεται. ἔξ ὑπ’ πάση ἀνάγκη ἐραστῆν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖς μὲν ὀνύηται κεκτημένοις, ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαμοῖς, ἀπαιδα, ἀοὐκον δι τὸ πλείστον χρόνων παιδικὰ ἐρασθής εὐχαίτ’ ἂν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὐτοῦ γλυκό ὡς πλείστον χρόνων καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

Β. Ἐστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀλλὰ κακά, ἀλλὰ τις δαιμόνων ἐμεξεῖ τοὺς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραντικὰ ἡδονῆν. οἶνον κόλακα, διενόθη πηθὼ καὶ βλάβη μεγάλη, ὦμος ἐπέμειξεν ἢ φύσις ἡδονής τινα ὢκ ἄμουσον. καὶ τοῖς ἐτάιρων ὡς βλαβερῶν ψέξεις ἄν, καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλά τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων θρεματών τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεῖσιν, οὐτ’ τὸ γε καθ’ ἡμέραν ἦδυ

0 στοιχεῖον εἰπεῖ ἄπαρχει. παιδικοῖς δὲ ἐρασθῆς πρὸς τὸ βλαβερῷ καὶ ἐσ’ τὸ συνημερεύειν πάντων ἀγαθῶντος. ἱλικα γάρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τῶν ἱλικῶν. ἡ γάρ, οἶμαι, χρόνου ἴσθης ἐπ’ ἴσας ἡδονάς ἀγουσία δι’ ὀμοιότητας φυλλάν παρέχεται ἀλλ’ ὦμος κόροι γε καὶ ἦ τούτων συνον-

240. B. “Εστι μὲν δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] Having shown that the relation of ἔραστής and παιδικά is injurious to the latter both in mind, body, and estate. Soor. proceeds to show that it is attended with no compensating pleasures, like those which a κόλαξ or ἐτάιρα may be supposed to offer. Ἀν ἔραστής is in fact the most disgusting of all companions, ἔκειν κόλακα, διενόθη πηθὼ καὶ βλάβη μεγάλη] Athen. vi. 254 ε. (οἱ κόλακες) ἑστοιεῖται ὡς τοῖς ἄγαθον τῶν ἄνδρῶν κατ- ευθυνόντων φησὶν γοῦν Ἀνάξιαις. οἱ κόλακες εἰσὶ τῶν ἐρώτων οἰκεῖοι Ἰκαναίοις, κ.τ.λ. The κόλαξ of the old and middle comedy is identical with the παράδοτον of later times. One of his qualifications was the possession of a ready wit. So Euclis (κόλακες, ap. Athen. i. 1. 236 b), δι’ ἄρα ἀρκετὰ πολλὰ τὸν κόλακ’ εὐθέως λέγει, ἡ τάξεις; ἢ φέρεται ἑραξεί. This is probably the θάνατον ὦκ ἀμωμοῖς to which Plato alludes. ἡ διάστοια] This Ionic or old Attic dat. occurs repeatedly in Plato: as inf. p. 275, ἄν ἦμεραν δεῦτα: 278, ἀδαιν σ. Inferior MSS. frequently give the common form instead.

These particles occur together in an interrogative sentence. Placed. 72 δ, τις μηχανή μη σοφί πάντα καταναλοθήκε εἰς το τεύχον; and Symp. 197 λ, τις ἐναυσώσεται μη σοφί ἢ ἐρωτοί εἴναι σοφίας; In all such cases the sentence is virtually negative.

* φυλασσεῖ τὸ καρπουτόνως *'being ever watched with the most jealous vigilance,' *καρπουτόνως* is preferred by Ast, who cites Rep. iii. 509 c. But the Bodl. and the majority of MSS. support the reading in the text, which is further confirmed by the Lexicographers. In Aristoph. Ran. 958, on the other hand, there can be little doubt that εἰκνέ τοκεῖον ἐστιν the true reading, not καρπουτόνως, as generally given, and as quoted here by Stallb.

*ἀναφέρων τὸ ἐπιτύμνησιν* Boll. ἀναφέρων τε καὶ ἐπιτύμνησιν καὶ ὑπερβαλλόντας, which Stallb. strange to say, admits into his text, not perceiving that the καὶ is a remnant of another reading ἀναπετυμέρων τε καὶ ἐπιτύμνησιν, found in five MSS. With equal want of tact he rejects the excellent emendation of Heim., ἐπαυγάσθη για τὸς υπόκειμος, which means next to nothing. In this, however, he is supported by his own counter-
The image contains a page from a book in Greek and Latin. The text appears to be a mix of both languages, with the Greek text on the left and the Latin text on the right. The Greek text is discussing a philosophical topic, possibly related to ethics or metaphysics, while the Latin text seems to be a commentary or annotation on the Greek text. The page number is 241, and the title at the top is "ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ." (Phaidros.)
βαλών ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διόκειν ἀγανακτοῦν καὶ ἐπιθέαζον, ἡγομονεῖ τὸ ἀπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἔρωτί καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἀνοητῷ χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺς μᾶλλον μὴ ἔρωτι καὶ νοῦν ἐγοντι εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαίον εἰπ’ ἐνδοῦν εὑρέτον ἀπίστω, δυσκόλον, φθονερῷ, ἀπεθανοῦν, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς υἱόσιαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τοῦ σώματος ἔξω, πολὺ δὲ βλαβεροπάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς πάθεσιν, ἢς οὐτε ἀνδρόποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμώτερον οὔτε ἐπιστικῶς οὔτε ποτὲ ἐσται. Ταῦτα τε οὐν χρῆ, ὅ παϊ, ἐξωνοία, καὶ εἰδεναι τὴν ἔραστος φύλαν, ὅτι οὐ μετ’ εἰνοιας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίων τρόπων, χάρων πληρομνῆς.

Ὁς λύκοι ἄρ’ ἀγαπῶν, ὅς παῖδα φιλοῦν ἔρασται.

Τοῦτ’ ἐκείνῳ, ὅς Φαίδρε, οὐκέτ’ ἀν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσαις ἐμοὶ λέγοντος, ἀλλ’ ἡδὴ σοι τέλος ἔχετω ὁ λόγος.

Φ.Α. Καίτοι ἦμιν γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν, καὶ ἔρειν τὰ ἵσα περὶ τοῦ μη ἔρωτον, ὡς δεῖ ἐκεῖνο χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγον ὅσ’ ἀν’ ἔχει ἄγαθα. νῦν δὲ δή, ὅ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαίνει;

Σ.Α. Οὔκ ὠσθον, ὅ μακάρι, ὅτι ἡδὴ ἐτ’ ἀγάμομαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι διώραμβος, καὶ τούτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ’ ἐπαίνειν τὸν ἐτερὸν ἀρξομαι, τί με οὔτε ποιήσων; ἄρ’ οὔτ’ ὅτι

have given πάλινφθα’, sc. τὰ ἐλέουσα, for the τὰ λεοκτ. of Herm. See L. Dindorf in Steph. Lex. v. ἐλέουσα. Mainzke gives πιπτρατα πάλιν.

ἐπιθέαζον] So Bekk. The Boll, and several others have ἐπιθεάζων, adopted by Stallb. But ἐπιθέαζον is the true Attic form, as appears from Pherecrates, Com. ap. Stuid., ἐπεγρον ἀρτατα κατιθεαζε τ’ σαρη, as now read, instead of the unmetrical κατιθεαζε. Hesych. too and the Gramm. are generally in favour of this form. See Blumf. ad Choeeph. 813. Hesych.: ἐπιθεάζειν θεοῦ ἐπικαλέται.

c. el ὑπὲρ, δικασκάνοι εἶς, κ.τ.λ.] ‘else must he needs surrender himself to one as false as he is morose jealous and disagreeable,’ &c. εἶναι is in the σερντ οἴλιγγεις dependent on the foregoing ὅτι.

ἀλλὰ σιτίων τρόπων, χάρων πληρομνῆς] These words, as Stallb. explains, are not to be taken with γίγνεται, but with the φιλοῦσιν of the following line. The same sentiment occurs Χομ. Συμμ. viii. 15, ἐπι πρὸς τὰ στίχα διὰ πληρομνῆς ἄναγκη καὶ πρὸς τὰ παυδίκα πάθεσιν. The hexameter line is doubtless Plato’s, as appears from the exclamation of Soct, τοῦτ’ ἐκείνῳ! ‘I told you so,’ viz. that I was in danger of an access of νυμφαρχία: ‘and behold already, not content with dithyrambs, I have got into heroics.’ For τοῦτ’ ἐκείνῳ comp. Ατ. Λεχ. 41, τοῦτ’ ἐκείνῳ οὐδ’ ἀληθώς. D. ἦς λύκοι ἄρ’ ἀγαπῶν] Hence the happy compound λυκοφύλα, by which the intercourse of Plato with Dionysus II. is characterized, Epist. III. p. 318 ετ’ ἄγαθα καὶ οὖν λυκοφύλα καὶ ἀκούσων.

Ε. ἡδὴ ἐτ’ ἀγάμομαι, κ.τ.λ.] See Hom. Π. xii. 262, 5.
υπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς μὲ σὺ προῦβαλες ἐκ πρωνιῶν, σταθῆρας ἐνθουσιάσω; λέγω οὖν ἐνι λόγῳ ὅτι, ὅσα τῶν ἔτερον λειλοδορήκαμεν, τῷ ἐτέρῳ τάναντι τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσετε, καὶ τί δεί μακρὸν λόγον; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἰκανῶς εἴρηται. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ μύθος, ὃ τι πάσχεις προσήκει καὶ αὐτῷ, τούτῳ πείσταιν καὶ χαίρῃ τῶν σεταθῶν | τοῖς διαβασὶ ἀπέργουμαι, πρῶτο υπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖξον ἀναγκασθήναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 182 κεὶ αὐτῷ, τούτῳ πείσταιν καὶ ἑαυτῷ τῶν σεταθῶν ἀπόφημι ἀποφήμι ἢ μεν. 183 ΣΩ. Θεός γὰρ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὃς παρέλθη, καὶ ἀνεχθὲς χαμάμισις. οἷς γὰρ ἔγω τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου ἡ γενομένη μηδέν πλείον ἢ σὲ πεπονηκόφυς γεγενήθαι ἦτοι αὐτῶν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἐν γὲ τῷ πρῶτῳ προσαναγ-κάζοντα. Συμμίζω Θεοῦ μισεῖροι λόγον τῶν δὲ ἄλλων


182, μεσαίως ἢ ἦσσαν ἡ καλωμένη σταθῆρα] The adjs. σταθῆρας being derived from ἱστασθαι, Heind. is offended by the tautology, and ejects the words ἡ δὴ καλωμένη στ. as a "Grammatici additamentum." To this Stalib. replies (not without merit) that it is very common to find clauses in the text of Plato which have all the appearance of glosses. I confess that Heind.'s suspicion appears to me but too probable, though I have not ventured, in the face of the testimonies appealed to by Ast., to bracket the questionable words. ἡ δὴ καλωμένη ἔσται means already, "it is now high noon," and σταθῆρα adds nothing to the idea. Unless indeed we suppose that Plato fancies that σταθῆρα is derived from σταθεῖει, a supposition not perhaps altogether inadmissible, considering the general character of his etymologising. The word occurs Aesch. fr. ψυχαγωγ., quoted by Phot. and Zuid., σταθεῖας χευμάτοις, which Phot. exp. by σταθώμενοι, adding καὶ ἀριστοφάνης ἐν πρώτων: Σταθῆρα δὲ καλωμένη ἢ βαθμίς, where it must mean 'full- blown,' rather than 'abiding,' μνήμων, as Phot. interprets. In Antimachus, as quoted ibid., we have θέρεσα σταθηρέως for 'midsummer,' or the 'summer solstice.' "Greci omnino quae nominant ad annum vel secentum vergunt usque dictum. Hinc stateros firmos, floruentes, et crūros integerrimos. Nic. Theriac, ἡλιόφων προτάτῳ ἤσταται Ακτίνι." Rulnik ad Tim. in v. σταθῆρα, q.v. Dind. (in Steph. Lex. vii. p. 641) agrees with Rulnik, and Heind. in ejecting the obnoxious word.


I strike out of the account, i.e. make an
πάμπολυ κρατεῖς. καὶ τῶν αὖ δοκεῖς αὐτίκος μοι γεγενητόθαι λόγῳ τυλίγθημα.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεσι. ἀλλὰ τῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ ᾧ.

ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ ἐμελλὼν, ὡ γαθε, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ ἐώθος σημεῖον μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—ἀεὶ δὲ με ἐπίσχευ, δ’ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν—, καὶ των φωνὴν ἐδοξᾶ αὐτόθεν ἀκούσαί, ᾗ μὲ οὐκ ἐὰν ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὡς τὴ ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τῷ θείῳ. εἰμὶ δὴ οὐν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάντω δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαύλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαντῷ μόνον ἴκανος, σαφῶς οὖν ἤδη μανθάνω τὸ ἀμάρτημα,

exception in favour of, 'Simmias of Thebes.' Theaeet. 162 d, τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκ τῶν λέγει καὶ τῶν γράφει περί αὐτῶν, ἄν εἰλέν ἢ ἐν τῆς εἰλέν, ἔλειρά. The filologia of Simmias is anowhed by himself, Phaed. 85 ε, τὸ μὲντο τὸ λέγομεν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχως, καὶ μὴ προσφέροντακαίρον ἂν ἂν πανταχ’ ἐκείνων ἀπαίη για, πάνω μελέτους εἶναι ἀναδρο. In the Crito he is said to have offered a sum sufficient to procure the liberation of Soer, p. 45 p. He and his inseparable friend Cebes are mentioned in the 13th Platonic Epistle, p. 363. They are both called νέανσοι in the Phaedo. The mention of Simmias in the Phaedrus may therefor be thought an argument against its early composition, for we can hardly suppose that he and Cebes visited Athens and became known to Soer, before the termination of the Peloponessian War, intercourse between Athens and Thebes being inconceivable during the continuance of hostilities.

μέν, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἂεὶ ἀποτρέψει με τούτον ἢ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ ὅσον. So Cie. de Divin. i. 54, "Si vinum quidam, quod daemonium appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nuncum impellentetur, suspe revocanti." The clause ἂς δὲ μ’ ἐπίσχευ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, if taken literally, implies much more than this, and Heind. and Hirsch, would expel it accordingly. ἂς may however have the sense of ἔκανεν, so that ὅταν γένηται shall be implied. 'Every time (it occurs) it restrains me from the thing, whatever it be, that I intend doing.' On the other hand, there seems no sufficient motive for this voluntary piece of information. And we may easily comprehend how the clause might be introduced by a copyst, mindful of the passage in the Apology from which the fabricator of the spurious Thesig apparently took his circumstantial statement (Thesig. 128 b). There is some difficulty in reconciling the testimony of Plato and Xenophon on the subject of δαιμόνιον. Those interested in the question will do well to consult Kühner's preface to his edition of the Memorabilia, p. 18 seq. On the confusion of δαιμόνιον and δαιμων by later writers, the reader is referred to a note on A. Butler's Lectures on Philosophy, vol. i. p. 375.

c. ἢ μὲ οὖν ἐὰ] The voice, he says, forbade him to depart before he had made his peace with heaven. His own power of divination, though limited, was sufficient to reveal to him the nature of this offence. Hermet., ἀφωσίωσις, δεινότατος παραλείμματος ἀποκλήμασις.
ός δή τοι, ἡ ἐταῖρη, μαντικῶν γέ τι καὶ ἡ φυχή. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔδραξε μέν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον, καὶ ποιο δὲ ἐνυσσοπούμην καὶ Ἰβυκοῦ, μὴ τι παρὰ θεῶς ἄμβλακὼν τιμᾶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἄμεινας νῦν δ' ἡσυχαῖα τὸ ἀμάρτημα.

ΦΑΙ. Δέγεις δὲ δὴ τί;
Σ. Λέων, ὁ Φαίδρη, λέων λόγον αὔτός τε ἐκάμισας ἐμὲ τῇ ἱμάγκαςας εἰπένι.
ΦΑΙ. Ἡ γὰρ τῆς;
Σ. Διότι καὶ ὑπὸ τι ἀσεβῆ οὐ τίς ἂν εἰῇ δεινότερος;
ΦΑΙ. Οὐδεὶς, εἰ γε σοῦ ἁληθῆ λέγεις.
Σ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἐρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεῶν των ἤγει;
ΦΑΙ. Δέγεται γε δή.
Σ. Οὐ τι ὑπὸ γε Ἀυγοῦ, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, Ἐ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρμακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη, εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ὠσπερ ὅπον ἔστι, θεὸς ἢ τοῦ θεῶν ὁ Ἐρως, οὔτε ἂν κακὸν εἴη τὸ δὲ λόγῳ τῷ νῦν δή περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέτην ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄντος. ταύτη τε οὖν ἠμαρτανέτην περὶ τῶν Ἐρωτα, ἐτι τε τῇ εὐθυθείᾳ αὐτοῦ πάνι αὐτεία, τὸ μὴ δὲν ὑγεῖς λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθῆς σεβοῦσθαι τε ἡσυχαῖα τὸν ὄντε, εἰ ἄρα ἄνθρωποις τινὰς ἔξαπατήσαντε

"for, in point of fact, the soul herself is a creature endowed with the gift of prophecy." Comp. Tim. 71 ε. εἰ ἐκτοπέστωτε ἤμας... κατάστησαν ἐν τούτῳ (σο. τῷ ἡπατι) τὸ μαντεῖον.

καὶ παῖς ἐνυσσοπούμην] 'I had a kind of misgiving.' Heyseh. διασαύας τῇ ἐνυσσοπίᾳ, φοβεῖσθαι. The line of Ibycus is quoted with slight variations in Soeid. under the words ἠμαρτανέτωτε καὶ ἔκινεσθαι, ἐνυσσοπίᾳ, οὐκεῖοι, τοῖς τε παρὰ θεῶν, probably stood in the original, and so Bergk, frag. Ibycy 51. Soer. fears 'lest he should purchase honour from men at the price of offending heaven.' His speech had gratified Phaedr., but had given offence to Eros, by misrepresenting his character.

ε. σεβοῦσθαι ὡς τι ἄντε] Coms.: "de se donner l’air d’être quelque chose parcequ’ils imposaient peut-être aux esprits frivoles et dévoilant leurs suffrages." For this folly and impiety combined Soer. knows of but one form of expiation: he must compose a paenicide, as Stesichorus did in a parallel case. The first of the two poems of Stesichorus is usually cited under the title Ἑλλὸς πέρις. The longest surviving fragment is that found in the Schol. to Eur. Orest. 243. In it Stesichorus asserts that Tyndareus the father of Helen having neglected to sacrifice to Aphrodite, the goddess wreaked her displeasure on his daughters Helen and Clytemnestra, whom she caused to be δηγήμενος καὶ γῆγήμους καὶ ησυχαίρημα. It was in these epithets, seemingly, that the offence lay: as we may
eidokimíseton en aitíou. emoi mén oún, ó phíle, kathērasmatai анаγκη. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογίας καθαρὸς ἄρχαιος, ἐν Ὠμήρος μὲν οὐκ ἦσθετο, Στησίχορος δὲ τῶν γὰρ ὁμμάτων, στερηθεῖσι διὰ τὴν Ἑλένην κακηγοριάν, οὐκ ἤγινθης ωσπέρ Ὠμήρος, ἀλλὰ ἄτε μουσικὸς ὑν ἔγρα ἡν αἰτία, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐθὺς Οὔκ ἔστι εἰμι τῶν λόγων οὗτος, οὔ" ἔβας ἐν νησίων εὐσέλμους, οὐδ' ἵκοι Πέργαμα Τροῖας, καὶ ποιήσας δὴ ἐπάνω τὴν καλομένην παλιοφδιαν, παραχρήμα ανέβλεψεν. ἔγιν οὖν σοφότερος ἐκεῖνων γενήσομαι καὶ αὐτὸ γε τοῦτο. πρὶν γὰρ τὴν παθεῖν διὰ τὴν Ὠμήρου κακηγορίαν περάσομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλιοφδιάν, γυμνῆ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ οὐκ ὡσπέρ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. 

ΦΑΙ. Τούτων, ὦ Σώκρατε, οὐκ ἔστω ἅττ' ἂν ἐμοὶ ἔπετε ἴδιος.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ, ὦ γαθῆ Φαίδρε, ἐννοεῖς ὡς ἀναιδῶς ἐνρηθεῖν τὸ λόγω, οὕτως τε καὶ ὡς τὸ βιβλίον ῥηθεῖς. εἰ γὰρ ἀκούοι τις τύχου ἡμῶν γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶσος τὸ ἔθος, ἔτερον δὲ τοιούτου ἔρων ἦ καὶ πρότερον ποτὲ ἐρασθεὶς, λεγόμενον ὡς διὰ σμικρᾶ μεγάλας ἔχθρας ἐρασταὶ ἀναιροῦται καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ παιδικὰ φθονερὸς τε καὶ βλαβερὸς, πῶς ὅπελε γὰρ ἄτε τοιοῦτου ἔγερθη πρὸς τὸν παιδικὸν καὶ αὐτὸν ἔλευθερον ἔρωτα.
Δ ἔθορακότων, πολλοῦ δὲ ἰνδέιν ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖν ἄ ψέγορεν τοῖς Ἕρωται.

Π. Ἡσυχίας μὴ δὲ, καὶ ᾿Σκόρρατες.

ΣΩ. Τούτων γε τοίνυν ἔγονε αἰσχυνόμενοι, καὶ αὐτῶν τοῖς Ἕρωται δεδώτας, ἐπιθυμῶν ποτίμου λόγος οὗτος ἄλμηραν ἀκοῦν ἀποκλύσεσθαι. αὐμβούλευσα δὲ καὶ Ἀυώη ὦ τι τάχιστα γράψαι ὡς χρῆ ἑραστῇ μᾶλλον ἡ μῆ ἔρωτι τοῖς ὁμοίων χαρίζεσθαι.

Π. Ἀλλʼ εἴ σὺ ἂν έτι ἔξει τοῦθ᾿ οὕτως σοι γὰρ ἐνπόντος τοῦ τοῦ ἑραστοῦ ἐπαινοῦ, πάσα ἀνάγνη Αυώην ἐν ὑπʼ ἔρωτι ἀναγκασθήναι γράψαι αὖ περὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν λόγου.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν πιστεύον, ἐωστερ ἄν ἦν ὦ σοι.

Π. Λέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩ. Ποῦ δὴ μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὄν ἐλεγοῦ; ὡν καὶ τούτῳ ἀκοῦσῃ, καὶ μη, ἀνήκοος ὡν, θάση ταρσάμενος τῷ μη ἔρωτι.

Π. Οὗτος παρὰ σοι μάλα πλήρων ἀεὶ πάρεστιν, ὅταν σοὶ βουλῇ.

ΣΩ. Οὐτωσι τούτων ὡ ταῖ καλέ, ἔννοησον, ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἱλίου πρότερος ἦν | λόγος Φαῦδρος τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρί- νοσίου ἄνδρος δὲ μὲν λέγειν, Ἑπισχύρου τοῦ Εὐφημίου, Ἰμεραίου. λεκτέος δὲ δέ, ὡτι Οὐκ ἑστιν ἐτύμος

Isocr. de Pace, p. 335, ἐν προθέσει πλη- ροίην, τοιοῦτοι μὲν ἔτοιν καὶ τοῖς διόλους εἰςελθόντων, τοῖς δὲ πολίταις μὲν ἐκλέκτοις ἐξέπεμπτοι. Also Plat. Legg. iv. 707, and Juv. viii. 174, "Pereat nautas et furibus et fugitivis."

Δ. παῦ τοῖς λόγοις—ἀποικύσασαθα. Probably suggested by Eur. Hipp. 653, & "γάρ οὔτε ναυσιοῦ ἐξυμβρέθαι Εἰς ὅτα κλάων. Soer. in like manner would fail purge his ears of the pestilent stuff he had heard by the infusion of more wholesome doctrine. Presently ἐκ τῶν ὁμών answers to our *caeteris paribus.*


Οὗτος παρά σοι—πάροστοι] Cobet, Vv. Ll. p. 119, somewhat rashly observes in reference to this passage: "Graecum est parum sui, non parum par a su. Scribe par a su, et apparebit quid sit verbo parum suum faciendum." But in Soph. phil. 1057 we find: ἔτοιν παρειτι μὲν Τίμωρος παρὰ ἦ σοι. Par a de par aesti is hardly to be construed on an illeprose writer on the strength of a (doubtful) reading of Lucian, as by Cobet, i. 1.

244. Φαῦδρος τοῦ Πυθοκλέους] All the proper names in this section are treated as significant. Φαῦδρος is the 'bright showy one'; Πυθοκλῆς perhaps = ὁ κλέως ἐπίδρα, a herculean to vulgar rumour or popular fallacy; Ἐφεμισάκουος quasi ὁ μυθιστος κατακλεισις (Rep. ii. 372 b), a lover of festivity; Ἑπισχύρος, Ἰμεραιο, and ἔφινα εξ αὐτος themselves. Accounts vary with respect to the name of the father of Stesichorus, no less than five names being mentioned by Suid., of which Soer. has selected the most poetical.

Οὐκ ἑστιν ἐτύμος, κ.τ.λ. It is a fallacy,
sends Socon, to argue that because the lover is mad, therefore the unlover should have the preference. It might be so, were madness per se an evil; but this is not so. There is a divine as well as a human madness; and the divine madness is the choicest gift of heaven to man. Its kinds, or some of them, are then enumerated.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, οὐ γὰρ τέκνη προφήτης ἢ ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς ἱστορίαν ἐφ’ ὅσιόν τε καὶ καλά ιδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα εἰργάσαντο, σωφρονύσαντο δὲ βραχέας ἢ οἰδίδεν, καὶ εἰὼν δὴ λέγομεν Σιβυλλάν τε καὶ ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴ χρώμενοι ἐνθέω πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προλέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὀρθώσαν, μυκάνουμεν ἄν δὴ λα μαντικὴ χρώμενοι ἐνθέω πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προλέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὀρθώσαν, μυκάνουμεν ἄν δὴ πολλὰ παντὶ λέγοντες, τὸ δὲ μὴν ἄξων ἐπιμαρτύρασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὄνομα παθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρῶν ἴππον τοῦ ὄνομα χρώμενοι, οὐ γὰρ ἄν τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ὅ τοῦ μέλλον κρίνει, αὐτὸ τά τούτο τούτο ψυχομενες μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν ἀλλ᾽ ὃς

all names were originally significant (Πιθανολόγησις τῆς ἀρχαίας ιστορίας, Crat. p. 388) is developed at great length in the Cratylus. The etymological speculations in that dialogue present a singular mixture of acuteness and extravagance, sometimes bona fide, but sometimes with the design of parroting the ill-regulated ingenuity of Plato's predecessors in the same line, of whom Euthyphron is named, though others are doubtless intended. Perhaps the derivation of μαντική may have been seriously meant. It was at any rate sufficiently plausible to have found favour with the Greeks of that age, as we know from Episthinos that it did in much later times. It also seems to have satisfied Cicero, Div. i. 1. If any justification were necessary it could be found in the fact that the word μαντὶς is used by Homer, who was quite ignorant of the connexion between frenzy and the prophetic art. Yet Heind. censures Plato for not perceiving its connexion with μάντις! The bad taste (ἀναιρετικά) of those who inserted the ταῦτα is paralleled by the ἀνίκητα of disguising the true origin of κρυστηρίου by encumbering the final syllable with a τόν. Crat. 414 c. The subsequent derivation of αἰσχριστική (ὁρμητική, ὀρμητική, ἱστορική) is in Plato's broadest style of banter.
καλοῦ ὄντος, ὅταν θεία μοῖρα γίγνεται, οὕτω νομίσαντες ἔθεντο. οἶ δὲ νῦν ἀπεροκάλως τὸ τά ἐπεμβάλλοντες μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων, ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τῆς ὀρθῶς ποιομένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων, ἄτ' ἐκ διανοιας ποριζομένων ἀνθρωπίνη συνήσῃ νῦν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰκονομικὴν ἐπισκόπησαν ἢν δὲ νῦν ὀικονομικὴν τῷ ὁσμούντων σεμινοῦντες οἶ νέοι καλοῦσιν. ὅσῳ δὲ οὖν τελεότερον καὶ ἐντιμότερον μαντικὴ ὀικονομικὴς, τὸ τῆς ὑματικῆς τῷ ὑμάτῳ ἔργον τ' ἔργον, τόσῳ κάλλιον μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανιὰς σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γυγμότητος. Ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσον γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἀ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνυμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τούτω τῶν γενῶν, ἢ μανιὰ ἐγγενεμένη καὶ προφητεύσασα διὸ ἐδεί, ἀπαλλαγὴν εὐρέτο, καταψυχήσα ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, ἀθέν ἀρα καθαρμῶν τα καὶ τελετῶν τυχόντω ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τῶν ἐαυτῆς ἔχοντα πρὸς τοῦ παρόντος καὶ τοῦ ἐπιτελεστής, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθός μανεντὶ 245 τε καὶ καταψυχομένης τῶν παρώντων κακῶν εὐρομένη. | Τριτή

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.


δὲ ἀπὸ Μαυσών κατοκωχή τε καὶ μαντα, λαβοῦσα ἀπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἤγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατὰ τέθας καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθη ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαίων ἐργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγνωμένους παθεῖτε. δὲ δ’ ἂν

agrotantisbibopita pata, sed agroti ipse pia placidum honinnum posteri, quoes nullius proprii delicti conscientia sedvis tacita avitiae nonae exiguit. Haec autem non omnes ejusdem generis homines se aliquotier affectat, sed modo inermittit, modo recrudesceit, ut e. c. τῶν ἔρωτιν τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ Ὀδυσσέους Ταμανῆς μὲν ὧν ἦν βήγενος μῆρα, Αἰθίοπων δὲ τῆς Τιερα-μοῦ, Παια. τοῦ. 5. Ia vis illa hereditarii malis ex τινὶ τῶν γενών erumpit in apertum furorem, quos, eum spiritu divino, tacent aliquis hujus funestae familiae et causas domesticae labis et remedii prae- sagit, addibit quisque piaculorum nostras a parentibus acceptam in omnem tempor abolo. Ila παλαια μυρίσα sunt dirae ultices sive parentum sive aliorum ne- fariis oochorum furiae temeratam domum caecis tabis urgentes, ἡ μέρες τῆς τετελε- λυσθῆσιν. 1 Ambrophanus. p. 636 sqq.

What was the nature of the lustral rites (καθαρισμοὶ) revealed to the favoured eye of madness, we learn generally from a passage of the Cratylus (406 a), in which are enumerated ἐρωτευόμεναι (fumigations), λοστρά, and παροικίσεις, as the most efficacious means of moral as well as physical purification. Compare a very curious passage in Aristides Rhetor, ἱερών ὁλόγων B, i. p. 475, Dind. The opinion that the maniac possessed a special in- sight into the causes and remedies of disease is paralleled in our own times by the belief in clairvoyance. Among special difficulties presented by the passage, we may note—1. the clause δὲ τῶν παλαίων ἐκ μνημάτων πασῶν ἐν τινὶ τῶν γενών, where C. F. Hermann, offended by the absence of the γενών, conjectures ἐν τοῖς τῶν γενών ἐκ μνημάτων, κ.τ.λ. This, however, is but καθάρισμα ἰδαῖον, for there is evidently no place for the conjunctive τῶν. If any alteration were necessary, it would be safer to substitute ἐν (οὐ ἐνυπηρετεῖ) ἢ φησι. But the clause is suggested by a line of the Phaedo of Plato quoted by I. ἐκ τῶν παλαίων ἄρεος ἐκ μνημάτων, l. 934, ἣ δὲ ἔνυπηρετεῖν ἡ ἐκνίασιν a. Ποτὶν ἐκνίασιν, κ.τ.λ. The word means originally

′out of the way of; ′ exempt from;′ hence′ safe and sound;′ frequently used with a gen., as in a line quoted in the Rym., ἀν Ζεὺς γενίσθαι τὴν ἐπὶ ἱπποῖν, ἠνευζεί, ἔξστασες, ἐς ἱππασίας ἐς τῷ ἀγίης. So Hippocrates de Morbis, B. I (Op. ed. Kühn, vol. ii. p. 151), ἂν ἔτι τὸ πολύ ποιοῦν γίνεται: and without a case, ib. B. 3, p. 205, ἢ ἐς ἱπποῖν (ἐς τὰ ἱππασίας ἐς τῷ ἁγίης). The sense is transferred from the patient to the malady, 3. τῶν ἐκνίασιν ἔκοντα: I have retained this, the reading of by far the greater number of MSS., for which AR. Rhet. has τῶν ἵππων ἔκοντα. An attempt has been made to defend the reading of the MSS. by Soph. Oed. 708, ἱππασίας ἐκ άνθρωπος ἔχον τέχνην. But this passage, besides offering a solitary instance of ἔχον with gen., is not really in point. Its true meaning, as Hermann pointed out, is not, 'nemo mortaliim particeps est decimavium,' but rather 'nihil verum humanum ex oculo ortum est.' Nor are the analogies given in Math. Gr. Gr. § 324, to which Ast and Stallb. appeal, to be relied on. It is indeed just possible that this may be an affected poeticism, suggested to Plato by the line in the Oedipus, as he quotes παλαια τῶν μνημάτων in a sense somewhat different from that which the words bear in the original. Even so, why the reflexive pronoun? I think there is much to be said in favour of the suggestion of Dr. Badlam, who observes, 'Postremum vocem (ἔχον) libenter eximium, utpoite a dittographia ortam, τὸν έκνίασιν.' 4, κατασκομένως: this epic use of the sor. 2. mid. for the passive is universally adopted by the Attics in the case of ἔκνιασιν and its compounds. See note to 238 a.

215. κατασκομένως] AR. Rhet. and vulg. κατασκομ. But four or five MSS. give the true form. 

ὑπὸ δὲ ἄν — ἡμαίσθητον, 'who so,' says Soeci, 'knocks at the doors of Poesy untouched with the Muses’ frenzy—
fondly persuading himself that art alone will make him a thorough poet,—neither he nor his works will ever attain perfection, but are destined, for all their cold propriety, to be eclipsed by the effusions of the inspired madman.' Compare Proclus, Politi, p. 365, l. 16, &c.; see also, Seneca, "nee munus non laude est, nolite æquor æquore æque etiam, &c.; and Cato, "nec æque magna poesia est, nec æque confusa est, nec æque inveniri potest." This more intelligible reading is facilitated by Ast and by Bath., who also quote Symm. in defence of it. But the MSS. are unanimous in favour of poetica, which is also the reading of Ar. Rhet., and Seneca has "fustri poeticae foris compos sui populi," de Tranquill. An. c. 16. It is a question whether Plato borrowed from Democritus this now sufficiently trite sentiment. Cic. Div. c. 27, "negat sine furore Democritus quomquam poetae magnum esse possit, quod idem dicit Plato." Hor. A. P. 295, "excludit sanos Heliconem poetas Democritum." Aristotle means much the same thing, Probl. xxx. 1, when he says, μή δια τοι αι σφαίρας μελαγχολίας; a passage referred to by Cic. Tus. v. 33. 80, "Aristoteles ita omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse." In the proverb θόρηδος θέρας the metaphor is preserved though the sentiment differs. In illustration of αστήρας compare inf. 248 b, "αστήρ τοι τοι πάντα" θέρας, and especially the fragm. of Pind., "αστήρ καρπών θέρας" quoted in Rep. v. 457 b, Boeckh, fr. 227. Of the poetical fury Plato elsewhere speaks disrespectfully enough, when he has not, as here, his singing garments on. Compare the Ion, esp. p. 533 e seq., and Meno 99 c, ὡς εἶναι καλῶς θείους τοι ὑβρίζει καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα ἀποδεικνύει, κ. η. Conf. 560 b, μετρητά τοι καὶ κασμία διάκυνν ὡς ἄγροικοι καὶ καταλυκτέρια ὁ ποιήσεως πειθόντες. b. δειττόμενος, ὃν] Stallb. appositely quotes Demosth. contra Symm. 186. 5, εἰ πᾶντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγοντες φάσαι, ὃς ἄν ἢ ἔχει βασιλεία, κ. η. The deponent verb δειττόμενος is borrowed by Plato and the Attics from the Homeric δείκνυμαι. They never use it in the sense of δείκνυς, as Homer and after him Hippocrates sometimes do, but always transitively. See Lobeck, Phryn. p. 220. τῷ ἐρωτήτῳ] Arb. Rhet. τῷ πολιτί. c. δειττόμενος μὲν ἐπίστασις, σοφοὶ δὲ πιστής] The σοφοὶ are those trained to high speculation, as in the Pythagorean and Academic schools; the δειττοὶ may include the litigants of the courts and agora, as well as the ethical and empirical sects. The latter will see no cogency in the argument, as they will reject or fail to comprehend the theory of the soul on which it is based. This theory Soer. proceeds to expound, borrowing, in the early part of his exposition, the dogmatic and oracular tone of the earlier speculatoes, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and the Pythagoreans.
πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης, ἱδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα, τάλθες νοήσαι, ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἦν.

Ψυχή πάσα ἀδανατός. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικύνητον ἀδανατον ὁ δὲ ἀλλὸ κυνῶν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλον κυνούμενον, πάλαιν ἔχουν κυνήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κυνῶν, ἄτε οὐκ ἀπολείπετο ἐαυτῷ, οὐ ποτε λήγει κυνούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχή κυνήσεως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον, εἰς ἀρχὴς γὰρ ἀγάκη τίν πλοῖο γενόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδὲ εἰς ἑνός εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἄν εἰς ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητον ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ αὐτὴν εἰσέχω. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολοµένης οὔτε αὐτὴ ποτε ἐκ τοῦ οὔτε ἄλλο εἰς ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἰπερ εἰς ἀρχῆς δει τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. οὔτα δὴ κυνήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κυνῶν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἀπόκλισθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι διάνοιαν, η πάντα τοις ὡρανῶν πᾶσαν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μῆποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κυνήσθαι γενήσεται. ἀδανατὸν

Psiχ."πάσα." Not "every soul," but rather "all soul," i.e. the vital principle in general. The argument amounts to this, that organization depends on soul, not soul on organization, as will be shown more at length in the excursus on the Erode Discourses of Socrates.

In ei γίγνεται σοι σαφές, ἄσα νοῦ τοῦ ὄρκου γίγνεσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔνας ἄρχης γίγνεται. "Recte mundi supremum esse sunt" (cc, post γίγνεστο). "Sic enim rationem: "Si principium ab alia ex oritur, esse non poterit oriri ex principio; aliquid fam consensus erat omnem rerum a principio oriri oripere." Badh. Præcl. p. vi. Acutely, as usual: but is not the same thing implied in the text as it stands, and as Fic renders it, "ex principio utique non orior tur," i.e. a first principle must in that case derive its existence from something which is not a first principle: as if he had said, ἐγὼ δέν άρχης γίγνεται ἤ, a perfect reductio ad absurdum? G. Herm. explains differently: "Hoc ipsum, τὰ τὸ γεγονόμενον, ex precedentibus repitendum est. Id, si principium a fine gignetur ous ἄν εἰς ἄρχης γίγνεσθαι diít." Ann. in mg. Cicero, who translates this proof in the 6th book of his Repub. c. 25, and repeats his translation in Tuscul. Disp. i. 23, seems by his rendering of this passage to have read ἄρχης for ἄρχης. His words are: "Ip sum (principium) nulla ex re alia nasci potest, nec enim esset id principium quod gignetur alium." Schleiermacher, I observe, has anticipated Badh.'s τοῦτο: "Hinter dem ersten oder zweiten γίγνεται sehr leicht kann τοῦτο ausgefallen sein, da man dem übersetzte muss: "denn wenn der Anfang aus etwas entstanden, so entstande dies nicht aus dem Anfange." But I confess that the comparative difficulty of the MS. reading is with me an argument of its genuineness; and in the second ἄρχης, if it ever existed, I can see only a conjecture of some ingenious glossator. The passage in Theol. Therap. ii. p. 36, 42 Syll. (Gaisf. p. 100) is a quotation from the pseudo-Timaeeus, not from the Phaedrus directly, as Stahl. seems to imagine. From that source probably came the ἄρχης, which would entail the further change of γίγνεται into ἔγν, or ὕπο in Tim. Locr. i. 1, e. γὰρ ἔγνετο, ὧν ἄν ἦν ἄρχη, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα εἰς ἄρχη ἔγνετο. τοῦτο δὲ ous ἀπάλλυσθαι—γενήσεται] In like strain, mutatis mutandis, argues a great physicist of our own day: "To admit that force may be destructible, or
can altogether disappear, would be to admit that matter could be uncreated, for we know matter only by its forces.” Faraday, on the Conservation of Force. After στάσεις we must understand, not δυνάμεις, but some other word, as δύναμις or δύναμεως. Else must all heaven and all created nature collapse and become fixed, having no source of fresh movement or growth remaining.

E. ψυχής οὐδέν τε καὶ λόγον] Comp. Legg. l. 385 ε. ἤ δὲ ψυχή τοῦσμα, τις τούτου λόγον: ἔχουν δὲλον πλὴρος τῶν μὲν δὴ μυθέως τὴν θυμομένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν καὶ κόμισαν: ibid. supra. δὲν οὖν ἕκαστοι περὶ ἔκαστος τρία νοεῖν—ἐν μὲν τῶν οὗτων, ἐν δὲ τῆς οὗτας τοῦ λόγου, ἐν δὲ άρχαια, ὅπου λόγος, as here, is equivalent to δύος or ἄρχαια, of which αύτία is the objective counterpart. Soor. had shown that motion or change must have an ἀρχή, and that this ἀρχή must have the source of its motion in itself, &c. He now proceeds to show that soul only is such an ἀρχή, and that, being such, it is uncreate and immortal, ἀθανασία being implied in αὐθεντικία, τούτου αὐτὸν is used by an ordinary attraction for τοῦτον αὐτὸν, namely τὸ φίλου κυνομένου.

246. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας] ‘concerning its form,’ or ‘tipho,’ or generally, ‘concerning its nature,’ ἰδέα being frequently equivalent to φῶς. The heia kal μάρκα διάγραψις which Soer. declines is developed in the Republic and Timæus: the views which are there reasoned out being here presented in the form of an allegory. For nothing can be more true than Stahl’s remark: “Philosophos quo tempore Phaedrum scripsit, jam tandem de animi humanae natura sententiam animo suo informatam tenuit quam in libris de Republica copiosius illustravit.” All commentators, ancient and modern, have recognized in the Charioteer and his pair of steeds the well-known triple division of the soul into the reasoning, the passionate, and the appetite principles (λογιστικόν, θυμικόν, ἑπιθυμητικόν), which lies at the root of Plato’s ethical doctrine. See Galen de Hippocrate et Plat. (Opp. v. 5, p. 302, ed. Kühn): ὅταν ἄρα τίποτε πρὸς ἔκπληκτον, εἰ καὶ ἐνεργεία πρὸς κάθα λόγος ἔχουσα, τούτου ἐν λογισμῷ πρὸς θυμόν ... συμβαίνει σοὶ ὅτι τῶν φύσεων διαπείδευσαν τὴν συνεχίαν. άλλ' ἔτοι μὲν ἐνεργεία δυσπνεώς ὅπως κατὰ κόσμων ἐκφερόμενος συναπειράχησεν αὐτὴν τὴν ἀληθείαν, κ.τ.λ. And again, p. 246, δι' ὅτι τὸ θυμανόμενον ἔτοι κατὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦντος, καὶ ὅτι τὸ θυμανόμενον ὀλέθνησε συμμαχεῖ τῇ ἐπιθυμητικῇ, δ' ἐνδέξειται (ὁ Πλάτων) τούτο τὸ προερημένον παραδείγματος, alluding to the anecdote of Leontius in Repub. iv. 433 ε. Observe, Plato asserts only that where the reason and the appetites are at variance, the θυμός naturally takes part with the former (ἐν τῇ τῇ ψυχῆς στάσει διὰ τίθεναι πρὸς τὸν λογιστικόν). He nowhere denies that a feud may spring up between the θυμός and the reason. The θυμός is in itself good and of heavenly extraction, but in excess it may disturb the equipoise of the soul, and so produce evil. Whereas the natural tendency of the lower appetites is evil and degrading to human nature, and they are therefore figured here by the low-bred and ill-conditioned steed, as the θυμός is said to be ‘noble and good and of noble and good parentage.’
έοικεν, ἀνθρωπόνης τε καὶ ἐλάττωνος. ταύτη οὖν λέγω-
μεν. Ἑοικέτω δὴ ἐξιμβοῦτο δυνάμει υποπτέρου λεύχους
tε καὶ ἡμῶν θεῶν, μὲν οὖν ὑπ' οὗ τε καὶ ἡμῶν πάν-
tες αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ εἴς ἀγαθοῖς, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
μέμικται. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων ἡμωρόδος B
ἡμῶνεστ, εἰτα τῶν ὑπ' οὗ μὲν αὐτῶ καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς
cαὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτον, δὲ εἴς ἐναντίαν τε καὶ ἐναντίαν. χα-
λετή δὴ καὶ δύσκολος εἰς ἀνάγκης ἡ περὶ ἡμῶν ἡμῶνχυσις.
Πη δὴ οὖν θυγατέρα τε καὶ ἀδανατόν ζωῶν ἐκλήθη, πε-
ρατέων εἰσείν. πάσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῖς ἀνθ-
χοι, πάντα δὲ οὐρανῶν περιπολεί, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἰδέσι
γνωμονής. τελεά μὲν οὖν οὕσα καὶ ἐπιστρωμένη μετεορο-
τορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τοῖς κόσμων διοικεῖ: ἡ δὲ πτεροβ-
ρύησασα φέρεται, ἐως ἄν στερεὰ τοὺς ἀντιλάβηται, οὐ
cατοκισθείς, σώμα γηῦν λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ ἄλλοι δοκοῦν
κινεῖ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμις, ζωῶν τὸ ἐξιμπαν ἐκλήθη,
ψυχὴ καὶ σώμα παγεῖν, θυγατέρα τ' ἐσχεν ἐπωμενίων ἀδα-
νατον δὲ οὐδ' εἴς ἐνὸς λόγου λεογισμένον, ἀλλὰ πλάττο-
μεν οὔτε ἄδιντες οὔτε ἰκανῶς νοστάσεις θεῶν, ἀδανατῶν

B. Πη δὴ οὖν, κ.π.Λ. Σοκρ. now en-
devours to explain the meaning of the
terms ‘mortal’ and ‘immortal animal’
respectively. Stahl. unnecessarily sup-
plies ψυχῆς to be the understood subject of ἐκλήθην.
πάσα ἡ ψυχή] Soul in its entirety, the
soul of the universe, which is also a
providence (ἐπιμελεῖται), regulating mat-
ter and animating its various forms.
This soul is not to be regarded as a per-
sonality excluding all finite personalities,
but rather as including them, as forming
the sum total of the separate intelli-
gences. “Alles Geistige wird hier offen-
bar als eine betrachtet, ohne Unterschied
des Ranges und der Persönlichkeit.”
150, λέγει δὲ τὰ μὲν τοῦ πάντων
πάντως ὑπὸ τοῦτο ψυχῆς ἐπιτροπεῖται,
ὅπερ πάν τυχό πιστῶν.
c. η δὲ πτεροβρύησασα, κ.π.Λ. Certain
souls fall from their high estate, and be-
come incarnate upon the earth, when
they take to them an earthly body, earth
being the heaviest of the elements. The
heavenly bodies, according to the ancient
physicists, are composed of elements purer
and lighter than those which make up
our planet. Having stated the fact of this
lapis animarius, Socr. proceeds
(mythically) to set forth its causes.
λεογισμόν] Badh. proposes λεο-
γισμῆς, on the ground that the perf. of
λογίζωμαι is never used passively.
Stahl. makes no reply to the objection, but
translates λόγος λ. by “ratio apte con-
clusa.” I apprehend that λεογισμένον
is not passive here, any more than in
εν. Iph, A. 386, τὸ λεογισμένον
παρῆ, where λελ. is much the same as
ἐλθον or as εἶ ἐντευμενόν in Crat.
404, where see Heind.. “Immortal it can-
not be called on any principle of sound
reason,”—ἵπτον εὐπολομάχων being supplied
from the foregoing clause. A similar
perfect is ἐπαγγελαί (negligent, re-
marks), Ἀρ. Eth. N. x. 4. 10. The only
tense of λογίζομαι which the Attics use
passively seems to be the aor. 1, ἔλογι-
ζῆν.

Ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν] ‘but though we never
saw nor have adequately conceived him,
we figure a God as a kind of immortal
animal, possessing both a soul and a body
combined in a unity which is to last for
ever.' In the Timaeus the created gods are compounded of body and soul, which can only be put aside by the will of the supreme Deity. In the ἄλοιποι or inferior divinities, the union is essentially indissoluble. In the tenth of the Laws, on the other hand, Plato inclines to the notion that even the created gods may be incorporeal (Laws, p. 899 A). Possibly the words in the text are to be understood as conveying an apology for his temerity in speculating upon the subject at all.

The grand Miltonic pomp of this passage exceeded the comprehension of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose criticisms on Plato and on Thucydides are of nearly equal rigidity (De admirabili vi discendi in Deesthia, p. 971, Reiske). The language was probably suggested by Soph. Elect. 175, ἥσι: μέγας ὑγιείων ἐν οὐρανῷ Ἰεὺς, ἔλαφον πτερόν ἄρα, πρότος πορεύεται, διακοσμόν πάντα καὶ ἐπικελοθίμους τῷ δʹ ἐπεται στρατία τῷ ἄλοιπον τε καὶ δαιμονίων, κατὰ ἐνδική μέρη | κεκοσμημένη.

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247. μένε γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἶκῳ μόνῃ τῶν ὑπὸ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δύσκεκα ἀρμιφό τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἀρχινοί, ἦγοῦντα κατὰ τάξιν ἡν ἐκαστὸς ἐσάχθη. τολλᾶι μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριω θέα τε καὶ διήθεμι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ὡς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἐπιστρέφοντα, πράττων ἐκαστὸς

In this clause Plato has availed himself of a Pythagorean philosophy. Aristotle tells us that “the Pythagoreans place a fire in the centre of the universe, round which they suppose the earth to revolve; as the other planets do.” Among the planets they enumerate the Sun and Moon; this central fire is therefore distinct from the Sun, and there is no foundation for the opinion, repeated in a recent treatise on Egyptian Astronomy (Rawlinson’s Herodotus, vol. ii. p. 330), that Pythagoras was acquainted with the true theory of the solar system. The Pythagoreans named this Central Fire ἄπλω φυλακή, ἄπλω πυργός, ἄπλω ὦκος, and lastly Ἑστία τοῦ πατρός. Comp. Arist. de Caelo ii. 13, with Stob. Ecl. i. P. 486. It is true, says Plato, that within the circumference of the heavenly sphere there is no lack of glorious spectacles and goodly highways, which the gods traverse as they go about their every-day avocations; but besides these there is a route which they tread only on their high feast days—a route uphill from first to last, leading to the very apex of the arch which supports the vault of heaven, and there opening upon its outer circumference, whence they can feast their eyes upon the glories of the super-ceilstial region—ἐπωρώσας τῷ ἔκτις τοῦ οὐρανοῦ—which far exceed the θέαν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ in beauty, as the road which leads to them excels in difficulty the beaten highways on which the gods ordinarily go to and fro. Such, after much consideration, I believe to be Plato’s meaning in this grand but obscure passage. The sense I have given to διήθος seems justified by Thuc. iii. 98, ἐκ τῆς ἔρημης ἐφεσφερόμενου, ὅθεν ὁ θεὸς διήθος, compared with Herod. i. 139, ἀγομενοὶ δὲ διήθος πάντα πτώσι τῶν ὄρων ἐξουσία διὰ τῶν γανακών, ἐν ὁ δὲ ξύλῳ διηθόμεντες ἐκλείπονται. The word is sometimes used for the orbits described by the heavenly bodies, as in Epin. 977 α, στρέφων διὰ τοῦ πάσας διήθουσι; sometimes also for the evolutions of an army, as Legg. vii. 813 ε. In this place however the διήθος seem to be roads leading ἐκβολὴ and out of the spheres of the several planets, included in the great sphere of the fixed stars, which to the ancients formed the boundary of the ἄκημος or ὀσφαῖς. So a recent German translator, “gar manche den Himmel durchschreitende Bahn.” ἀψις, which I have rendered ‘arch,’ properly denotes the orbit of a wheel. Here I take it to mean a zone or “rib,” supporting the vault of heaven. Proclus, Theol. iv. c. 4, gives the following explanation: ἔτεισα εἰς τὸν ὀσφαῖνον ἀψις, προτεκτόνος ὀσφαίκυην τοῦ ὀσφαῖς, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενην, καὶ μετὰ ταυτικὴν εἰς αὐτόν τοῦ ὀσφαίς καὶ τοῦ ὀσφαίνον κύκλων. The word ὀσφαίκυην shows that he understands ἀψις to mean the undermost of two or more coats or shells of which the heavenly sphere consists. Comp. Galen de Hipp. et Plat., p. 190, Kühn: εἰς τὸν ὀσφαίκυην τὰς πλαυρὰς χειών, ‘to the coat or membrane which lines the ribs.’ If ἀψις can mean a vault or spherical arch (forix coeli, coeli convexa, as the interpr. under it), there is no objection to this view, which Stallb. adopts. Mine however is more in accordance with the classical use of ἀψις, and it seems to me that the idea of such a zone may easily have been suggested by the phenomenon of the milky way. I suppose this ἀψις to touch the under surface of the ὀσφαῖς, as Procl. supposes his ἔνδος to do: and both interpretations explain ἔνδος and ὀσφαῖνον, the readings supported by the best MSS. The position of ὀσφαῖς in the sentence shows it to be a secondary predicate: ‘up to its summit or vertex.’ Comp. Arist. An. 390, παρ’ αὐτῆς τὴν χείσαν ὄσφαις ὁμώς ἔγραψε τόν. The variant ἐν ὑπὸ removes some difficulties, and so does ὀσφαῖνον for ὀσφαῖνον, but in an obscure passage like this it seems the safer course to hold to the reading for which there is preponderant authority. Proclus has much to say upon the inner meaning of the myths, but nothing worth attending to.
αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτῶν. ἔστειλε δὲ ὁ ἄει ἑθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμειος. φθόνος γὰρ ἐξωθεὶς ὀρεὶ ὀστατεῖ. ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαίτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ὅσιν, ἀκρατ ὑπὸ τὴν ὑποραίαν ἀφίκε πορεύονται πρὸς ἀνάντες ἦδη, τὰ μὲν θεῶν ἄχαμα ἰσορρόπους εὐθυνὰ ὅστα βαδίως πορεύεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μοῖρας βριθεὶς γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ὑπὸς μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γην ἑρέων τε καὶ βαρῖνων τῳ μὴ καλὸς ὁ νεώραιμενος τῶν ἕλιξιων. ἔνθα δὴ τῶν τε καὶ ἀγών ἐσχάτοις ψυχῇ πρόκειται, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλοῦμενες, ἦνικ ἀν πρὸς ἀκραφ γένονται, ἔξω πορευοίς θείες ἕστησαν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποραίων νοτό, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιέχει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ὑποραίου. τῶν δὲ ὑποραίων τόπον οὐ τε τις ὑμνησίμῳ τῶν τρέχοντις οὐ τε ποθ ὑμνήσει καὶ αξίαν, ἐχει δὲ δόει, τολμητέοις γὰρ οὖν τὸ γε ἄλθες εἰπεῖν,
when truth itself is our theme. For the region in question is the abode of that Essence which is the subject-matter of science truly so called,—an Essence hueless, formless, intangible, in the strictest sense real, though visible only to the eye of pure intelligence. The text was formerly embarrassed by an interpolated χρήσις (θετή νη χρήσις), a reading which Bekk. has unaccountably retained, though χρήσις is absent from the Boll. and other MSS. of good repute. The text given above seems to me to be open to no objection, and is fully supported by MS. authority. For the sense compare Philob. 62 έπιστημή έπιστημόν χάρισμα, ἡ μὲν ἐκ τα γεγονόμενα καὶ ἀπολογίαν ἀπαθεοτατον, ἢ δὲ ἐκ τὰ μέτρα γεγονόμενα μῆτε ἀπολογίαν, κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκολούθως ὅσα δεῖ. τάσσων εἰς τὰ ἀληθῶς ἐπιστημονικά, ἡγεασμένοι ἐκεῖνοι ἀληθεστέραν εἰμι. δ. ἢς ἐμθα θεί μνήμα, κ.τ.λ. For ἡ οὐδ. διάνοια, ἄτε. τεινθομία, one might conj. with G. Herm. ἢ τε ἐν, but ἄτε is so placed in Tim. 24 δ, ἢς ἐν φιλοσοφοὺς τα καὶ ϕιλόσοφος ἡ ὑπό σοιοθεί, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere. For ἀκράτους ἐπιστημὸν Stahl., offended by the recurrence of τρέφομαι, has restored the old reading ἀκράτους ἐμποδίσομεν, which is found in most MSS., and which he thus translates: "Ungote igniter dei ratio (Gelst) propter mentem et scientiam esse seditum pura et intimata," &c. an interpretation which greatly needs an interpreter. I think there can be no doubt that Heind. was right in receiving τρέφομαι on the authority of a Vienna, supported by other MSS. Others have ἀκράτους, which leads to ἀκράτα. The mind of a god feeds, says Socra. on pure intelligence and pure science; so does every soul, though not divine, which is destined to receive what rightfully belongs to it (i.e. to enter on its rightful inheritance, the truth, in distinction from those less fortunate spirits which accident, or the headstrong violence of the unruly steed, prevents from reaching the άληθες τεύχος presently named). Every such favoured soul welcomes, after long absence, the sight of the Essential; it feeds on and reveals in the contemplation of the True, until the rotation of the great celestial sphere brings it round again to the point of its departure. εὐπαθής is nearly equivalent to ἑυπαθής, "enjoys itself." ἦν ἐν μέλι. Boll. ἦν. G. Herm. conj. ὡς ἐν μέλι. οὕτως γένεσις πρόσεπτων J The object of the highest science is not the phenomenal, but the real—not the concrete, but the abstract. This highest and truest science is, in Plato's view, Dionetic. Comp. Philob. 57 η ἡ άληθες διάλεγεσθαι δύναμις εἰ tive πρὸς αὐτὴς ἄλλαν κριμαίνει την γὰρ προς τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἄντων, καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύτην ἄλλο περιφερεῖ πάνω ἐνωμεν ἡγεσίαν ἦν εἰς ἡγεσίαν, ἡ γεγονός. ἡ ἐπιστημή οὖν) This science is said to be real (οὐσία) as the ὅν which
it contemplates. Other sciences have to do with the οὐσίας in virtue of this μέθεξις, but have no independent reality. They are οὐτα πει ποτα ταύτα, but not οὕτως nor αὐτά καθ' αὐτά οὕτως. Compare Sophist. 241 D.

τὸν ἂντον ἰστήνην] Πτ. ν. 368, ἔνθ' ἰστερήσῃ σπεύδοντος ὅκει, ἄνεος, ὁρᾶτο ὅαρ, παρὰ δ' ἀμβρόσιον βάλει εἰδώρ.

οὗ δὲ ἄλλα ψυχαί] The gods, we see, stand on the outer surface (οὐσία) of heaven: of the other souls, those which most resemble gods can only partially emerge into the outer region. Their heads being above water, or whatever be the element of which the great sphere is composed, they are able to view the Essences, though with some difficulty, for their steeds confuse and trouble them. A second order of souls is less favoured: they see but in part, for ever and anon the restlessness of their teams causes them to dip below the surface. The majority are unable to struggle up into the higher region at all, but are carried round with the rest, immersed in the liquid element.

Hom. Hymn. 33. 11, ἐν' ἀκρωτηρία 

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The old reading was οὕς δὲ ἔχει, for which Ast plausibly suggested τοῦ (κυκλίου) δὴ ἔχει . οὐ ἐστὶν ; The reason, says Soc., why the souls exhibit this exceeding eagerness to behold the Fields of Truth, is that pasturage is found there suited to the pure intellect, the best and noblest part of the soul, and to the growth of the plumage from which the soul derives her lightness and buoyancy. Where, we may observe, the sign and thing signified are represented as two independent facts; for the "plumage" of the soul is simply the same thing with τὸ ἀριστον τῆς ψυχῆς. This is one of many artifices by which Plato obliges his readers to keep in mind the inner meaning of his allegory. The ἀληθείας πέδιων is a new feature in the scenery of the mythos. Possibly Plato found the phrase in some Orphic poet, possibly also in some Pythagorean book. It is used by the author of the Axiochus (371 b) to denote the place where Minos and Rhadamantus hold their court. Analogous phrases are ἄριστος λέων in Orph. Litth. 31: "Ἀτρησ ἀλέων in Empedocles v. 23, Karsl.; λύβης πέδων in Republ. x. 621. Plutarch, de Defect. Orac., uses ἀληθείας πέδων in a sense half mathematical half mystical, and savouring strongly of a Pythagorean source. The periphrasis ἄ λυμμα διὰ πτεροῦ φούσι is analogous to τὸ τῆς ἄλυμμα ὑπαγὴν γένος, supra 244 d.

ο. θεόμεν τε Ἀδραστείας δοκεῖ] Adrasteia, the Inevitable, is an epithet of Ἀιαξ, and her mystical name in the Orphic theology (Lob. Aetaia, p. 485). In Aetaia, 972, Adrasteia is identified with Nemesis, and so she continued to be in the popular creed. Auct. Rhesi 488, οὐδ' Ἀδραστεία λέγει : Republ. 461 a, προκειμένῳ δὲ Ἀδραστείαν. On this occasion the mystical sense is adopted by Plato, who, according to Olympiodorus, παντοτικοὶ περιβάλλει τ' Ὀρφέως, and nowhere more than in this mythos. θεόμεν Ἀδραστεῖα is simply the 'law of destiny,' according to which those spirits which in the course of the divine progress have seen somewhat, i.e. some considerable measure, of truth, shall remain unharmed until the next great revolution, and so on each time in succession. Those whose powers are unequal to the effort, and who, through mishap or fault of their own, shed their plumage and fall to the earth in consequence, are in their first earthly genesis incensed as men, never as beasts; this last degradation being apparently the result of a perverse choice deliberately made by the soul itself at a subsequent period (inf. 249 b). Human destiny would seem therefore to be partly the result of choice, partly of necessity—and we have here a metaphorical problem clothed in a mythical dress.

d. τῆν μὲν πλείστα—τυραννοῦσα] For this curious classification 'in order of merit' we are not obliged to seek any more occult motive than Plato's private predilections. Empedocles, in a passage relating to the Metempsychosis, had given the precedence to μάκας τε και δυσμάς και ἡμών, Καὶ πρόμοι, 354, Karsl. But in Plato's estimation the φιλόσοφος naturally holds the first rank, the 'lover of beauty' and the musical and erotic man' meaning much the same thing—ὅς φιλόσοφος Ὀδης
νησομένου φιλοσόφου δι φιλοκάλου δι μουσικοῦ τινὸς καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν εἰς βασιλέως ἐννόμον δι πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἀρχαγοῦ, τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ δι τινὸς οἰκονομικοῦ δι χρηματιστικοῦ, τετάρτην εἰς φιλοσόφου δι γυμνοῦ ἐν στυκοῦ δι περὶ σώματος ἰασίν των ἐνσωμένου, πέμπτην μαυρικοῦ βίου δι των τελεστικῶν ἔξοουσιν ἐκτὸς σωματικὸς δι τῶν περὶ μέρης τῶν ἀλλοις ἀρμόσει, ἐβδομῆ δημοτικῶς δι γεωργικὸς, διθῆ συστικὸς δι δημοτικὸς, ἐνάτης τυραννικὸς. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἀπασίν ὡς ἐν δὲν ἅπαξ τοῖς μουσικῶς. Phaed. 61 A. In assigning a low position to the ‘soothsayer or ritualist,’ and also to the poetic or mimetic genius, he somewhat maliciously corrects Empedocles, and at the same time aims at a blow at the superstitious piety and literary sentimentality of his own day. For Plato’s view of μιμησία we may compare a curious passage in the tenth book of the Republic, init. to p. 602. His estimate of the μαυρικὸν γένος may be gathered from a striking description ibid. ii. 364 c seq., fully explaining the μαυρικὸς βίος δι τελεστικῶς of the text. The ‘sophist and people’s man’ are placed where we should expect to find them, just above the worst and most irredesceable of monsters, the tyrant. So in the Republic the δημοτικὸς is raised but one step above the τυραννίς: Rep. 569 comp. with 562. Of the first four kinds we may remark that they represent some more or less dignified and useful employment, while of the four which follow, three denote, in Plato’s view, some variety of imposture; the class of ‘mechanics and tillers of the soil’ being placed thus low in the scale partly for the purpose of depressing their associates. It may surprise us to find the χωραγιστικὸς placed so high, and the physician no higher in the scale, especially as a physician (Hippocrates) is almost the only one of his contemporaries, out of his own circle, of whom Plato speaks in terms of unqualified admiration. But Hippocrates, as we are told in 270 c, was one of the few who combined physic and physics, the study of the human frame with that of natural philosophy. He may therefore be classed with the φιλοσόφοι, and we do not find that Plato speaks with much respect of any other member of the medical faculty. It may be observed that in the Politics, 269 c, the βασιλεῖς πειρατικῷ καὶ πολιτικῷ are identified; a discrepancy which I mention for the benefit of those critics who maintain, on grounds hardly stronger than this, that the Politics was the work of an anonymous opponent of Plato*. It will be observed that I have followed Bdt. in inserting ἀνάφλοσιν. The members of this higher class being all arranged in triplets (for μουσικὸς καὶ ἐρωτικὸς form only one sub-genus), symmetry requires that the φιλοσόφος should be distinguished from his companions.

* Σ. ημιμοιακός] This is the reading of the Bth and other MSS. of good note. Berk. retains the vulg. δημοκριτικὸς—‘the life of the hunter for popularity,’ the captator popularis aurae. This, however, in a description of recognized human professions is too vituperative, and blunts the edge of Plato’s satire. Every public man is a democrat, only the worst specimens of the class are δημοκριτικοί. Besides, the word δημοκρίτου and its derivatives seem to have come into use at a much later period.

τυραννικός] Either one who has usurped or one who seeks to usurp the supreme power by unconstitutional means, or perhaps, more generally, the man who in his own sphere acts solely with a view to self, as the tyrant does in his. So the τυραννικὸς ἄντρος of the Republic denotes one under the sway of some one passion which tyrannizes over his whole being.

ἐν δὲ τούτωι, κ.τ.λ.] The destiny of

* In the Republic the βασιλεῖς is identified with the φιλοσόφοι.
the soul after death is determined solely by the life it had led on earth, without reference to the ante-natal state. How a σωφροσύνη or a τύμπανος can be said δεικνύον δίσεχον we are not informed, and the τούτοις καταγγέλλει that this condition is fixed according to an intellectual standard (τὴν μὲν πνεύμα τιθείς), whereas its doom after leaving the body depends on moral considerations (ὅτι δὲν δικαίως διαγαμματίζεται).

ἔσε ὡς γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ]; i.e. ἔσε τὸν ἔτους ῥάμαν αἰσθήσεται: Ἰταμ. 42 b. Comp. Virg. G. iv. 223, “viva volare Sideris in numerum atque alto succedere coelo.”

οὐκ ἄφυκεν τὰ ἔτη μουριῶν] This ‘genitive of time’ is usually accompanied with πρὸ οὗ οὖν. But the prep. is frequently omitted, as in a Law an. Dom. Mtd. p. 529, οὔ δὲ θαυμασθείς εἰσαχθεῖς εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν τρίακοστα ἡμερῶν αὐτῶν οὖν ἔτος ἦν τῇ ἡ γραφή. Herod. vi. 58, ἀποκριθεὶς ἡμερῶν οὖν ἐκασται ἁμαρτ. Similarly in reference to past time, Arist. Plat. 98, σᾶλλον γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἷς ἔδωκεν ποι ἥρμον. It would be vain to inquire into Plato’s reasons for fixing this precise number of years. An ‘annus magnus,’ at the end of which the planets recover the relative positions they occupied at its commencement, was a device of the Egyptian astronomers, but there is no proof that Plato thought of it here. Besides, the Egyptian cycle was fixed at 36,526 years. Other cycles are enumerated by Ideler, Chronol. i. 183 seq., none of which are of the length of a myriad years. It is more probable that Plato took the hint from Empedocles, who in the process to his principal work

sings thus: ὅσιοι Ἀκνήμην χρήμα, δέννῃ δέκαμως ταλαντών (οὐκ θεωρεῖ Αἰδη- θενείας, p. 583). ‘Ἀθάνατος ζωομάχος κατε- φανήσαν χρόνον’ οὐδ’ ἐνικάζει φόνῳ φῶς καὶ μορφή. (Δαμιάνου οὐτε βίοι καλογραφεῖσαι μακρύνοντος, Τρίς μιρία μαρίαν ἔραν ἀπὸ μακράν ἀλληλοώνειν γενέσθαι παρείται διά χρώνων ἄσος ὑμνών. Τῶν (ἐ. τ. τοῦ) οὐ καθὼς μυθοποιοῦσα, καὶ ἀληθῶς: whereas in Plato the human soul, before its fall, is ranked among the Ἀμιστις. Krische (Phaedr. p. 66) will have it that by ἔρα Empedocles meant the third part of a year. If there be any truth in this notion, the μέρα ἔτους of Plato and the τρίς μαρίαν ἔραν of Empedocles will denote the same period of time. But this is probably a needless refinement; the numbers three and ten being both ‘sacred’ numbers, and therefore naturally suggesting themselves to a mind of a mystical turn like that of Empedocles, and indeed of Plato in his mythopoeic mood.

429] The soul of the true philosopher is excused from seven of the ten millennial probation through which the rest have to pass. This is probably an Orphic-Pythagorean idea. Pindar, who borrows largely from such sources, has the well-known lines: ὅτι θ’ ἐπάλλημα εἰς τρίς ἕκαστηι μείναις ἀνά πάσης ἄλκηκας ἔχειν Πυθαγόρης, ἐτελείαν Δίως ὅπου πάρα Κρόνοι τώρας ἔνθα μακράν νάσος κ.τ.λ. Ol. ii. 68. Compare also the curious statement of Herodotus (ii. 123), who speaks of a περιπλανώμενος τροχιῶν ἡμερῶν as a feature in the Egyptian me- tempsychosis, which he accuses his own countrymen of plagiarizing: τῷ τῷ τῇ ἐλέγη εἰς οἱ 'Ελλήνες ἐχθρισσότοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον οἱ δὲ υπότερον, ὅτ’ ἐδείξαν ἐκείνος τῶν ἔτων, εἰδά τὰ αὐθανάσια, οὐ γραφά. The αἰτία, which takes place at the end of each millenial pe-
Plato goes on to say, is neither more nor less than an act of remembrance (anamnesis); these general forms of the understanding reminding us of their transcendent prototypes—the ideas presented to the gaze of the unembodied soul in the ante-natal state. It will be observed that I have adopted for the vulg. ἰδος Baill.'s correction ἱδος. This will be thought over bold, in face of a consensus of MSS. But to speak of the ἱδος itself as ἰδος—proceeding or advancing to a unity, itself being that unity which is the result of the process—is a licence of bad writing in which it is difficult to believe that Plato would indulge. Neither can we speak of an ἱδος ἵνα ἐμαθήθη, which is equally tautological. It is evidently the generalizing mind, which can alone be said ἰδεῖν εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ἑνωμένον, or in other words, ἐν πολλῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς ἱδος. Comp. Rep. x. 536 a, ἵδος γὰρ τοῦ ἐν ἑπαρ- τον ἐλάβων τίθεναι περὶ ἑνας τὰ πολλὰ ἵνα τὰν ποδήν ὑξία ἐνεπήρωσε. This generalizing process, the primary law of the human understanding, is briefly expressed in the Platonic formula ἵδος καὶ πολλά. Phileb. 16 c is a 'locus classicus' on this subject.

The intellect of the philosopher obeys the same laws as other minds; it too can only arrive at truth by collecting generals from particulars: but the philosopher does that systematically and perseveringly, which
μόνη πτερούται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια: πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνους αἱ ἐστὶ μηνή καὶ δύσμως, πρὸς δὲ ὀσπέρ θείς ὁν θείος ἐστι. τοὺς δὲ δὴ τοιούτους ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὁρθῶς χρόνεως, τελέοις αἱ τελεταὶ τελοῦμεν, τέλεος ὄντως μόνον γίγνεται. ἐξυπηρέμεσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν σπουδαιστῶν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγάντων, νοθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακυπών, ἐνθυσίαξαν δὲ λέγηθε τοὺς πολλοὺς.

"Εστί δὲ οὖν δεύορ ὃ πᾶς ἦκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρ-

ordinary men do in a purposeless and intermitting manner. Hence the soul of the sage alone recovers its lost plumage, the symbol and earnest of its divinity. 'For it is always dwelling in memory upon that Essence, by dwelling on which it is that even a god is divine,' i.e. to the contemplation of which a god owes his divinity, as if he had said θεῖος ὁ θείος ἐστι θεῖοι πρὸς τοῖς οὐν καὶ θείοι. For the phrase πρὸς τῶν οὐν οὐκ ευρέσθαι. Phaed. 84 c, αὐτός πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Ξωράτης, 'δεικνυσίν εστὶν.' So paul. inf. we have, πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγάντων. πρὸς ὀσπέρ θείοι ὁν θείοι ἦσιν] Hermias tells us that there were no less than four readings of this clause: ὁ πρὸς ὀσπέρ θείος ὁν θείοι ἦσιν, ὁ πάλιν θείου ἦσιν, ὁ δὲ πάλιν ἦσιν, ὁ μετὰ τοῦ ἄθροι, πρὸς ὀσπέρ θείος ὁν θείοι ἦσιν, ὁ πάλιν θείοι ἦσιν. The second of these is found in the Boll. and Vat., and is much the best. ὁ πάλιν could only mean the same as πρὸς οὐν, with a meaning which would clash with the conventional theology of the Mythus. θεῖος without the article denotes any one of the twelve gods, or rather of the eleven before alluded to; for we are left to conjecture what the spiritual nutriment of Hestia may have been, wings being evidently inappropiate to so sedimentary a deity. ὑπομνήμασι] The ὑπὸ, it would seem, are not themselves ὑπάρξει, but only 'memoranda' suggestive of ὑπότα. This Ast has perceived, comm. p. 432; 'haec veri comprehensio recordatio dicitur, quia ipsum verum quodd in superiori vita spectativum (h. e. θεία, proprio sensu ita dicta, ut distinguatur ab eo quod ἄθροι, h. e. notio universa vel genus, vocatur) haec comprehensione revocatur.' In modern language, it is by meditating 'aright' on 'common notions' that the philosopher arrives at exact scientific ideas. ὑπομνήματι implies that this must be done methodically, i.e. according to the principles of a true dialectic. I think the distinction between ἄθροι and θείοι is here not to be overlooked, though the two words are in most cases inter-

D. ὡς παρακύπτων] Properly the compound means 'move amiss,' as in Arist. Ran. 645, ὕποστά τινι μὲ παρακυπώντα ἴδοι, where παρακύπτων. is now substituted on MS. authority for the vulg. ὑποκυμάτων. The same correction seems to be required in Rep. ix. 573 c, μακάρων καὶ ὑποκύπτων. As a synonym of ὑποκυμάτων, the intransitive παρακύπτων is usual, not παρακύπτων, which is first used by late writers. Com. ap. Harpoc. p. 29: συναντίων παρακυπώνται καὶ μακαρίων. So an old dotard is called παρακυπώντας ὄψις ἡλικίας by a comic poet ap. J. Pull, Mein. Com. Gr. iv. 680.

"Εστι δὲ οὖν δεύορ] Soor, in these words reminds Phaedr. of the drift of the brilliant episode just concluded. It.
was designed as a picture of the "fourth Madness," that of Love, or rather as a theory of the philosophic habit of mind of which Love is the symbol. The point really attained is, that the philosopher is the subject of an "enthusiasm," a rapt and passionate yearning after a truth higher and purer than either the senses or the understanding reflecting on the objects of sense can furnish. Why is this enthusiasm to be styled Love, and what have the two states of consciousness in common with each other? This is the question which is now to be attacked, and to which Plato proceeds with much skill and ingenuity to elaborate an answer. "Beauty" furnishes the connecting link. Beauty, the object of Love, is one of the Ideas, and it is that which alone of the world of sense presents a vivid and approximately adequate resemblance. The transition from ideal truth in general to this particular variety, in other words from τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀνατείναις ἔρικτον to τῷ κάλλως, had been prepared by the vivid imagery of the ἔσχατας τιών, and the speaker is able to slip in the word κάλλως at the very commencement of this portion of the discourse, as if it were synonymous with τῷ ἐν, and had formed the subject of the foregoing episode, when in fact it has never once been mentioned. With regard to the construction of the sentence, which is irregular in more respects than one, we may observe (1) That the apodosis to θέλειν is contained in the words ὁ ἄρα αὕτη... γένεται, καὶ ἄρα... καὶ οὐδεὶς, the intervening clauses being parenthetical from ἄρα to διεκείμενοι, incl. (2) This parenthetical sentence is itself anacoluthic, in two respects. The relative ἢ, sc. μαρτίνα (for which Ast conj. ὅ), is a "pendent" accusative, referring to αὐτήν ἄρα μαρτίνα διεκείμενον, though not grammatically constructed with it. In the next place ὅταν would naturally have been followed by a second subjunctive, instead of which we have the three participles ἀναπτυχθεῖν, βλέπον, ἁμέλεα. We might have had ἀναπτυχθεῖν δὴ followed by βλέπον and ἁμέλεα, or ἀναπτυχθεῖν δὴ... βλέπεται... ἁμέλεα. The clause ὅταν... ἁμέλεα is in effect an epexegetes of ἢ, and serves as a résumé of the foregoing description of the philosophic enthusiasm. The difficulty of rendering this in English is skillfully surmounted in Mr. Wright's translation of Phaedr. p. 40. ὁ ἄρα ἀνατείναις κάλλως ἄρα 'bird-like, casts many an upward glance, regardless of things below.' Άρ. Αν. 50: χω καλοὶς ἄστοις 'Ανα κέχηεν. Socr. alludes to the vulgar prejudice against philosophers as described Theaet. 174 a. Compare the indolent incident in the Nubes, 171. The passage quoted by Ast from Plat. Epict. vii. 348, ἐν μὲν βλέπω ξὺς, καθ' ἅρα πάντων πάθην ἀναπτυχθα, illustrates, but may hardly be regarded as an imitation of, the present. Still less can I see that in the present passage "homines amoris corporis appetentes iriderrunt." It would have been more correct to say "homines amore divino instincto admumbrantur." They expose themselves to the jeers of the vulgar by their habits of rapt abstraction, longings as they do, like caged birds, to escape from their fleshly incumbrances.

π. ὁ ἄρα αὕτη, κ.τ.λ.] This, the philosophic, is said to be the best of all the enthusiasms, of ξέναι μαρτίναι, both in itself and in its origin and antecedents: it is best for its possessor, and for him who shares it with him; for the sage, that is, and for his youthful disciple whom he infects with his own sacred frenzy. The Φιλοσόφος had already (248 ν) been placed in the same category with the Φιλόκαλος and Ἐρωτικός, and (249) we read of the παιδευτικῶν μὲν Φιλοσόφοι. We were thus prepared for the identification, for the purposes of this discussion, of the sage and the lover which is effected in the next clause. The madman, it is said, of this philosophic type, who falls in love with a beautiful human being is under such circumstances called Ερωτικός.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

άριστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τὸ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχου τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρωτὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστής καλεῖται. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰρήνη, πάσα μὲν ἄνθρωπον ψυχή φύσει τεθεῖσα τὸ ὄντα, ἡ οὖν ἡ ἡλθεν εἰς τὸ τὸ ζῷον, ἥ ἄναμμησκέσθαι 250 δ" ἐκ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνα οὐ βάδιον ἀπάστη, οὔτε ὅσι Βραγεώς ἐδού τότε τἀκε, οὔτε ἄλθευρο πεσοῦσαι ἐνυστύχησαι, οὔτε ὑπὸ τῶν ὀμίλων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀδικον τραπέμεναι ἱθῆσθαι δὲν τότε ἐδού ιερῶν ἐχειν. ὁλίγαν δὴ λείπουσαι αἷς τῷ τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν, αὐτὰ δὲ, ὅταν τῶν ἐκεί ὁμοίωσι ἔδοσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκεθο' αὐτῶν γίγνονται, ὁ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσι διὰ τῷ μὴ ἱκανῷ διασταθεσθαι. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνες

καθάπερ γὰρ εἰρήνη] Sup. 248 B: comp. with 249 A.

ἡ οὖν εἰ ἢλεον, κ.τ.λ.] 'else had it never entered the animal called man.' ἥ, αλλίσομαι, as sup. 237 C. It would seem to follow from this that every man is potentially a philosopher, as the slave- boy in the Μένος is shown to be an unconscious geometer. There are very few however who realize their own capacities, ἀναμμῆσκεσθαι δ' ἐκ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνα οὐ βάδιον ἀπάστη. This may be owing to their ill-humour either in the former or in the present state of existence. In the latter case evil associations may have turned them from the right path and clouded their memory, so that they quite forget the 'sacred objects' they held on the solemn occasion of their initiation. The force of ἵππα will appear more fully in the sequel.

250. οὗται δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] As the ideas are παραδείγματα τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν, so the phemenomenal is ἕξωμα τῶν ἐνδεικτικῶν. Comp. Tim. 29 B; 48 E, ἐν μὲν ἄν παραδείγματα εἰδὼν ἑπικείμενον, νοητὰ καὶ ἀλή κατὰ τῶν δὲ, μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δεδεμένα, γένοις ἔχον καὶ ἀρταῖον: Plur. 132 D, καταπληκτὶ... τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ ταύτα ἄτῆ παραδείγματα ἑσται ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταύτων ἑσθήσω καὶ εἴειν ὁμοιόμετα καὶ ἡ μεθέσις αὐτῆ τῶν ἐκείνων γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδών οὐκ ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκείστοις ἀτούσι. The phraseology of the ideal theory is pretty fully illustrated by A. Butler, Lect. ii. 127 foll.

ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκεθὰ αὐτῶν γί-
In the words μὴν δένσιν καὶ δόγμαν, δοτικὸς is to be construed with εἰσκενα, and referred to διακοσμήσας, κ.τ.λ., as Stallb. observes. In that case there is no difficulty in the position of the μόνος.

μετὰ μὲν Δίος ἢ μετὰ; That is, μὴν δένσιν καὶ δόγμαν, δοτικὸς, is the highest reason, is the especial patron. Comp. Phil. 30 τ. The passage which follows is full of phrases borrowed from the Eleusinian rites. From this we must not infer that Plato connotes the notion that a purer and more philosophical faith was communicated to the initiated at Eleusis, a fancy which still lingers in some minds even after the triumphant exposure of its baselessness effected by Lobeck in his greatest work. The contrary, in fact, follows from the language of Plato, for how could the mysteries have served the purpose of metaphorical illustration had they possessed a philosophical meaning of their own? When the figure and the thing figured are both in codem generi, we have no metaphor but only confusion: and it were scarcely less absurd to argue from the image of the chariots and their horses into philosophic conclusions, than to use the passage before us in support of the Warburtonian theory. At the same time it is more than probable that this portion of the Phaedr., and others in which the same metaphor occurs, have helped to produce the opinion alluded to. So far as we can make out the nature of the ἐνα μικρὰ πάθησιν or μυστήρια shown to the initiated in the μυστῆρας ἰδίος (Ar. Nub. 203), or great hall of the Eleusinian temple, they consisted partly in images of Demeter and her συζυγίων Iacchus and Persephonē, and partly in revelations, 'revelations religious in monitions,' like those shown to the devout in Romish churches at the present day. These objects, φάκελοι, were exhibited in Ἀφιετῆ καθότι, under the 'clear effulgence' of blazing torches, and the μύσης or ἐπιτρέπει (for the distinction between the two words, as if they implied, the one an earlier, the other a more advanced stage of initiation, was a later refinement) consisted in the fruition of the dazzling scene presented to the eye of the worshipper. Comp. Plato, Pro. of the whole. W. Yet, as of the τελεύτην καὶ ἀρχήν ἐν θυρήμα καὶ βοηθός ἀλλήλους συνεταῖος, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυόμενων τῶν ἰερῶν προέχουσι ὕδως μετὰ φύσεως (inf. p. 251) καὶ σωτηρία, οὐκαὶ καὶ πολιορκία ἐν ἀρχήν ἀποκάλει οὐκ ἐν ἐνθάν ἄνθρωποι καὶ φύσει μεγά μάχαι, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλίαν ἀναγιγανήν, κ.τ.λ. (ap. Lobs. Aglaoph. p. 61). Also Arist. Ran. 340, θύεια φίλογοι λαμπάδαν ἐν χεριοὶ τινάκας: ἵκθυς, ἐν ἱκτικῶς, ἐν χερί καὶ πτεροχέας ἐν πολλῶν ἀρχήν τινάκας, ὁ θεοῦ ἡ σωτήρια συνεπεται. If we accept this view, which Lobeck supports with a profusion of learning and argument, the passage before us is perfectly intelligible. "Etenim Plato in Phaedr. quum docere vellet quantum oblectationis habeat inquisitio et investigatio veri (ὅ τ᾽ ὑπὸ διῶν) exsequi exemplum sumit a mysteriis, contindentisque animos rerum supernaturarum imaginum cognitione plus voluptatis capere, quam divinae species initiatis afferat: "ὅθεν (animi a corporibus secreti et liberis) καὶ ζητοῦντο... ἐποτετουστε... quae ab Eleusinis transita esse recte judicat Herculis." Loh. l. 1. p. 57. The initiation of the philosophic soul is said to be μακρωτάτης, the most blissful of all initiations, not excepting that of Eleusis —"so we may without impiety style it" (θεῖα λαμπάδα). μάκαρ and εὐθαμών were technical predicates of the initiated, εὐθάμων being the last stage—the consummation of the whole initiatory process. Theon. Math. p. 13. So Erasp. Bucch. 72. "Ω μάκαρ ὁσις εὐθάμων τελεύτας θεῶν ἐλθόν, κ.τ.λ." The φάκελοι displayed to the soul in the ἵκτακια τοὺς τόπουs τοιούτουs ἐν τούτωs διδότωs, the
ideas or archetypal forms. To these perhaps, rather than to the Eleusinian images, the epithets ἄλκηκρα καὶ ἀπαμὴ καὶ ἀτρεμὴ καὶ εὐθαμματο προσφέρεται properly belong; though it is probable that there is some reference to the serene beauty of the colossal statues which decorated the mystic temple. Witness the grandeur of the fragment preserved in our own University, which is certainly 'simple and full of repose,' though, alas! far from 'entire.' (See below 254 ν, εἶναι αὐτὴν... εἰ ἄγετά ἄρθρα βεβαιῶν.) The ideas are ἄλκηκρα καὶ ἀπαμὴ, because seen as they are in themselves, αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν, not in the concrete (κατὰ ἀκριματικῶς, διασκορπῶν, Soph. 258 ι, 290 ν). They are also ἀτρεμὴ because δὲ κατὰ τά τινας ἑκατόν ἐξ οὐκ ημιθυμοῦν εὐθαμματα (Phaed. 78 ν). The word ἄλκηκρα occurs in Tim. 44 c, ἄλκηκροι ἰγίς τε παρτέλος, τὴν μεγάλην ἀποφυγήν μοί σαν, γίγνεται, where it answers to our 'vast' and is opposed to 'sick.' For the epithet εὐθαμματα (effect predicted of the cause, as μακρωπούστα is transferred from the spectator to the θεία) compare the 'Beauteous Vision' of Christian Theology, μοιχοῦσει καὶ ἐποπτεύοσε γενναίας is not to be distinguished here, except in so far as the latter word defines the sense of the former. Properly speaking μοῖραι is the generic term for the entire process, including the ἐποπτεύει, or state of the epeit or adept, who after due previous illuminations and the like is admitted into the adytum to behold the ἀοιδικὰ δείγματα. (Jambil. Myst. Ι. 10. 53.) So Symp. 209 ι, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά κἀν υἱὸι μυθίζειν τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικὰ δὲ ἐν ἑκατον ταῦτα ἑνόμιζεν, εὰν τις ὁμίλοις μετί τινις οὖν οἰς εἰ ὀσὶς τ’ ἐν εἰς, where after εἰς we must supply μυθίζων, a sufficient proof that μοῖραι is not restricted to the preliminary stage. A difficulty has been raised about the use of ὑπέρενα, for which Hirsch. ventures to substitute προπετεύει. If he is right, it will be necessary also to alter Xen. Anab. iv. 1. 21, διὰ ταῦτα σε ὑπέρενα, φθάσαι βουλήμανες, where the compound has the same sense which it bears here. Comp. also Polyb, i. 81. 3, quoted by Stalib., ἡ κλοσίων ὑποτέκει αὐτόν. c. καθαρός ὑπήρξε καὶ ἀντίγραφο—διερευνάτως. Of the two epithets καθαροῖς has reference to the ceremonial and legal purity presupposed in the ἐποπταί, as indeed in worshippers generally, "quam omnis præcatio sanctorum eos qui deae non sint purae suæs, sanctis aequat." (Liv. xlv. 5, ap. Lob. I. l. p. 17). ἐποπτεύοντες has evidently a double meaning, which it is impossible to express by one word in English. It means (1) 'unmarked,' i.e. unpolluted; and (2) 'unentangled,' 'unimprisoned;' according to the two senses of σῆμα. Hence tr. 'free from the bondage and pollution of that which now we call σῆμα,' instead of σῆμα, which, there is reason to suppose, was the original name of the body; καὶ γάρ σημα τινὲς φασιν αὐτό εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ (Crat. 400 c). Comp. Gorg. 408. The notion and etymology are both Orphic, as Plato states in the former of the passages quoted, in which other etyma are mentioned and discussed with laudable impartiality. This fleshly prison we 'bear about with us, bound in its chains as the oath is fastened to his shell.' For the Pythagorean, as well as Orphic, theory of the penal incapacitation of the soul in the body, see also Phaed. 62 b and the interpreters. Also ib. 82 ε, τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνευ καὶ διακεχειλήθῃν ἐν τῇ αἴσθησι καὶ προσπεκτικῇ ποιήσῃ, ὅπερ δὲ εἰρήμεοι κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μυθίζων κατεργάζομεν' let this then serve by way of tribute to
memory, for she is the cause of this too long digression, which was prompted by a fond yearning for the glories of a past state of existence.' He then reverts to the subject of beauty and its relation to love, taking up the argument interrupted 249 η.

D. ὦ δέ τὴν ἴματιν ἐξετάζει, κ.τ.λ. This passage is thus translated by Cicero, Fin. ii. 16. 52: "Oculorum, inquit Plato, est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. Quam illa ardentia amores excitaret sui, si vidisset?" It is imitated De Off. i. 5: "Formam honesti video ... quae si oculus cerneretur, mirabilem amores excitaret." On the superiority of sight over the other senses see Tim. 47, ὢν δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἤμων λόγον αὐτὴ τῇ μεγίστῃ ἀφελεία γέγομεν ἢμῖν, κ.τ.λ. Ἡ ἴματα may be rendered 'the most acute and penetrating,' though it might also bear the meaning 'swiftest,' ἐκεί τὸ ἔκποντον ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅρατο τοῦ φόνου φθάνεισθαι (Pseud-Arist. de Mundo 4. 18).

After τοιοῦτον ... παρεῖρητο we must understand ὁς καλὸς παρέχται. Before καί τῶλα δῶν ἐραστὰ Butt. supposes σῶλον to have been dropped by the抄写ists, "absorbed" by ὦν. But this is needless. τῶλα δῶν ἐραστὰ are the τίμια ψυχὰς before mentioned, ἐπικω- σὺν, χαρακτηρικὰ, &c. Tr. 'so, too, would the other forms which are fitted to inspire love,' if they, like beauty, had their visible counterparts. ὦν δὲ ["as it is, however, Beauty alone is privileged to be at once most lustrous and most lovable."] κ. τ. λ. It is only minds fresh from the initiatory rite, or those which have not yet been spilt, that pass rapidly from the visible to the invisible or ideal Beauty, when they 'behold her earthly namesake.' In Parm. 133 ν, sensible phenomena, τὰ παρὰ ἴμαντα, are said to be ἴμαντα, homonyma with the corresponding ideas. In the same sense Socr. speaks in Phaed. 103 β, ἐπονομάζουσε αὐτὰ τῇ ἴμαντι ἐνυμοί, ἢ τῇ καθ' ἴμαντα τῇ τῶν ἔλθων. ἴματα παραδοθούν] i. e. ἐξῆς ἐνυματικά is frequently used in this intransitive way, as Rep. viii. 507, ἀνδρὸς τῶν πολισμίων: frequently also with the reflexive pronoun, αὐτὸν or the like.

ἐβρεῖ προσομιλῆσαι] A periphrasis for ἐβρεῖν. Soph. Trach. 591, παρ' ὑμὶν φοιτήσας ποιήσαι τοῦ. Tim. 88 o, γνωστικός προσομιλισθήσας. So inf. 258 ξ, the unruly steed is called ἐβρεῖς καὶ ἀλαξορελαῖ ἐταῖροι. Here tr. 'addicting himself to excess,' ἐβρεῖs being the ἐπιφανεία of ἐπιθύμησις, as explained, supra. 238 τ. Rationalized, this whole passage may be taken to mean that to the pure only all things are pure: that the enthusiastic love of moral or ideal beauty can alone prevent corporeal beauty from becoming a snare and a source of delusion to those who are susceptible of its
influence, as ‘men of genius’ usually are. The enthusiasm of the ἀρτιτελῆς is next described. Not mere poetical or artistic sensibility, but the possession of a poetico-philosophical temperament is implied in the description, which agrees with the epithets φιλόσοφος ὡς φιλολόγος ὡς μονοτῆς τις καὶ ἕρμαντος, supra 248 D. No better description could be given of Plato’s own idiosyncrasy.

251. ἔδειξεν | Vulg. dedieo. Bodl. dedie, supported by three others which give dediein. This form Bekk. has adopted into the text. The only objection to the reading is the questionability of the apodosis ἦν ὑπὲρ γὰρ οἷον for ὑπὲρ ὑπὲρ. To this however neither Cobet, nor Butt., a better syntactical authority. Both agree that dediein is repugnant to analogy. If we had a perf. opt. it would rather be dediein, thinks Butt. ‘Indispensable analogy requires dediein, like πεφυγείη, ἐληκυνθοί, ἐδεδοκισθοί, πεπαυθήν.’ Butt. Irreg. Verbs, tr. p. 69, note. This dediein calls forth from Cobet a shriek of horror, and it certainly seems as bad, if not worse, than dediein.

οὖν ἐκ τῆς φρικῆς | ‘as is natural after his cold fit.’ supra praestāv mēn ἑφρίζειν. The first effect of love on the highest natures is to astonish and dismay, then to kindle the imagination and stimulate the intellectual faculties. Both φρίζει and ρέγον are used by Hippocrates to denote the cold fit of a fever.

αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἣδον ἰδιώκων. ὃ ἄρτιτελής, ὃ τῶν τότε πολυθέρων, ὅταν θεοεδεῖς πρόσωπον ἑλληνικός εἰς μεμημημένον, ἥ τινα σώματος ἰδέαν, πρωτόν μὲν ἑφρίζει, καὶ τὶ τῶν τότε ὑπῆλεν αὐτῶν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσωπῶν ὡς θεῶν σέβεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐδεδείε τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θοῦ ἂν ὡς ἄγαλματι καὶ θεῷ τῶν παιδικῶν. ἵδιντα δὲ αὐτῶν, οὖν ἐκ τῆς φρίκης, μεταβολὴ τε καὶ ἱδρύως καὶ θερμότης λαμ. π. βάνει. δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορρόφημα διὰ τῶν ὁμίματων, ἐθερμάνθη ἢ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἀράβεται.
locum posita sunt ut pro insitiva haberi possint, quanquam egregie sensum adjuvant. Quocirca videndum an non veritas sic possit, tene toto judicii vestro de tuis omen, ut si tuorum pereat, eademmodo, permutatus sit, etiam, locus egregius restitutur." He adds an illustrative quotation from Origen, Cels. vi. p. 606 ο: metamebus in tuum lex unum manu et tuum apologetum autem esse animam, aut autem vivumquae et animam sequentur. The two words ανακηπτει και γαργαλιζεται θεωρονται τον πτερον.

επιθυμησις δε, κ.τ.λ.] 'no sooner does the fertilizing moisture descend upon the soil than over her entire surface the stamp of each feather swells and strives to grow from the root upwards.' For ανακηπτει is in connection with the practice of Attic press authors, who never write εφευσα, εφωσα, μαρα, μαρε, and so in compounds also. Φωνα, προσερθον, ου προσερθουν (ap. Lob. Phryn. 739, q. v.). So also βουσμα in preference to βεσμαμ.

[ζα ανακηπτει] 'in this condition of things she (the soul) forments and throbs (bubbles) all over.' Ανακηπτει, ανακηπις, Tm. Lex. Hom. Ili. vii. 263, ανακηπις αμα: ib. xiii. 705, ανακηπει αρσ. Said of springing water in Apoll. Rhod. iii. 237 (ap Ruink. ad Tm.), καλης ανακηπης περημ. καις denotes any kind of exsudation or moisture bursting forth. See the Lex. in v. 'Ανακηπεις seems also to have been used by Hippocrates and the medical writers (Steph. Lex. i. 2, p. 403). The penult is long in Attic: Soph. Phil. 754, φωνας ταυτω εν θυσιω κυκλω αμα. c. φως] Bekk. and Zue. φως. But the transitive present is preferable, ουκ ορατος φως διανοοι αι διαφωνοις: so Αατ and Stahl. With φως, διανοος would have to be supplied, but the aorist does not suit the sense, though right in form, for though the Attics say έφως, not φως, they borrow the conjunctive from the passive aorist. Τη: 'When they are just beginning to have teeth.'

[ζει τε και ανακηπετει] 'is in a state of ferment and general irritability and thrills' (γαργαλίζεται) and so Αατ and Σταλ. With φως, διανοος would have to be supplied, but the aorist does not suit the sense, though right in form, for though the Attics say έφως, not φως, they borrow the conjunctive from the passive aorist. Τη: 'When they are just beginning to have teeth.'

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μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ βρόντα, δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὕμερος καλεῖται, δεχομένη ἃ τῶν ὕμερον] ἀρνηταὶ τε καὶ θερμαίνονται, λοφᾶ τὰς ὀδύνας καὶ γέγραπην ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται καὶ αὐξήσῃ, τὰ τῶν διεχόμενον στόματα, ἢ τὸ πτερόν

μέρος as unnecessary. Stallb. defends both. The words ἐπιόντα καὶ βρόντα are found in the best MSS, but three give ἐπιβρέντα καὶ ἱδρυτα, whence Bähr, conjet. ἵδρυτα καὶ ἐπιβρέντα, and so, I suspect, Plato wrote. Krische conj. that the word Λωφᾶς was suggested by Empedocles. 

Carm. 421, σύστα σφιχτὸν ἐχων λωφῆς 

θυμόνω, but this seems idle, as λωφᾶς ἤστων or ἄνω στότοι (Thuc. vi. 13) is found both in popular and medical Greek (Hippocr. i. 517, Κῦλον, ποιεῖ λωφᾶς τῶν νόσουν. So λ. χόλον, οἰωνίρας, &c.). The popular elym. of Λωφᾶς from Λόφος is ridiculous, but it may possibly be connected with the Ger. laubs, "to refresh," it being not very unfrequently used transitively, as in Emped. i. 1.; Aesch. Prom. 27, ὁ λωφᾶς γὰρ ὁδὸν πέφυκεν ὅτι, and by Apoll. Rhod.

ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται, κ.τ.λ.] "when the soul is parted from her beloved, and her moisture fails, then the mouths of the passages, or pores, where the feather is shooting shrivel up, and so close and intercept the nascent germ. Every such germ, imprisoned thus below the surface, along with the infused desire (λωφᾶς), throbs like a pulsating artery, and the proper outlet aching enlarges: so that the soul tingleth and smarteth all over, and is maddened with pain and anguish." This description has all the gravity of a medical diagnosis, and some part at least of its phraseology is borrowed from medical authors: e.g. we find μόρας στόμα in Hippocr. i. 376, ed. K., συναπαίνεστα: ib. ii. 140, 207, 795, ἐμυδειν τὸ στόμα: ib. 794, ἀποκτεινότων: ib. σφυξίν: ib. iii. 461, οὐ ἢ ἡ φλέβῃ ἢ ὅτι τὴν ἀγωνία σφικτῆς μανικαί, where Galen observes, ἐνθέλουσας ὅτι τὸ σφιξίν ἐκτὸς τῆς μεγάλης υδατί καὶ σφιχάνας κυρίως τῶν ἐρυθτῶν ἐπιφώνων. But σφιξίς is also said of any throbbing: σφυξάες ἐν τῶν ἐλέκτρων, Hipp. Aph. 7. 21. Hence in this place τὰ σφιχάτα, sc. μύρυ, may be rendered, 'those parts of the body which throb violently.' δεξιάδος and ἄγραψις are also medical terms, though I have no example in prompta where they occur in the senses they bear here. For διή. comp. Timaeus 84 c, where διήδχος = air-passages. Hesych., ἄγραψις-τόστι, ἄγραψις. Herm., ἄγραψις ἀντὶ τῶν κεκτεῖ καὶ ἐνθέλουσ. Comp. Ruhnck. and Tim. Lex. v. ἄγραψις: Pors. ad Eur. Or. 909. So much for the phraseology of the passage, which might be much more copiously illustrated. The readings about which there is any dispute are three.

I have written ἀποκτείνει for the vulg. ἀποκτείνει—two MSS, giving ἀποκτείνει. Similarly for ἀποκτεινόμενη. ἀποκτεινόμενη, ἀποκτεινώμενη, ἀποκτεινώμενη are found. The Bodl. and a few others have ἀποκτεινόμενη, whence Bekk. rightly restored ἀποκτεινόμενη, and so subsequent eds., who however inconsistently retain ἀποκτείνεται. It is now pretty generally acknowledged that κλεῖς, κλępα, κιλέκρα, &c. are the true and only Attic forms. So Dind. (in Steph. Lex. v. κληίς) now admits, and he gives citations from the grammarians establishing the point, which is made yet clearer by Cobet, Vv. L. p. 159: "Antique scripturae quam grammaticorum auctoribus textur, passim in libris paulo melioribus aut certa exempla comparant, aut manifesta vestigia in antiquis corruptulis, quae proeminentem, et inquam in Eccles. 420, ὃς ἡ ἀποκτείνη τῆς θρήνος. Ravnennas dedit ἀποκτεῖνη λείρο περί προ ἀποκτείνη (IN pro HI), sec." So in Rep. viii. 569 e, κλήσατε has been restored from the oldest Paris MS. for κλαίσατε. For the vulg. ἔκαστη I have given ἐκάστη, sc. ἔκαστη, in obedience to the suggestion of Ἀστ. ἔκαστη is here = κλαίσατε rather than βλαστήσῃς.—a sprout or germ, rather than a 'sprouting' (cf. sup. ὧν τὸ πτερόν καυλός). Both senses are acknowledged by the Lex. ψ., though the latter is the more common of the two. In the preceding clause one πτερόν βλάστηται is put as a specimen of all, and afterwards each is said to graze, rub, or prick against its own orifice. The Zür. also gives ἔκαστη, but Stallb. adheres to the MSS., which vary so much in the matter of its script, that their authority is of little weight in the present case.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

The states of feeling "mixed of pleasure and pain" are described less poetically but with equal truth and vivacity in Philob. 46 seq., a passage which the student should by all means compare with the present.

She is sore troubled by the strangeness of her sensations. The etymology and consequently the original meaning of the word are uncertain. Buttm. in Lexil. derives it from δόξα, and compares the Ger. "nicht daheim seyn," "unheimlich," expressions to which we have the counterpart in English. But this is unlikely, in my opinion. Others comp. the Homeric ἄδημος. The adj. ἄδημος is supposed by Buttm. to be a figment, but ἄδημοστρόφος is attested by Sud. Phot. ἄδημοστρόφος κυρίως τὸ ἀποφέρει καὶ ἄφησιν ἐν τῷ δόμῳ ἡ χείρ. The latter part of the explanation may be dismissed, but the synonyms are rightly chosen. In Demosth. F. L. p. 402 the agitation of a modest female pressed to sing at a riotous party is described by this verb.

refreshed (irrigated) herself with the love-showers, or 'effluence of beauty,' before described, 251 n. One MS. has ἀναχειρευμένη, which is also not amiss. But ἄνουξα occurs Gorg. 498 ε; Crit. 117 b. Presently for ἄνουξα Badh. conj. ἄνων: cf. sup. κεντομένη ἄνουξα. The confusion of the two words is common. In Tim. 54 ε, ἄνων is the reading of the Boll.; Bekk. ἄνως, not so well. So too ib. 88 c, ἄνως ought not to have been disturbed, as it is the true antitheton to the foregoing ἄνως.

252. ὄδε δὴ] * and this, you will observe, is the reason why she never willingly quite the presence of the fair one." Symp. 192 δ, ὄδε καὶ νῦτα καὶ ἡμέραν μὴ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀλλήλων. νομίζω δὲ] 'she makes light too of the laws of custom and etiquette, on the observance of which she once piqued herself, and is prepared to resign her freedom, and to conch (slave-like) as near as they will let her to her love.' An allusion possibly to the custom of lodging servants in the vestibule of the house. Comp. Symp. 203 δ, ἐπὶ θάρσει καὶ εἰ ποῦ νυκτὸς κοιτᾶσθαι κοιμάσθως, τὸ δὲ is put 'abstract for concrete,' as ἄφροτη for ἐμφύτησιν in Eur. Ion 1108. "Sic Dion.
originating about the time of Plistratius, Plato frequently appeals with a kind of mock solemnity, as if it contained hidden treasures of ancient wisdom. Comp. Gorg. 493 a with Crat. 400 c.

To this Orphic school the two lines here quoted may probably have belonged:

"Heo versus non a Platone contestis puto, qui quum a poeta minime alienus et in omn genere dicendi potentissimus essebat, haud dubie meliores finissit, sed ex alio poeta sumtos, et leni quadrum mutatione ad praeuentum causam accommodatos. Nam quam illa (ut exemplum ponam) hoc modo scripta est: 'Dove e' fuiu, e'miow, 'Ewrota kalwun potntmr

in all these cases the more significant name is said to be used by the gods, the unmeaning one by men. Crat. 391 d, βδλων ὑπ' αγαθὴν καλουσα πρὸς ὅθηται ἤπερ ἀπ' φαίνει ὕπόσστατα. In this passage, as Lobeck observes, "Plato Amoris nomen significantius manifesto dilis tribuat, ita etiam e ceteris ex. appareat divina vocabula tum humanis, tum divinis accommodatio."

According to the same authority the άνδρες έπι are simply "apocryphal" lines or poems known to the few, but not found in the current books or editions. Suid., βιβλία συνεδρίων και διακεχωρισμάτων, και τινά τάς ἀπεικόνους (in n. ἄνωθεν). Ίδ., ἀπεικόνες τάς ἀπεικονισμένος. Themist. Orat. iv. 60, στίβον ἀρχαία σφαλαὶ οὐ κομίσα ἐν μία ἀνθρωπογενεσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ σπουδαία καὶ ἀποτέλεσις. Such διάσταση were frequently fathered upon celebrated authors—were in fact forgeries. Onomacritus, it will be remembered, was banished from Athens for this offence (Herod. vii. 6).

The same Onomacritus had the credit of being the composer of all—properly of the more ancient—poems which bore the pseudonyms of Orpheus and Musaeus. To this apocryphal literature,
διά νεώτητα γελάσει. Λέγουσι δέ, οἴμαι, τινὲς Ὄμηροίδων ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπών δύο ἐπὶ εἰς τὸν Ἑρωτα, ὅν τὸ ἔτερον ὑβριστικῶν πάντων καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἐμμετρον, ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὕδε,

τὸν δὲ ἤγοι θυντοὶ μὲν Ἑρωτα καλοὺς ποτηρίων,
ἀδάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτέρωτοι ἄναγκην.

τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθοντες, ἔξεστι δὲ μὴ ὁμώς δὲ ἢ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρωτῶν τούτω ἐκεῖνο τυχάνει ὅν. τῶν μὲν οὖν Δίως ὁπάδων ὁ ληφθείς ἐμβριθε-στερον δύναται φέρει τὸ τοῦ πτερώμου ἄχθος: ὅσοι δὲ Ἄρεως τε θεραπευταί, καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιπόλους,

ὁταν ὑπ᾽ Ἑρωτον ἀλώσι καὶ τι οἰηθῶν ἀνικείσθαι ὑπὸ

δικαιῶς, οὐσά σφόδρα ἄριστικῶς περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαλεγχέων. ἢμφα γὰρ τοῦ στερεοῦ σῶματος εἶναι τήν ψυχήν ἀναθηματίζειν χώρας. In the same sense Callias the versifying grammarian is said by Athenaeus to have written certain lines (which he quotes) ἀκολου-στέρον κατὰ τὴν διάλεξαν, x. 454 λ. Hermes understands ἄριστοικῶς in the same sense, but conceives the ἔθια to lie solely in the anadonic violation of metre: τὸ δὲ πάνω ἄριστοικω πρῶτον ἐπιστεύει διὰ τῶν ἑκάστων ὡς σφόδρα τι ἐμμετρον ἐμμετρον γαρ ὡστε τὸ ἑτοῖ

C. ἀδάνατοι—ἀναγκής! The ἄναγκη for which Plato apologizes consists in the shortening of the δὲ before two con-sonants, and in the lengthening of the ù in ἀδάνατοι. Ἐκ τοῦ πτερωμότατον, and not πτερώτατον is the true reading, follows clearly from the context, in which the growth of the feathers and the attendant phenomena are dwelt upon. The reading is preserved in three MSS., also in Schol. Ecl. Phys. p. 23 Π[103 ed. Gain.] and is adopted by Bekker. This is corrupted into πτέρω-τατον in the Bodl. and most others, whence the further corruption into πτέρω-τατον adopted by Steph. from one MS. The 'tendency,' or 'necessity, which gives birth to plumage' is, according to the myths, the cause of love and of its symptoms, ἢ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρωτῶν τοῦτ’ ἐκεῖνο τυχάνει δρ. Ἀχὶ

and Stallb., who retain πτέρωτατον, revel in a licence of interpretation truly hybrisitic. The simple φαῖροι is acknowled-

ged by Hesych. and restored to the text of Soph. Trach. 1061 by Dind. in place of the vulg. φώνης'. See his comm. on Sophocles, ed. Oxon. p. 270 where he thus corrects the hitherto un-metrical text:

Ω Παλλάς, Παλλάς, τὸ γὰρ μὲν ἠλώτα-

ται, τοῦ ταῖ,

τοῦ φαῖροι οἰκτείρας ἀνεπερυθοῦν ἐμμε-

τρον ἐμμετρον ἐμμετρον

To deny the short quantity of the penult. of φαῖροι is a paradox to me unac-

countable, though maintained by Stallb. and apparently by Lobbeck also. ἐμβριθεστερον] 'with greater con-

stancy or sedateness,' as beseeches the fol-

lowers of Zeus, compared with those of

less intellectual deities. Λατ. compares

Theact. 1.44 b, οἱ ἐμβριθεστερος νεφελο-

πος ἄπαντως πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα (op-

posed to ἄξιος sup.). Ep. vii. 328 b, τὸ

δὲ Δίως ἡπιστάσθην τῆς ψυχῆς πέρα

φέρει τε ἐμβριθεῖν ἡ λαίκαι τῇ ὅθη

μετρίω ἔχουν. In Plut. Coriol. 220 e ἐμβριθεῖν is coupled with πρόσ. Ἡρμ.,

καταστάσιμον καὶ οὐ σφόδρα κεκιμημένον.

Synonyms with βλασφήμως and βίβαζος,

Rep. viii. 535 A b, where the legislator,

in selecting the members of the ruling

class, is directed to look out for τὸν βεβαιοτάτον καὶ ἀνθρωπότατον, and

again, for youths, γενναίον τε καὶ βλα-

σφήνος τὰ ἡθη.

Βασιλεῖς δὲ Ἄρεως τε, κ.κ.λ.᾿] Herms., οἱ

κάτοχοι τοῦ Δίως σταθμοὶ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τοῦ

Ἀρεώς φοινικοὶ καὶ Φιλότυποι.
D. ἐστιν ὁ ἀδιάφθορος\footnote{i.e. so long as he retains his pristine purity, underballed by evil associates, &c. Comp. sup. 250 ι., ὁ μὲν ἄνω ὁ μήνσελής ἢ διεφθαρμένος. For ἄνθερος in the next clause the odd, give ἀνθερεῖν, which Heinl. corrected.}

καὶ τοῦτο τῆς πρότερης, κ.τ.λ., ἐν τούτῳ ἐν τούτῳ τοῦτον ἐκατόστα λέγει ἡ ἄνακτες ὁ ἀνθρώπος. For ἀνθρώπος in the next clause the odd, give ἀνθερεῖν, which Heinl. corrected.

τὸν τε ὅν ἦρωτα, κ.τ.λ. \footnote{‘hence each man in selecting his love from the ranks of beauty follows his own peculiar bent; his choice being determined by a kind of complexional necessity, the doctrine of temperaments being thus early, it would seem, connected with the notion of a ruling deity. πρὸς τέρας is here equiv. to πρὸς τὸν ἑκέντρου τέρατον. So Logg. iv. 721 ο., πρὸς τὸν ἑκέντρου τέρατον. It is more usually adverbal, as ἐφικμ. 470 ο., πρὸς τέρατον λέγω (τιθ., opposed to ἐπὶ τέρατον, which occurs inf. 278 ο.; So πρὸς λέγων, Gorg. 459 ο., if the reading is correct. Presently τεκτανίσωσαι, ‘moulds or fashions,’ is explained by βρουκοῦσα, inf. 253 ο.; τιμήσωσαι τε καὶ ὅργανάσω σωσαι. Equiv. to ὁργίσω τιμήσωσαι. ὁργίσσω διεβ. is the usual construction, but in later writers we have also ὁργ. διεβ. τε, ‘to celebrate with mystic rites.’ E. ὁ μὲν δὴ οὖν ἄνως Δίως Πάνω τίμα, κ.τ.λ. Hence it comes that the followers of we are curious that he they love shall of the Jovial type of soul, i.e. in whom intellect is predominant. He reading Δίως is well supported by Ἀρ., authority, the Boil. δὴ διε ὁ περιπτώσις περιπτώσις. It is recognized as in comm., and by Proclus, Alchb. i. (p. 310 Cousin, διοῦς διόν 

Ἀλκ. i. (p. 310 Cousin, ἄνω τῶν διῶν καὶ ἄνω τῶν στῶν φώνης), who elsewhere speaks of 

Δίως ψυχής (Comm. in Tim. 46 ν., 310 ν.), using also the adverbs διώκει, and ἴδωμεν, Ἰδωλίτερ' and Ἰδωλικόν), Suid., Δίως ἄρη καὶ Δίως Βαύκα. The 

mst. Or. xiii. 165 ὁ, ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον μὲν καὶ ἄνθρωπον διώκει (ap. Piers. ad Moerid. p. 186, q. v.). We have also Δίως as a 

proper name in Plat. Mor. 421 ν., Stallb. and the Z. Ed. give Δίως, which has but one considerable MS. in its favour. For the idea, which was afterwards adopted and improved upon by Neo-

Platonists ancient and modern, compare Horace’s Mercurialis custos virorum. Also Shakespeare, Cymbeline iv. 2, “His foot Mercurial; this Marsilius High. The 

brawns of Hercules: but his Jovial face?” ib. v. 4, “Our Jovial star reigned at his birth.” Spenser, F. Q. ii. 12, et. 51, “Thereto the heavens always Jovial Lookt on them lovely:” explained by “under the aspect of the planet Jupiter.” It is an interesting question how much of the ‘occult science,’ so popular at the time of the Renaissance, may be traced up to the Platonic myths. We have clear traces of the doctrine of planetary influence in Proclus, and in the Neo-platonic treatises which bear the name of Hermes Trismegistus, to which Cornelius Agrippa frequently appeals. The curious are referred to the 

Oculta Philosophia of the latter. B. ii. c. 58, De septem mundi Gubernatoribus planetis, ib. c. 60, fn., a passage which seems suggested by 253 θ of this dialogue, read, of course, through Neo-

platonic glasses. B. iii. c. 38, treats of the question “Quae divina dona homo desuper a singulis caelorum et intelli-

gentiarum ordinibus accipit.” Compare
also ib. c. 46 seq. for the four kinds of 'furores divinæ;' also Proclus in Timæum, p. 45 ε, 319 δ,—both curious passages, as showing the astrological interpretation put by his Greek commentators upon Plato's mythical psychology. Among the ἠθὴ ἔπη enumerated by Proclus, are the Κρόνος (according to him the highest type of all), the Δίας, Ἡλιακὸς, Θελησμικός, Ἀριστοκράτος, Αφροδίσιας, Ἐρωτικός, on each of which he spends a great deal of fanciful ingenuity. The following passage is a résumé of the Neo-platonic theory of astral influence on human character: ἔθεων καὶ λέγειν τὶνες ἐνότητας ὡς τὸ μὲν φιλόν αὐτῶν (οἷς τοῦ αὐθεντικῶς τῷ ἀκραίῳ (ὅς ὀφείλεται τῷ ἀκραίῳ) τότε ἐκεῖνον τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ λόγον τὸν ἐκείνου κριτικῶς καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν θυμωναίον Ἀρει, τὸ δὲ φωτισμὰ τῆς Ἐρώτης (τὸ δὲ ἐπειδήμονι Ἀφροδίσιας, τὸ δὲ αισθητικῶς Ἡλιάς, τὸ δὲ φυσικῶς Ζελαθής, (ib. 348 a.). This preference of the Saturnine temperament seems grounded on the dictum of Aristotle, ὅτι οἱ ἐφόβοι μεταλαγχωλικοὶ.


καὶ ότιν αὐτῶν, κτλ.] The true φράττη, unlike the selfish lover described in the former Socratic speech, sup. 239 ε, uses every effort to develop the faculties of the ἔφόβον, and to make him φιλόσοφος τοῖς διὰ ἡγεμονικοῖς. The latter word is of course used in its esoteric sense, Zeus being the symbol of the universal Reason, the μέγας ἡγεμόνις τοῦ ἐν ὅλων. In the next sentence Plato seems to intimate that the 'follower of Zeus' is in some cases unconscious of his high vocation until stimulated by the converse of a kindred spirit. If the lover has not previously been grounded in the study of philosophy, he sets about it now, and in addition to his own researches he has recourse to every accessible source of knowledge. τῷ ἐπιτηθεῖσαν εἰναι εὐθὺς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, as Hein. remarks. [ἵνατος εἰς, κτλ.] The idea of 'tracking' is implied in the foregoing μεταχείρισις (inf. 276 δ, τῷ τοῦτον ἤγερες μεταξύ). In endeavouring to detect by traces in his own nature the true character of the god to whom he belongs,—the Lover finds his search facilitated by the very necessity he feels of gazing intently upon that god. The obscurity of this passage escapes the comm. πρὸς τῶν δεον seems to refer both to Zeus, and to his incarnate image in the person of the beloved, which, mystically speaking, may be looked upon as one and the same. Comp. sup. καὶ ὑπὸ δεον αὐτῶν ἵκινοι ἐγέρθη. It is the Jovial element in the beloved one, which produces an ἄναγκης of the archetypal Zeus: just as the contemplation of sensible beauty recalls the τὸ καλὸν itself. In other words, the philosophic genius of the beloved reminds the Lover of his own vocation, and makes him long to bring his manners and pursuits into conformity with the highest reason. To teach and to learn are, in the Socratic view, but parts of the same process,—master and pupil being συνδιδᾶντας of the same god. 253. The αὐθεντικῶς μετασχῆμα] This μεθέχει is represented as an ὁμοιώσις in
αἰτιώμενοι ἐπὶ τε μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι, κἂν ἐκ Δώς ἄροτρους ἄσπερ αἱ βάσεις, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἔρωμένου ψυχήν ἐπανενεργοῦσι ποιούσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοίωσιν τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ. οὕτω δὲ αὖ μεθ" Ἡρας εἰπώντο, βασιλικῶν ζητοῦσι, καὶ εὐφόρους περὶ τούτων τόπτα δράσις τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνος τε καὶ ἐκάστων τῶν θεῶν ὀντός κατὰ τὸν θεόν ἑντὸς ἔρισθεν τὸν σφετέρου παῖδα περικείναι, καὶ ὅταν κτῆσιςται, μιμοῦμενοι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πειθοῦντες καὶ ὑπακούουντες εἰς τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἀγωνίαν, ὡς ἐκάστῳ δύναμις, οὐ φθοράν οὖν ἀνελευθέρωσι δυσμενεῖα χρόνῳ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλὰ εἰς ὁμοίωσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ τῷ θεῷ, ὅταν τιμῶσι, πάσαν πάντως ὁ τι μᾶλλον πειρώμενοι ἄγεν ὄντως ποιοῦσιν. πρὸς τιμία

Thucyd. 176 b, ὑμ. θεβαὶ κατὰ τὸ δυστὸν ἐνδούσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ διόνυς μετὰ φρονήσεως γεννήσαν. So created things are sometimes spoken of as metékonta, sometimes as μάθημα τῶν ὀντών.

καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ὑμνίοις ἀνάμειν αἱ βάσεις. "Reason being the Zeus in man," says Krische, "Plato may have mythically denoted the act of pure thought as a drawing draughts from Zeus himself, a process which he happily compares with that of the Bacchi women," who are represented by Euripides as causing water to burst from the rock, and wine, honey, and milk from the dry ground. Bacch. 143, 704 seq. This entire passage is well illustrated by a fragment of Aeschines Sostraicus, ap. Aristid. Rhet. ii. p. 23. Dind. (to which Stallb. also refers, as well as to Ion 532): ἐγὼ δὲ διὰ τὸν ὑμνίον ἐν παράσιν θεοῦ ἀλλ' ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἔρωμεν διάφορον τῶν βασιλείων, καὶ γὰρ αἱ βάσεις τῶν διὰδοτῶν ἐνθεοῦ γένος τῶν, ἂν δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ ἔρωμεν οὐδὲ ἄλλο ὄνομα δύναται ὄνομαι, δεῖται μὲν καὶ γὰρ ἢπάντα (I. ἀριστοτροπία): καὶ δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν μεθύμην ἐποιήσασα ἔνδεξιον ἀνθρώπου ἀφελέσασα αὐτῷ ἢμα, μιας ἡμέρας ἕως ἐν ἡπέφη τοῦ ἐρώταν λατρεύσει:

οὐδεὶς δὲ αὖ μεθ" Ἡρας. "Hera is the symbol of the practical as Zeus of the speculative intellect. Her votaries are not philosophers, but rather men born for empire: basileis ἐννοοῦν ἡ πολεμικοὶ καὶ ἄρχοντες (248 D). Eustath. p. 81. "Ἡρα γὰρ καὶ ἡ βασιλεία, καὶ ἡ ῥαία ζωὴ ἡ βασιλικὴ. The MSS. give the whimsical variant μὲθ' ἡμέρας.

b. οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνος] It is not clear whether poets come under this category. Probably not all, but only the lyrical. It may also include the seer and the physician. Aesch. Eum. 62, ἰστρομεντις δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ περισσότερος Καὶ τόσον ἀλλοις δυνάμεως καθάροις.

οὐτὸς κατὰ τὸν θεόν ἀνευομένος] οὐτὸς belongs here to περικείσθαι, the next clause being epexegetical, "dei cui exemplum spectantes" (Stallb.). The use of ἐναρκτάς as an engine of education was no new idea in Greece. Compare Eurip. Med. 844 with Frag. inc. 880, Nauck, παρθενωμεν ἐρωταὶ Πειλείων ἐπάρχει: and Dictys, 342 (Frag. viii. Dind.).

καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πειθοῦντες] Herm., τέλος γὰρ τῆς ἐραστηκίας τοῦ ἀντικρότου γεννήσαν, ρυθμούσαν, shaping or conforming them to the mode of life and the moral standard proper to the god they serve. οὐ δὲ φθοράς Thin, as Hermias remarks, has reference to the φθοράν attributed to the ἐραστήν in the Speech of Lysias: οὗ δυσμενέωτες οὐ δὲ νόμοι ἔρασιν: ... γὰρ ἐποικοῦν μία γὰρ ἄνευν ἡ ζωὴ αὐτῶν τοιούτως δὲ ἦσαν καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις οὐκ ἔμοι καὶ φημοῖς ὑπεργορεύατο τῶν πάσησ φέρεται ἐπαγγελματίας πάντως τότε τοῦ βίου τὸ Τί άρσεν φίλος; Καβάλλε ἐγώ (p. 166, Ast.).

c. οὐτὸς πανάκισ] A parallel collocation is found in Phaed. 67 D, παρασκευάζονθ'
μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔρωτιν καὶ τελετή, εάν γε
dιαπράζωνται ο προθυμούνται, ἢν λέγω, οὕτως
tοι καὶ εὐδαμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δὲ ἐρωτα μανέντος 
ὑπὸ τοῦ 
φιληθείν 
γίνεται, εάν 
αἰρεθῇ, ἀλλικεῖται δὲ δὴ ο 
αἰρεθεὶς 
tωμὸς τρόπω.

Καθάπερ ἐν ἄρχῃ τούτῳ τοῦ μύθου τριχῇ ἀπειλομεν
δὲ ψυχὴν ἐκάστην, ἱππομάριφον μὲν δύο τινὲς εἰδή, ἡμωνικ

κὸν δὲ εἰσὶ τρίτων, καὶ νῦν ἐτί ἡμῖν ταῦτα μενετὸν
tων δὲ δὴ ἰππῶν ὁ μέν, φαμέν, ἀγάθος, ὁ δ' οὖ. ἁρετῇ 
dὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγάθου Ἡ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ 
διεἰσόμεν, νῦν δὲ

λαυτὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀλήθειας ὑποτασσάντος τοῦ 
τετελέσθη ποτέ ἤτοι ζητὶ, ὡς γὰρ ἐθέλησεν. 

Comp. Gorg. 507 ἐν πάντα . . . εἰς τά τοῦ . . . ἐσχάλη

σεται . . . ὡς πρᾶξεν.

πράξεως δὲ ἄν οὐκ. κ.α.] Such, says Soec., 

is the high object the true lover strives after, so glorious and so fraught 

with bliss to the beloved the secret rites 

celebrated by his love-frenzied admirer 

if he be successful in his suit. ἦν λέγω 

is to be taken with οὕτω according to 

Aet, as if we had found ὡς λέγω, ἦν. 

He quotes Gorg. 473 Χ, ὡς 

ταῦτα εἰσίν καὶ ὡς διεῖσεν ἃν ὁμήρους. 

But query? Stallb. λέγω, which he takes 

with διαπράζω, is perhaps better than the 

vulg. The change had been recommended 

by Heindl, with the remark 

"ipsam quoque asedum friget." The 

telethi is the initiation into the 

mysteries of philosophy—the ἐπιθύμησια 

διὸν—fore though those of other 
dotries have been mentioned, it is this study 

which Soec. has principally in view. For 

γε διαπράζω, the reading of most MSS. 

and Bekk, is γε διαπράζωμαι. 

διαπράζω 

is adopted by Stallb. and the 

Zur., and is found also in Hermelius, 

who omits the γε. The old reading will give 

the sense 'if they succeed in working in 

the beloved the effect they desire to 

produce.' But this seems more and less 

than the context requires. The force 

of γε is—γε τελεθι, as in truth it is, if 

the lover achieve his object.' 

diaphράζω 

is here used in the spiritual as 

before, 234 and elsewhere, in the vulgar 

sense... 

αἰρεθῇ is an explanatory 

repetition of ἔκαστην... 

αιρεθῇ. For the use of the verb 

comp. 

Lyd. 209 ἀν ὡς ἐπικε καὶ τόν ἐρωμένον πρῶ 

τὸ ἐκλήν. Ob. that ἔκαστα ἔλκωσα are 

the usual Attic passives of ἀπειλεῖ, 

ὑποτασσάμε 

αἱ ἡμῶν being commonly the passives of 

ἀπειλεῖ, ἐλεῖρε. But exceptions occur, 

as Phil. 66, περὶ μεταγι πῦ τὸ μέτα 

. . . τῆς ἀπομίνθος μεθ' θείος, where, if 

ὑποτασσάς be interpreted 'captam esse,' in 

allusion to the foregoing chase (τὸ 

ἀγάθον ὑπείρασε, 64 Χ), there is no 

necessity for the emend. ἐλεῖρει ὑπέ 

suggested by Badg., and which I once ap 

proved.

Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ] Soec. now proceeds 

to make the ends of his discourse 

meet, by showing (1) the relation 

between the doctrine of ἀνάμεσος 

and that of the tripartite soul, sup. 246; 

and (2) the relation of both doctrines 

to the phenomena of Love.

[Διεισόμενος] MSS. διεισόμενος, corr. 

Heindl. Later edd. perversely restore 

the evidently vicious reading of the 

MSS. Compare Soph. 220 ἐν, where 

the same corruption occurs, διεισόμε 

for διεισόμενος. Soec. has throughout 

spoken in the plural, and continues to do 

so both here and in the dialogue quoted. 

It is a part of his εἰρωνεία to represent 

the myth as a joint performance. 

Aet however defends διεισόμενον by 

245 ἐν, τοσοῦτο μὲν οὐ 

καὶ οὐ πλεῖστο Χ ὡς 

μαλλὰ 

γεγραμμένον ἀπὸ 

θεῶν λέγει καλὰ 

ἐργα 

τίνως τοῦ ἐν 

ἀντὶ 

μὴ 

φροῦ 

μὲ 

τις 

καὶ 

λέγω 

ἀσθείω 

μὲ 

here we 

must remember Soec. is engaged in a 

dialogue with an imaginary νῦν καλὸς, 

πρὸς 

δὲ 

αἰρεθῇ—a personage of whom 

he has by this time lost sight. ἔκαστα 

is an Attic dual, for the common εἰκε, 

as we have φέρειν in Rep. 410 ἐν, and 

πέθα 

in Isocr. Paneg. 54.
λεκτέων. ο μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ καλλιών στάσει ὦν

δ. ο μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ καλλιών στάσει ὦν] i.e. ο ἐν δεῖξ, the off-horse being usually the better, as the epithet, δεξιόσπορος implies. In the description of the two steeds there is evident parallelism: but in some of the details a certain liberty has been taken. Thus, while ὅπος and αὐθλοί, ἑπίγραυτος and συμφράκτης, λευκὸς ἰθεῖς and μελάγχρως answer literally to each other, the relation of the other contrasted features is rather essential than verbal. For instance, to λευκομάχον, 'clean-boned,' with joints well defined,' respond two epithets, πολίς (= nimius, lumbering, over-large, or, as our jockeys say, 'too much of a horse') and εἰκόνισμοι, 'ill-made, as if thrown together at haphazard. Again, μελανόμαχος an- swers to λευκομάχον, 'with grey and bloodshot eyes.' J. Poll. 2. 62, ἵπποι μελάντες δραμαλός. This is better than Stallo's "sanguineus," referring to the general temperament. For there is nothing to answer to this in the former catalogue, and the restive horse would scarcely have been called 'sanguine,' but rather 'plagmatic,' or 'choleric.' The necessity for two epithets, κρατερομαχός and βραχυντάκτος, answering to the single ψυχικός, is not so manifest; and the antithesis between τιμής ἐρασίθη μετὰ συνετέρωσις τοῦ καὶ αἰθόν on the one hand, and δέκται καὶ διαφώνεις ἑταίροι on the other, seems complete without the addition of the words καὶ ἄλφητιν δόξης ἑταίροι to the former. ἄλφητιν δόξης is interpreted "vera opinionis," but it may well be doubted whether this is possible; ἄλφητιν δόξα has a definite sense in Plato, but where does he use ἄλφητιν in such connexion? 'Veritable opinion' would rather denote δόξα as distinguished from ἑπιστήμη, and in this case the epithet would be the reverse of laudatory. It is remarkable that Hermelins takes no notice of this clause, and this aggravates its suspicious appearance. Lastly, in the description of the bad steed, the clauses περὶ ἑτα λάδιος, καφώς, answer to nothing very definite in the portrait of his yokelfellow. If περὶ ἑτα λάδιος simply mean 'stupid,' 'senseless' (see Photius, quoted presently), and καφώς be taken with the succeeding clause, we have a kind of antithesis to ἄλφητιν δόξης ἑταίροι, of the common interpretation of these words to stand. But I cannot consent to separate μετὰ συνετέρωσις καὶ αἰθόν from τιμής ἐρασίθη, as in that case the opposition to δέκται καὶ διαφώνεις ἑταίροι would be incomplete. As regards the text, it may be observed that besides μελανόμαχος for βραχυντάκτος, there is no considerable variant in the MS. readings as given by Bock, with the remarkable exception λασιόκοφος, which the Boll, and some others have. Porson, who examined the Boll, before it went to Oxford, seems to have adopted this compound in lieu of the vulg. λασιοκοφος, and he is supported by Phot. in Lox.: λασιόκοφος: ο λιγαλ κωφος, ολοι λασια τὰ ἄτα ἐχειν με συνετερωσιν καὶ συμφρακτον, evidently referring to this passage, to which the reference is still more explicit in Sync. and Enax. Calv. 67 D. ο ἱλλο καὶ Πλατων τῶν ἕπων περὶ ἄτα λασιάκοφον λέγει. Add Hesych.: λασιακόφους τοις κωφοις. The reading is therefore not derived from the Boll, as Stallo thinks, but is of high antiquity, and the temptation to receive it would have been great, were it not that the still more ancient 'Homeric Allegories' of Heraclitus (litherto called Heraclidas) rather countenance the vulg. We there read περιστάλαιοι λυκάλκοφος (comp. Ar. Eq. 43, γεράστων ἄτιχωφον). The entire passage is quoted by Heraclitus, cap. xvi, p. 36, ed. Meleier. He gives besides the νν. II. τὸ ἔιθορο τοὔτοις γιγαντωσιν ς πολιτικεὺς: omits ἀληθινὴ before δόξης, as does the Cod. Vat., inspected by Cobet; for κελεύματι μονον καὶ λαργον he gives κελεύσματι καὶ λαργον μων: for βραχυντάκτος, πολυτράκτος: for μελανόμαχος, and for μόχλης, μόχλις. Amid this discrepancy of authorities I have not ventured to alter the received text, though by no means satisfied with it.—The description of the better horse is illustrated by Virg. Georg. Iii. 78, illa arunda cervix, Argutumque caput, brevis albus, obscuraque terga: Luxuriantque toris animosam pectus. Also by Shakap., Venus and Adonis, "Round-hoofed, short-jointed, fetlocks shag and long: Broad breast, full eyes, small head and nostril wide: High crest, short ears, straight legs and passing strong: This mane, thick tail, broad buttock, tender hide." For ὁφαλχην compare Xen. Eq. i. 8, ἀπὸ τοῦ στέρων ο μὲν αἰχμὴν αὐτοῦ μὴ δοστερ καπροῦ προπετηθεὶς φείδοι (this seems to
τὸ τ’ εἶδος ὅρθός καὶ διηρθρωμένος, ὑψάχ̄ην, ἐπίγυν-νος, λευκός ἰδεῖν, μελανόματα, τιμῆς ἑραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τι καὶ αἰδών, καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος, ἀπληκτος, κελεύματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ ἴσοις ὑποκείτων ὦ δ’ ἐν οἴκοισί οὐράνοις, ἀργός, εἰκὸς συμπεφρημένος, κρατεράχην, βραχυτράχχος, συμπρόσωπος, μελάγχος, γλαυκόματα, ὑφαίμοι, ὑβρεῖς καὶ ἀλατοεῖαι ἑταῖρος, περὶ δέ ἡμέρας, κοίνων, μάκτινα μετὰ κέντρων μόνος ὑπείκειν. ὅταν δ’ οὖν ὦ ἴσοις ἰδον τὸ ἐφωτικόν ὀμμα, πάσαν αἰσθη-
σει διαθερμήμα την ψυχήν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου κέντρον ὑποπλησθῇ, | ὁ μὲν, εὑρεθής τῷ ἡμύχῳ τῶν 254 ἰππῶν, ἀεὶ τε καὶ τότε αἴδοι πιαξόμενος, ἐστάντων κατέχει μὴ ἐπιπηδήν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ· ὁ δὲ οὔτε κέντρον ἡμύχων οὔτε μάστιγος ἐπὶ ἐντρέπεται, σκρητῶν δὲ βία φέρεται, καὶ πάντα πράγματα παρέχον τῷ σύγνινι τε καὶ ἡμύχῳ ἀναγκάζει λέναι τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀφροδίσιων χάριτος, τῷ δὲ κατ’ ἄρχας μὲν ἀντιτείνειν ἀγανακτώντω, ὡς δεινα καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκαζόμενον τελευτάντε δὲ, ὡτιν μηδὲν ἢ πέρας κακοῦ, προφυτεύσαν αἰγομένων, ἐξαντε καὶ ὀμολογήσαντε ποιήσαι τὸ κελεύμενον. καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τ' ἐγείνοντο καὶ εἴδον τὴν ὧν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ἀστράπτουσαν. ἴδοντος δὲ τοῦ ἡμύχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἡνεχθῆ, καὶ πάλιν εἰδὼν αὐτὴν μετὰ σαφροσύνης ἐν ἀγνῷ βαθρῷ

diaethmemaiu tēn psichēn. Comp. inf. 255a, tō bēma ... dia tōn Ómētωn lōn, ἢ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν λέναι. These considerations seem to remove the difficulty with regard to τίνος, and prevent us from yielding to Stallibr's proposal of substituting διαθερμήματα for διαθερμήματα,—a change in every point of view undesirable. Presently, 254c, the ἄγαθος ἴππος in his turn ἰδρυτί πάσαν ἰδρυτί τὴν ψυχήν. The psychology of all the passages is Platonic, if not in all points unexceptionable. Particularly striking is the description of passionate love, as distinguished from mere lust. The 'obedient steed' is restrained by shame from violence; true passion being always united with sexual modesty, ἀεὶ παρ' σε καί τότε, 'then as always.' Compare with the entire passage 251c, δεν μὲν ὅσον, βλέποντα πρὸς τοῦ παθητι κάλλους ... ὀρθειαίτης, and ibid. p. 251p, δεδαμενος του κάλλους την ἀποβοήθησι δια των ὀματων, ὀρθειαίτης, κ.τ.λ. The use of ὄμιον for ψυχή is poetical, and frequent in tragedy. For ὄμιοι θρύμν. comp. Protag. inf. πάγωμα ἤθη ὑποκυπτόμενου: κ. απ. 251p, ὅν τοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδοι.

254a. τῆς ὀργῆς τε καὶ ἡμύχου | Observe that the article affects both nouns, though relating to different subjects. In such cases τοι occurs usually before καὶ, but not always. Eur. Herc. Purr. 340, τοῦ Ἡρακλέους πατέρα καὶ ἴππαρον, 'the sire and (the) spouse of Hercules.'

to δὲ κατ' ἄρχας μὲν ἀντιτείνειν] The ἴππος are of course the logos of the ψυχήν, and the θυγατέρες μέρος τῆς ψυχήν, which combine to resist the mere animal appetite. Presently we find that the driver 'brings both horses on their haunches,' but there is this difference, that the better horse makes no resistance. So in Rep. iv. 440t, παῖς ἐπιθυμώντως αὐτὸν (τὸν θυμόν) κοινωνίσαστα, ἀιρώμενος λόγῳ μὴ δεῖν τι πράτειν, ὀμοία σὲ οὐκ ἂν ζωον γενομένον ποτὲ ἐν σαρκί τινος ἀνωθέν, ὀμοία 'ο' οὔτε ἐν ἐλατρ. πεπελεύστω ἑλάτρ. v. tελευτάτω ἑλάτρ., κ.τ.λ.] Ultimately, when they are weary of resisting, the driver and his ally are faint to come to terms with the refractory steed. They yield for a while, but so soon as they come in presence of the beloved, the aspect of his beauty awakens the repugnance of the driver by reviving the memory of the absolutely Beautiful (αἱ εἰς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους μνήμη). Comp. with this passage one of Galen, de Hippocr. et Platon. vi. 510, Kuhn., σωλάκεις μὲν ἔκτειναι τῷ θυμοειδεῖ τὰ λακτὰ δώς, σωλάκεις δὲ τῇ ἐναρμονίᾳ, καθάρθεν ἐλάτρ. καὶ συμμετέχαν παρὰλλον τρέψει ἀπεί καὶ ἐπαναστάτε ἵππον, κ.τ.λ.

ἐν ἀγνῷ βάθρῳ | 'on a holy pedestal,' an allusion doubtless to the images in the adyta at Eleusis. Paur. iii. 19. 3, τοῦ δὲ ἐγκάλματος τὸ βάθρον παρέχεται Βασιλεία σχῆμα. Ετυμ. Μ. δέ, βάθρον βάθα η βάσις τοῦ ἀσύλου. So also Heuch.
βεβώσαν. ἰδούσα δὲ ἔδεισε τε καὶ σεφθέισα ἀνέπεσεν
κύπτια, καὶ ἄρα ἰαγγακάσθη ἐις τοῦπισοῦ ἐλκύσαι τὰς ἱνιάς
οὗτω σφόδρα, ὥστε ἐπὶ τὰ ἱσχία ἀμφω καθίσαι τὸ ἱπποῦ,
τὸν μὲν ἐκόντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, τὸν δὲ ὑβριστὴν
μᾶλα ἀκοντα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω, ὦ μὲν ὑπ’ ἀισχύ-
νης τε καὶ θάμβοις ἱδρώτα πᾶσιν ἐβρέθη τῇ ψυχῇ, ὦ
δὲ, λέξας τῆς ὄδυνες ἢν υπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τε ἐσχῆ καὶ
τοῦ πτωμάτω, μῦγος ἐξαναπνεύσας έλθοντος ὄργῃ,
πολλά κακίζων τὸν τε ἱμῖοιο καὶ τὸν ὄμοζυγο ώς δειλια
τε καὶ ἀνανθρία λυπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὁμολογίαν,
καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔθλοντας προσέμεναι ἰαγγάκαζων μόνης
συνεχόμηκε, δεσμοῦν εἰσαῦθης ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ
τοῦ συντεθέντος χρόνου, [οὐ] ἀμνησμοῖν προστοιουμένω
ἀναμμήσκων, βιαζόμενοι, χρεμτιζόν, ἐλκόν τινάκας
ἀυτοῖς προσελθέων εἶτα τούτοις τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων.
καὶ ἐπειδῇ ἠγνοῦ ἦσαν, ἠγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον,
ἐνδικόν τῶν χαλκῶν, μετ’ ἀναιδείας ἔλεικε. ὦ δὲ ἱμῖοιος

σεφθέσα[ν] Ἑσαύλι, ἐπ’ ἐφθαρ’ ἑπεβάλθην, ἰαγγάκαζας ἠγκύψας Σοφοκλῆς Δαί-
δαλος (Frag. 175, Dind.). This deponent
are, formed contrary to analogy from
αἴθμαι, is noted by other grammarians
as occurring only twice, here and in Soph.
1.1. The MSS. have the variants στρε-
θέως, στρεφθείσας, στραφθείσα, ἀδινήσα, ἀδινήσα,
Comp. Ellendt, Lex. Soph. in a. σεθώ.

c. ὕπ’-λυπνε ἡν τὰς καὶ ὁμο-
λογίας: As guilty of λιποτάζων in
breaking the terms of the agreement.
The τοῖς which Bath. would insert seems
unnecessary. Hürzler, Maj. 298 p., εἶδαμε
μὲν τὴν ἑπίφαν καὶ ἠπάθειαν.

d. καὶ πάλιν, κ.π.λ.ρ, ‘after one more
attempt to force his unwilling companions
to draw nigh to the beloved, he has to
yield a reluctant assent to their prayer
for further delay.’ The aorists in this
passage and the context are illustrated
by Phaedo. 73 p (quoted by Heind.),
οὐκοῦν αὐθα, ὦτι οὐ ἑρατεῖ ὅτι ἔνοικαι
λόφων ἡ ἑπίφαν ἡ ἀλλά ὅσ τὰ παιδικά
αὐτῶν ἔσοδο κρησάω, πάσχοντες τόσο,
ἐγκυψάν τε τῆς λόφων, καὶ ἐν τῇ δια-
νοις ἐλαβόν τοῦ εἴδου τοῦ παιδοῦ, ὦ ὁ
ἡ λόφο. Εἰς εἰς τὸ πρώτον: The Attic
verb in use is ἀναβάλλεσθαι. This is pos-
sibly one of the Ionieisms of which Plato,
according to the grammarians, was fond.
Herod. ix. 45, ὄν υπερβάλεται τὴν συμ-
βολὴν Μαρθάνα. But Lucian, perhaps
imitating Plato, has οὐαθρών ὑπερβαλέ-
μένα τὴν ψυχονα. Later writers fre-
cently use ἐνεργέσθαι in the same
sense. The gen. sae. δεσμοῦν—though
they pray’ or ‘because they pray’—needs
neither alteration nor apology, though
Heind.’s conj. δεσμοῦν is not in itself
improbable, the substitution of a plural
for a dual being a common error in
MSS. Presently ως is found in all the
MSS. after χρόνον, evidently by an error
of the scribes, who have repeated the
last syllable of χρόνον. Heind. seems
first to have called attention to this
error.

καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἠγνοῦ ἦσαν—έλεικε] The
tense changes from past to present, as in
the passage of the Phaedo just quoted it
changes from present to past.

ἠγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον] ‘with
head down, and tail stretched out.’ Xen.
Eq. 1.8, ὦ γὰρ ἡγκύψαστε, ἀλλ’
ἐκτείνατες τῶν τρόχων καὶ τῶν
ἐνεργείας δεσμοῦ τῳ ἱππῳ ἐς πηκτικῷ.
ταυτών πάθος παθῶν] i.e. δείσις καὶ 
σφεδρία, paul. sup. The next clause is 
expository, and therefore the copula is 
dispensed with.

κ. ὁσπερ ἄνω ὑπηληγος] As racers 
fall back at the barrier which their eager 
team strives to force. ὑπηληγος, for which 
the commoner form is ὑπηληγης, is 
mentioned by J. Poll. (III. 147), with its 
synonymous ἐφηληγος, χρημη, βαλλεις. It is 
distinguished from the last term in the 
Lex. Rhet. βαλλεις ἡλια δύο τῶν δρα 
μάων, ἀλλ’ ὃν σχολιᾷ τι διατηται. This 
ἐφηληγος seems to be the ὑπηληγης proper, 
which is accordingly explained by Steph. 
as another case of the ambiguous, i.e. τὸν 
ὑπηληγης, ὡς λαξατὸ δεκτοεικες κα 
ἱκτοφαραινω, quo laxato dejectoque curricul 
en ingredientur.” On the 
other hand Pausanias seems to deny that the 
ὑπηληγης was a rope. Speaking of the 
hippodrome at Olympia, he says, δείσις 
πρὸ ἅνων καλώδιον ἂν ἂν ὑπηληγος 
(vi. 20, § 7). The entire passage is thus 
translated by Mr. Wright: “Backward 
he falls like racers at the barrier, and with 
a wrench still more violent than before 
pulls back the bit from the teeth of the 
estive horse, thereby drenching his jaws 
and riotous tongue with blood, and bruising 
against the ground his legs and haunches, consigns him to anguish.” 
ὡς δὲναις ἔσωσεν is a poeticalism found else 
where in Plato. The comm. quote Hom. 
Od. xvii. 567, ὑπηρέταις ἔσωσεν: ib. xix. 
187, τέρτοτε γε διϊστες: also Rep. ix. 
574 c, τέρτοτε διϊστε. So Ovid, Exilii 
terma quum habit una dies. But the 
passage which suggested the phrase to 
Plato was probably Eurip. frag. Antig., 
Τινα γαρ πεισαν σκοπελον ὑπηληγης δια 
:"Oδέναις ἔσωσε; (No. 176, Nauck.) 
ἀλλ’ ἀληθῶς τούτῳ πεποιθώτος, καὶ αὐτὸς ὃν 
φύσει φίλος [εἰς 
ταυτῶν ἄγει τὴν 
φιλίαν] τῷ 
θεραπευτι, ἕαν 
Ἀρα καὶ εἰν 

[254, Ε]
τῷ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ξυμφοιτητῆς ἡ των ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ἦ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρῶν ἐρώτητε πλησίασέως, καὶ διὰ τούτῳ ἀπωθή τὸν ἐρωτήτα προϊόντος δὲ ἤδη τοῦ χρόνου ἥθελα καὶ τὸ χρεών ἤμανεν εἰς τῷ προσέσθαι αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ ὀμίλιαν. οὐ γὰρ δήσοθ᾽ εἰμαρται κακὸν κακῷ φίλον ὅσοι ἀγαθὸν μή φίλον ἀγαθόν εἶναι. προσεμένου δὲ καὶ λόγον καὶ ὀμίλιαν δεξιάμενον, ἐγγύθευν ἡ εὔνοια γιγνομένη τοῦ ἑρωτήτου εκπλήττετι τὸν ἑρωτήμενον, διασθανόμενον ὅτι οὖν οἱ εὐμαρταντες ἄλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοῦραν φιλίας οὐδεμίαν παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἔθνον φίλον, ὅταν δὲ χρονιζέ τοῦτο δρών καὶ πλησιάζῃ μετά τοῦ ὀπτείναι ἐν τῇ γυμνασίᾳ καὶ εἰς ταῖς ἀλλαὶς ὀμίλιαις, τότε ἤδη ἡ τοῦ βείματος ἐκείνου πυρήνη, ὡς ἦμερον Ζεὺς Γανυμήδος ἑρωτῶν ἐνόμασε, πολλὴ φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστήν, ἡ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐδω, ἡ δ᾽ ἀπομεστομέναν ἐξω ἀπορρέει καὶ οἶον πνεύμα ἡ τῆς ἰχώ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ

B. οὐ γὰρ δήσοθʹ εἰμαρται, 'for it cannot not surely be in the order of destiny.' I have followed Hirsch, in writing δήσοθ' as one word in place of the received δή ποτε. The particle has no temporal significance here, but is equivalent to δῆσον, as in Soph. Trach. 976, où δήσοθʹ ἐστι θεωρεῖν. εἰμαρταί is an echo of the foregoing χρεών.

προσεμένου Vulcan. prōsēmōn. Corr. Heid. dianothēropòmēn] 'clearly as he discerns that all others his friends and kindred taken together have no affection to offer comparable in degree to that felt for him by his heaven-inspired friend.' Comp. the speech of Lytias, p. 233 c, where the contrary view is upheld.

τοῦτο δρών] Apparently we must understand μοῦραν, implied in μοῦραν διεξαγόνων, paul. sup.

c. ἡ τοῦ βείματος—πυρήνη] i. e. ἡ τοῦ κόλλου ἀπορροήν, sup. 251 b.

ὁ Ζεὺς—ἀνόμασε] Plato here attributes to the highest authority the whimsical etymology of Ζεὺς given above (p. 252 c), ἐκείσθ᾽ μὲρ᾽ ἐπισταντα καὶ ἰδεῖντα, ἣ δὲ ἔτι τοῦτ᾽ ἑμεῖς καλεῖται, where see the note. There is an equally fanciful etymology of the name Γανυμήδης in the Symposium of Xenophon (viii. 30).

In the Laws Plato attributes the invention of the fable of Ganymede to the Cretans: Κρηταῖ τῶν περὶ τὸν Γανυμήδα μίθον κατηγορούμεν,... τοῦτον δὲ τὸν μύθον προστεθείναι κατὰ τὸν Διόσ, ὡς ἐνθέμες δὴ τῷ θεῷ κατηγορόμεν αὐτὰ τὸν ἡπείριν (p. 636 b). If Plato is in earnest, his accusation is disproved by Hom. II. xx. 232, a version of the story entirely free from impurity. But perhaps it is only meant that the Cretans gave a vile meaning to the more ancient tradition. Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xiii. 709 c, quotes this entire passage of the Phaedrus from ὧν δὲ χρονιζέ τοῖς ἑκένει ἑν ἐξ ἑν, and again from ἐκθέμει δὲ τοῖς κόσμιοι ἐστες, p. 256, and from ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διὰ τὸ λατγοιον φώτοκατέργασθαι ἐπὶ παρ᾽ ἐραστῶν φιλίας, ib. e. He proceeds to quote Levit. xx. 13 to show the greater strictness and purity of the Mosaic Institutes.

ἀπομεστομένου] 'as he fills up and brims over.'

καὶ οἶον πνεύμα, κ.τ.λ.] 'and as a wind or a sound, rebounding from smooth and solid bodies, travels back to the point of its departure, so the stream of beauty returns through the eyes to its source, the beautiful youth, and when it has reached his soul through that the appointed channel of communication, and quickened and excited him, it waters the passages of the feathers and sets them sprouting.'
στερεών ἀλλομάνης πάλιν ὅθεν ὁμορρήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ
tοῦ καλλούς ρέωμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὄμματων
ἵνα, ἣ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγαι ἀφικόμενον καὶ ἀναπτέρυκα, τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν ἀρδεύ τε καὶ ὀρῴ-
μησε πτεροφύειν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐρωμένου ἀν ψυχὴν τὴν
ἐρωτοσ ἐνέπλησεν ἕρωτη μὲν οὖν ὅτι δὲ ἀπορεῖ καὶ οὐδὲ
ὀτι πέπονθεν οἰδὲν οὐδὲ ἔχει φράσει αὐτῇ σφάγαι ἂλλῳ οἴνῳ ἃπί
ἀλλοι ἀφιλανίας ἀπολεικτικοῦ πρόφασιν εἰπέν τινι ὃν ἔχει,
ἀδήπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ [ἴν] τῷ ἐρωτοτέλευτον ὅρᾳς ἠλέηθε,
καὶ όταν μὲν έκεινος παρῴθη, λήγει κατὰ ταύτη τῆς ὀδύνης ὅταν δὲ ἀπῄ, κατὰ ταύτα ταῖς ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖ-
tαι, εἰδούλων ἐρωτοσ ἀντέρωτα ἔχουν καλεί δὴ αὐτόν καὶ
οἴεται οὐκ ἐρωτᾶ ἄλλᾳ φιλίαν εἶναι ἐπιφυπτεῖ δὲ ἐκείνῳ ὁ
παραμπηγίως μὲν, ἀπθενεστέρος δὲ, ὅραν ἄντεθαι,

tóυτον ἀκοπείσαι τὰ ὡντα: ib. 109, ὁδήρεσ περὶ τέλη μόρφως ἡ Βαφραγχος
κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν] Aesch. Αγ. 544, τῶν ἀντερῶτων ἰμέρω πεπληγμένως Κ.
Ποθεῖν ποθώνον τῷ δὲ γίνεται στρατὼν λέ-gεις. The word ἀντέρως, in the sense of 'love returned,' Germ. 'Gegenliebe,'
occurs nowhere but in Plato or his imitators, though the passage quoted from
Aesch. shows that the conception must have been familiar to the poets.
The word too must have been in common use, for statues were erected to Eros and
Anteros at Elis. Pausan. Eliac. c. 25, καὶ ἐρωτοῖ καὶ θ. Ἡλίου καὶ Ἀθηναῖος
cat. ταύτα Ἐλεείος Ἀθηναίος Ἀντέρως ἐφημερίσεις: ib. κατ' ὃν φιλία σοὶ ὁ
Ἐρως κλαδὸν δὴ ἀπελείπεσε περικαίτα τοῦ φοινικᾶς ὁ Ἀντέρως. From another
passage (Attic. c. 29) we learn that it was the province of Anteros to avenge
as an ἀλάστως the wrongs of slighted lovers. This would follow, according to
mythological etiquette, from his being the patron of mutual passion. There is
therefore no such contradiction, as Att supposes, between the popular idea of
Anteros and that of Plato in the text. Here Anteros is called an 'image' or
reflection of Eros, in accordance with the previous figure of a mirror. Ηερν.,
τὰ δὲντα δὲ προηγάτερ τῷ ἄντερως ἐπίβα οἱ προτειόν ἠτίς τοῦ
ἀντέρωτος οὐ ἔρως.
filēs, συγκατακέωσθαί. καὶ δὴ, ὥσιν εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τούτο ταχὺ ταῦτα. ἐν ὑπὲρ τὴ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἔραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ὕππος ἔχει το τέλευ πρὸς τὸν ἡμιο- χιον, καὶ ἄξιοι ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαύσων; | ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἔραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὡς σφοδρὸν ἀναστάλαμος, ὅταν τὸ συγκατακέωσαι, ὥστε ἐστὶ μὴ ἀπαρνηθῆραι τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῷ ἐρωτεῦτε, εἰ δεσπερέναι τυχεῖν. ὁ δὲ ὁμοίως αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἡμιο-
χιον πρὸς ταῦτα μετὰ ἰδίους καὶ λόγου ἀντίτεινε. ἐὰν μὲν δὴ ὥσιν εἰς τεταγμένην τῇ δίαιτα καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίως τῆς διανοίας ἀγαλμάτα, μακάρων μὲν ἐκ ὁμονοητικῶν τῶν ἐνθάδε βίων διάγονων, ἐγκατατέρατος αὐτῶν καὶ κόσμων ὑπερ, δούλωσάμενοι μὲν ὁ κακίας ψυ-
χής ἐνεγίγνετο, ἐλευθερώσατος δὲ ὁ ἁρετὴ τελευτάσατος δὲ δὴ, ὑπόπτηροι καὶ ἑκαφοῖς γεγονότε, τῶν τριῶν πα-
λαυμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἐν νεικήσασιν,
embracement of the lower appetites (ελαφροὶ γεγονότες), and in its power of securing fully plumed to the highest regions of intellectual contemplation. Mere human or prudential virtue has no boon to confer which is comparable to this, the best result of god-given madness in its highest manifestation.

c. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίρετ] Having fixed the destiny of the philosophic lovers, Plato proceeds to discuss the case of the ‘phililotmik’ or those who, though actuated by a generous ambition and a love of glory, fall short of the refined standard of excellence aimed at by the δίσια or votaries of Zeus, and of philosophic truth. Probably he has in his mind the character so vividly portrayed in the eighth book of the Republic—a man with both virtues and failings proper to what we should call the aristocratic, and what Plato styles the timocratic type (I. l. p. 549). In that passage as in this the φιλότμος is put second in order of excellence to the φιλόσοφος. According to the Platonic psychology he is one in whom the时常 preliminary eliminantes: ήτοι οἴκια μεταφθάνοισιν: φυλάκας καὶ χαρίσματο παραφερόμενοι... ἐπιστατομένων, κ.τ.λ. τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν—ἐλέεν τι καὶ διαπράξαντο] I cannot but wish that the reading in Eusebius, εἰλεθήναι (which Heind. has adopted), were supported by some one of the Platonic MSS. But Eusebius also reads διεσπάσθης, and this gives to both variants the air of a critical emendation. The received reading yields the following sense: 'They seize, and consummate a choice which the vulgar esteem the height of bliss'—'choice' being put per συνθηματικά for the thing chosen, the gratification of appetite. Horn., τὴν αἰσχρὰν ἑδυνήν λέγει. Of the coupling of duals and plurals in the same clause Stahl gives many instances. One of these, Phaedr. 261 b, appears doubtful: though there can be no doubt as to others.
λοιπόν ἡ ἡδὴ χρώνοι μὲν αὐτῇ, σπανίς δὲ, ἄτε οὐ πάση δεδομένα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράττοντες. φίλω μὲν οὖν καὶ ἰς τούτω, ήττον δὲ ἐκείνων, ἄλληλου διὰ τὸ τῶν ἔρωτος καὶ ἐξ ἔγερσας διάγοισι, πίστεις τὰς μεγίστας ἴχνους ἄλληλους δεδοκέναι τε καὶ διδόχθαι, ἃς οὐ δεμοτίννι εἶναι λύσανται εἰς ἔχονταν ποτὲ ἔλθειν. ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ ἀπετροφεῖ μὲν, ὁμορρόκτοι δὲ περοῦσθαι ἐκβάλλοντι τοῦ σώματος, ὡστε οὐ σμικρὸν ἄθλον τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μανίας φέρονται εἰς γὰρ σκότον καὶ τὴν ἐν γής πορείαν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ έτι ἔλθειν τοὺς κατηργούμενους ἡδή τῆς ὑπουργικῆς πορείας, ἡλλὰ φανῶν διάγοισιν ἐνδαίμωνες μετὰ ἄλληλων πορευομένους, καὶ ὄμοπτέρους ἔρωτος χάριν, ἑτον ἔγενονται, γενέσθαι.

Ταύτα τοσάτα, δὲ παί, καὶ θεία αὐτῷ σοι δωρήσεται ἡ παρ’ ἔραστον φιλία. ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἔρωτος οἰκείοτητας, σωφροσύνῃ θυσίᾳ κεκραμένη, θυγᾶ τε καὶ φειδωλά οἰκονομοῦν, ἀνέλυθρων ὑπὸ πλῆθος ἐπανομομένην ὡς

χρώνοι ταῖς αὐτῷ] Sc. τῇ αἰρόειν, as if he had written ἀφεναι.

D. διὰ τὴν ἐρωτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ἔγερσαι] both while their passion lasts and after they have escaped from its influence.

(γεν.)

ἀρωματικὸς ἐν περιπέφαμα] Sup. 255 c, ἀρωματικὴ περιπέφαμα, With their plagure in act to shoot,' or, as Krivche gives it, ‘mit dem Triebe sich zu befürbiren.’ The perf. ἀρωματική is always intransitive and scarcely distinguishable in sense from ἀρωματικός.

ὑποφανεῖν] The MSS. vaclate as usual between ἐντοπίαν, ὑπαράσια, and ὑπουργικά, but the last is the best supported. It is also found in all the copies of Eusebius. Comp. 249, αἰ ὑπαράσια (ψυχα) ὑπὲρ τῶν πρῶτων βιῶν τελευτήσομεν, κρίνοντα ἐντοπίας κριθαίνει δὲ, αἰ ἐν τῶ ὕπο τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐνδεχόμενον ἐν ἐντοπίας καὶ ἐν ἐντοπίας εἴπερ ἐντοπίας βιῶν. See also the note on ὑπουργικά, p. 247 n.

The souls sejourn in some region of the ὑπάρασιά, or space enclosed by the great outermost sphere, that of the fixed stars. They do not, of course, mount to the outer surface, the ἀληθείας πεδίον, not being

VOL. I.
a word co-extensive in meaning with the Lat. **servati**, comp. Phaed. 81 c, ψυχῇ ... peri τὰ μνήματα καὶ τὰς τάφους κυλινδομένη, where see Wytenbach's note. In other passages of Plato the variant **κυλινδόσαθαι** is found in some of the MSS., as Thesest. 172 c, οἷ' ἐν δικαστήριοι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλιν-

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trates the present passage. For **κυλινδέ**:

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Socrates, an affected disclaimer of poetic genius, like that in p. 338 c, is a question on which the comm. are not agreed. To the former view it is enough to reply, that the diction and spirit of the Socratic are in studied contrast to the prosaic trimness of the Lysias discourse, with which Phaedrus had possessed himself enraptured.

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[p. 237] ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ [236, ε]

φίλαν ὃ δὲ ὡσπερ ἄδελφος αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τετραπταῖος τρέιτον, ὡν καὶ ὁ ἔραστὴς οὖ ᾗ αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφότερης καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς πρὸς Ἐρωτα μετὰ φιλοσοφόφων λόγων τῶν βίων ποιήται.

ΦΑΙ. Συνειχομαί σοι, ὃ Σάκρατες, ἐπερ ἁμενον ἀπαθὴς ἠμῶν εἶναι, ταύτα γίγνεσθαι, τὸν λόγον δὲ σου πάλαι θαυμάσας έχω, ὡσφ καλλίω τοῦ προτέρου ἀπεργάσω. ἄσητε δικῶν μη μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινῶς φανή, ἕαν ἀρα καὶ ἀθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτοῖν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατείναι. καὶ γάρ τις αὐτῶν, ὃ θαυμάστω, ἐναγγεῖος τῶν πολιτικῶν τούτων αὐτῶ λαοδόρων ἀνείδιζε, καὶ διὰ πάσης τῆς λαοδορίας ἐκάλει λογογραφόν τόχο οἷν ἄν ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἐπίσχοι ἑμῖν ἄν τοῦ γράφειν.

Σ.Α. Γελοιών γ’, ὃ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεσι, καὶ τοῦ ἐταῖρου συνχόν διαμαρτάνει, εἰ αὐτῶν ὅπως ἦγει τινὰ ὕψος. ἠσος δὲ καὶ τὸν λαοδορώμενον αὐτῷ ὅρει νομίζοντα λέγειν ὅ λέγετι.
This proverb is said by Meineke (Com. Gr. ii. 677) to be "numm omnium ad explicandum difficilimum." The text of Plato seems to offer an explanation; but it is only one amongst many. The nearest English equivalent appears to be the proverbial 'Sour grapes.' In Libanius, Epist. xvi., it has evidently this meaning. An old man is there made to say, that δὲ τὸ ἄλλοι εἰς τέρμα ἔρχεται, τούτ' ἐστὶν γλυκός ἄγκων διὰ τὸν ἀθέτειαν, that youthful pleasures are to him bad; but 'sour grapes,' by reason of his enfeebled powers. Accordingly, the Paroemiographers tell us that the phrase is used ἐν τῶν καταραμομένων, or as the gloss in Hezych. runs, ἐν τῶν αἰσχρῶν τι δικαιοσύνης, ἀναιροτότως ἢ ὡς κἀκεῖνος, ὧς τὸ εὐαντίου, συνεισεῖσθαι. So, too, Scholl, in loc. including Hermelins. The words have evidently this sense in Plato; and the interpretation he offers is found also in Hezych. and the Paroemiographers. The μακρός, or as some would read, περὶς ἄγκων in question appears to have been the same as that bend or 'elbow' of the Nile below Memphis, which Herodotus tells us the Persians dammed up, after cutting a new and shorter channel (ii. 99). Comp. Paroem. Gr. ii. 60, Lutsch., τὸν ἄγκιν ἐν τῇ Μεμφίδῃ ἄγκων [leg. γλυκός ἄγκων] προπαρατεύομεν ἐπὶ τῶν πληντῶν κατ' ἀντίθεσιν ἵππων, διὰ τὸ δισχερές. A very different explanation is given in Athenaeus (xii. 516) upon the authority of Clearchus, who asserts that the name γλυκός ἄγκων or γλυκίκων ἄγκων (or ἄγκων?) was bestowed by the Lydians in mockery upon a certain secluded region of their city in which a deed of whole-sale shame and wickedness had been perpetrated by the contrivance of their queen Omphale. The same Lydian story is repeated by Eustathius on the Iliad, p. 1082, and by Hezych. and others in connection with γλυκός ἄγκων. Eustath. adds that there was a place in Samos dedicated in like manner by Polycrates to purposes of shameful licentiousness. Hence, according to Plistarch, the similar ὄρκοκρίματα or euphemism: Σαμίων ἄθην καὶ Σαμικὴ λαθρα (Plut. Prov. Ix.). Comp. Loh. Aglaoph. p. 1022. A third explanation of the proverb, widely different from the foregoing, is given in Suidas, ν. γλυκός ἄγκων, from which we might infer that the phrase had a serious as well as an ironical meaning. The passage, however, added in Suidas, from the Phaeum of Plato Cominius, is too fragmentary to enable us to judge of the correctness of the interpretation put upon it. Heind. positively denies that the explanation in the text can have come from Plato's pen. He would therefore strike out the words ἄγκων ἐν τῷ τόδε ἄλλῳ, which, he says, "Grammatici esse possunt, Platonis esse non possunt." This appears to me too bold an expedient, though it does seem improbable that the ἄγκων in question should have become so familiar to the Greek sailors before the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses, as to have had occasion to a phrase of such general application as γλυκός ἄγκων seems to have been. Neither is it quite in Plato's manner to interpret his own pleantries. The true origin of the phrase, like those of many other proverbial expressions, we must be content to leave in ambigu.
οὐτός ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς ἐπαινετὰς, ὡστε προσπαραγράφουσι πρώτους οἱ ἂν ἐκαστὰς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν αὐτούς.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις τούτο; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

Σ.Ο. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἄρχῳ ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ συγγράμματι πρῶτος ὁ ἐπαινετὴς γέγραφαι;

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς;

Σ.Ο. Ἐδοξέ ἵνα φῶς τῇ βουλῇ ἢ τῷ δῆμῳ ἢ ἀμφότεροις, καὶ ὅσι εἰπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς καὶ ἐγκωμίας τὸ σύγγραφεύς; ἔπειτα λέγει δὴ μετὰ τούτο, ἐπιδεικνύοντος τοὺς ἐπαινετάς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνώστε πάνυ μακρὸν ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα. ἦς καὶ ἄλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐξογείη.

Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμείην, γεγράφως ἀπέρ-
χεταὶ ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητὴς· εάν δὲ ἐξαλειφθῇ καὶ ἀμοιρος γένηται λογογραφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀξίου εἶναι συγγράφεων, πενθεὶ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον γε ὧτι οὐχ ὡς ὑπερφυνοῦντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ἀλλ’ ὡς τεθαυμακοτες.

ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν ἴκανος γένηται ῥήτωρ ἡ βασιλεία, ὡστε λαβὸν τὴν Λυκουργοῦν ἡ Σύλωνος ἡ Δαρείου δύναμιν ἄδανατος γενέσθαι λογογράφος ἐν τόλμῃ, ἃρ’ οὖς ἐστὶν ἤγεται αὐτὸς τε αὐτὸν ἔτι ζων, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτ’ γιγνόμενοι ταῦτα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζοντο, θεώμενοι αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δεῖ γε ὧν τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστι καὶ ὅποις— τοῦς δύσνους Δυσία, ὑνεδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὦτι συγγράφει;

ΦΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῇ ἐαυτῷ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὡς ἐσκευε, ὑνεδίζειν.
The Muses scorn with vulgar brains to dwell—
Poor layman I, for sacred rites unfit.

The distinction between metrical and unmetrical compositions may seem at first sight out of place here. But in 278 ε, a passage written with direct reference to the present, λόγοι ἐν μέτρῳ and λόγοι ἐν μέτρῳ are distinguished in the same manner. Comp. also 278 c, λοιπόν τε καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος συντῆτοι λόγοι, καὶ Ὀμήρω καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος ἀντίστικως ποιήσῃς, ὃ ἐν τῷ συντικυκλώσεις, τρέτον δὲ θέλω καὶ τοιαύτη τις ἐν ποιητικῷ λόγῳ, νόμους ὁμολόγους, συμμετρικὰ ἐφαρμοσάμεθα. The remarkable feature in the passage before us is the use of ἰδιωτικόν in one sense followed immediately by ἱδιώτης in another. Certainly the words ἰδιωτικόν, ὁ ἰδιώτης are not indispensable to the sense, and it is strange to find Plato subdividing ἰδιωτικόν λόγοι into ἰδιωτικό and ἰδιωτικά. Upon referring to the Commentary of Hermelias, we find no traces of ἰδιώτης, ὁ ἰδιώτης, either in the Lemmata or their interpretation, though he is careful to paraphrase the remainder of the sentence. ἰδιώτης is used here because the rest of the sentence is quoted from him. The selection is taken from Carew’s Poems:

“Thus while you deal your body ’mongst your friends,
And fill their circling arms, my glad soul sends
This her embraces: thus we of Delphi great—
As laymen clasp their hands, so we our feet.”

Upon Master W. Montague
his return from traveel.

So also Sir P. Sidney, Sonnet 74:

D ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρῶν αὐτῷ γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙ. Τί γὰρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλῳ ἐκείνῳ οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἢδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν ἄλλο οἱ αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς.

ΦΑΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ὁ πρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; δεόμεθα τι, δι' Φαιδρὸ, Λυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ ἄλλων ὡς τοιαύτη τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράφει, εἰτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἰτε ἱδιωτικόν, ἐν μέτρῳ [ὡς ποιητής], ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου [ὡς ἰδιώτης];
the doubt does not appear to have occurred to any editor before Hirsch and Badiu, the latter of whom extends the query to the entire clause from «έν τε» to «Διώς». This scepticism however goes too far, as the parallel passages abundantly prove.

καὶ διό καὶ δικαίως ἀνθρωποδοθεῖς κέκληται.

The pleasures 'justly called servile' are those of which even virtues are capable, whereas those of the intellect are proper to τοῖς ἐναντίωσιν ἢ ἃς ἀνθρωποδοθεῖσι τραφεῖσιν, sc. τοῖς ἐναντίωσιν (Theet. 175 b). Comp. Phileb. 52 b, ταύτα τοίνυν τάς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονάς ἀξίους τε εἰς εἰς λοιπὰς ρητὸν, καὶ υδαμάς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄλλα τῶν σφάλματα διάλογον. This oligarchic spirit reigns through the entire ethical philosophy of Plato, and in a less degree of Aristotle also. Heind. aptly compares Eth. N. iii. 10, βαρύς τοῖς τοῖς τοιούτοις μαθημάτων ἡδονάς ἢ σοφόρον καὶ ἄλκαλιον; ἐγὼ καὶ τὰ λαμπά δὴ οὔτως, ἀλλὰ τὰ σφάλματα δηλ. οὖν ἀνθρωποδοθεῖς καὶ θρησκεῖς παρατηρεῖται. Also Plat. Epist. vii. 335 a, τῶν ἀνθρωποδοθῶν καὶ ἀχρηστῶν ἁρπασμόν περιχωρεῖν ὧδε ὡς ἡμών ἡδονάς. Σχεδὸν μὲν δὴ—καὶ θραύμα μοι δοκοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ., The little episode which follows reminds the reader of the manner of the dialogue, while it forms a natural transition from the mythic to the lighter but still poetical style of the sequel. It also furnishes a dramatic motive to a discussion sustained under unfavorable circumstances, by persons one of whom at least may be supposed not to have been superior to the sleep-persuading influences of the place and time.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

59] καὶ ἀλλήλους διαλεγόμενου καθορᾶν. εἰ οὖν ἵοιεν καὶ
ψι καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ μὴ διαλεγομένοις ἀλλὰ νυσταξοῦσας καὶ κηλουμένους ὑπὸ αὐτῶν δὲ
ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελθοῦσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἀνθρώποι ἀττα σφόνω ἔλθοντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὦσπερ
προβάτα μεσημβρίαζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην ἔδωκεν εάν
dὲ ὀρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὦσπερ
Σειρῆνας ἀκηλίτους, ὃ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις

ΦΑΙ. Ἐχουσί δὲ δὴ τὶ τοῦτο; ἀνήκοος γάρ, ὡς οὕκε, τυχαῖος ὦν.

Σ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν
tοιούτων ἀνήκοον εἶναι. λέγεται δὲ ὡς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἀνθρώπου τῶν πρὶν Μοῦσας γεγονέναι. γενομένου δὲ
Μοῦσων καὶ φανεροὶς θοῖς, οὕτως ἂρα τωὸς τότε
ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑπ᾽ ἡδονῆς, ὡστε ἄξιοτες ἡμέλησαν σύνων
καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἐλθον τελευτήσαντες οὕτως, ἐξ όν
τὸ τεττάγονον γένος μετ᾽ ἕκεινο φύεται, γέρας τοῦτο παρὰ
Μοῦσων λαβῶν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γεγομένου, ἀλλὰ
ἄσιτον τε καὶ ἄπτον εὐθὺς ζῶειν, ἐως ἄν τελευτήσῃς,
καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔθουν παρὰ Μοῦσας ἀπαγγέλλεις τίς τίνα

259. καθορᾶν] Intr. 'to look down.' Plato has here adopted a
Homer's usage, of which I can find no other
example in an Attic writer. Hom. II. xi. 336: "Εἴναυ σφὶ κατὰ θέα μάκης ἐκ
νουσας Ἀκρών." Ex ἔδει καθορᾶν. This
and similar passages from Homer are
brought forward by Stallb. as a tri-
umphant reply to Badh.'s question,
"Quis unquam verbum καθορᾶν sive
casa usurpari vidit?" His triumph
would have been more complete, had he
been able to produce a parallel instance
from a prose author of the Attic period.
He is right, however, in rejecting
Badh.'s ingenious suggestion, δοκούσι
ψφ (for δοκούσαν ψφ), which is forbidden
by the καὶ ψφ of the sentence following.
ψφ ἐν τη' πρώτη = at solent 'sole sub
ardenti; a habitat which Stallb. rather
unnecessarily demonstrates by a long
array of authorities extending from
Aristophanes to Themistius. This heavy
artillery is levelled at Dr. Badhau, whom
Stallb. justly regards as an emissary of
the archfiend of Leysen.

b. τῶν πρὶν Μοῦσας γεγονέναι] An
abbreviated construction for the usual
τῶν ὑπὸ γένοστο τῆς, κ.τ.λ. Protag.
230 b, τῶν ὑπὸ πόλεων καὶ τῆς καταγω-
γῆς.

εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον] Above, 230 b,
καὶ γε ἡ καταγωγή.

c. καὶ ἐλθον τελευτήσαντες ἀποτέλεσ] 'died
ere they felt themselves to be dying.'

γέγομένων] Badh. proposes a trans-
pose: μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι, ἀλλά
δει λέγετο τε καὶ ἄπτον εὐθὺς γεγομένων
ψφιν.
προσφυλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἑρατοί τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἑρωτικοῖς,
καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὐτῶς, κατὰ τὸ ἐδῶς ἐκάστης τιμῆς. τῇ δὲ
πρεσβυτάτη Ἐλλάππη καὶ τῇ μετ’ αὐτὴν Οὐρανία τοὺς
ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντας τε καὶ τιμώντας τὴν ἐκείνην μο-
σίκην ἀγγέλουσιν, αἱ ἐκ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περὶ τε
ὑμανόν καὶ λόγον οὗτοι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἴσα
καλλιστήρια φῶσα, πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἔνεκεν λεκτέων τι καὶ
οὐ καθευδητέων ἐν τῇ μεσομβρίᾳ.

Φ.Ι. Δεκτέων γὰρ οὖν.

Σ.Ω. Ὀνκοῦν, ὅπερ νῦν προονέμεθα, σκέψασθαι τὸν
λόγον ὅπερ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπερ μὴ,
σκεπτέων.

τῇ δὲ Ἑρατοῖς] Ovid, Ars Amat. ii. 15, Nunc mihi, sequam, praece et Cythera,
faveo, Nunc Erato, nam tu nomen
amoriam habes.

D. κατὰ τὸ ἐδῶς ἐκάστης τιμῆς] τοῦτο
ἔστιν, κατὰ τὰ διώκει ἐκάστης Ἑθοῦς.

Herm. Καλλιστήρ] This is one of the Pytha-
gorisms which Plato has scattered over
the face of the present Dialogue. δὲ δὲ
ἐλάσσον τὴν θείναν ἀνδροκοσμέταν, ἴσον ὑπὸ Ὀμηροῦ
μὲν Καλλιστῆρι ἀναμάζου ὄντος, τὸν Ποίη-
τήρα δὲ φιλοσοφιάν (Max. Tyr., Diss.
vii. 2. 63, quoted by Ast.). Hermas
has the glories, Καλλιστὴς δὲ ἔλλοχον παρὰ
τὴν θάλασσαν ὧν ἔτη, τοὺς ὑπὸ καλλιστήρια
ἀναμακιγγάλων τῇ δὲ Ὀμηροῦ
tῶν ἀναμακιγγάλων.

τὴν ἐκείνην μουσικήν | Phaed. 61 A, δὲ
φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἐν τῇ μεγαλίτη μου-
σική. Comp. Legg. III. 689 B, ἡ καλ-
λιστήρ καὶ μεγαλίτη τῶν ἑρωτικῶν με-
γαλίτη δικαίωται ἐν λέγειν μουσικῆς,
κ.τ.λ.

ἵσας καλλιστήρια φωτῆς καὶ λέγεται
(ὅτι) ὁ Πολυαρχός ἐτεῖσθη τὴν οὐρανίαν
φωτῆς καὶ τινὲς δὲ τὰ οὐράνια τῶν χορδῶν
ἐκ τῶν ὑψώτατων ἄνθρωποι χαίροντες ἔχουν
ὅτι Προσκυμβολείται ἐκτὸς τοῦ Κρόνου
σφαιρά, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλλων ὅσως ἐλλα
χορδαὶ ἔχουσι (Herm.). This, though not
directly in point, is curious as being
probably a genuine Pythagoreanism. προσ-
κυμβολείται or -αυ is explained as
"nomen comin unciss, respondens ci quom
diociem A appellant." Steph. Thea, vi.
1959, Dind.

οὖν ἔνεκεν] So the Boll. Bekk. has
unaccountably adopted the poetic οὖ-
νεκεν (without οὖν) of three MSS. In

Attic prose, the only legitimate forms of
this prep. are ἔνεκα and ἔνεκεν. ἔνεκα
is found in Aristoph.

ε. Οὐκοῦν—σκεπτέων] I have re-
tained the punctuation of Bekk. and
Stallb. Ast places a comma after σκέ-
ψασθαι. But σκέψεως may more na-
turally be taken with ἐν προομέθεα, as if
he had written, προομέθεαν, προθάλ.
tεσμῇ, τὸ σκέψασθαι, κ.τ.λ. So, in effect,
Stallb. The redundancy is in Plato's
manner.

ὅπερ καλῶς ἔχει | Soec. now enters in
earnest upon the investigation of a true
Rhetorie. He begins by proposing the
question, whether a really good speech
does not presuppose on the part of the
speaker an accurate knowledge of the
subject he proposes to handle. Phaedr.
replies to this with the well-known
paradox of the rhetoricians, that a
speaker has no need to know the actual
right or wrong or the good or evil of
the matter in hand, but only that which
is likely to approve itself as right or
wrong, good or evil, to his audience.
The final cause of speaking is per-
suasion, and this is produced not by
truth but by seeming truth. Soec. re-
covers this answer with mock respect,
and then proceeds to examine how much
of truth it contains. Comp. Gorg. 45α
ὑποπολογικός ἄν ὃι ἢ δῶς πολίτις πολύ-
τις ἐκ τοῦ πολεμοῦ ἄλλα ὑπὸ διδασκα-
λείης περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τι καὶ ἄλλον ὅπερ
Ναλ... οὐδ' ἢ ὑποπολογικός δ' ἰσοτο-
ὶς διακρίνεται τε καὶ τῶν ἐλλάξα
δικαιών τι περὶ καὶ ἄλλα πιστικῶς
μόνον, κ.τ.λ.
ΦΑ. ΑΔΙΩΝ.
ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δει τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς
βρηθησομένως τὴν τοῦ λέγουσιν διάνοιαν εἰδικῶν τάληθες
ὅων ἂν ἔρει πέρι μέλλῃ;
ΦΑ. Οὐτοὶ περὶ τούτων ἀκόμα, διό γε Σωκρατεῖ,
260 οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην | τῷ μέλλοντι ήμορία έσεσθαι τὰ τῷ
ὅντι δίκαια μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντα ἂν πλήθει οἴτερ
δικάσουσιν, οἴδε τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἡ καλὰ, ἀλλ' ὅσα δο-
ξεῖν ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῆς
ἀληθείας.
ΣΩ. Οὕτωι ἀπόβλητον ἔσος εἶναι δεῖ, ὧ Παιδρός,
δ' ἂν εἰπωσι σοφοὶ, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι, καὶ δὴ
cαι τὸ νῦν λεξικόν οὐκ ἄφετένον.
ΦΑ. ὃρθως λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οἴδε δ' ἐκ σκοπώμεν αὐτὸ.
ΦΑ. Πώς; ε
ΣΩ. Εἰ σε πείθωμι ἕως πολεμίους ἁμώνειν κτησά-
μενον ἔπιπον, ἁμὼθε δ' ἔπιπον ἁγνοούμεν, τοσοῦτοι μέντοι
τυχήσασιν εἰδώς περὶ σοῦ, ὡς Παιδρός ἔπιπον ἱερεῖ
tὸ τῶν ἡμέρων ἡμῶν μέγιστα ἔχον διὰ—
ΦΑ. Γελοῖοι γ' ἂν, οἴ Σωκράτεις, εἰπή.
ΣΩ. Οὕτω γε ὅλ' ὅτε δὴ σπουδῆ σε πείθωμι,
συντηθεὶς λόγον ἐπαινοῦ κατὰ τοῦ ὄνομα ἔπιπον ἐπονο-
μάζων καὶ λέγων ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμαμι οἷοι
τε κεκτηθοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ ὀρτατείας, ἀποπολέμειν τε χρήσιμων

260. Οὕτωι ἀπόβλητοι] Π. ii. 361, οὕτωι ἀπόβλητοι ἐποκέντρῳ, ὅ τι ἀληθεῖ
τε. The ironical σοφοὶ probably includes all the τεχνογράφοι from Κορακι
and Τίτιας downwards.
μὴ τι λέγωσι] 'lest there should be
truth in what they say,' or 'whether
what they say may not be true.' Protag.
339 c, ἐρεβοῦμεν μὴ τι λέγοι. If the
present λέγωσι had been used, it would
have been correct to transl. 'whether
what they say is true,' and this is rather
what we should have expected here. But
see Soph. 242 b, ἐνοχεύσασθαι (ἀναγ-
καίως) μὴ πρὶν τεταγμένοι μὲν ἄνων περὶ
ταῦτα, ἄλλως δ' ἀλλάξας ἀφαίρεται ὡς
ἐκκενωθρεῖ ἐχομεῖν. Winckelmann's conj.
"προ Παυλισ μεγαλώνειον αἰτίαν, ἀποπολέμειν τε χρήσιμων" is perfectly gratutious.

Εἰ. Εἰ σε πείθωμι.] Soc. here puts a
particular case corresponding to the
general formula under review. The for-
num, being found to break down when
applied to a simple case, must be sur-
srendered as untenable.

Οὕτω γε] The Bodd. and others have
οὕσα τε, which has no meaning. οὕσα γε
"not just yet," implying that Phaedr.
is premature in saying that the case is
absurd, the absurdity having yet to be
developed.

ἄτοκ. τε χρήσιμων] 'good to fight
from,' i. e. to ride into battle. The next
phrase, προσεφεκτέον σκέπη, is inter-
preted "apparture utensilia." But query
as to this use of ἀρσεφέρων. I conjoin καὶ πρότερον δὲ ἐνεγκαί διωσεῖν καὶ φιλοῦν καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρωπον. ἀρσεφέρων would naturally mean 'to apply instruments to a purpose,' a matter beyond the powers of ass or horse. ἀγάλατος would be the gloss of Hermæus. The illustration in the text was probably suggested by a current proverb, ἀρσεφέρων ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπον ἀντὶς τὰ ἄγαλα. For each of these passages, see Soph. 234 π., ovenant καὶ πρὸς γε Θαλάσση (ποιητὴν) καὶ φιλοῦν καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρωπον. The reading of a passage which, as given in the MSS., has been a stumbling-block to editors. The great majority of codices give ἀρσεφέρων δὲ ἐνεγκαί διωσεῖν καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρωπον, but it involves the harsh and here pointless ταχυς ἄγαλμα, ἀγάλατος — much harsher than the κακὸς φιλος quoted from Soph. Oed. Tyr. 582.

μὴ περὶ δενο σκίας] The word σκίας is added in some manuscripts of the MSS. as being a proverbial phrase denoting that which is beneath contempt. A comedy of Archippus was known differently by the titles 'Omos and Οτονοκαί. See Ménex, Com. Gr. I. 208, and comp. Arist. Vesp. 191, Περὶ τῶν σχεδίων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σκίων καὶ σκίων (Herm. Comm. p. 182, Astr.). If we retain the σκίας, which Herm. does not notice, we obtain the sense, Is it not better to be ridiculous and a friend (as I am when I advise you in good faith [στιγμῇ], to ride an ass, &c.) than to be clever and a foe (as he is who for purposes of his own persuades an audience that right is wrong)? Εἰναι however is not necessary to the sense, and perhaps the Greek is more idiomatic without it: but with this exception, I have no doubt about the reading of a passage which, as given in the MSS., has been a stumbling-block to editors. The great majority of codices give ἀρσεφέρων δὲ ἐνεγκαί διωσεῖν καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρωπον, &c., but it involves the harsh and here pointless ταχυς ἄγαλма, ἀγάλατος — much harsher than the κακὸς φιλος quoted from Soph. Oed. Tyr. 582.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

Ε ΦΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταῦτα;
ΣΩ. Φημί, ἐάν οἱ γ' ἐπιοῦσες αὐτῇ λόγους μαρτυρῶ-
σιν εἰσὶν τέχνη. Ὠσπερ γὰρ ἀκούεις δοκῶ τῶν προσω-
των καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων ὃτι ψευδεῖται καὶ οὐκ

ὁδειν, ἡγεῖται, νομίζειν, &c. are followed by an infinitive. See by all means Cobet, Νεωτ. Lec. p. 362. The copyists, not perceiving that the γ' in such cases belongs to the infinitive, perpetually omit it in transcription. Even Stallo, in his note, acknowledges the necessity of the particle to the sense. For the sentiment comp. Aesch. Pers. 521, 'Τῆς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐνδήμησε στάχυν Ἀτη, ὅθεν πάγκολωτον ἐξερχόμεθα.' Kirsch ingeniously suggests a direct reference to a dictum of Gorgias preserved Arist. Rhet. iii. 3. 4, ὅλον Γοργίας ἐλάχιστον ἐνδήμησε στάχυν Ἀτη, ὅθεν πάγκολωτον ἐξερχόμεθα. But the phrase was proverbial, as we might infer from Aesch. l. c. Herm. p. 182: καὶ ταῦτο ὅ ἄνω παράμελα ἐφράζει, ὅτι ταὐτοῖς κακὰ στείρων κακὰ θεριζοί.

Β. Οὐδὲν γε ἐπείδη 'a most in-

different (harvest). Not satisfied with the easy ascent of Plaut., Soc. pro-

fesses to be afraid that his attack on Rhetoric had been too coarse and sweep-

ing. He accordingly produces her in person to make her own apology. She

never used the language imputed to her professors, nor insisted on ignorance of

truth as a qualification for successful oratory. What she does insist on is this:

that knowledge is not sufficient of itself to work persuasion, unless it be

united to accomplishments which she and she alone can impart. If her ad-

vice is to go for any thing (si quid valet

menum consilium), the student will first

furnish his mind with knowledge, and

then proceed to acquire the art of using it successfully. For ἡ μὲν ἡμωνοῦσα, the

ΜΣΣ. have ἡμὶ ἡμωνοῦσα, after which

Heind. inserts χρήσαται. Plato would

rather have written ι τις μὲν συμ-

βολής, Χ. Hermias supplier (κινήτωρ, not

however as part of the text. For the

vulg. ι τις τὸν Boll. has τι τιν, 'if my

advice is worth any thing.' Many of

the edd. give λαμβάνειν, for which we

should expect λαμβάνοντα. Godf. Herm.

reads λαμβάνειν, referring to Phaed. 87.

ο, and Seeliger ad Eur. El. 593. If this

stands, the infinitive will depend for-

mally on ἄνευ, really on a verb sup-

pressed. And this seems the best solu-

tion of the difficulty. This portion of

the dialogue may be intended to qualify

the sweeping denunciations of Rhetoric

contained in the Gorgias, to which dial-

there is a more undisguised allusion in

the immediate sequel. Possibly Plato

meant to answer the unfriendly critici-

isms of Isocrates or some other of his

censors.

Ε. Φημί, ἐάν οἱ γ' ἐπιοῦσες αὐτῇ λόγους, 

κ.τ.λ.] 'yes! if only the on-coming

arguments bear her witness that she is

really an Art.' The 'arguments' or

reasonings here personified, under the

figure of a party of fresh witnesses in

the cause, are doubtless those which

thumped over Gorgias and Polus:

Gorg. 463 ο, ὥστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμ-

πειρατεία τε καὶ τριβή: 501 δ, κομῳδῇ

ἀτέχνῳ... ἓρχεται... ἀληθὸς τε

παντότεν, ὥστιν τε τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία. Comp. inf. 270 ο.
ἐστι τέχνη ἄλλη, ἀτεχνός τριβή, τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησιν Λάκων, ἐτύμως τέχνη ἀνέι τοῦ ἄληθειας ἠφίκα σοι, ἐστι γὰρ μὴ ποιήσῃ ὑστερον γένηται.

ΦΑΙ. Τούτων δει τῶν λόγων, ὁ Σωκράτης ἀλλὰ δεύο αὐτοὺς παράγων, ἐξετάζει τί καὶ πῶς λέγοντος.

ΣΩ. Πάρτε ὅτι, θρήματα γενοντα, καλλίστατά πεῖ Φαιδρόν πεῖθε, ὡς ἦν μή ἵκανος φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἤκανός ποτε λέγοντα ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός. ἀποκρυφεῖσθ' ὅτι ὁ Φαιδρός.

ΦΑΙ. Ἐρωτάτε.

τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησιν ὁ Λάκων] See Rep. ix. 376 b, μετάβα τε, Κριτέριον φασι, καὶ πατρίδα ἔτει τε καὶ ἱστος: Epist. vii. 345, ἵπτοτειν, φησιν ὁ Θηβαῖος. These apophthegms are sometimes quoted in the original Doric, but sometimes, as in Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 18, ὅ, they are paraphrased in good Attic. In the present passage the poetic ἔτυμος is the only remnant of the original dictum, whatever it may have been. The passage has been much criticized, as by Schleierm., Voegelin (In Praef. ed. Tur. p. xii), and by a writer in the Rhenish Mus. xii. p. 404. Some have recommended the mutilation, others the entire excision of the sentence: but the last-named writer's suggestion is more ingenious—φησιν ὁ Λακων, i.e. ὁ ἄγορος ἀλαχων, "the spokesman of the party." But why this ἐν ήρι here? Stahl, is said by its author to have approved of this clever, but, I think, uncalled for alteration. The passage quoted from the Rhetoric will be found sufficient to justify the present text. The collector of Laconian apophthegms, whether Plutarch or some other, gives the sentiment in nearly the same words, but with a prefatory ἐν τῷ σιώ. Plut. Mor. p. 233 b, Μεγαλουκουμένου τινος ἐτι πτῇ ἤτοι τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ, εἰσὶ τις Λάκων, Ἀλλὰ, ἐν τῷ σιώ, τέχνη ἀνέκου τοῦ ἄληθειας ἠφίκα αὐτῷ αὕτῳ μή πάντως γέννησαι. No one however regards this as an independent testimony. The phrase ἠφίκη ἔπαι Θηβαίος betrays Plato's hand (Phaed. 65 b; Theaet. 186 b, ἰδοὺς καὶ ἄληθειας ἠφίκεισκεν καὶ elsewhere.), φησιν ὁ Λάκων seems to have been a usual formula of citation, when these ἄληθειασκοὶ, of which the Athenians seem to have been fond, were introduced to season their discourse. For the Laco- nian dislike of rhetoric comp. Sext. Empir., Math. ii. § 21, τὸν ἐπὶ εἶδος ἑτεροχρονο ρητορικὴν ἀπόκεισθαι νεωτία, ἐπαν- ειλθάτα ἐκδίκασθαι οὐκ ἑρωιδεῖ... προσέρχεται... ὁ δὲ λογικὸς λόγον ἐπὶ παρακώνει τὰς Ἀθηναίας ἀμελεῖστας. Perhaps the dictum in the text may have been connected with this story, which no comm. notices.

261. δὲ] Vulg. δὲ. The δὲ is but a makeshift reading, taken from a limited number of MSS. The alternative is to suppose that a verb has been dropped, such as δείκνυσι οὐ περί Φαιδρον δὲ after λέγων.

Πάρτε δὴ] 'approach, ye gentle creatures, and try to convince the prolific Phaedrus that without a due tincture of philosophy he will never be able to speak on any subject as he ought to speak.' Herme- neia's interpretation of θρήματα is a curiosity: τῶν λόγων θρῆματα καλεῖ οἱ γάρ λόγοι τῆς ψυχῆς θρῆματα εἶναι, οἱ οὐθε- νιάδες καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ ἀνθοδεικτικοῖς. He is more successful in his gloss on καλ- λίστατα: ἦ αὐτόν τοῦ Φ. καλοὺ παίδα, ἦ καλοῦς παῖδας τίτωται, τῶν λόγων. The latter is the sense generally adopted, as by Plutarch, Mor. p. 1000, quoted by Heind., τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων πατέρα Φαιδρόν ἐν Σωκράτει θρῆσιν εἰπεῖτο εἰκονὶς αὐτῶν γένομενος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὁμορφῷ δια- λόγῳ καλλίστατα (for the vulg. καλ- λιστάτην): Lach. Ag. 761, ὅκιοι εἰκονὶ- καὶ καλλιστάτα νόμοι δὲ. But we have it in the former sense in Eur. Or. 964, ἐν ἔαξΟι καὶ κατὰ χαῦνον νεφέους κα- λλιστάς θέε, sc. Persephone. Socr. uses a poetic phrase to humour his companion's love of fine writing.

Σ. Αρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὠλον ἡ ῥήτορική ἄν εἰς
tέχνη τυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγου, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστη-
ρίοις καὶ ὁσοὶ ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἱδίοις,
β ἡ αὐτή σύμμορφος τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι; καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντυ-
μότερον τὸ γε ὅρθον περὶ σπουδαία ἡ περὶ φαύλα γιγαν-
τέμενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτα ἀκόμη κάποιος;

Φα. Ὁ μᾶ τὸν Δ’ οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ
μάλιστα μὲν πῶς περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται
tέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημογορίας ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ ὁνὴ
ἀκόμη.

Σ. Αλλ’ ἡ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ ὁδυσσέως τέχνας

*Ἀρ’ οὖν ὃς, κ.τ.λ.]* As a step towards the
proof of the position, that a philo-
osophic training is necessary to the rhetor,
the ἱδίοι begin ascendum aetas by de-
defining the art of Rhetoric. Rhetoric is
"a winning or working upon the soul by
means of discourses," and this description
holds good whatever the matter in which
Rhetoric works, or whatever the oc-
cassion on which it exerts her powers:
for, in strictness, the dignity or mean-
ness of the subject-matter does not
affect her greatness as an art. For this
broad view of the scope of Rhetoric
Phaedr. is not prepared. The treatises
he has read restrict her functions to the
law-courts and the popular assemblies,—
a restriction which Socr. proceeds to
reason away by examples.

*ψυχαγωγία τις* This definition puts
in a more philosophical form the well-
known ῥητορικὴ πείθος δημογορίας, at-
tributed to Corax and Tissias. The verb
ψυχαγωγεῖν is common. Arist. Poet.
6. 17, τὰ μὲν οὖν τινα ψυχαγωγεῖ ἡ πραγ-
μοθέληθα τοῦ μέσου μέρη ἀπίν, αἱ τε προ-
πετείαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις. Sext. Empir.
adv. Gramm. 297, ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
στοχαζόμενον, οἱ δὲ ἐκ παρτός ψυχαγωγεῖν
ἐθέλοντες: ψυχαγωγεῖ δὲ μάλλον τὸ ἐθέλον
ἡ ταληθῆς. Also in the orators, Lycurg.
c. Leocr. 333, εἶναι δὲ διστῶν εἴνοι
δικαιεῖ τοῖς λόγοις ψυχαγωγήσαι, καὶ τὴν
ἀγρότητα αὐτῶν τοῦ ἱδίον τῶν δικαστῶν
eis ἔλεγον προσαγαγότας; τοὺς δικαστὰς.
Cic. de Orat. ii. c. 24, Tantam vim
habet illa quae recta a bono poeta dieta
cust, Πλατωνικὰ αἵρεις ommium regimia
rurum orationis. It is uncertain whether
Plato invented the substantive or found
it ready to his hand.
Socrates.

The words of the technical treatises of Socrates, as you see, point to the certainty and firmness.

The question is therefore solved: first, have you learned anything of the preceding rhetorics, and not mere words of the perhaps idle lectures of some. Zeno, the father of Gorgias, was a Nestor partly in account of his greatness, partly because he was not brought up in a city.

Of the men who wrote on rhetoric, we shall need more apt ones. Zeno is well represented by Xenocrates. He loved the sceptic name, distinguished for his socratic genius. Protagoras.

His discourses were wise, wise words, wise men, wise things, wise words, wise actions. In the text, you before whom is probably interpreted.

C. ο. ι. 

unless you are dressing up, let us say, a Gorgias in the yard of Nestor, or a Thrasymachus or Theodorus in that of Ulysses; or, unless the mask of Nestor conceals a Gorgias,' &c. Aristophanes, in his work De Sophisticis Elenchis, seems to imply that Gorgias wrote no technical treatise on Rhetoric, but lest his pupils model speeches (communes loci) to learn by heart instead. The first technographer, he says, was Tasia, then came Thrasymachus, and thirdly Theodorus. So in the Gorgias, p. 402 a, we read of a written "speech of Polus, but not of one by Gorgias. On the other hand, it is not to be supposed with Spengel (Artt. L. S. 333) that Plato would use Platonists, or make a wrong guess of the Tasia-speak, one possibility means "Gorgias or somebody else like him," for who but Gorgias can be represented by Nestor, or what name can there be of Plato's meaning when he makes that his, as well as Thrasymuchus, his long lecture a "speech"? Company also 267 a, when Gorgias is quoted with the acknowledged technographer Taisia. Unless Plato wrote connubially in the passage.

Of what is more probable, Gorgias wrote a "speech," but found or thought it useless for educational purposes. That Aristotle's catalogue of the earliest technographers l. 1. l. is not complete, follows from a passage of the "Hekatos of Alexander" (l. ii. 15), in which a "speech of Corax, the professor of Tasia, is expressly mentioned. M. as many think. Aristoxeneus was the author of the work quoted. His testimony to a fact of literary history is not inferior to Aristotle's, who indeed speaks of a "speech of Corax, Rhet. ii. 21. 11. From another passage, ib. iii. 14. 7, it follows that Gorgias was at any rate the author of rhetorical precepts, and not a mere writer of speeches, as indeed Spengel admits. The by-name of Nestor, as we learn from Socrates, ap. Spengel 1. 1. p. 113, was afterwards given to Isocrates. 

οούς ἀντίλεγοντες μέντοι  Συ. 285 ν. 

εἰτε μοῖς ... ἰδοὺ ἠθέλει μέτοι ... λέγειν, ἀπὸ Βοῦς τὸν Ὀισίλιον ἀπὸς; inf. 207 c. Soccr. is now showing that the controversies of the law-court, the assembly, and the schools are all conducted on the same principles, and amenable to the same rules of art.
Σ.Ο. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου;
Φ.Α. Ναί.
Σ.Ο. Οἰκοῦν ὁ τέχνη τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει φανήναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοὺς αὐτοῖς τὸτε μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἀδίκου;
Φ.Α. Τί μήν;
Δ. Σ.Ο. Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτε μὲν ἄγαθα, τοτε δὲ αὖ τάναντια;
Φ.Α. Οὐτός.
Σ.Ο. Τὸν οὖν Ἐλεαστικὸν Παλαμηῆδην λέγοντα οὖκ ἵσμεν τέχνη, ὡστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκοῦοντι τὰ αὐτὰ ὠμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ τολλά, μένοντά τε αὐτῷ καὶ φερομένα;
Φ.Α. Μᾶλα γε.
Σ.Ο. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήρια τέ ἐστιν ἢ ἀντιλογική καὶ περὶ δημηγοριῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰσκε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἰπέρ ἐστιν, αὕτη ἢ εἰς τις ὀδὸς τ' ἐσται πᾶν παντὶ ὠμοίον τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ ὀιδ' δυνάτων, καὶ ἀλλ' ὠμοιώτατος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἀγεν.
Φ.Α. Πώς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;

Οἰκοῦν ὁ τέχνη, κ.τ.λ.· "and he who conducts such a controversy (ὁ ἄντιλογον περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου) scientifically will cause a given action to appear in either light—just, or, when he chooses, unjust—to the same jury at two different times, will he not?"

D. τῶν οὖν Ἐλεαστικῶν Παλαμηῆδην Schol., Ζητήσανα φησὶ τὸν μακεδόνα ἑταίρον. That the father of the Eristic sects here meant, the context proves to demonstration. The various reading ἅλατον, derived from Quintilian, Inst. lll. 1. 10 (meaning the rhetor Aelidamas), is entitled to no consideration, as it destroys the point and purpose of the passage. Diog. L. ix. 25, ὅ ἀφέτερον τῷ Φαίδρῳ καὶ Ἐλεαστικῷ Παλαμηῆδῃ αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι καὶ καλεῖ. Zeno's paradoxes on the subjects of the One and Many, of Rest and Motion, &c., which Socr. here alludes to, may be learned from any history of philosophy. The dialogue called Sophista was written to overthrow this 'Antilogia' method, in order to make way for a rational Logic. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον, κ.τ.λ.· "The art of controversy is therefore not confined to oratory forensic or popular, but, so far as appears, it must be an art, if art it really is, applicable to all kinds of discourse without exception—an art capable of making any thing appear like any thing else within the limits of possibility, also of exposing every attempt on the part of an adversary to perform the same feat without detection. Socr. proceeds to argue that a man who has this power must know whether one thing is like another or not: that in order to impose on others and to detect imposition in them, he must himself be undeceived. A science of truth (λογική) is consequently implied in the science of seeming (διακώπτω)). Comp. Arist. Rhet. i. 1. 12, quoted p. 263 inf."
ΣΩ. Τῇ δε δοκῶ ζητοῦσι ϕανεῖσθαι ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέροντι γιγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ διάγον; | ΦΑΙ. Ἐν τοῖς διάγονοι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρῶν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐθέλων ἐπὶ τὸ ἑναντῖον ἡ κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὲ οὖ; 

ΣΩ. Δεῦ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι τὴν ὑμιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέαναι.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Η οὖν οἷς τ' ἔστασι, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοοῦν ἑκάστου, τῆς τοῦ ἀγνοομένου ὑμιότητα σμικράν τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγνώσκειν; 

ΦΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζοντες καὶ ἀπατωμένους δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τούτο δὲ ὑμιοτήτων τινῶν εἰςερήμην.

ΦΑΙ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὖτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐστιν οὖν οὗς τεχνικὸς ἐσται μεταβαθάζειν κατὰ σμικρῶν διὰ τῶν ὑμιότητων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίου ἀπάγων, ἢ αὕτως τούτῳ διαφεύγειν, ο μὴ ἔγνωρικός δὲ ἐστιν ἑκάστον τῶν ὄντων; 

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ μὴ ποτὲ.

ΣΩ. Δόγμων ἄρα τέχνην, ὡ τείχε, ὃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ

292. "Ἡ οὖν οἷς τ' ἔστασι' suppose a man to be ignorant of the truth of any given thing, how is he, in other things, to detect a resemblance to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant, or to discern whether such resemblance is great or small?" 

π. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα] 'consequently where people are deceived, and their notions are at variance with the realities, it is plain that such illusions slide into their minds by means of certain resemblances.' τὸ πάθος τούτο = τὸ ἀπατώθαι.

"Εστιν οὖν] Without a familiarity with truth, argues Socrates, it is impossible for a speaker either to mislead his hearers in a thoroughly skilful manner, or to avoid being himself misled. For μεταβαθάζειν the vulg. had μεταβιβάζων. The correction is supplied by Galen, Hipp. et Plat. p. 331 (v. p. 729, Kühn). Bodl., μεταβιβάζει. No further alteration seems necessary. The rhetor ἀπάγει ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ μεταβαθάζει κατὰ σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τούναντιν, κ.τ.λ., leads his audience away from the truth, and brings them round insensibly to the opposite of the truth, effecting this by means of resemblances or artful counterfeits: as when, says Herm., ἦν ὁρατόν ἠργάραος τομοὺς πολλὰς ἡ τῶν χαλκῶν ἵππων, καὶ τις ἐξ ὧν τὸν φάτταν περισσοτέρως, ἐπὶ ἐκείνης ὑμέτατος δὲ τὸν γόνην τελέσθη.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

99

κ. εἶδος, δόξας δὲ τετηρευκὼς γελοίαν τυφώ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἀτέχνουν παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙ. Κυνδυνεύειν.

Σ. Ο. Βουλέων όν, ἐν τῷ Αυστίου λόγῳ διὸ φέρεις καὶ ἐν ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν ἰδεῖν τι δεν φαμέν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐπτέχνων εἶναι.

ΦΑΙ. Πάντων γε ποι μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψυλῆς ποις λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἕκαστα παραδείγματα.

Σ. Ο. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γε τυχαὶ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρρή- 

θήτων τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντε τι παραδείγματα, ὡς ἐν ὡς εἰδοὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τούς ἀκούοντας. 

καὶ ἐγώ, ὦ Φάιδρε, αἰτίωμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεοὺς ἵσσος δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ υπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἄθιο 

ἐπιτεπνευκότες ἃν Ἱμιω εἰν τούτῳ τῷ γέρας. οὐ γάρ ποι ἐγών τέχνης τως τῷ λέγειν μέτοχο

ΦΑΙ. ἶςτο ὡς λέγεις, μόνον δηλωσον ο ὑψής.

Σ. Ο. Ἰθι δὴ μοι ἀνάγωβοι τὴν τοῦ Αυστίου λόγου ἀρχήν.

ΦΑΙ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τοῖς γενεμένων, ἀκήκοας. 

ἀξιώ δὲ μη διὰ τοῦτο ἄτυχήσαι ἃν δειμα, ὅτι οὐκ

c. δόξας—τετηρευκὼς] Angl., “a master of oratorical.” Germ. Tr., “der Meinvngen nachjagt.” τετηρευκώς, Ga- len and Boll, for the vulg. τετηρευκώς. Plato never uses ἐπηράν either literally or metaphorically, but always ἐπηράν ὡς ἐπηράντοις ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν. Xenophon employs both 

forms.


Socr. proposes to illustrate his principle by reference to the discourse of Lysias, and to his own two discourses. To this Phaedr. gladly agrees, for, says he, we are at present reasoning too abstractedly —ψυλῆς. Comp. Theset. 161, ἐκ τῶν 

ψυλῶν λόγων πρὸς τῆς γεωμετρίαν—“we left abstract dialectics for geometry,” which uses paradigms. In 278 C τοῖς ψυλῆς 

ψυλῆς = poetry unaccompanied with music. Legg. ii. 609 b, λέγων ψυλῆς denotes prose as distinguished from met-

trical composition.

καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην] The connexion 

between the two main portions of the 

dialogue is here plainly indicated. The 
speeches are patterns—παραδείγματα— 

illustrative of the theoretical principles 

developed in the second half of the work. 

Socr. affects to believe that this advantage 

is accidental, if it be not rather due to 

the inspiration of the local divinities or 

the Μουσῶν παράγοι, the sweet singers 

overhead.

D. ἵστε ἐν—παράγοι] “how one who 

knows the truth may play upon and 

mislead his hearers.” Ethyl. 278 π, ὁμη 

ἐκεῖνοι τοῖς προφῆταις— 

amuse themselves at your expense.”

ἾΣΤΟ ὡς λέγεις] Phaedr. is impatient 

of the frequent allusions to these insects: 

a dramatic touch this of great delicacy.

Socr. takes the hint, and introduces them 

no more.
ἐραστῆς ὃν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει—
Σ. Παύσαι. τί δή οὖν οὗτος ἀμαρτάνει καὶ ἀτέχνην ποιεῖ; λεκτέων, ἔγαρ;
Φ. Ναι.
Σ. Ὁριστεί γὰρ οὖν παντὶ δήλου τὸ γε τοιοῦδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἕνα τῶν ὄντων ὁμονοητικῶν ἔχομεν, περὶ δ᾿ ἕνα στασιωτικῶς;
Φ. Δοκοῦ μὲν δ᾿ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἔτι δ᾿ εἰπε σαφέστερον.
Σ. Ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἰπη σιδήρου ἡ ἀγρύρου, ὅρι τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοθήμεν;
Φ. Καὶ μάλα.
Σ. Τί δ᾿ ὅταν δικαίου ἡ ἁγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλη φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἄλληλος τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;
Φ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Σ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὖ.
Φ. Οὕτως.
Σ. Ποτέρως οὖν εὑπατητύτεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέρως μεῖξον δύναται;
Φ. Δήλον ὅτι ἐν ὦς πλανώμεθα.
Σ. Ὅντος τῶν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετεῖναι

263. τοῖς ὅτι μὲν ένα τῶν ὄντων] Vulg. τοῖς ὅτι μὲν ένα τῶν ὄντων. The reading ὅτι μὲν ένα τῶν ὄντων is taken from Cod. 1, and is certainly right, in my judgment.

ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἄλληλος] This distinction of ἀμφισβητήσαμα καὶ μὴ is illustrated by Arist. Rhet. 1.11.12: τὰ κακά δὲ δι’ ἄλλων πείθειν καθάρτη καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πράττομεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ’ ἔνα μήτε κανθάμεν πᾶς ἔχει, καὶ διότι ἄλλου χρωμάτου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαιοῦντάλλοι λέοντες ἔχομεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλου τεχνών φόβων τάνασσα τοιούτως συλλογίζονται, ἢ ἐν διαλεκτικῇ καὶ ἑ σιθορικῇ τοῦτο ποιώντως ἤρων γὰρ εἶναι ἄμφοτεροι τῶν ἐνοτήτων. Here το δίκαιον is the special subject of the forensic, το ἁγαθόν of the deliberative rhetoric.

b. Οὖθεν τῶν μελλων] Having shown that Rhetoric is chiefly conversant with debatable terms, Socr. proceeds to argue that a complete theory of Rhetoric presupposes a methodical division of the things which are and of those which are not debatable or ambiguous. The word ὅτι (via et arte, Cic.) excludes a mere popular (e.g.), or verbal, as distinguished from a scientific and natural διάλεκτικα. So Aristotle uses ἰδιαίτερα, Rhet. init., in the sense ‘to systematize,’ or ‘methodize’ (for ὅτι = μεθοδος), and he begins his treatise by defining the object-matter of the art he is about to handle. It is remarkable that Lydias himself is not mentioned by Plato in the list of technographers, whom he treats so roughly in the sequel. Cicero indeed says, on the authority of Aristotle, Lysian primo proferit solitum artem esse dicendi, deinde quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus vero jejuniorem, orationes eum scribere allis coepisse, artem removisse (Brut. 12.
πρώτον μὲν δεὶ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διηρήσατα, καὶ εἰλιξφέναι τινὰ χαρακτήρα ἐκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀνάγκῃ τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶται καὶ ἐν ὧν μὴ.

ΔΑΙ. Κάλλιο γοῦν ἄν, ὁ Ἑῳκρατεῖς, εἴδος ἐκαθο- νομητωκός τοῦτο λαβῶν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτα γε οἷμα πρὸς ἐκάστῳ γυγνόμενον μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ὃς ἔστω αἰσθάνεσθαι, περὶ οὗ ἄν μελλή ἐρέων, ποτέρου ὑπὸ τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους.

ΔΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τῶν Ἑρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἰναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μη;

ΔΑΙ. Τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δὴ τοῦ, ἢ οἷοι ἄν σοι συγχωρήσατε εἰπές ἃ νῦν ἢ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη δὲ τέ ἐστι τῷ ἐρωτεῖμοι καὶ ἐρωτεῖ καὶ αὕτης ὡς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;

48). Quintilian attributes to Lysias the opinion that Rhetoric "observationem quodam esse non artem" (Inst. ii. c. 17). This was probably the judgment of his riper years, when the change in his practice alluded to by Cicero had taken place. It would be unsafe to conclude from such authorities as the pseudo-Plutarch and Suidas that his treatise, if he published one, survived him. Kirsche's inference that the τέχνη of Lysias was written after the ἔρωτοι, which Plato here criticizes, is palpably unsound. It would be equally fair to argue that the work had disappeared from circulation before the Phaedrus was written, or that Plato had never seen it. But the words of Cicero by no means prove the existence of a written τέχνη by Lysias. His instruction in the art of Rhetoric may have been comprised in oral lectures, as must have been the case in other instances. Compare what Phaedr. says, sup. 261 β: λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημοσιογραφίας, and the note.

c. Κάλλιο γοῦν ἄν] As we might say, 'a very pretty generalization this, if you can carry it out.' Herm. ὁ ἰδίως τὴν διαιρετικὴν μέθοδον ἔρωτα ἔχει. This 'discreet method' is further explained in the sequel, p. 265 c.

"Εστιν γε οἷμα] In the second place, when he comes in contact with either of the two classes, the Disputable or the Indisputable, he ought not to be baffled by it, but should be able to discern at a glance to whether of the two the matter he has to speak about does properly belong.

τὴν ἔρωτα ἐγίνομεν ὑπὸ τοῦτο τοῦ τῆς ἀμφισβητησίμης ἢ τῆς ἀπόκρισις των τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει.
that from Αν. 760 is ambiguous; and of Eccles. 1137 Porson suggests the emendation κεί τῶν δευτέρων ἐν τίς εἴσοδον τυχόντας, for καὶ ... εἰ τι. D. διὰ τὸ ἐπιστευτικόν] See, τοὺς δια- νόησις. Τρισάλ, ὦ πάνω μέμηραι, 'I have quite forgotten.' 264. ᾽Ἀρρήτως γε ἡς σφόδρα] Alluding to the elaborate definitions in 237 b seq. and 244a seq. ἑσύχασον ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν] 'did he force us to conceive of Love as some definite entity selected by himself? Did he, I say, compose the ensuing discourse from first to last in due subordination to this idea?'

264. Ἡ τολλοῦ δεῖν] Hence, says Hermeias, later critics say of Lysias, διὶ πίνεν τυπαῖ πραγματο, τάξει δὲ ὅ, διὰ τὸ εὐφρενικόν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ λόγου. If Lysias could have been heard in reply, he would have said that his ἔρωτὴ ἔχει the best of reasons for not defining too clearly the subject of his address. ὡς ὀδὲ ἀν ἄρχῃς] "Lysias," says Criscie, "begins where he should have ended, inasmuch as he assumes as known the particulars concerning the person and personal relations of the suitor, and gives them precedence of that which is general." (τοι µὲν τῶν εἰς πραγματικὸν ἐπιστασια, κ.τ.λ.). Plato is apparently aware that this was done of set purpose, and as a stroke of art, and he compares the trick to the feat of swimming on the back. For the expression comp. Rep. vii. 529 c, καὶ ἐξ ὑπτιας νέων ἐν γῇ ἐν δακτὺ αἰσθήσεω, a curious passage, in which Plato ridicules the popular notion that the study of astronomy has an elevating tendency. Comp. also Parmen. 137 Α, διαφέρει τοιούτου τε καὶ ταὐτών πληθὺς λόγῳ. Here,, ὡς τε ὄντι ἐνεργῆς τοῦ λόγου ἡς ἐξ ὑπτιας νέων (Πλάτ., αἰ. Λεκτ.), ἐπὶ ἐνεργίας ἔχων καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτί διατηρήσεως τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴς παρὰ τοῦ χρόνου ἤκρατο καὶ παρὰ
διαλείψεις ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἀρχεῖται ἀφ’ ὑπὸν πεπαυμένος ἂν ἦδη ὁ ἐραστὴς λέγει πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ. ἦ οὐδὲν ἐπιτο. Φαίδρε, φίλη κεφαλή;

ΦΑΙ. 'Εστι γε τοῦ δή, ὡς Σώκρατες, τελευτή, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

Σ.Τ. Τί δὲ τάλα; οὗ χίδην δικεί βεβληθοῦσα τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἡ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἐκ των ἀπάγωγων ἀκατέργατων δεύτερον δεῖ τεθῆναι, ἡ τι άλλο τῶν ῥητέρων; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξον, ὄσι μὴν ἐιδότι, οὔκ ἀγενώς τὸ ἐπί τοῦ εἰρημένου τῷ γράφοντι σὺ δὲ ἕτεροι τῶν ἀνάγκης λογογραφικῆς, ἡ τούτων ἐκείνοις οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ’ ἀλληλα ἐθηκεν;

Ὁ ΦΑΙ. Χρηστός ἦ, οὔτε μὲ ἡγεῖς ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνων οὕτως ἀκριβίως διδεῖν.

Σ.Τ. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οὕτωι σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὡστερ ἔξον συνεστάναι συμα τὰ ἐχοντα αὐτῶν αὐ-

φάσεις, ὥσι καλομικάττες ὑποτ. Λύας doubtlessly plumed himself on his skill in pluming thus in medium res, instead of commencing ab ovo, as a novice might think it his duty to do. And even the confusion of which Plato complains he might justify on practical grounds: the entire speech being an example of rhetorical insinuation, where more is meant than meets or is fit to meet the ear. But it does not suit Plato's purpose to place himself on the 'Standpunkt' of his victim.

πεπαυμένος, So. τοῦ λόγου.

Φαίδρη, φίλη κεφαλή] An imitation of the Homeric Τεῦρη, φίλη κεφαλή (II. viii. 281), as Ast and Stallb. observe. One MS. gives Φ αιδρ , a reading which I am surprised to see that Hirsch and Badh. patronize.

Β. 'Εστι γε τοῦ δή] 'That of which he speaks (in the exordium) is, I grant you, a termination' rather than a beginning.

χεῖραν] 'holder-skelter,' like rubbish shot from a cart.

ἐμι μὲν γὰρ] 'I, who am but a novice, could not help being struck by the adacty of the writer, in blunting out the first thing that came into his head.' The phrases οὐκ ἀγενώς, πάντως γέννας, πάνω μεταφιστό, are frequent in the ironi-cal sense. Exactly in point is Gorg. 492 b, οὔκ ἀγενώς γε, καὶ Καλλίλεια, ἅτιν' ἔχει τοῦ λόγου παρηγοροφόμενος.

αὐτῷ ή ἔχει τοῦ ἀνάγκης] 'are you aware of any covert literary or rhetorical reason which can have induced the writer to string his topics together thus?' To which Phaedr. replies: 'you do me too much honour in supposing that I am clever enough to penetrate his motives so exactly.' θρησκείᾳ εἰ, ἢν εἰ εἰ, are well-known ironical formulas, like our 'thank you,' 'you are very kind,' &c.

Σ.Τ. δεῖν πάντα λόγον δισσερ ἔξον] This comparison of a well-arranged discourse to a living organism occurs again, Philib. 66 b: ἣν οὐκ ἐπαναφέρειν κόσμος τῷ ἀπώλειας λόγοι καλὸς ἐκφύγων εἴρησεν ἐκὸν λόγον ἀπεργάζον φαινεῖται. It is also implied inf. 268 D, καταγελών ἐν εἴ τις στενί τραγῳδιῶν ἄλλο αὐτῶν διεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν ἀπειράσασθαι. Comp. Politics, p. 277 b, ἀλλ’ ἀπεφέρειν δ λόγον ἥμων δισσερ ἔξον, κ. π. λ., where, however, the ἔξον is γεγραμένον. Aristotle borrows the illustration from Plato in his remarks on Epic poetry, Poet. 23. 1: τῇ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, ὥστε δι’ τῶν μέσων καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις συνεστάναι δραματικῶς,
τού, ὡστε μὴτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μὴτε ἀποῦν, ἀλλὰ μέσα
tε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέπουσ’ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμ-
μένῳ.

Φ.Α. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
Σ. Ἐκείνα τῶν τοῦ τούτου ἐταίρου σου λόγου, εἰδ’
οὕτως εἰτε ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ εὑρήσεις τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος
οὐδέν διαφέροντα, ὦ Μίδα τῷ Φρυγί φασί τινες ἐπιγρα-
μάτα γράφων.

Φ.Α. Ποῖν τούτῳ, καὶ τί πεπονθός;
Σ. Ἐστι μὲν τούτου τόδε,

χαλκός παρθένοις εἰμὶ, Μίδα ὦ ἐπί σήματι καίρια.
ὁρᾶ’ ἐν ὑδρῷ το νάρ καὶ δύνατα μακρὰ τεῦχης,
αὐτοῦ τῆδε μένουσα πολυκλαύστου ἐπὶ τύμβου,
ἀγγελεῖ παροιμία Μίδας ὃτι τῆδε τέθηκαται.

ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἡ ὑστατόν τι λέγεις εἰς

οὐθαί, ἐννοεῖς πον, ὅπε ἐγφάιμαι.
ΦΑΙ. Σκόπτεις τὸν λόγον ἦμων, ὥς Σωκράτες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον μὲν τοίμων, ὡς μὴ σὺ ἔχεις, ἐπειδὴ — καὶ τοις συχνὰ γε ἔχεις μοι δοκεῖ παραδείγματα, πρὸς αὐτὸς μὲν ἄνω, μημείοθαί αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάντως τοῦ — εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἑτέρους λόγους ὑμεῖς. ἦν γὰρ τι ἐν 265 αὐτῶι, ὃς δοκῶ, προσήκον ἴδειν τοὺς βουλαῖς μένωι περὶ λόγων σκοπέων.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποιοῦν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίων ποι ἡστηρήν ὡς τῷ ἔρωτι, ὡς τῷ μη δὲ χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τινα χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τινα γὰρ τῷ ἔρωτι, ἔλεγέν τινα γὰρ τῷ ἔρωτι. Καὶ μᾶλλον ἁνδρικῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἡμῖν σὲ τὰ λαθέθες ἔρεως, ὡς μεμνημόνως, ὡς καθὼς εἰς ἐναντίων, ἔστιν αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦτο, μανίαν γὰρ τῷ ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τῷ ἔρωτι, ἔλεγέν τινα γὰρ τῷ ἔρωτι. Καὶ μᾶλλον ἁνδρικῶς.

ΣΩ. Μανίας δὲ γε εἴδη δοῦν, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἁνδρικῶν, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔρωτών ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίων γυνομοιρίαν.

Εἰ παραδείγματα] Herm. ἄραρθόματα λέγει. ἐπιθέλοντα αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάντως τι.] We may supply ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον φεύγων. There are many things in the speech of Lysias, says Soc., which may serve as useful examples to the learner if he endeaours.—I do not say to imitate them—but from that. The apostrophe is adopted out of deference to Phaedr. The only difficulty in the passage is the position of the words μὴ πάντως τι. They seem however to be introduced πάντως ὑπάρκουσι, and certainly no proposed change is for the better. Ast suggests πρὸς τὰ βλέπων μὴ δύναται δὲ, μημείοθαί αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν, μὴ πάντως τι (sc. αὐτά) δὲ, "in quae si quis in- tueatur inde proficat aliquid; similiae ea constet nihil proficat." But that case we must have ὑπὸ τοῦ τι, which it is strange that Ast should not have perceived. Winckeln's μὴ πάντως δὲ φάσσει δὲ hardly needs discussion. Herm., πρὸς ταῦτα τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τὰ ἄμαρτήματα τοῦ Δικαίων λόγων βλέπων τις καὶ μὴ χρώματος ἄφθαστο. Socr. then turns to his own discourses, which, as they were given him by inspiration, it is no breach of modesty to prefer to that of Lysias. There was one feature in them, he thinks, which it concerns every speculator on rhetoric to give heed to.

265. ἡστηρήν] So all the MSS. and Hermeias. The form occurs frequently in Plato, as in 273 b, and twice or three times in Aristoph., as we include, or not 187 a, τὸ σε ὑπὸ ἡστηρήν οὔχ ἐγὼ πάντως ἄλλα πάντως ἄφθασαν, where Porphur prefers ἡστηρήν, Cebet ἡστηρήν.

Mανίας δὲ γε.] Socr. had pointed out a glaring omission in the speech of Lysias. The orator had discarded fluently of Love, but had forgotten to explain what he meant by the term. His own speeches present a favourable contrast in this respect. Not only had he 'compelled his hearers to conceive of Love' under the more general idea of Madness, but by dividing and subdividing, he had determined the particular variety of Madness to which Love corresponds. In order to this, he had first adopted the obvious distinction of divine and human; showing that beside the ordinary morbid madness, there was one caused by a divine influence emancipating the soul from the yoke of usage.
ΦΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τετάρας θεών τέταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴς μὲν ἐπίπνους Ἀπόλλωνος Θέατς, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δ' αὐτοπηγητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἐρωτος, ἐρωτικήν μαντίαν ἐφησαμένη τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικόζοντος, ὅσοι μὲν ἀληθῶς τινὸς ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἀν καὶ ἀλλοσε παραφέρομεν, κεράσατεν οὖν παντάπασιν ἀπιθανον λόγον, μιθικὸν των ὑμνον προσε-παίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εἰφήμως τῶν ἐμών τε καὶ σὺν δεσπότῃ Ἐρωτα, ὃς Φαίδρη, καλῶν παιδῶν ἐφοροῦν.
ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα ἐμοιγε οὐκ ἀρδῶς ἀκούσαι.
ΣΩ. Τόδε τούτων αὐτόθεν λάβομεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυγείον πρὸς τὸ ἐπαυχεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβιβάζαι.
ΦΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὑμιᾷ παιδώ πεπαισθαι τούτων δὲ τινῶν ἐκ τύχης ῥηθότων δυόν

and convention (sup. 252 A, νομοῦς δὲ καὶ εὐδοκιμῶν, κ.τ.λ.). This divine Madness he had parcelled into four, &c. Above, p. 244 seq.

παραφέρομενοι.] Herm., ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς ἀνυπαντώσεις τοῦ ἔρωτος ἐπεν. This passage has evidently an apologetic purpose; though it is not quite clear whether Plato means to apologize for the dubious morality of portions of his ἔρωτας λόγος, or only for its high flights of mythical speculation.

κεράσατεν [having mixed a not unpalatable discourse] as men mix a κρατὴρ for libation.

μαθητῶν τῶν ὑμῶν προσεπ. : 'we chanted for the solace of Eros a mythic hymn in strain meet and pious.' "προσε-παίσαμεν πρὸς συνοικίαν διείλαμεν" (Stallb.). The verb is sometimes used in the same sense with a dative; Plut. Eros. c. 20, τὰ καὶ τὸ όνομα παντοῦ προσα-παίσαμεν ἑκάστῳ τῷ θεῷ τρέφοντες περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ δόντων ἐπικαλομένοις, ὅλιγα δ' εἰρήναται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀνίους. παιδών and its derivatives παιδαί, &c., are not unfrequently applied to religious hymns or choral celebrations. Arist. Ran. 318, οἱ μεμεριόμενοι ἔστησαν τοὺς παιδαίς, οἵν τοῖς γέφυρα τοῖς ἐνθυμεῖται. Th. Lyrist. 770, ὧν παρελθεῖ θεάηρ παιδῶν παρυῆλεν ἐγώ (where perhaps παιδῶν should be restored, the Attics usually writing παιδῶν, but not παι-γία. Later writers seem only to have used ἐνθυμα παιδῶν, &c., and hence the freq. variations in MSS.). Plut. Crat. 406 c. ποιηματίσκειν αἱ θεαὶ. It is more important to observe that in the Timaeus Plato extends the term παιδῶν to all mythical presentations of speculative ideas, especially in Physics, the region, in his view, of probability and plausible conjecture. Tim. 59 c. τῶν ἐνοχῶν μῦθων μεταδίδοντος ἰδίᾳ, ἢν ἤν τοῖς ἀναπάσεως ἕκακα τοῖς περὶ τῶν ὅστων ὅλα καταβηθούσων λόγως, τους γενέσεως περὶ διαθέματος εἰλαθαίς ἀντιμε-μελῆτον ἐβαστῇ κατατάτη, μετριάν ἐν τῷ βίον παιδιάν καὶ φρονίμον ποιοῦν. This explains Socr.'s meaning, when he declares presently that, ἢμι μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὅστι παιδῶν πεπαισθαί.


τούτους δὲ τίνων] Equiv. to ὅστις τούτων ἐκ τύχης ῥοθοῦν διό τιν'
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

Ιητερ, δι εις την δυναμις τεχνη λαβειν δυνατο τις, ουκ αχαρι.

ΦΑ. Τιων δη;

Χ. Η. Εις μην τε ιδεαν συνορωντα άγεν τα πολλαχη

ειδι δεν, δι εις την δυναμις, κ.τ.λ. 'Among these, so to speak, chance utterances (alluding to the two speeches) 'there were implied two forms of procedure, of which it were gratifying if one could obtain a clear technical description.' This is Aet's view of this somewhat difficult passage. He says: "Genitivi autem totorum ... ρηθτων των ειδων non sunt dum horum orationum casus quidam dictorum species, sed objective, quod dicunt, accipiendo sunt: dum species quae inventiimus vel conspicuius in his orationibus; sic enim genitivum a Graecis poni constat ut patrio eum sermone praepositum an vel in exprimere possimus." (Comm. maj. p. 545). The genitives totorum ... ρηθτων will thus depend on ειδων, which itself depends virtually on δυναμις, αναθαλων being interpolated to prevent ambiguity. Those who think the interpretation too subtle, will perhaps be disposed to acquiesce in Aet's earlier view, as shown in his version: "horum autem fortuito memoratorium generum, si quis ipsam (αναθαλων ut vulg. pro αναθαλων) vim arte perciupere possit haud ingratum." And so Galen probably understood it, for he gives ειδων and αναθαλωnt. Plato had alluded to the two processes, without explaining them technically, but rather in τεχνης, (Paul. sup. μεχανα γραμ των ερημαν ειτη της Ερωτη, καται, και μεχανα δε γε ειδη δου, the first being a generalization, the second a 'division'— the very two processes referred to here.) For των I had thought of των ου, but I lay no stress upon this conjecture. The two forms of procedure are, according to Herm., the οροστηση and διαρρητηση, according to Galen, the συναγωγη and διαρητηση would better correspond to Plato's language. Modern interpreters, not very correctly, render διαρητηση, by 'analytic,' a term usually applied by the ancients (as pseudo-Perictyne, ap. Stob. Anth. i. p. 7, δοκει αν αναλυσαι ολος εστι παντο γενοι ὁποι μην δραχυς) to the former or generalizing process, which Aristotle denotes by συναιγωνη; Topic. viii. 1. 18, δε εναγωγη απο των καθ εκπατα το καθολο λαμβανεται. 'Collection' and 'division' are the terms which answer most nearly to συναγωγη and διαιρεσις, and should be used in translating them. The 'divisive' definition is called by Sext. Emp. δε εναιαναγως ορος (adv. Math. ii. 2). The scholastic term is Division, and Abelard has left a treatise under the title of Divido Divisionum, in which he shows in how many different ways the process may be effected. The Socratic definitions, it may be observed, were founded on a συναγωγη, or collection of particulars, the πειραιακη λογια of Aristotle. The method of division, on the other hand, is always attributed to Plato, as by Galen in his work De Hippocrate et Platon. It is in one point of view supplementary to the simpler Socratic process, being designed to fix the 'differentia' of the thing to be defined with the greatest possible exactitude. The emphasis with which it is here introduced favours the belief that it was a novelty in the Athenian schools at the time when the Phaedrus was written or published: though from Xen. Mem. iv. 5. 12 we should infer that it had presented itself in an elementary form to Socrates. Galen insists particularly on the value of this 'dia- critic method' in the classification of diseases, and professes to believe that it was first suggested by the works of Hippocrates, with which he rightly supposes that Plato was familiar. The "Practic," of the physician was "the mistress," according to Galen, to the philosopher's "Theorick." But probably he overrates the obligation of one of his favourite authors to the other.

Δ. Εις μην τε ιδεαν] He here describes the process from the many to the one. Comp. sup. 249 a, ετε γαρ άνθρωπον των ειδων λεγόμενον, εκ πολλων λοτη ανθρωπων εις εν λογιας ξωραιομενον. The word συνορωντα is illustrated by Legg. xii. 905, προ τε εν συνορωντα παντα συνορωντα. The first method, says Socr., consists in taking a comprehensive view of the multitude of scattered particulars and bringing them
διεσπαρμένα, ἵν’ ἐκαστὸν ὠριζόμενον δῆλον πού, περὶ οὗ ἄν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλη. ὡσπερ τὰ νῦν δὴ περὶ "Ερωτος, ὁ ἔστιν, ὁρισθεῖν, εἰτ’ εὖ εἰτὲ κακῶς ἐλέξθη. τὸ γονύ σαφές καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὁμολογοῦμεν διὰ ταῦτα ἐσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος.

ΦΔ. Τὸ δ’ ἔτερον ὁδὸ εἰδος τὶ λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; 

ΣΩ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ’ εἰδὴ δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ’ ἄρθρα, ἤ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπίχειρεῖν καταγεννᾶται μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπο τρόμον χρώμενου. ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ ἀρτι

under one general form or notion, for the purpose of defining and so placing out of doubt the nature of the particular subject you wish to give instruction in. In the next clause τὰ νῦν δὴ is a ‘pendent,’ ὡσπερ ταὐτα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τὸ τουτὸ ταὐτὸ ἐχθροφορεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἐπίχειρεῖν καταγεννᾶται μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπο τρόμον χρώμενου. ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ ἀρτι

The phrase ὁδὸ εἰδος is illustrated by Crat. 386 e, δῆλον δὴ διὰ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ὀδοὺν ἔχωτα τινα βιβλιάσαν ἐστί τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς συνήθειαν ἡμῶν, ἐκανάμεν ἐνα καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἡμετέρους φαινόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τρός τινα αὐτῶν ὀδοὺν ἔχωτα ἐπείπερ πέφυκεν. And again 387 a, πέφυκεν ἡμῖν πράγματος ἐκαστὸν ἢ δὲ ἠμᾶς ἔβουλαμεθαὶ καὶ οὐ δὲ βουληθήμεν, ἢ δὲ μὴν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν βουληθήμεν ἐκαστὸν τέμνειν τοῦ τέμνειν ταῦτα καὶ τέμνονειν καὶ τῷ πέφυκε, τεμοῦνει ταῦτα καὶ πέλου τινὰ ἡμᾶς ἐρέθω καὶ ἄρθρω πράξεως ναιτοῦ, ἢ ψωμὶ πέφυκεν, ἔχειν ἐπίθεσιν ἑαυτὸ ταῦτα καὶ οὐδὲν πράξεως. Those passages are important, as showing that the method owed its value in Plato’s eyes not merely to the ingenuity it calls forth (though on that too he elsewhere insists, Polit. 286 d), but to its power as an engine of positive discovery, and as a means of revealing the thought or plan in nature which underlies all her phenomena. If we remember this, we shall not wonder at the enthusiasm with which Socr. presently speaks of the able dialectician.

καταγεννᾶται ὁδὸν "Cic. de finibus ii. 9. 26. Hoc est non dividere sed franges. Sen. Epist. 89, § 3, Pudiam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes non in frusta dividam : dividit enim illum non concidit utile est.” (Ast.) In Polit. 262 d, we have specimens of this chopping method held up for avoidance. 

magoeus] The functions of the ancient magoeus seem to have been manifold, including those of the butcher and butchery, as well as those ordinarily assigned to the cook, plain or ornamental. So in the Cyclops of Euripides the καλὸς "Aidou magoeus slaughter his victims before he roasts or boils them. And in Plutarch,
The image contains a page of Greek text. The text appears to be a philosophical or literary passage, possibly from a work on logic or rhetoric. The page number at the bottom is 109. The text is not fully visible, but it seems to be discussing a topic related to logic or a rhetorical device.

The text is not in a well-recognized modern language, and it may be a challenge for automated understanding. Nevertheless, it appears to be discussing a concept that is possibly related to a particular method or technique in the field of logic or rhetoric.

Without further context, it is difficult to provide a more detailed interpretation of the text. The page numbers and references are also not clear, making it hard to connect this passage to specific sources or authors.

In summary, the image contains a page of Greek text that appears to be discussing a philosophical or literary concept, possibly related to logic or rhetoric. The text is not fully visible, and its exact content is challenging to interpret without further context.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ [266, Β

[kai] proteiampenos uphnesen os megistow aitwv hamv B 

agathv.

Phi. 1. Alfihstata legeis.

Si. Tovton dh eyouge autov te erashtis, d Phaidre, 
tovn diarresewn kai sungenwv, w oivos te d legew te 

tai frouneiv ean te tw allov iippowmai dynatov eis en 

epi polla pevouk3 orav, touton diw kato pinasino 

meti xhmon woste theio. kai meni kai tous dunasmow 

auto drov ei mou 3rho6 eme prosagorevai, thei oide, 
kalo de oin mexhr toude dialektikov. ta de evn para 

soi to kal Dvizin mabontas eipe ti xhri kalein. h touto 

ekewn estin h logon tychi, h Thrasuamakos te kai o 

alloi xromenoi sofoi men autoi legein gevanas, allovs.

b. proteiampenos] 'having held out to 

view,' 'exhibited,' as an anatomist to 
his pupils. So epideiwm is used Sophist. 
264 Β, tawl toinw epheirmwv, sekh- 

zontes dh to prothwv genov, porwvthai 

cat tois deixi deia mefor tov mephtov 

phymov tou tov semeiowv koinwias, eis 

en auton to koiw pantu periplhtes, tov 

oulion Lwptai phos eptideixzemv 

mellonta men hamv autovv, epeita dh kai 

tais ellogistai genwv tov tonwto mevadov 

pevounov,—a passage exactly parallel to 

the present. 1b. 247 b, skopei protei- 

nomen xwov dh eidoqov de dieqhtai 

kai orologion tovun elnav to xw.

In the same dialogue, 232 Β, we find diptefon en 

the ethics,—another metaphor for the 

same thing. Before proteiampenos Badn. 

brackets και. I think rightly, 'When he 

has found what he seeks, he holds it 

up to view, and,' &c.

Tovton dh eyouge—frouneiv] Soc. is 

not only greatly addicted to these 'di-

visions' and 'collections' in his own prac-
tice, and with a view to his improvement as 
a speaker and a thinker, but, &c. A 
like educational effect is attributed to 
these dialectical exercises in the Politic-
cus, 285 Β, 287, where their tediousness 
and seeming pedantry is justified on the 
ground that they make men dialek-
tikoi kai eireptikoi:

eis en kai epi polla pevouk3] The 

best MSS. and Stob. have pevouk3, a 

few pevouktas as in the vulgar. Stablb. 

pevouk3, which I have adopted. pev-

ouktas may have arisen from the not un-

quent confusion of C and Θ. — He 

whose view embraces both a One and a 

Many, as they exist in nature (e.g. pepi 

pevouk3 and 2 en in hamv pevouk3), has for 

Socr. the greatest attraction—he is pre-

pared 'to follow close behind him as a 
god.' Katapostas and the fall. words are 

not quoted from any existing line of 

Homer: the nearest is Od. v. 183, 2 θ 

epeita mawv exhia vaiwv theio. Heind. 

aptly compares, for the sense, Dion. Hal. 

Huet. (p. 407, Reiske), ή γαρ τεχνη τη 

diarreswv, δο φειριν ο Platon, diarreswv 

kai sungenwv, deizai to evd zaos eis 

kai tovas exei tovus, kai pantwz sungaw-

yg eva taot, tovto γαρ εστι diarreswv 

tekhny, eva 285 or 287, polla 

C. dialektikos] In antithesis to anty-

logismos ev episthmos, who refuse to see 

the Many in the One. Repub. v. 454, 

2 genala, 2v 47, 2 Plakas, 2 duxa-

mei tis antylogie tychi. Tl dh 'Oti, 

eiswv, dekotioi mo to auton kai exoete 

pollwz elhestwv, kai eloenv ola empat 

allw dialegheswv, lwa to m b duxawv, kast 

eido diaraomwv 2 legumwv episkewv, 

allw kast autv to onoma diwkev tov 

leghenwv twn eblwv, eridi, o di-

lektiw proq allhwmv xhdmov. This 

description applies to Zeno and his fol-

lowers, and to some of the minor So- 

cratic sects, especially the Megaric and 

Cynic.

ta de evn] Soc. proceeds ironically to 
inquire whether the art of dialectic as 

he had described it was the art professed 

and taught by the rhetors, Lyssias and 

Thrasymachus.
τε ποιοῦσιν, ὦ τι ἄν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῖσιν ἐθέλωσιν;

ΦΑΙ. Βασιλείκαι μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονες γε ἂν ἔρωτας, ἀλλὰ τούτο μὲν τὸ ἔδοξος ὅρθος ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς καλέων, διαλεκτικὸν καλῶν τὸ δὲ ῥήτορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἐν ἡμᾶς.

Σ. Πώς φης; καλὸν τού τι ἂν εἶν δὲ τούτων ἀπολειφθέν ὡμοί τέχνη λαμβάνεται; πάντως δὲ οὐκ ἀτμαστέον αὐτὸ σοι τε καὶ ἐμοί. λεκτέον δὲ τι μένυτο καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥήτορικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλλα του συχνά, ὥστε κράτεις, τὰ γ' ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοι.

Σ. [Καὶ] καλῶς γ' ὑπεμνησας, προοίμιον μὲν οἷμαι προτὸν ὡς δὲ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι εἰν ἀρχῇ, ταύτα λέγεις

Ε — ἥ γάρ; τὰ κυριά τῆς τέχνης

ΦΑΙ. Ναί.

Σ. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησιν τοια μαρτυρίας τῇ ἐπ
form, φεύγεται ὁ δείκτης—τεκμηρίαν δὲ—
οὐ γὰρ ἐν τὰς ἡ τἀθεὶ ἐπιστῶσιν ἢ εἰς ὑποθέτουν ὑποθείς. Ἡβ. 8, 8, εἰς τὸν μὲν ἄνω ἐπιστ. αὐτός, ὡς ἐκείνοις ἐξοικονομημένοις ἢ ἐκείνοις, κ.λ. εἰς ναὶ ἐπιστήμης συνεχέσεις therefore arguments drawn from the general experience of mankind, τεκμηρίας from the known antecedents of an individual. Whether this is the meaning of the term here it is impossible to say, but it seems probable that the author quoted has preserved in this, as in other instances, the traditions of the more ancient schools. A different explanation of τεκμηρίας is suggested by Ammonius, p. 127, Valck. (quoted in Spengel, Art. Scip. p. 117), σημεία καὶ τεκμηρίας διαφέρον ἁρτίνα ἐν τῷ τέχνῃ, ἃ τα paraρχήματα σημείοις πιστοτάτα, ἃ τὰ μέλλοντα τεκμηρίας. πιστοτάτας—καὶ ἐπιτυπώσων]. The distinction is explained Rhet. ad Alex. 3, εἰς δὲ διὸ τὸ πλείον τῶν πιστῶν γίνονται τὰ ταταρτάτα, καὶ τα τάρτατά τοῦ τοιεὶς λεγομένους καὶ ἐπιτυπώσων τά μὲν γὰρ εἰς καὶ παραδείγματα καὶ τεκμηρία καὶ ἐνδιδομένη καὶ γράφει καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ οἱ ἔλεγχοι πιστεῖ χρόνων τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν προγνωσμών δὲ κατηγορίας ἐν μαρτυρία δρών καὶ. Here ἐπιτυπώσων πιστεῖ seem equivalent to the ἐπιτυπώσων of the text.

λογοδοτών] Cicero refers to this expression in the Orator, I, 11, Theodorum Byzantium, multosque alios quos logocibidem appellat in Phaedro Socrates. It denotes a master of rhetorical artifice, a 'ruminating speech-wright,' and refers doubtless to the multiplicity and subtlety of his rules of art. By ἔλεγχοι καὶ ἐπιστυπώσων a distinction analogous to that between πιστῶν and ἐπιστυπώσων is probably meant: 'proof or confirmation primary and secondary,' i.e. 'subsidiary.' What kind of πιστεῖ is technically meant by ἔλεγχοι is not quite clear—probably a reduction ad absurdnum. Comp. Arist. Rhet. ii. 22, 14, ἔτι τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ ἐπιστημο
te πρῶτος εὑρέ καὶ παρεταίνους; οἱ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ παρα-
ψόγους φασίν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν, μνήμης χάριν στοφός γαρ ἀνήρ.
Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὐδεῖ, οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἰδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τὰ τε αὐ-
συμκρά μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα συμκρά φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι
dia ῥώμην λόγου, καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖος τά τε ἔναντι καὶ−
νόμος, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἀπειρα μήκη περί πάντων ἀνέφερον; ταύτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτὲ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασε,
tute of point and neatness, and some of
his γενέματα have been much quoted, e. g.
a line, called "iambic" by Hermeias,
"Η δέος ἢ λίπη παίσ ταρκ πάντα βλου.
—ονθάλασσαν, explained by the verb
from which it comes: Arist. Thesm. 1011,
ἀλλά Ῥείκοι ὑπὲρθάλησαν
Περεντίαν ἔκριναν, "Οτι δὲ μὴ γέγοναν"
Ἀνδρουθών — telegraphed to me," con-
veyed a secret intimation. Hence the
substantive may mean "hint," "insinu-
tion," "covert allusion," as of one who
"just hints a fault, and hesitates dis-
like." parémpinos and parafýros may
be varieties of ōpódeuma, but as the
words nowhere recur, it is impossible to
be quite sure of this. 'Indirect compli-
mint' or 'censure' seems to express
what is meant by the terms. parafýros
answers to our 'side-thrust.' Mr. Cope
doubts whether the metrical parafýros
of his Grammar can be derived from pre-
cipta or examples. The latter would
accord best with the words of Plato, and,
I apprehend, with the practice of the
schools; for, the metre apart, there was
nothing new in furnishing learners with
pattern instances of the different rho-
tological features.
Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε, κ.τ.λ.] Gorgias
was accompanied by his reputed master
Tisias, on the occasion of his visit to
Athens, A.B.P. 4. They are here made
jointly responsible for the opinion that
to the orator the Probable is of more
value than the True; and also, it would
seem, for the σχηματοσεξεῖμεν which follow.
A parallel passage is quoted from Iso-
crates, Paneg. p. 42 c (written Β.Ç. 360).
A comparison of the two illustrates the
difference of style in the two authors.
ἐπειδὴ οἱ λόγοι τωνήθην έχουσι την
φάσιν, διὰ οὗ τε εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
πολλαχώς ἐξήγησαν, καὶ τα τε μεγάλα
ταπείνα τοιῆμα καὶ τῶν μικρῶν μέγεθος
περιθέναι, καὶ τὰ παλαῖ καὶ ἄνων διελθεῖν
καὶ περὶ τῶν νέωσι γεγονημένων ἀρχαίως
εἴπεν, κ.τ.λ. Possibly some similar
vaunt had occurred in one of the public
ἐπιδείξεις of Gorgias, known both to
Isocrates and Plato. In the Vitae X
Rhet. (888 f.) μεγάλα μεγάλα ποιών τα τα
d μεγάλα μεγάλα is given as Isocrates' defi-
nition of Rhetoric. The words καὶ τ' ἀρχαῖας τα τἐ ἐναντία κακῶν seem to
stand in no regular constructional re-
lation either to those which precede or
to those which follow. Heind. supposes
an ellipse of λέγομεν or some equivalent
verb, but does not conceal his suspicion
that the text is faulty. As, on the
other hand, joins ἀρχαῖας and κακῶν
with φαίνεσθαι, adding "fit enim suspe-
numero ut adverbia loco adjectivorum
ponantur." In his larger commentary
this explanation is not repeated, nor is
any other substituted for it. Stallb.,
which would supply λέγομεν instead of
may be Plato's meaning, though one sees
not how these words can be "understood
from the foregoing ποιών διὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν
λόγων." The governing verb, it seems
to me, should rather be supplied from
the sequel: for it is not to be supposed
that the text is defective, no inserion
being conceivable which would not spoil
the rhythm of the passage. It is as if
Plato had meant after κακῶν, to add
ςυντομώτατα τα τέ λέγειν καὶ εἰς μίκροις
ἀνέφερον, instead of the accusatives he
actually uses. The meaning of the words
is suggested by the quotation from Is-
crates, who understands by κακῶν, τα
νέωσι γεγονημένα (more properly, things
strange and novel), which the orator was
to dignify by the use of antique phrases
and allusions, while τάνως, i.e. τα
ἀρχαῖα, things trite and stale, were to
be elevated by a novelty of treatment,
the κακολογία with which Dion. Hal.
tells us that Gorgias used to "astonish
the vulgar." (De Lysia, p. 458, Reiske).
καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς εὐρήκειν ἑφὲ ὡς δὲι λόγουν τέχνης, δὲν δὲ ὅπερ μακρῶν ὅπερ βραχέως, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

ΦΑΙ. Σοφότατα γε, ὃ Πρὸδεκε.

ΣΩ. Ἡπίπται δὲ σὺ λέγομεν; οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν σύμβουλον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἑλείον ἔχον γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δὲν οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ Πόλου πῶς φράσωμεν αὐτῷ μουσεία λό-
learned speech. 'Mr. Cope's view (Journ. Phil. iii. 253 and note), that the words refer to a "collection of speeches for the use of Polus' school, similar to Gorgias' landes et esuperationes, and Protagoras' communes loci, in which these new figures of speech were illustrated," does not, I confess, seem to me so probable as that of the old Greek commentator, though, of course, ὁ Πολύς or τὸ παρόν is not the only figure to which the words apply. I think also with Spengel that the word λόγος itself there may lie a mocking allusion to the termination-λογια in διπλασιολογια, &c. Comp. 272, βραχυλογιας και ελευνολογιας... έκαστον το δε τη ειδη μαθη λόγων. Mr. Cope differs from me further in retaining Békker's δε for the ὁ τοῦ Βοδλ. In this I should be glad to agree with him, if I could reconcile myself to the ellipse of εύφην which he supposes; for the use of ὁν in the sense of ὁν, 'veluti,' is certainly not common. If ὁ δε were established, I should be strongly moved to accept the conj. of Polus, and read προσποιήσω, taking εύφηνεσ as an acc. pl. with the gen. διομάτων, 'nominum venustates;' προσποιήσω might, I conceive, mean 'annexed,' 'added,' i.e. to the previously existing rhetorical figures: it certainly could not have the meaning 'arrogavit' (as if we had found προσποιήσω). As Stahl, who adopts the conj. in his last ed., seems to think. By διπλασιολογια Stahl, supposes that Polus meant τα παρόν, that is, balanced clauses in which the changes are rung on a couple of words; as in the well-known passage of Gorg. 448 o, εκ των ἐμπειριων ἐκποιηηεν εἱρήμενα, κ.τ.λ. The explanation of the Schol. has, at any rate, the merit of simplicity: οἶνων τῷ φεῦ, φεῦ. He might have quoted the οἶνος ἔστην, οἶκι ἔστη νηπίων ομάραττες τοῦ Δαμοθένους. The next word, γνωμολογια (comp. γνωμοσυ- νικα, Ar. Eij. 1782), seems to mean the "style potential." (De "παραληφή ἡ νοηρία," Schol.), while εἰκονολογια may denote the free use of metaphor or simile, as when Gorgias calls vultures 'living tombs.' The "Lycymnian names" are explained by the passage quoted from the Rhetoric, which is carefully discussed by Mr. Cope, l. i. p. 255. The general must depend on μαστία, and ἕδωρθατο is constructed with Δικημος, understood from the derivative adj. For Δικημοινων Λαυ would read Δικημινωιν, of which there is the trace in the corrupt reading of one MS. Δικημωνωτων. But Lobeck, the great authority on such questions, considers Δικημους equally legitimate. "Possessivorum quae a propriis in -ως excentibus derivatur, terminativo duplex est, una omnibus partibus expressa, Ἀναλεισος, Ἀλευς alterius concessio, ὅθεσιν Ἀπαθεος, Philar. Ep. ix. τὸ "Ἡλιος, τὰ "Ἠλιαν," Pathol. Serm. Gr. i. 340.

c. εὐφηνειαν] Dion. Hal. de Isoc. p. 538, ο γὰρ ἄνθρωπος (sc. Ιωσηφάντης) την εὐφηνειαν ἐκ παιδες διάσκει, καὶ τοῦ γελοφόρου λέγεω στοχάζεται μάλλον ἢ τοῦ ἀφελίαν.

Προσταγραφα — μέντοι τινας' ἀπαθεος were there not, as I fancy there were, some similar coinages of Protagoras? For μέντοι in interrogat. see above, 261 c.

"Ορθότειτα" ['correct diction," the title, as some think, of a grammatical work of Protagoras, whom we know from Crat. 391 c to have speculated upon the ὀρθότης διομάτων. It appears certain that Protagoras wrote a work on Grammar, in which the moods of verbs and genders of nouns were enumerated, perhaps for the first time. See Frel Questi. Trag. p. 130 ful.; Spengel, Art. Script. p. 40; and Cope, Journ. Phil. iii. 48. The explanation of Hermenias is different. He supposes the word to denote the simple and straightforward style which Protagoras adopted in preference to the affected Sicilian rhetoric. "Ορθότειτα γε τις' τούτους, κυριολεκτε" διά γὰρ τῶν κυρίων διομάτων μεῖντος εἰς τὸν προσταγράφος τὴν λόγων, καὶ οὐ διὰ παραβολῶν.
καλά. τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτροῦν ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἔλκο-
μένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τῶν
Χαλκηδονίου σθένος. ὀργίσατε τὸ αὖ πολλοῦ ᾧμ ἅνως
ἀνήρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ἀργυσμένων ἐπὶ δόμων κηλεῦ, ὡς
ἐφε' διαβάλλει τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολάς ἡθενή
κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κουῤή πᾶσιν ἔοικε
συνδεδωγμένων εἶναι, ὃ τις μὲν ἑπάρηκον, ἦλθοι δὲ ἄλλο
τίθενται ὅνομα.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίω ἔκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνήσαται ἐπὶ
tελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἰ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις εἰπεῖν λό-
γων τέχνης πέρι.

ΦΑΙ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐσθων δὴ τὰ γε σμικρὰ· ταῦτα δὲ ὅτι αὐγάς
μᾶλλον ἔδωμεν, τίνα καὶ ποτ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν.

και ἐπεθύνων. This sense of the word certainly agrees better with that which it bears in Dion. Hal. de Demosth. p. 1035, where Plato is called the κανονικὸς ὑδροθείας, in reference to his purity of style. Besides, if the ὑδροθεία of Protagoras was purely grammatical, we should hardly expect to find it noticed in the Cratylus. On the whole, I incline to the opinion that the ὑδροθεία of the Cratylus was something different from the ὑδροθεία of this pas-

sage. What the ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά may have been, we know not.

Τῶν γε μὴν] Thrasymachus was a master of the art of composing pathetic commonplace, applicable to the sorrows of age and penury. This meaning Plato has purposely wrought in pompous poetic diction, in mockery of the 'mighty man of Chaleedom.' The dactylic, or rather choriamtic, rhythm of the passage is remark

able. For ἐκείνους ἐπὶ comp. inf. 271, ἔλθοντο ἐπὶ. τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνης τὸ πρόσφορον. Spengel's notion that ἐπὶ is separated from ἐλκοῦσιν by tmesis, though ingenious, is untenable, as the middle ἐφελκόσθαι could bear no sense suitable to the passage, as the act. ἐφελ-
κομεν would. Possibly allusion is made to the practice of bringing into court the aged and destitute, young children, &c.

Ηρμ., ὁ γὰρ Xαλκηδόων, ποτέτων, ὁ
Θρασύμαχος, ταύτα ἐδίδαξεν, ὃς δὲ πρὸς

θετον ἕγερε τῶν δικαστῶν, καὶ ἐπι-
παράδειγμαι ἐλεον γῆρας, πενίαν, τέχναν ἀπόθυ-
φυμένοιν (sic Spengel. codd. ἀπόθυμφων). For an instance of a moving tale of age and penury, accompanied by the appear-

dance of their victim in person, see Augustini adv. Timarchem. c. 104. Bekk. From Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 1, we learn that

Thrasybus wrote Εἰμον ἀπετιθεμένου, apparently a treatise, accompanied with some selected examples, on the best mode of exciting compassion. To this Plato alludes, and from the sequel we are tempted to conjecture that Thrasymachus may have composed a similar work on the passion of anger, unless indeed his ἔξαρχος had a wider scope than their name would indicate.

d. δὲνδὲ] 'on any or no grounds,' i.e. under circumstances most unfavour-

able to himself. ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολή, to wipe off an asperion, is a common phrase.

ἀλλα—ὅριν] According to the interpp. the terms omitted are ἐκίνησις or ἀποθεματισμος. έπάθος, 'recompilation,' is recognized by Arist. Rhet. iii.

13. 8.

268. ἐν' αὐγάς] See Ruhnken on Tim.

Lex. in v., and add to his instances Eur. Hec. 1136, Πορα, ὑπὸν θ', ἐν' αὐγάς

πετάξα λεισσούμενος τίτλοις. Socrt. pro-

poses to submit the wares of Thrasy-

machus to a searching scrutiny, holding

them up to the light, as purchasers in the

cloth-market hold the web offered
ΦΑΙΡΩΣ.

—268, c.]

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα ἔφρωμένην, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἐν γε δὴ πληθοὺς συνώδεις.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἔχει γὰρ ἀλλ', ὃ διαμόνη, ἵδε καὶ σὺ εἰ ὅμα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεσπρακτός αὐτῶν τὸ ἦτριον ὦστερ ἐμοὶ.

ΦΑΙ. Δείκνυ μόνον.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι εἰ τις προσέλθων τῷ ἔταφρῳ σου Ἐρυξιμάχῳ ἢ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀκοουμενῷ εἶτε ὅτι Ἐγώ ἐπίσταμαι τοιαῦτ' ἀπτά σώμασι προσφέρειν, ὡστε θερμαίνειν τ' εἰ μὲν βολῶμαι καὶ ψύχειν, καὶ εἰ μὲν δὲξῃ μοι, ἐμεῖν ποιεῖν, ἐὰν δ' αὖ, κατὰ διαχωρίου, καὶ ἄλλα πάρμπολα τοιαῦτα· καὶ ἐπιστάμενος αὐτὰ ἄξιοι ιατρικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἄλλου ποιεῖν ὅ ἄν τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην παραδῷ· τί αὖ οἷε τοιοῦτανες εἰπὲς;

ΦΑΙ. Τί γε ἄλλο ἢ ἐρέσθαι εἰ προσεπίσταται καὶ οὐστινας δεῖ καὶ ὅποτε ἔκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὅποσον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν εἰπὼν ὅτι Οἰδαμῶς ἄλλ' ἄξιον τὸν ταύτα καὶ ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οὖν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν ὅ ἐρωτᾷς;

ΦΑΙ. Εἴποικεν ἃν, οἴμαι, ὅτι μαίνεται ἀνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχὼν φαρμακίους ιατρὸς οἰεται γεγονέναι, οὖδεν ἐπαίτων τῆς τέχνης.

for sale, in order to ascertain whether the texture is sound or defective.

"Diastérès—τὸ ἦτριον" 'If they show the web' is, I believe, the corresponding English phrase. This would be the case, if the warp (ήτριον) had diastérēs, gaps or faults in its texture. The metaphor is preserved in δείκνυ μόνον.

'ἐπὶ ἔταφρῳ' σου Phaedr. and Erximachus are together in the house of Cullias (Protag. 315 c), and at Agathon's table in the Symposium. For Aesculapius, see the commencement of this dial.

"κατὰ διαχωρίου" Hippocrates uses διαχωρίου and ὑποχωρίου indiscriminately of the excretions: Aphorism 7, 67, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἕνθος διαχωρίου ὤμοι δὲ, οἷα αὐτῷ σχηματίζουσιν ὑποχωρίουσιν. Xen. Anab. viii. 20, καὶ ἴσον καὶ κάτω διαχωρίου ἀυτοῦ. Here διαχωρίου is probably transitive, as freq. in the medical writers.

"αὐτὸν τιν'" 'of himself,' i. e. 'unassisted,' or, as we say, 'by the light of nature.' We have presently, 260 c, αὐτὸν τιν' ἀυτῶν.

Περιτυχών φαρμακίων] 'having picked up a nostrum or two.' Compare Dryden's inventive against the 'apothecary tribe,'

"From files a random receipt they take,
And many, deaths of one prescription make."

To John Druden, Esq.

Sext. Emp. Math. ii. 41, ἀλλ' ἣν λόγον ἔχει φαρμακοπάθεια πρὸς ἤτριον, τούτων ὁ δημαγωγὸς πρὸς τὸν πολιτικόν."
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Σ. Τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλεὶ αὖ προσελθὼν καὶ Βύρτπιδη
τις λέγωι, ὃς ἐπίσταται περὶ συμκρούν πράγματος ῥήσεις
παραμικθεὶς ποιεῖ καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικράς, ὅταν
τοῖς βούληται, οίκτρας καὶ τοίνυντοι αὐτῷ φοβερᾶς
καὶ ἀπειλητικά, ὥσα τ' ἅλλα τοιαύτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ
τραγῳδίας ποίησιν οἴεται παραδίδοναι;

Φ. Καὶ οὖν τίς ἂν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὦ μι, καταγελῶν,
εἰ τις οἴεται τραγῳδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστα-
σιν, πρέπουσαν ἅλλην τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνυσταμένην.

Σ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἂν ἀγροίκως γε, ὦ μι, λουδορθείτως,
ἀλλ' ὅστερ ἂν μουσικός ἐντυχὼν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ ἀρμονικῷ
εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυχάνη ἐπιστάμενος ὃς οἶοι τε ὑπερτάην
καὶ βαρυτάτην χορήν ποιεῖ, οὖν ἀγρίως εἴποι ἂν ὦ Ἄρη
μοιχήρε, μελαγχολὴς, ἀλλ' ὅτε μουσικός ὃν πρατέορον,
ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπισταθηκεῖ τὸν μελ-
λοντα ἀρμονικοῦ ἐσεθαί, οὐδὲν μὴν κολυεί τῆς ἱμηοῦν
ἀρμονίας ἐπαιξῆν τὸν τὴν σὺν ἔνων ἔχοντα: τὰ γὰρ πρὸ
ἀρμονίας ἀνάγκαια μαθήματα ἐπισταθηκοί, ἀλλ' οὖ τὰ ἀρ-
μονικά.

Φ. Ὀρθότατα γε.

Σ. Οὐκών καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τῶν σφου καὶ ἐπιδεικνύ-
μενον τὰ πρὸ τραγῳδίας ἂν φαίνῃ ἂλλ' οὐ τὰ τραγικά,
καὶ ὃ Ἀκουμενὸς τὰ πρὸ ἰατρικῆς ἂλλ' οὐ τὰ ἰατρικά.

Φ. Παντάπατί μὲν οὖν.

Σ. Τί δὲ; τὸν μελήματιν Ἀδραστον οἰομέθα ἢ καὶ

Δ. Τὴν τούτων σύστασιν] This apt
reply of Phaedr. is evidently inconsis-
tent with Ast's mean opinion of his
understanding. Accordingly we are in-
formed that the remark is plagiarized
from Soer., sup. 264 c. δὲν τὰ αὐτὰ λέγων
διαφέροντα, κ.π.λ. This

grouping or consistence of parts is es-
sential to every λόγος, whether metrical
or not; and to every art and science pre-
tending to theoretical completeness.

πρέπουσαν—συνισταμένον] "πρέπουσαν
per prolepsin quandam dictum, ut idem
valetat quod dōsēn pρέpεων ἀκαλλήλως τε
καὶ τὸ ἀδραστόν." Stulli.

ἀς οὖν τῷ ἀδραστῷ] Herm., τὸ ἐπι-
τετείχειν καὶ ἀνικεῖται τὰς χρήσεως.

269. τὰ πρὸ τραγῳδίας] The μαθημα-
τα which precede tragedy, and are necessary
to its production; its προγραμματα, or
preliminaries. Skill in these does not of
itself constitute a tragic poet; but is a
vita γεια αναν ωναραν βαλλων.

268. τὸν μελήματιν Ἀδραστον] The epithet
was probably suggested by Tyrtæus:

γράφεσαι τῷ Ἀδραστον μελαγχόγερν ἔκγο
(Ερ. 8, v. 8, Bergk). The mythical king
seems to have owed this epithet to the
skill with which he worked on the feel-
ings of Theseus on the occasion which
forms the subject of the Supplies of
Euripides. The opinion of Ast, that, as
"Gorgias wears the mask of Nestor,
and Thracymachus or Theodorus that of
Ulysses' (p. 261 c), so by Adrastus some contemporary orator is here meant, and that this can only be Antiphon Rhiannusius, is supported by the following arguments. (1) We should expect a pair of orators answering to the pairs of poets and of physicians just introduced, and as the latter were real personages, there is a presumption that Adrastus, as well as Pericles, would be so too. (2) Antiphon, as we know from the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vitt. X Orat. p. 341, Wytt.) and Philostratus (V. Sophist. 915), got the by-name of Nestor from his powers of persuasion. (3) The name of Antiphanes' defence (Thuc. iv. 68), said to have been the finest effort of the kind that the men of that day had heard, may seem to justify his being coupled with Ulysses, as Euripides with Sophocles. Against these considerations, however, may be set the fact, that Antiphanes' style was noted by the ancient critics for its deficiency in sweetness, an impression also conveyed by the existing remains (Dion. Hal. de Comp. Verb. p. 52, Reiske; ib. p. 250, where he is classed with Aeschylus, Thucydidces, and the other well-known representatives of the αἰσθητὰ λαξία). In the Menexenas, moreover, Plato's allusion to Antiphanes is not complimentary: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄστις δεῖ τινὶ κάκιον ἐπισκέψῃ, μονοικὴν μὲν οὖν Δαιμονίω παρεθεὶς, ἑρωτικὴν δὲ ὑπὸ 'Ἀντίφωνος τοῦ Παμφιού (p. 236). There is also force in Heind's remark, that the καλ before Περικλέα implies a difference, "seu seate seu generae," between the two orators mentioned. Lastly, from the magnificent terms in which Plato presently speaks of Pericles, it is probable that he looked upon him as standing quite alone among Athenian orators, as one, in fact, whose parallel could only be found in the heroic age. If this view is correct, we should mar a graceful compliment by refusing to take the passage in its literal sense, as referring to a hero familiar in Attic tradition. "oδηματα" Hirsch. conj. oδημεῖον καὶ—not improbably, as the double αὐν is common in cases where the verb is distant in the sentence, as paul. sup., ὢστερ ἐν μοινικὸν ἄνευ χορῶν...οὐκ ἄργος εἰμι τον. Before and after oμα, αὐ is frequently suppressed by the scribes, who probably thought it a solecism, not being aware that to such cases it belongs to the following infinitive.

3. ὢοστερ ἐγά τε καὶ σο' The οδημα ἀπαλλαγέων probably refers to the ἄστεγος τριβή of p. 261 b, for which Soer., in his present courteous mood, indirectly apologizes. μὴ ἐπισκέψῃς δειλάγησατι Being no scientific dialecticians, the old rhetors were unaware of the importance of strict definition and of the mode of obtaining it. Hence they were ignorant of the true scope of their own science, and by consequence of the relation of its various parts to the whole and to each other. A true definition of rhetoric (such as the ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγου, p. 261) would have enlightened them on these points.
δὴ διδάσκοντες ἄλλους ἢγουνται σφοιν τελεός ῥητορικήν
dεδιδάχθαι, τὸ δ’ ἐκαστα τούτων πιθανός λέγειν τε καὶ
tὸ ὄλον συνιστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον, αὐτοῖς δὲν παρ᾽
αὐτῶν τοὺς μαθήτας σφοιν πορίεσθεν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΦΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, Ἔ Σώκρατε, κυνδυνεῖς τοιοῦτων
tὶ εἶναι τῷ τῆς τέχνης, ἢν ὁδῷ οἱ ἄνδρες ὁς ῥητορική
didaskoun te kai γράφουσι καὶ ἐμοίου δοκεῖν ἀληθῆ
eirheken. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ τὸ ὄντω ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ
tuθανὸν τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἄν τις δύναιτο πορι
csthsai:

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, Ἔ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν
tέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκός, ἦσος δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὡς
πέρ τάλλα. εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικήν εἶναι, ἔστε
ῥήτορ αἴλουγμος, προσλαβοῦν εἰπώτημα τε καὶ μελετήρ
όντο δ’ ἀν ἔλληπης τούτων, τάστη ἀτελής ἔσει. ὅσον δὲ

c. οὐδὲν ἔργον] Hermeus reads ὃς oúdein érgon δὲ, and so two MSS. But the omission of ὃς seems justified by Gorg. 507 ε, ὃς ἐπιθυμεῖ έστι μάν καθάπερ εὐκεροῦστα ἔποιεῖν, ἐνθάνατον καὶ διαπέκτην διοικοῦσα. Of the other passages quoted by Ast there is scarce one in which the participle does not seem to have been absorbed by a preceding word ending in -ον. In Crat. 386 ε, οὗ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἡμᾶς is not understood, but the words are constructed with ἐπιθυμέι τότε obscure to be repeated from the foregoing clause. The phrases οὐ λαμβάνειν, οὐλαμβάνων, οὐ μὴν ἔργον, are familiar, and oúdēn ἔργον occurs in Philippides Comicus (ap. Meineke, iv. 471)—Πάση τ’ ἐπιθυμήμα τοῦ ἔργου μακρομένον, Αὐτὴν μέχριν δ’ οὐδὲν ἔντει βᾶπτον, in the same sense as here, not, as more freq., with the force ‘non opus.’ That which the teachers of rhetoric regarded as a mere nothing, which their pupils were to extemporize at pleasure, was in truth the most difficult thing of all: viz. the judgment to use the different figures of speech impressively, joined with the skill to combine the parts of a discourse—its proem, its exodeis, &c.—unto an harmonious whole.

D. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, κ.τ.λ.] As for the power, says Iser— if you mean that of becoming a finished performer—it will, or rather must, follow universal analogy:

if you are blessed with a natural faculty for speaking, and improve it by science and assiduous practice, you will be a considerable orator. This became a commonplace among the rhetoricians. Isocr. Antid. § 200, Εἰκ., Αὐτῶμος ὡς δέ τοῖς μέλλων διουσι τῇ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἡ περὶ παράδειγμα ἡ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας, πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο περιουσάμαν καλώς ἥ ἀν πραγματεύοντον τηχεῖαν, ἔτεια
c. Παναγεώργιον κ.τ.λ., κ.τ.λ. Hippocratis Lex (1, 4. Kühn). But the genuineness of the piece is open to suspicion.

δῆ διδασκοντες ἄλλους ἢγουντας σφοιν τελεος ῥητορικην
The present professors, says Socr., are on a wrong track: we must look in a different direction if we would discover the true way of handling rhetoric as an art. The correction Τιτικα for Βυσικα, adopted from Schaefer by Spengel and Stallb., is plausible, but far from certain: see below, 272 c, et ταυτι πη βοοθείαν έχασε έπαικεσιν Βυσικον ή ταυτι έλλοι. The scribes disfigure the name Τιτικα in almost every instance, but they never seem to confound it with Βυσικα. The emendation is supported by Krische, p. 118 and note, but with more subtlety than soundness. Why should not Plato single out Lysias as an instance of what he considered vicious practice, as Thrasymachus was an example of empirical theory? 

The word διδασκεται—endless chatter, garrulity—applied by the vulgar in contempt to philosophic δάδας, is accepted by Plato and paraded with a kind of defiance. Thus in the Parmenides the youthful Socrates is exhorted to exercise and improve his powers, δάδας δικαιοσύνης προκεντά τό γαρ υψιλόνον τούτο και πάντη τελεσιούργον έοίκεν έντευκεν ποθεν εισιναι, o καὶ Περίκλης προς τό ευφυς είναι.
270. προσπεύων—Ἀναξαγόρας. A different estimate of Anaxagoras is formed in the Phaedo (p. 97 ι), as of Pericles in the Gorgias. It is not, however, difficult to account for the seeming discrepancy. In the Gorgias Plato speaks of Pericles from an ethical-political, in the Phaedrus from an artistic point of view; while the defect in the Anaxagorean system pointed out in the Phaedo need not be supposed to have blinded Plato to its striking originality and superiority to the efforts of earlier speculators. We may well believe that he would cheerfully have accorded the praise of a δηλωτός ἔργον and τελεσυνεργός to a philosopher who, according to Aristotle, in comparison with the random guesses of his predecessors, might be said to speak words of truth and soberness: οἷον οὖν ἐφάνη παρ' εἰκα λέγοντας τὸν πρότερον (Met. 1. 4. 16).

μετεωρολογία—αὐτή.] It was from converse with Anaxagoras, says Soros, that Pericles stored his mind with lofty speculations, and was able to penetrate to the essential nature of Intelligence and Unintelligence—the theme on which Anaxagoras chiefly loved to descend; and from that source he borrowed, for Platonists, all that could be made available for it. The νοτος καὶ ἔννοια of the text are the intelligent and un-intelligent principles in Nature, which Anaxagoras was the first to place in sharp antithesis to each other (Herm. ἄνισον λέγει τὴν διά). Thus his celebrated βιβλίον commenced with the words, ὅμων πάντα χρήματα, ἐτα Νοῦς ἡλίαν ἔσκαψες. On this account, says Plutarch, Ἀναξαγόρας οὶ τὸν Ἀθηναίοις Νοῦς προστήθησαν, either, he adds, from admiration of his profound physiological genius, or because he was the first to dethrone Chance or Necessity and set up pure Intelligence in their room as the principle of law and order in the universe—in mulmion πάσα τοῦ θηλαίου ἀποκρίςτα καὶ λογισμοῖς τὰς λογισμοῖς (Vit. Peric. c. 4.). He adds, τοῦτον ἐπερρών τῶν ἁθρόων θαυμώματα ὁ Περσεληνός καὶ τὴν λεγομένην μετεωρολογία καὶ μετερατολογία ἐπιπλεόνετο... αὐτής, τοῦ διάματος ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν λόγων ὃφελέσι ἐχεῖ καὶ καθορίσεις ἐκχειρίζει καὶ πανοράμην διαμωσύνην. To the same cause Plutarch attributes the superiority of Pericles to the vulgur δισελεμωσία which arises from ignorance of physical causation. All this is intelligible and not improbable; but Plato seems to say considerably more than this, viz. that it was to the lessons of Anaxagoras, especially on νοτος καὶ ἔννοια, that Pericles owed his deep knowledge of human nature (τὸ δηλέοντα φύσιν ὑπνοῦ, inf.). Now it is pretty certain that nothing of the kind was to be learnt from Anaxagoras, whose theory of a cosmic Intelligence had nothing to do with the theory of human nature. On the other hand, it is impossible either to understand the passage in an ironical sense, or to treat it as a mere rhetorical flourish. Plato's meaning was probably this. Pericles, having become familiar with the Anaxagorean distinction between the Rational and Irrational principles as exhibited on a great scale in Nature (ἐν τῇ διά φύσει, inf.), found it easy to apply the same distinction to that department of nature (the mind of man) with which as an orator and statesman he had too much to do. He was now, however, in a point of view, that is sufficient for us to distinguish between the λόγον Ἐχειν and the ἔλεγον—the reasoning and unreasoning principle in his audience—and to address himself successfully to each in its turn (compare sup. 346 B, πᾶσας ἡ φύσις παντὶ ἐπιμελεῖται τω ἄνθρωπῳ). It is thus, apparently, that Cicero understands the passage—Orat. iv. 14: Nam nec latus nec copiosus de magnis variusque rebus sine philosophia potest quisquam dicere: si quidem etiam in Phaedo Platonis hoc Pericem praestitisse caeteris dicit oratoribus Socrates, quod est Anaxagors physicique fuerit audientor: a quo consue cum, quum aliqua praec. clara quaedam et magnifica didicisset, uborem et fecundumuisse, guarumque (quod est eloquentiae maximum) quibus orationes modis quibusque animorum partes pelletur or. The same view is more vaguely expressed in the Brutus.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 123

ΦΑΙ. Πώς τούτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. 'Ο αυτός που τρόπος τέχνης βητορίκης, ὀστερ καὶ ιατρικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. Πώς δὴ;

ΣΩ. 'Εν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσις, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, εἰ μέλεις μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπεπρα ἀλλὰ τέχνη τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφὴν προσφέρων ὄγλειαν καὶ βοῶμεν ἐμποίησαι, τῇ δὲ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπηγεῖδείς νομίμους πειθώ ἢν ἄν βούλῃ καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσεις.

ΦΑΙ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ψυχῆς οὐν φύσις ἀξίως λόγου κατανοοῦσα οὐκ ἄνωτον εἶναι ἀνεί τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;

ΦΑΙ. Εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτεις γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν

(χ. 44): Pericles primus adhibuit doctrinam: quae quamquam tunc erat nulla dicendi, tamen, ab Analecta physico creditus, exercitationem mentis a recondita abstrusisque rebus ad causas forenses popolaresque facile traduxit.

b. 'Ο αὐτός τοῦ τρόπου, κ.τ.λ. In modern language, Rhetoric is to be based on Psychology, in the same way as Medicine on Physiology; otherwise both are alike empirical. The parallel between ἄρχη and φύσις is familiar in Plato. More remarkable is the statement that the final cause of rhetoric is to improve the morals and institutions of a people. Comp. Polit. 304, ἐξορθεία, πείθωσα τὸ δίκαιον, ζωήικουπερὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τῆς πράξεις. See also the Introduction.

c. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσις! The soul being a part of Nature, Psychology must needs be a branch of general Physics. This view is universal in Greek Philosophy.

Εἰ μὲν—γε] The MSS. have εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτεις τε. Galen, in quoting this passage (Opp. xx. 4, Kühn), reads εἰ μὲν οὖν Ἰπποκράτεις τε, κ.τ.λ. The reading in the text is that adopted by Stallb., Ast, and Hirschig. The Zurich Edd. have εἰ μὲν οὖ́ν... γε, but μὲν οὖν would imply a modified dissent, which is out of place here.

Ἰπποκράτεις γε] Protag. 311 B, Ἰπποκράτεις τὸν Κρόνον τῶν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν. Concerning this medical caste, order, or corporation, see Grote, H. G. i. 248.
plato

270, c

ςωμα πολυειδεις έστι. Compare also § 5, ει ἐν ἥν δινθετος, ειθετον ἐν δηλευς, κ.ά. Possibly, too, he may refer to the first section of the treatise, which contains a protest against the hasty generalizations of contemporary physiologists, and may therefore be construed into an acknowledgment of the importance to the physician of a sounder method; and this is the colour put upon it by Galen. However this may be, Plato would naturally sympathize with the strong aversion expressed in the tract to the one-sidedness of the early physi- cists, seeing in Hippocrates' method a practical anticipation of his own principle, τὸ ἐν πολλά, τὰ πολλὰ ἐν. The medical precepts in Charm. 156 c are probably borrowed from Hippocrates or his school, and to a certain extent illustrate the passage before us.

οὐδέ περὶ σώματος ἤστι κατανόησις. The genitive with περὶ is a not uncommon periphrasis for the accusative, as Ast observes: inf. 271 c, εἰδω- τες ψυχης περὶ παθήσεως: Gorg 512 b, διτερφάντα περὶ τούτων τῷ τείρ. The variation from the preceding constr., ψυχην κατανοηθαι, is designed. We have κατανοηθαι περὶ τούτων in Xen. Cyr. i. 6. 20, quoted by Heind. In the next speech ὁ λόγος is personified, as throughout this dialogue. For εξετάσωται Galen read εξετάσωται. (ἀνὴρ τὸς μεθόδου ταύτης] μέθοδος means either 'investigation' (going in quest), or a particular mode of investigation, our 'Method.' The μέθοδος here intended would seem to be that which connects any particular branch of inquiry with general physics. So we must under-

stand Plato, if his words are to be taken au pied de la lettre. But when he comes to the application, we look in vain for any such general theory of nature. The scheme of psychology he presently traces out rests solely on the observation of human nature, and is as inductive as Bacon himself could desire. And equally so is the method of Hippocrates, which Plato justly regards as parallel with his own. Both conform equally to the requirements of a sound dialectic; both equally cherish fruitful a priori reasonings. This difficulty, which seems to have escaped the commentators, is felt and clearly stated by M. Littre in the Introduction to his elaborate edition of Hippocrates (tom. i. p. 295 fol.). But I confess that his solution is not to me satisfactory. In the passage from the Hippocratic treatise de Victus ratione (i. 627, Kühn), which M. Littre supposes to be that referred to sup. c, Dietetics are made to depend on the facts of human, not general physiology, precisely as Plato connects Rhetoric with those of human psychology. What if, after all, Plato means nothing more by ὁ ποιον φαις than the general law of the One in Many and in Thought?

D. ἐκω μὲν ἀπολεῖν ἐκους. If it (the substance on which art is to be exerted) be simple and uniform, we are to study its powers, both active and passive; also on what substances it can act, and by what it is acted upon. τίσα (sc. δύσαις) τέ- φορον ἐκω is equiv. to τίσα φορεῖ ἐκεῖ, and there is no necessity for altering ἐκους into ἐκεῖν, as Steph. proposed and
ΦΑΙΑΡΟΣ

τὸ δέραν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; εἰπὲ δὲ πλεῖω εἰπῃ ἔχει: ταύτα ἀριθμήσαμεν, οπερ ἐφ’ ἐνός, τούτ’ ἰδεῖν ἐφ’ ἐκάστου, τῷ τῇ ποιεῖν αὐτῷ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τῇ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

ΦΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει, δ’ Σῶκρατες.

Σ. Ὁ γοῦν ἀνευ τούτων μέθοδος εοίκοι ἂν ὄσπερ τῷ τυφλῷ πορεία. ἀλλ’ ὅν μὴν ἀπεικαστέον τῶν γε τέχνη μετάλοντα ὅπως τυφλῆς οὐδὲ κωφῆς, ἀλλὰ δήλον ὡς ἂν τοῖς τις τέχνης λόγους διδασκόντων καὶ παρείκειν τῇς φύσεως τούτων πρός ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσούσεν ἐσται δὲ του ψυχῆς τούτο.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

71

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀμφότερος τέταται | πρὸς τοῦτο πατρι. πεθανόν γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖται ἡ γάρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναι.

Σ. Δὴλον ἢ ὅτι ὁ Θεασώμαχος τε καὶ δεὶ ἂν ἄλλος
totale, on the other hand, made the heart
the centre of the entire consciousness,
while the Stoic Chrysippus discarded
the distinction of édīn altogether (οὐκ ἀλλὰ
tὸν διαμορφώσας ὑπάρχον ὑπὸ τοῦ
tοῦ ἐνθυμητικοῦ), but agreed with Aris-
totle in placing the reason and will
(προσωπεύει) in the heart. Galen, de
Plat. et Hipp. vi. 1 al.
σποδή] ‘in earnest,’ not as a mere
amateur or ἕιδης, but ὡς καθεδρικ.
διάδοσις τ. ὑπ. probably refers to
the practice of placing in the hands of their
pupils manuals called τέχνη, which
seems to have been nearly universal
among the teachers of rhetoric.
Δεύτερον δὲ γε] Having determined
the constituent parts of the Soul, the
philosophic rhetorician will proceed (2)
to enumerate their modes of action, and
the affections to which they are re-
spectively subject. ὅπως, as τῷ ρατ. sup.,
denotes the ὁμοίως φημὸς: ‘in’ or ‘by
which’ any particular functions are
exercised. This part of Rhetoric and that
which follows are handled by Aristotle
in his inimitable second book.
ἱπτον δὲ δι] His third and last step
will be to classify, διακόσμοι, the dif-
ferent modifications of Soul and the
diverse kinds of discourse, arranging
them, as it were, in parallel tables for
the purpose of pairing them according
to their mutual correspondences: such a
kind of discourse being good for the
emotive, such another for the rational
part, &c. Nor will the theory be com-
plete, unless he further show the causes
of this compatibility,—why a soul so
constituted is necessarily wrought on by
discourses of such and such a kind, but
incapable to those of a different descrip-
tion. Just as in Medicine, the ideal
Physician knows how to adapt his treat-
ment to different κρατεῖς or tempera-
ments, as well as to the different parts
of the body, and can explain the physical
reasons which determine his choice of
remedies in every case. The λόγων γένη
enumerated by Hermias are, α. ἐν-
δυπητικοί, βιοκοι, ναικημαστικοί. He
adds, οὖν δὲ ἀφ' οὗν ὁμοίως τοῖς
ἀποδεικτικοῖς λόγοις χαρᾶς, δὲ δι' ἐκτὸς
ἐπιθυμιών ζῶν τοῖς κολακικοῖς καὶ ἐγκαι-
μαστικοῖς. Aristotle goes, of course,
much deeper than this (Rhet. ii. 12—17).
v. Κάλλιστα γοῦν] I admit, says
Phaedr., that the way you point out will
be the best. Socr., dissatisfied with this
concession, tells him there is no other
method possible: this alone is in accord-
ance with the idea of what art should
be, no matter what the subject-matter
to which the method may be applied.
The existing technographers, he pre-
tends, know this well, but are crafty
enough to keep their psychological lore
to themselves. The method of συναι-
γωγή and διαλέξεως (p. 265) is there-
fore, according to Plato, equally ap-
applicable to all arts and sciences. This supports the view that η τοῦ ἰδον φύσις refers, not to positive physical science, but to the principles which should regulate physical research. For Nature creates, as our minds conceive, according to genera and species. The One in Many is both a condition of thought and a law of things.

c. μὴ πειθάμεθ' αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖνη γράφειν] 'let us not believe them that they write secundum artem, i. e. let them not persuade us that,' &c.

Ψυχαγωγία τίς] Not the only, but one special mode of acting upon the Soul (sup. 261). Legislation, music, religion, are also forms of 'psychagogue' according to Plato and Aristotle. Poetry, so far as it is designed to act on the Will, may be classed as a branch of Rhetoric, which, like it, is a Ψυχαγωγία διὰ λόγων (261 a). In the elegant passage which follows, Plato sketches the ground-plan of an ideal philosophical Rhetoric—a plan upon which the treatise of Aristotle was afterwards constructed. The ὡς λέγεται are, as before, the λόγον ἔχουν and the ἀλογον, with their subdivisions—the faculties, the passions, the appetites, &c. It is from the combinations of these elements that we get the varieties of character (διὰ τῶν μὲν τοιοῦτων, κτλ.) and when these are determined (approximately, we may suppose) it will be time to make a corresponding list of the 'kinds of discourse' ('ορωνίσια modi'—Cic. Brut. 41), showing that 'persons of a given description are from such particular causes easily wrought upon by such and such modes of address, while persons of a different complexion are, for certain reasons, insusceptible of such influence.' This is evidently an application to Rhetoric of the general Method of Division sketched in p. 255 ff., as indeed Galen points out, Hipp. et Plut., Opp. tom. v. p. 754, Kühn. He cites the present passage from ἐνεάδι to ὡς μὴ πειθήμενος κρατεῖ, and proceeds to illustrate the subject further by a passage from the Philebus (18 b), where the diacritic method is applied to the science of Grammar.

to-and-4-256.png

A theoretical knowledge of the varieties of human character is not enough; the student must have his senses sharpened to detect their manifestations in actual life and practice, or be thus far none the better or wiser for all the lessons he heard in the days of his pupillage. The MSS. give ἄρα μιήθῃ (εἰ μὴ Βολλ.) εἰσέλθῃ ποι πλῶν αὐτῶν (Βολλ. αὐτῷ) ἤν τότε ἴσον λόγον ἐξεῖλον.

In the text I have adopted, which is Ast’s, εἰσάγεσθαι is taken from the MSS. of Galen, μιήθῃ from Gal. and Hermasias, ἀπολογεῖται from the Boll, and some other MSS. Heind. and after him Bekk. adhere to the vulg., which would give the sense, or know no more than the mass of their sources heard him from his teachers. But the amended text gives, in my judgment, a more pointed meaning. Plato would say that without tact and experience the labour of the schools is labour lost. The only objection to my rendering is grounded on the absence of a preposition before ἄρα λόγον.

"πλῶν γέρασθαι εἰ ἐναληθήνω τινι εἰκὼν τινι, τίνος τινι, γωνίαν, non dilecto..." (Heind.). To evade this objection, Ast resolves ἄρα λόγον γέρασθαι ἄρα λόγον, supposing λόγος to be the subject of ἐλέφανται: "aliquam nihilum utilissimae afferre quae tam audiretur praecopta." But this seems to me harsher than to suppose an ellipse of the preposition, in which we are completely justified by Isocr. Antid. 315 ὅ ἦν σωφρόνον μοι πλῆκτον γέρασθαι, 'from all which performances I have reaped no benefit.' Hence in Envy. 290 β, for ἐναληθήνω τις θρησκευτικής αὐτής ἐκ πλῆκτων ἑστιν ἡ διὰ, συγκαταγορεύει καὶ χαράσσανται ὑπὸ των ἀνθρώπων. "Of the art of hunting nothing comes except..." The Zuar. Eed. read with Ast; Hirsch adheres to the vulg.

Σωκράτης ἂν τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ ἐμοῦ τῶν ἐν τῷ βουνῷ πηγαίνειν, τοιοῦτοι ἵπποι ἄριστοι εἰσάγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶ καὶ ἄρας ἡ λόγος, μὴ ἴσαι ψυχαῖς, καί τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, μὴ ἴσαι ψυχαῖς, ἐν παρασύρειν αὐτῷ, ἵπποι προσοδεῖαν τοῦτο οὗτος ἴπποι τῆς λόγου ἔπειτα τῶν ζωῆς πειθῶ, — τοιαύτα δὲ ἦν πήγα πηγαίνειν, προσ-
λαβόντι καίρους τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἔλευνολογίας καὶ δεινόσεως ἐκάστων τε ὁσ' ἀν εἶδη μάθη λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαρίαν διαγνῶντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελεῶς ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειραγμένη, πρὸτερον δ' οὖν ἄλλ' ὁ τι ἄν αὐτῶν τις Ἀλέλητη λέγων ὑπὶ διδάσκους ἡ γράφων, φη δὲ τέχνη λέγειν, ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ, τῇ δὲ οὖν, φήσεις ἵσως ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὁ Φαίδρη τε καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὕτως ἡ ἄλλως πας ἀποδεκτέων λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης: Ἡ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Αδύνατον τοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως καὶ τοι οὐ σημερον γε φαινεται ἐργον. Ἡ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΣ. τούτου τοι ἕνεκα χρη πάντας τους λόγους αἰών καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφουσα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ τίς της ράβων καὶ βραχυτέρα φαίνεται ἐπὶ αὐτῆς ὁδός, ἵνα μή μάχην πολλήν ἀπίγη καὶ τραχείων, ἔξων διήγην τε καὶ λειαν. ἄλλα εἰ τών τη βοηθείαν ἔχεις ἐπακεφαλίων Δυστοῦ η τιος ἄλλον, πειράζει λέγειν ἀναμιμησκόμενος.

Buttm. quotes Phaed. 80 D. ἦ δὲ ψυχή δρα, τὸ ἀνίδαις. . . αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ μαύρ. . . εἴδη διασφερόμεθα; add inf. p. 277 W. ὃ δὲ χρῆ ἐν μία τῇ γεγραμμένῃ λόγῃ. . . οὕτως δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνερ κυλεύει, κ.κ.κ. (where after οὕτως some few cohd. give δ').


ἐν. ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ] 'he who refuses to believe him, has the better case,' i.e. we have a right to say, I don't believe you. A proverbial phrase for οὖ πειστέον, as Heind. suggests. The version of Serranus is amusing: "is nimirum pericacia non ratione vincit." Eppiat. vii. 343 D. ὁ δοκεόμενος τῶν διελλούντες ανατρέπεστε κρατεῖ. Tim. 54, ἕκτος τοις ἰκανοῖς ὁ ἄλλα φιλος κρατεῖ. ὁ συγγραφεύς] That is, the ideal teacher of rhetoric described 271 a as one δι' ἑν συνώδῃ τέχνην ῥητορικήν ἀδίκη. Socon had just said that the conditions laid down were equally binding upon the public speaker, the oral instructor, and the writer on rhetoric (λόγων ἣ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων).

ἀποκεκλείθαι λεγομένης] 'are we to accept (acquiesce in) this account of rhetoric or some others in preference?' ἀποδέχομαι om. gen. rei is very rare, if indeed it ever occurs (Alci. ii. 150 c is not in point); and we are therefore to regard λεγομένης τέχνης as a gen. abso1. He might have written ἀποδεκτοῦν, ὃν οὕτως λέγεται ἢ τῶν λόγων τέχνη, οὔτως λέγομεν λ. τέχνης, or ἀποδεκτὸν οὕτως λεγομένης λ. τέχνης.

'πολλήν ἀπίγη.] Of ἄνερα so used with accus. I have no other instance at hand. Badh. conj. περίπη, observing, "Ridiculum est ἀπίγη: vid. infra περίπης, περίποδος" (p. 274). Hirsch accordingly reads περίπη. Nor is the change in reality so great as it appears, περίπη might easily degenerate into πίγα, and this be mistaken for ἀπίγη. Bast. Ep. Crit. p. 928, Scauf, gives an instance of a mistake arising from the abbreviated way of writing περίγ, viz. as π with a small ς over it. C. F. Hermann, with curious infelicitv, proposes ἀπίγη: Stall. ἀπίγη. I retain the vulg., to which there is no theoretical objection. Compare Lobeck on Soph. AJ. v. 20.
ΦΑΙ. "Ενεκα μὲν πείρας ἐξουμ' ἂν, ἀλλ' οὐτὶ νῦν γ' οὕτως ἔχω.
ΣΩ. Βούλει ὁμ' ἐγώ τιν' εἶπω λόγον ὃν τῶν περὶ ταῦτα τινων ἀκήκοα;
ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Δέγεται γοῦν, ὃ Φαιδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπέων.
ΦΑΙ. Καὶ σὺ γε οὕτῳ ποίει.
ΣΩ. Φασὶ τοῖς ὁμοὶοι οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σημάνειν οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἃνω μακρὰν περιβάλλομενον παντάπασι γὰρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν τούδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλθειας μετέχει δεόν δικαίον ἢ ἀγαθὸν πέρι πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπουν γε τοιοῦτων φύσει ὠντων ἢ τροφῇ, τῶν ἐμέλλοντα ἰκανῶς ῥήτορικων ἔστωσαί τοῦ παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίων τοῦτων ἄλθειας μέλειον οὕτων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκὸς, ὃ δὲν προσέχει τῶν μέλλοντα τέχνη ἑρέιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ πραξθέντα

"Ενεκα μὲν πείρας" If 'trying' would avail, says Plutarch, he might perhaps remember,—but at the moment he can think of nothing.

"καὶ ὃ οὗτος" = without further assistance or consideration.

The adage implies that even the worse cause should have a fair hearing. Our 'give the devil his due' expresses a similar feeling. The Greek comm. suppose the proverb to be derived from the Egyptian fable of the wolf and the shepherds, told thus by Plutarch: λύκος δὲν παμένει ἐκστολευται ἐν σκηνη πρᾶβαστον, ἐγὼς προσελήφηnu, Κλίανος ἄν ὅλων θάρρους εἶ εγὼ τοῦτο ἐπιτινον (Sept. Sup. Conv. 156 a.). Hence perhaps the proverb λύκου ῥήματα. We are reminded of the ecclesiastical 'Advocatus diaboli'—the wolf frequently suppleting the place of the latter personage, as in the adage, εἶ καὶ λύκου ἐμφύσθης, equiv. to the Lat. ' lupus in fabula ' and our ' talk of the devil ' &c.

Having propounded his new scheme of a philosophical Rhetoric, Soer. proceeds to examine the objections which the popular teachers will probably bring against it. ' No more,' they will say, ' of this parade of first principles—this roundabout way of dealing with a simple matter. Probability, we repeat, and not truth—not the verum, but the veri-simile—is the province of the rhetor.' For μακρὰν περιβάλλον comp. Symp. 222 c, οὕτω κομψὸς κλάκε περιβάλλοντος. The usage is rare, and confined apparently to Plato and his later imitators. It may have come from the military sense of περιβάλλειν, to send round a detachment for the purpose of taking an enemy in the flank or rear. περιβάλλειν is passive in form, but virtually neuter.

" ἕτε ὁλείν—δεῖαν" The sentence, as Heind. observes, wants its apodosis, ἐτί δὲν referring formally to ἐπιτινον, but virtually taking the place of δειν after φασὶ. The connexion is re-established by μέλειον in the next sentence.

" τὸ πιθανὸν" The persuasive, the objector goes on to say, is another word for the probable, which ought to occupy the attention of the skilled orator, if he would deserve that title. Hence even the facts are to be suppressed if they happen to be unlikely. For οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ πρ., Heind. conf. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ πρ., h. e. τὰ τὰ ἐντι πρ. But such can hardly be spared in this connexion.
δειν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, έαν μὴ εἰκότως ἡ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκεῖα, ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκός διωκτέοι εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰσὶν. χαίρει τῷ 273 ἀλήθει. τούτῳ γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἀποστασιά τῆς πορίσεως.

ΦΑΙ. Αὐτὰ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, διεκτείνως ἡ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι. ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι εἰς τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐφησώμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τούτῳ πάρμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τισίαν αὐτοῦ πεπτάκης ἀκριβῶς. εἰπέτω τοῖς καὶ τὸ δέ ἡμῖν ὁ Τισίας, μὴ τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ τὸ πλήθει δοκοῦν.

Β. ΦΑΙ. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν εἰρῶν ἀμα καὶ

καὶ τάνως) ἂ

That is, not only in the practice of the law-court, in which κατηγορία and ἀπολογία have place, but also in that of the αγορά. Sup. 261 b, μᾶλλον, μὲν περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δραμάτου. Whatever be the occasion, the speaker should keep probability in view, without troubling himself about the truth. The double accus. after the verbal διεικόνισον is too trite a usage to require illustration.

273. Αὐτὰ γε] Badh. recasts the parts thus:—Φ. ἀυτὰ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, διελεύκως ἡ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι. Σ. ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι εἰς τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐφησώμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τούτῳ πάρμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα. Φ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τισίαν αὕτω πεπτάκης ἀκριβῶς. Σ. Εἰπέτω τοῖς καὶ τὸ δέ ἡμῖν ο Τισίας, κ.τ.λ. This arrangement has the advantage of explaining the sense of ἀκριβῶς, and the use of γὰρ. 'I have given the precepts of the rhetors word for word (ἀυτὰ),' says Socr., 'because I bethought me that we had already touched briefly on the subject, and I know what importance is attached to it by the professional teachers.' On the other hand ἀλλὰ μὴν and τῶν τῶν seem to be hardly the particles required from the speakers in Badh.'s arrangement. Socr. would not have passed over without comment his companion's as-

section that he was familiar with the τέχνη of Tisias. He would have owned the impeachment or disowned it. In the former case, τίς οὐ, or some equivalent, would have preceded εἰπότω τῶν ἠμῶν.

ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν] Sup. 259 b, οὗ εἶναι ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι βραχεῖ τῇ τῷ ἐπὶ δίκαια μισθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὰ δέξαμεν δὲ πλήθει, κ.τ.λ.

τὸν γε Τισίαν αὕτω πεπτάκης] 'you have, at all events, read up your Tisias carefully.' αὕτω = in his own book.

So Ath. Λv. 471, οὗ Ἀποκοινῶν πεπτάκης, 'nor have you conned—are you at home in Aesop.' Heracles strangely mistakes the meaning: ταυτέοις, ἔδειξας μακάριον οὖν τὸν Τισίαν.

3. Ταῦτα δή, ὡς ἔοικε] The instance of a suppressio seri which follows is doubtless extracted from the τέχνη of Tisias, which Phaedr. has at his fingers' ends. 'If a weak but courageous man be tried for beating a powerful but cowardly one, and robbing him of his cloak or the like, neither party is to state the precise truth. The coward is to pretend that the brave man was not alone when he thrashed him, while the other should first try to prove that no one else was by, and then make the most of the argument. How can a poor creature like me be supposed to have assaulted so fine a man? The other, we are told, will not avow his own cowardice, but will try to invent some other falsehood, whereby, if
τεχνικού ἐγραψεν, ὡς έαν τις ἁσθενής καὶ ἀνδρικός ἵσχυ-
ρον καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἰμάτιον ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀφελόμενον,
eἰς δυσκοητίρου ἄγηται, δεῖ δὴ τάλαθες μπορέστεροι λέγετε,
ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνον φαίνει τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγ-
κεκόψθαι, τὸν δὲ τούτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνω ἴστην,
ἐκεῖνο δὲ καταχρῆσασθαι τῷ ποῖς δὲ ἀν ἐγὼ τούσδε 
τούτῳ ἐπεξείρησα; ὃ δὲ οὐκ ἐρεῖ δὴ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ κάκην,
ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειροῦν τάξι ἣν ἐλέγχον πη
παραδοθῇ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ καὶ περὶ τάλλα δὴ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἀττ 
ἐστι τῇ τέχνῃ λεγόμενα, οὐ γὰρ, δὲ θάντερον;
ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;
ΣΩ. Φέυ, δεινώς γ᾽ ἐοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην 
ἀνεφελοῖ ὁ Τυσίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δὴ ποὺ ἄν τυγχάνει καὶ 
ὀπάθει χαίρει υἱομαζόμενος. ἄταρ, δὲ ἐταιρέ, τούτῳ ἥμεις 
πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μὴ—
ΦΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. "Οτι, ὅ Τυσία, πάλαι ἥμεις, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελ-
θεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες ὡς ἄρα τούτο τὸ εἰκὸς τοῖς 
pολλοῖς δὲ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγυγνόμενον 
tαῖς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἀρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὅ 
τὴν
it so happen, he will give his antagonist a fair chance of refuting him." The impotent conclusion of these elaborate mystifications was not, we may presume, contemplated by Tisias, but is maliciously added by Soer.
C. Δ. Φέυ, δεινώς γ᾽] 'bless me! what a dreadfully recollected artifice! whether Tisias has the merit of its discovery, or some one else, whoever he may be, or whenever it is his pleasure to be named.' Doubtless a mocking allusion to Corax and his ill-omened name. So Herm., τούτῳ εἶθεν τῶν διὰ τὸν Κόρακα, ἐκεῖθεν ἐλέγετο ὁ Κόρας Τυσίαν μαθὴ-
τὴς (πολ. διδάκτους) εἶναι. Comp. the 
Prov. κακὸς κόρακοι κακίον ὄν (Porson. Gr. ii. p. 409, ed. Leutsch.), where for 
Χειμὼν read Τυσίαν. The irony is in-
creased by the circumstance that the 
formula ὅπάθει here refers to the 
practice of giving the gods epithets 
taken from their favourite abodes: Δή-
λει, Πέθε, or the like.
Π. τοῦτο] If τοῦτο could be dispensed 
with we should be tempted by Heind.'s 
to the, which τὸ ποῖον in the next 
sentence appears to presuppose. In 
every instance that I can find, τὸ ποῖον; or τὰ 
pοῖα; refers to some definite antecedent. 
Inf. 277 D, ἀρ' ὧν δέθηκε τὸ λεθάντα 
ἄλγον ἑπτοροτέν, τὰ ποῖα: Phil. 343 B, 
ἀρ' ὧν οὖ τὸ: τὸ ποῖον; In the 
present case three or four MSS. give τοῦτο. 
Perhaps Plato wrote τοῦτος ἀπάτα.
P. τέλα: ἥμεις] Soer. informs Tisias that 
his objection has already been refuted, 
referring of course to p. 262 A, δὲ ἔρα 
tὸν μέλοντα ἀνατίθην ἄν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ 
δὲ μὴ ἀπαντήσασθαι τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν 
ὁστών καὶ ἁρμονίας ἄρησθαι διαθέναι, 
κ.τ.λ. Likeness and unlikeness to truth 
can only be apparent to one who knows 
what the truth itself is.
The sentiment is in conformity with Plato's celebrated dialogue, pæstos των χρημάτων μέτρων, Legg. iv. 716 c. "How many," asks Stalb., "of our writers on pulpit-eloquence" (hominelicum) "treat this branch of theology in so lofty a spirit?"

"οὕτως οἱ σοφότεροι ἡμῶν." Probably he alludes to the elder Pythagoreans, who, according to Proclus, Theol. i. 5, p. 13, are described Philib. 16 c, in the words, of παλαιοὶ κρυπται τούτων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρας τοίς οἰκοδόμοις. So Hermas understands: οἴ οὐορ, οὖν οἱ πιθανοτέροι. The sentiment which follows, that all men are follow-slaves under the superintendence of divine taskmasters, is found, as Heind. observes, in Phaed. 62 b: τάδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἰς λέγεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελούμενους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς τῶν κηρύγμάτων τοῖς θείοις εἶναι. Io. 85 b, Soer. speaks of himself as ἄνδρος τῶν κριτῶν καὶ ἱερὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄνθρωπος. The word ἀνθρώπος occurs Thuc. 172 c in a different connexion, but still with reference to oratory: οἱ δὲ λόγοι δὲν περὶ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς διεσπάτος καθήμενοι, the 'master' in this case being the dicast. Before ἀνθρώπου the best MSS., including the Boll, give ἡ, others μῆ. But nothing can be made of either, unless we admit the improbable supposition that some other substantive has been lost before ἀνθρώπου. 274. ὁ τι μή πάρεργον] Harn. ὁτι μή πάρεργον, ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἡ μή πάρεργον, τοποθ. ἡμῖν, κατὰ συμβαθείαν. Eng. 'except incidentally,' or 'as a secondary consideration.' ὅστις μὴ καὶ ὁ τι μή are of freq. occurrence, as Gorg. 522 b, οὔτως φασίντας ἡμῖν. ὅστις μή παντόπασιν διανοήσῃ ἢστι, 'unless he be a very coward.'
Ἀς ἐι μακρὰ ἡ περιόδος, μὴ θαυμάσῃς μεγάλων γὰρ ἐνέκα περιμένει, οὐχ ὡς ὂν δοκεῖς. ἔσται μὴ, ὅς ὁ λόγος φησίν, εάν τις ἑθήλη, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστα εἴκείνων γνωρίσει.

ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλως ἔμουγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὧν ἰῶκρατε, εἴπερ οἶος τὲ τις ἐρ. Σ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντι τοὺς καλοὺς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὁ τι ἂν τῷ ἐμβῆν παθέων.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἄτεχνας λόγων πέρι ἰκανῶς ἔχετω.

ΦΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

Σ. Τὸ δ’ εὐπρεπεῖας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἄπρεπεῖας, τὴν γνωρίσειν καλῶς ἂν ἔχω καὶ ὅπτῃ ἄπρεπῶς, λοιπῶν, ἂς γὰρ;

ΦΑΙ. Ναὶ.

Σ. Οἰσθ’ οὖν ὅπτῃ μάλιστα θεῷ χαριεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἂς λέγων;

Ἀς ἐι μακρὰ] marvel not, therefore, if the way be long and circuitous; it is for great ends, not for such as you imagine, that we are to take the winding road,' i.e. it is to please the gods, not, as you think, to gratify men, that we adopt the arduous and scientific in preference to the easy and empirical method. Heid. says the conj. δὲ for ὅτι, which I have adopted, seems necessary in order to furnish an antecedent to ταῦτα in the following clause: 'not but what, as our reasoning shows, these ordinary purposes (ἃ σὺ δοκεῖς, sc. τὸ εἰκός, τὸ πιθανόν) may, if one has a mind, be attained, and in the best possible manner, as following out of the first.' He had before said that the best way of ascertaining the probable was first to learn the true. (Herm. explains ἐξ ἑκείνων by ἐκ τῶν θεῶν. Read ἐκ τῶν θεῶν; a good gloss, ταῦτα being equiv. to πάντα καίνιτα. So 246, ὅσον καὶ μακρὰ διῆρεσις is opposed to ἀνθρωπίνη καὶ διάντερα.) Phaedr. admits that the Socratic way is in theory excellent, but doubts its practicability. To which Socr. replies, that, practicable or not, it is noble to aim at noble ends, even though the attempt should end in failure. And with these words he dismisses the question of art or no-art.

At the commencement of the discussion following the last Erotic Discourse, Socr. had exposed the futility of the prejudice against authorship in general, and caused Phaedr. to admit ἄριστον ἀπὸ τὸ γράφων λόγων (258 δ). This done, he makes the admission (ib. Ε) that there is a difference between τὸ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν, and proposes, as the theme of the day's discussion, the question: ἃς καὶ ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπτῃ μὴ (259 b). The discussion however has to wait until the preliminary question (commencing 260 ι) of ἀρχήν τε καὶ ἄτεχνα is disposed of: hence the present passage is, in form at least, a resumption of the thread of the dialogue, after a long parenthetic interruption. In commencing the art-discussion, he had roused the attention of Phaedr., by introducing a company of imaginary ἄρχου, uttering pretended Laconian apophthegms. Here he puts in the mouth of an Egyptian deity paradoxes redolent of an Attic phrontisterium.
ΦΑΙ. Οιδαμώς. συ δέ;

Σ. Ακοήν γ' ἔχω λέγεις τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ ἵσαν. εἰ δὲ τότε εὑρομεν αὐτοί, ἄρα γ' ἂν ἐθ' ἦμιν μέλι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων;

ΦΑΙ. Γελοίων ἡρων. ἀλλ' ἂ φῆς ἀκηκοῖναι, λέγε.

Σ. Πεισούσα τούτῳ περὶ Νακράτων τῆς Αἰγύπτου γενέσθαι τῶν ἑκεί παλαιῶν των θεῶν, οδ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον [τὸ] ἱερόν, ὁ δ' Καλουσι Ἡμιν αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαιμόνι εἶναι Θεῦθ. τούτον δὲ πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμόν εὑρεῖ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἐτι δὲ πεπείθαε ταὶ καὶ κυβεῖας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα. Βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Ἐπικοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην τόλμην τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ἡν οἱ "Ελληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦν, καὶ τῶν θεῶν "Ἀμμονα, παρὰ τούτον ἑλθὸν ὁ Θεῦθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξέ, καὶ ἐφ' ἐδώ διαδόθη ἐντὸς Ἀλλοι Ἀιγυπτίων. ὁ δ' ἴστε ἡρείνα ἐκάστη ἔχοι ὀφέλειαν. διεξόντος δ' ὁ τι καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς δοκεῖ λέγειν,

C. Νακράτων] This was a Greek emporium in Egypt, originally, according to Herod. ii. 179, the only foreign port. Thoth or Thoth, the Egyptian Hermes, is again mentioned in Phil. 18 ff. He was one of the twelve gods of second rank, and called by the Egyptians 'the scribe of the gods,' the 'lord of the divine word,' the 'writer of truth.' So Bunsen. Aegypten i. 462, from Lepsius. He was also the Moon-god. Herod. (ii. 67) informs us that the dead ibis was always taken for burial to Hermopolis, the city of Thoth (see Sir G. Wilkinson's note in Rawlinson's ed.) being, as Plato says, sacred to that god (Aelian, N. H. x. 20). The second article before ἵερον admits, of course, of explanation, but probability would be much in favour of the emended reading of Heind., Ast., and Hirsch., οὔ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον ἱερόν, even if we did not find it in the comm. of Hermias (who by the way gives a mystical reason of surpassing absurdity for the relation of the bird to the god, Schol. Herm. 199, Ast.).


D. Θεοῦ] It is impossible to say where Plato found this word, which seems a corruption or variety of 'Ἀμοῦς,' 'Ἀμῶν,' the Egyptian name, according to Herodotus, of Zeus (Her. ii. 42). Accordingly his name heads the list of the eight superior deities. This Ammon or Amon was besides in an especial sense the god of Thebes, hence styled by Herod. ibid. Ζηρὶς Θηβαίοις. He was the Zeus Ammon of the Greeks, his image being κρυοφόρων, ib. Hence Thebes itself was styled Diopolis. With the anacoluthia ἡ̂ν ... καλουσι, καὶ τὸν θεόν "Ἀμ-

μονα compare a similar sup. 258 ε, ἄν πολυποθηκαὶ δεῖ ἢ μὴ ἧσθηκαν. τὸν θεὸν is, of course, the Thamus just mentioned. For ἴστε, the reading received by all edd. since Heind., all the MSS. but one have ἴστε.

ἐπέδειξε[.] So the Boll., the majority of codds., and Hermias. Bekk. edits ἐπέδειξα from eight MSS. But ἐπέδειξα is better: 'exhibited,' or as Stollb. 'os-
tentavit.'

δοκεῖ] Vulg. doceo, al. doκεῖ. The Attic form is preserved in Stobaeus.
πάντα τα μέλη του θεού, τό δ’ ἐπιτείμει τοις μεν δη ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ ἀκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα Θαμάνων τῷ θεῷ λέγεται ἀποφήμαισαι, ὁ λόγος τόσο ἰν ἐμ’ διελθεῖν ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, Τοῦτο δὲ, δ’ ἐπιτείμει τὸ μᾶθημα, ἐφὶ ὁ θεὸς, σοφιτέρας Ἀιγυπτίων καὶ μηνικωτέρους παρέξεν μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον εὑρέθη. δ’ ἐπιτείμει τῷ τε νεκρῷ τε Θεῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐπί τοῖς τε καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς μέλλοντις χρήσθαι. καὶ νῦν σύ, 275 πατήρ ἐν γραμματέως, δι’ ἐνοπλῶν συνεστίον ἐπὶς ἡ δύνασθαι τὸ γὰρ τῶν μαθήτων λήγειν μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξεν, μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἀτεί διὰ πιστίν γράφει ἐξοθευρον ὑπὸ ἀλλοτρίων τῶν, οὐκ ἐν δικόντων ψυχῶν, οὐκοῦν μνήμης ἀλλ’ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον ἐφρεῖσίν καὶ σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς διέξον, οὐκ ἀλληλοεν τοις μελέτεις πολυτήκου γὰρ σοι γενόμενοι ἀνεν

π. ἐν’ ἀμφότερα] ‘for and against,’ ἐπι τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, ‘when he got upon the subject of written characters.’ Polit. 274 η’, ἐν’ αὐτῷ νῦν ἐρεῦν ἡδ.”

μνήμης—φάρμακας] ‘an specific for the memory and the wit.’ So above, 230 π., συ μέν μονοὶ διείσιμοι τοῖς ἐξοδοῖς τοῦ φάρμακον εὑρέσκεται. A more usual form would have been λήγος καί ἀμαθίας φάρμακας, as we find in Eurip. Fr. Palam. 2, Diad., τὰς γέ λήγος φάρμακα ἐξοδα- ταὶ μᾶλλον Ἀφώια καὶ παραπάτω, κ.τ.λ. But Synesius, τ. ἑπτ. p. 110, τὰς αλλοθύρων εἴκεσαν ὁ Προμμῆθες, διαμοιηθῆς φάρμακον.

275. καὶ νῦν σὺ δύνασαι] ‘so, in the present instance, you, who are the father of letters, have, out of tenderness for your offspring, attributed to them a power (or tendency), the contrary of that which they really possess,’ ἡ δύνασαι, for ἡ δύνασαι, or better αὐτὸς ἡν δυνάσαι, is confirmed by Philob. 35 η’, ἐνδικηθὲ ποῖος ἡν δύνασαι, and by several other passages cited by Stullb. in his ann.

τοῦτο γάρ] Theod.’s invention would impair the memory, by tempting men to neglect practising it. They would rely on written memoranda, and so get the habit of referring to outward symbols on alien material, rather than those stamped on the tablets of the brain. Hence writing is an aid, not to memory, but to reminiscence; helping us not to retain impressions but to recover them. The commentators quote largely in illustration of this passage. Quint. Inst. xi. 2. Θ, quanquam invento apud Platonem, ob- stare memoriae usum literarum: vide- liet quod illa, quae scriptum repersimus, velit custodire desinimus, et ipsa securi- ritate dimitimus: where the annotators refer to Caesar, B. G. vi. 14, to show the existence of a similar prejudice among the Druids, who forbade their lore to be committed to writing: “quia neque in vulgum disciplinam efferi velit, neque eos qui discent, litteris conscribant, minus memoriae studere.” To these Stullb. adds Senec. Ep. 89. 28. An anecdote is related by Herodias of a disciple of Plato, who, πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα πάντα ἀνπρογραμμένους ἀπεκτείνετο, καὶ κανανέ ἐπετεσσάρων πάντα ἀπόλεσε, καὶ ἀτέρτα ἐπ’ ἰδία τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἀρνητικὴν ὅτι ἐν βιβλίοις ἀποτιθημένα τὰ μνήματα, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ φυσι.” This may have been suggested, by a saying of Aristippus, of whom we are told ὅτι παρεκκλησιον τοῦ νεότια τοῖς  ἐξοδοι κτῖσθαι, ἀ ποτι οὕτως καὶ κανω- γάσταν εὐσκεκολομβῆτε (Stob. Anthol. Append. p. 60).

καλικήου γάρ σοι γενόμενοι] ‘your
pupils will be well informed without being well taught; hence they will be thought very knowing, though, with few exceptions, perfectly ignorant,—overbearing too in society, as having acquired the conceit of wisdom instead of the reality. With χαλέον ομοίων compare Thesm. 210 c, ζητον δει τας της ξυνάδας και ημερές, σωφρόνοις διότι οίδομεν είδον & μη αληθος. With the sentiment comp. the aphorism of Hesych.: πολυμαθής ἐσθο διδάσκει.

π. Ο' Σώκρατες.] A warning to the reader not to take Socrates at his word, when he pretends to have received an edifying recital from ancient tradition (ἀπό τῶν πρότερων). The comm. think that Αγνώτους implies in itself something of contempt, the verb αγνώτος having the derived sense παυσαρείων. Arist. Theum. 290, δει τα πάντα σαν παναρείως καθότι είκαν μοι δυνατά. Καλ τούτο τις εξελέγων οὐκ ἔτοι πάλαι Ηγεμόνες. Hesych., Αγνώτοσιν οτί δεύονα πράτειν. But this relates to the character of the Egyptians, not to the truth of their legends. Phaedr. merely means to say, you will not impose on me by affecting to lay the scene of your romances in Egypt or any other foreign country; we know how little it costs you to invent fables like that we have just heard. Whereupon Socrates, partly ignoring his meaning, reproves him for thinking more of the nationality of a speaker than of the truth of what he says; a reproof to which Phaedrus, good-humouredly submits. 'The priests,' says Socrates, 'in the sanctuary of Zeus, at Dodona, declared that the first oracles issued from an oak: the men of that day being so simple as to be content to hearken to trees and rocks, if they spake but truth.' 

θρόνος καὶ πέτρας] Socrates had only mentioned an oak, but he adds καὶ πέτρας for the sake of the adage. So (260 c) he says, περὶ δυον σαίδις ὁ πόσον, when the δυος itself had been in question. The proverb is sufficiently trite. Hom. Od. xix. 163, οῇ γὰρ ἀνὴρ δρόμοι ζωοί πολαισθών οὖν ἀνὴρ πέτρας, i.e. you had human parents, like other people. Hence Socrates in the Apol. 34 ν, ἤρωι εἰς μὲν ποὺς τίνες καὶ οἰκεῖοι, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνὴρ τοῦ Ὀμηρίου, οὖν ἀνὴρ ἀνὴρ δρόμοι οὖν ἀνὴρ πέτρας πέρα. 'I am not literally a "heroic filler."' Rep. vili. 544 ν, ὥσος οἰκείοις καὶ πέτραις τα πολιτείας γλύπτομαι, ἄλλοις ὄχι, τοὺς ἂν ἄνθρωποι πέπεθεν ἀνὴρ πέτρας τα πολιτείας γλυπτοί, ἄλλοις όχι τοὺς ἰδίους πέπεθεν: Cic. Acad. Pr. ii. 31. 100, Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus; habet corpus; habet animal, &c. The proverb is learnedly discussed by G. G. Nitschke, Rhein. Mus. 1857, p. 406. Its meaning in the present passage is faithfully given by Hermann as cited above. The προσθορᾶς δρόμος of Dodona are sufficiently well known—nor need we suppose that there is any allusion here to the Ἀδελφαὶ πέτρας, which was vocal only in a figure.
ΣΩ. Ουκον ὁ τέχνην αἰώμενον ἐν γράμμασι κατα-
λυτεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ παραδεχόμενος, ὡς τι σαφές, καὶ βεβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλὴν ἂν εὐθείας γέμων καὶ τῷ ὂστε τὴν Ἀρμονιοσ μαντείσιν ἰγνοσίην, πλέον τι οἴμομεν ἐνναί λόγους γεγραφήμενος τοῦ τῶν εἰδοτὰ ὑπομνηματείς περὶ ὃν ἢ τὰ γεγραφήμενα.

ΦΑΙ. Ὡρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γὰρ ποιήσαι, ὡς Φαῦρε, ταύτ᾽ ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄριον ξανάγραφα, καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἑγγορατεῖ μὲν ὡς ἱερὰ, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀνέργοι τι, σεμνῶς πάντως συμφαγῶς παίτων ἢ καὶ οὐξ ὄριον δοξάζω μὲν ὡς τι ἐφευρότατα αὐτοὺς λέγει, ἐὰν δὲ τῇ ἑρᾷ τῶν λεγόμενων βουλόμενος μαθῶσιν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον παιδῶν ἢ τί ὁ δὲ ἀπαξ γραφή, κυλοῦσθαι μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὀρἱῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἐπιλογοῦς, ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῶς παρ᾽ οἷς οὐδεὶς προσέχει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπισταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ τε καὶ μὴν πλημμελόμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δικὴ λοιδορθείς του πατρὸς ἢ τε δεῖ ται βοηθοῦν αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐν ἄμινα στὶλετον οὗτε βοηθήσω δυνατὸς αὐτῷ.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ταύτα σοι ὡρθότατα εἴρηται.
and very elegant instance of Plato's fondness for personifying the logos.

276. τοῦτον ἀδελφόν γενόσιν] The written λόγος is therefore the νόσος ἀδελ-
φὸς of the spoken. The distinction be-
tween the living and dead word which
follows is analogous to the Christian
anthithesis of "letter" and "spirit," of
which the one "killeth," but the other "giveth life." The Neo-platonists, from
Philo downwards, express the distinction
by λόγος ζωοδότης and λόγος προφο-
μην, the words used by Hermias in com-
menting on this passage.

β. ὁ νοῦν ἐχων γεωργίαν] 'would a
husbandman of any intelligence take
seeds which he cared for and wished to
bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant
them during the heat of summer in gar-
dens of Adonis, and then rejoice as he
watched them coming up in full beauty
ere they had been eight days sown ?
Hesych., Αἰσχίνοις κήποι, ἐν τοῖς
Ἀδωνίοις εὐωδα ἐξάγωνοι καὶ κήπους ἐν
κρατώρας, καὶ παυτοδαπὸν ἐκθεράφω-
σαν ἐκ μαρλασὶν καὶ ἥρας εἰς κερασέων ἀρῶν ἅπαντα περιειλοῦν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν
θρικείαις αὐτῶν κατακλυζόμενοι ἔνεδρο
Ἀρραβίτης φασιν. The glosses of the
paronomiographers are to the same effect.

'Α. κηπ. εἶτα τῶν ἄρων καὶ μη ἐξανιο-
μένων. Ἐπειδή γὰρ ἄδωνις ἐρῶτας ἄν, ἀν ὁ μίθος, 'Αρραβίτης, πρὸ ἐπειδῆ τελευτᾶ, οἱ ταῦτα ἐργαζόμενοι, κήπους ἐν ἕγγει 
των φυτεύοντες ἢ φυτεύομεν, ταχεῖω 
ἐκείνων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐφευρεθῇ μαραγμένων, Ἀδωνίοις κήπους ἔκαθεσιν. Theophras.
 κ. 111, Ἀρραβίτης πάντως καλοὶ ἄν
tαλλές 'Αδωνις. Πάρ μὲν οἱ δεῖρα κεῖται
δὲ ἄρων, ἑκατέρα φέροντο, ἐνω ἄρων κήπων, περιφυτευόμενοι ἐν ταπρασίαις Ἀρ.
 γείαις, Ζυμία δὲ μερῶν χρησὶς ἅλαβατρον, κ.
 ι. λ. The use of ἄρων for σειρέων, οτ 
 φυτεύομεν, is not uncommon in poetry.
Soph. Frng. 1ou, Ἐν δίκω κήπου ἀρίθμησι 
 μόνον εὐδαίμων ἄδων. So Oed. R.
 1485, παντὴν ἐφαίδευν ἔνεαν αὐτὸν ἀρό
θόρον, for which we find, τ. 1498, ὀθεν 
παντὶ ἀρόθορο. The occurrence of the 
word here is a poeticism, not out of keeping 
with the general colour of the passage.

ἐφ' οὖς δὲ ἐποδόθηκε ἡ, where he is
really in earnest, the cultivator will pro-
ceed on true principles of agriculture; 
he will sow his grain in fitting soil, and 
be well content if it come to maturity 
within eight months.' The MSS. show 
some confusion in the placing of the 
conditional particles: some giving ἄρ
thrice. I have kept Beke's text, as on
Phi. Oútω̣ν πον, δὲ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν σπουδὴ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρως ἄν, ᾖ λέγεις, ποιεῖτ.  
Σω. Τὸν δὲ δικαίως τε καὶ καλῶς καὶ ἀγαθῶς ἐπιστῆμα ἔχοντα τῷ γεωργῷ φῶμεν ἦττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἐαυτοῦ σπέρματα;  
Phi. "Ήκιστα γε.  
Σω. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδὴ αὐτὰ ἐν ὑδατι γράφει μέλαι σπεῖρον διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὐτοῖς λόγοι βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἰκανῶς τάληθι διδάξαι.  
Phi. Οὔκουν δὴ τὸ γ᾽ εἰκός.  
Σω. Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς ἔσεικε, πανίδια χάρων σπερεί τε καὶ γράφει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἔαντω τε ὑπομήνυμα θεσαυρύλλημεν, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἴκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταύτῳ ἱρὸς μετινώτι, ἡσθῆσατε τε αὐτῶς θεωρῶν φυμένους ἀπαλους· ὅταν δὲ ἀλλο πανίδια ἀλλὰς χρώνται, συμποσίως τε ἄροντες αὐτῶς ἐτέρως τε ὑπερ τοῦτον ἀδελφά, τότε ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἔσεικε, ἀντὶ τούτων οἰς λέγω παῖζων διάζει.

the whole the best. The former ἀν is, of course, a mere anticipation of that after ἄγαψε, to which verb both particles belong.

c. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδὴ[.] The philosopher who has true scientifie views of the Just, the Fair, and the Good, will surely deal as intelligently with this precious grain, the produce of his inner self, as the farmer does with his seeds. To commit them to paper would be like writing them in water; for what else is it to 'sow them in ink through a reed in the form of Discourses, as incapable of defending themselves logically, as they are of conveying an exact impression of the truth.' This, therefore, he will not do in his serious moods (σπουδῆ), but only by way of sport and recreation (πανίδια χάρων).

ἐν δεδομένῳ[.] Another instance of Plato's way of aliding in a proverbial phrase by way of additional illustration. See 275 d. "ἐν δεδομένῳ καθ' δεδομένοις εἰς ἐνυπάρχον vel συνέχεια, ut Latinorum in vento et aqua scribere (Catull. lxx. 5), proverbialiter dicitur, qui irrit quidquam facile, ἐπὶ τῶν μάθημα πονηρώτων, ut maximas explicat' (Latt.). 'Here lies one whose name was written in water' is the well-known inscription over the grave of an English poet. So, in verses attributed to Bacon:

"Who then to frail mortality shall trust,  
But limns the water, or but writes in dust!"


d. δομημένως[.] The use of literature is to preserve memorials of oral discussion: also to furnish an innocent substitute for the grosser kinds of pastime. εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν δεικται, 'should the writer ever reach oblivions old.' As Houd. observes, "verba huee postea sapienti," and possibly they are a literal quotation. This is at any rate more likely than Winckelmann's wild or rather perhaps tame emendation: ἐαυτῷ τε ὄντι. εἰς τὸ γῆρας, λήθης φάρμακα, καὶ παντὶ, κτλ. The παῖζων ἱρον μετινώτι, is of course the philosopher who adopts the Socratic method, literally, 'who hunts the same trail.'  

ἀντὶ τούτων οἰς λέγω] The οἰς is explained by the following ἐν λόγως. 'The philosopher will divert himself with the amusements I am describing, rather than
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.

Ε ΦΑΙ. Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαίλην παιδιάν, ἢ Σώ-
κρατες, τού ἐν λόγοις δυναμένον παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε
c αἰῶνας διὰ λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὶ γὰρ, ὃ φιλε Φαίδρε, οὕτω. πολὺ δ', οἴμαι,
καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὡταν τῆς δια-
λεκτική τέχνη χρώμεω, λαβὼν ψυχῆν προστικούσαν,
φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγως, ὃ ἐἀντίοι
tοῦ δ' τοῦ σπείραντον βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ | καὶ οὕτω ἄκαρποι ἅλλα
ἐχοντες σπέρμα, οἴκεν ἅλλοι. ἐν ἅλλοις ἥθει φύσμενοι
τοῦτ' ἄλλου τινα παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ τὸν ἑχοῦντα εὐ-
δαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ἄσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙ. Πολὺ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐτ' κάλλιον λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Νῦ ὅ ἐκείνα ἦδη, ὃ Φαίδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν,
tοῦτον ἀμολογημένον,

with those of the vulgar. The old read-
ing was olai légon, for which Heind. sug-
gested en olai légon. Bekk. found olai
Légon in the margin of one MS., and
rightly adopted it. Heind.'s ép, though
good in other respects, would mar the
rhythm of the clause. Both are better
than Ast's olai légon.

ε. Παγκάλην — παρὰ φαίλην] 'the
metrical you describe, that of him,
&c. is as excellent as the other is
contemptible.' Comp. the speech of
Pausdr., 258 ε, so strangely objected to
by Heind.

μοθάλωσιν] Heind. forbids us to
restrict this word to mythical discourse.
No doubt it will bear the more general
sense 'fabulari,' 'sermocinari,' as μέθος
is not unfrequently used for λόγος:
but I think that here at least Plato had
a special view to the myths with which
he delights to embellish his dialogues.
His own form of composition was as
nearly as possible an imitation of the
process described so vividly in the next
ῥήσεις: and he seems to have thought it
the best attainable substitute for the
oral διάλεξις which he extols. This
being the case, the written copy could
hardly be contrasted with the spoken
original; the less so, as Plato, in his
dialogues, takes pains to diminish the
distance between the two, as by making
his λόγοι not only able to defend
themselves and crush their antagonists,
but also careful to convey a right im-
pression of the mind of their parent,
and of the truth. If this view be correct,
we have in this and the succeeding pas-
sage an apology for the Platonic method
of composition, both on its mythical and
its dramatic side; the latter, however,
rather by implication than expressly.
In his larger commentary Ast seems to
hint something of the same kind.

πολὺ δ', οἴμαι, καλλίων σπουδὴ] Rhetor.,
at its very best, is inferior
to pure Dialectic, which, when it works
in minds of suitable capacity, is the
surest method of propagating fruitful
truths, and preserving them from ex-
tinction. Οἱ λόγοι thus sown owe their
vitality to the circumstance, that they
grow up, not all in the same kind of
soil, in which case they would soon dege-
nerate, but ἅλλοι ἐν ἅλλοις ἥθει.

277. τούτ' ἄλλου τινα] Referred by
Ast to σπέρμα (better to τὸ ἑχομεν σπέ-
ρμα). Heind., from whom I dissent,
understands ἱκανοῖς τῶν τῷ τε
φυτεύοντι.

Νῦ ὅ ἐκείνα] Having established,
parenthetically, the superiority of oral
to written speech, Socr. reverts to
the subject proposed 274 ἔ—το εὐπρεπεῖς
ἡ γραφὴς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, τῆς γυγά-
μενον καὶ τῶν ἐκόμων τοῦ, κ.τ.λ. The ob-
ject of the dialogue, he says, had been two-
fold: (1) to ascertain the justice or in-
justice of the reproach implied in the
term λογογράφος (esp. 257 c), and (2) to
determine the conditions of a technical
of the several varieties of mental character, and plan and adjust his discourse accordingly, providing simple speeches for the simple soul, but for minds of more varied development discourses of varied range, and of intricate but harmonious structure. Furthermore, we should rather have looked for forms, but the inf. depends virtually on ἐπισκεψιν ἃν. Notwithstanding this, Plato adds the clause ἄν ἐπισκεπτεῖται... οὕτωσιν ἄστων ὑπακούειν, just as he would have done had the sentence not been oblique.

D. Τί έποιη τοῦ καθέναν ἢ καθέναν] The original question which has been so long delayed, is now shown by Socr. to have been virtually disposed of in the course of the foregoing discussions. Speech-writing is disgraceful if the writer use terms he cannot explain, especially if such terms involve important moral distinctions; whereas, if the author know how to appraise his art at its true value and no higher, being master of the noble art of writing his thoughts on receptive and congenial
Λόγους λέγει τε καὶ γράφει, καὶ ὁπὶ γνωσμένον ἐν δίκῃ λέγοντι ἄν οὗδες ἢ μὴ, ἄρα οὐ δεδηλάτε ἂν λέγει· τα λεγείνα ἐμπροσθεν.

ΦΑΙ. Τὰ ποιὰ·

ΣΩ. Ἡ μετάλλος πάλιν ἔγραψιν ἡ γράφει καὶ ἐν διηθογίᾳ, νόμους καὶ δίκαια, σύγγραμμα πολιτικῶν γράφων, καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιώσαντα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφῆνες, οὕτω μὲν ὁνειδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἰ τεῖς φησιν εἰτε μὴ. τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπάρ τε καὶ ὁδόρ δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδικών περὶ καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκεφαλήγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονεῖον ἐνείαι, ὥστε τῷ ἐξοίκος αὐτῷ ἐπανέσθη.

ΦΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ ὁμί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ γε ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ περὶ ἑκάστων οὐκὶ ἔντι ταῖς ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἐνείαι, καὶ οὐδένα πᾶσα ἡ γραμματικὴ λόγων ἐν μέτρῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἐξισι δικαιοῦσι γραφήναι, ὥστε λειτουργεῖν τέ ὁι ῥαβδοῦμενοι ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδακτις πειθοῦς ἑνεκαὶ ἐλέξθησαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὁμί τοῖς ἐξελέουσιν εἰδότων

sole—in that case he will go near to be one whom both Socr. and his friend would heartily pray to be like' (278 b).

νέμουσα τιθεὶς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικῶν γράφων ὁ προετοιμασία, and so being the author of a political treatise. The text is perfectly sound, Plato meaning to say that the public man is essentially an author, however much he may repudiate the title. So presently 278 c, ἐν τις ἐν πολιτικῶς λόγων, νέμουσα ἔνθι, σύγγραμμα ἐγραφέν. Comp. sup. 257 Ε fol. Heind. objects that an accurate writer would have used σύγγραμμα rather than σύγγραμα, and therefore, with Ast and Schleierm., condemns νέμουσα τιθείς as a gloss. On the other hand, an elegant writer would hardly have put γραφήν so soon after γράφει, as Plato would have done if νέμουσα τιθείς had not intervened. "In his capacity of lawyer, the statesman is in effect an author," would be our modern way of expressing the meaning of the passage. So Stahl, "Indem er Gesetze gebend eine Staatschrift verfasst."
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

υπόμνησιν γεγονέναι, ἐν ὑπὸ τοὺς διδασκομένους καὶ μαθήματας χάριν λεγομένους καὶ τῷ ὤντι γραφομένους ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, ἐν μόνοις τὸ τε ἐναργεῖς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδής· δεῖ δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον ὑπεύθυς γνησίοις εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, εὖν εἰρέθεις ἐρή, ἐπείτα εἰ τινες τοιούτοι ἐγκονοὶ τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἀμα ἐν ἀλλασίω ἄλλον ψυχαῖς καὶ ἄξιον ἐνέφυσαι τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἐν·—ὁδοὺς δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀμήν κυνηγεῖε, ὃ Φαῦδρε, εἰναι οἶον ἔγω τε καὶ σὺ εὐξαίμαιν ἂν σὲ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γεγένθαι.

ΦΑ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἐγωγε βούλομαι τε καὶ εὐχομαι ἄ λέγεις.

ΣΧ. Οὐκούν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἢμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγου καὶ τὸ τε ἔθνος φράξει λυσίτα, ὅτι ἐν καταβάλει εἰς τὸ Νυμφῶν νάμα τε καὶ μοσεῖον ἡκουσάμεθα λόγων, οἱ ἑπετασσόμενοι λέγειν λυσίτα τε καὶ εἰ τὰς ἀλλού συντηθέσι λόγους, καὶ Ὠμήρος καὶ εἰ τὰς ἀλλοὺς αὐτοῦ ποίησις ψυλῆν ἢ ἐν ἄδω συντηθείκε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ οὕτις ἐν

278. ἐν μένοις] We must either read with Heind. ἐν μένοις τοῦτοι, or eject ἐν, with Hirsch, and Stallb. The former expedient seems to me preferable.

ἰδι ἐφοβηθεὶς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ] Νοῦς ἐγών, τε ἐφοβηθεῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ, but rather to ἐν ἑαυτῶν λόγον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ ἐφοβηθεῖς—the word within, if it have been discovered by himself, or, as it were, self-sown, and not transplanted from some other mind.

ἱ. διαλ. This Ionic or rather old Attic form is freq. in Plato. See instances, p. 240 n. note. On this archaism see Bentley, Dissert. on Phalaris, § xiii. (vol. ii. p. 6, Dyce).

ὁδὸς δὲ] Some MSS. give δῆ, but see above, p. 272 a.

ἐν τῷ Νυμφῶν νάμα τε καὶ μοσεῖον] Alluding to the recess on the banks of the Ilissus, described in the opening scene of the dialogue, which was sacred to Pan and the Nymphs, and decorated with images inserted in niches carved on the rocks. Strictly speaking this was a Παρεόν or Νυμπάων; Pan and the Nymphs being inseparable in such localities. But the Muse Iliussion, to whom an elegant temple was dedicated on the opposite side of the stream, were in fact river-nymphs. See Servius ad Virg. Ecl. vii. 21. “Nymphæae, master amor, Libethridyes: Libethrides fons est ubi coluntur Musæe, et sic sit Libethridyes, ut si dicere Hippocrene idem fontes Hippocrēn, ut autem poetae inconvent Nymphas, sicut hoc loco: etiam in fine (Ecl. x. 1), Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihu concede laborem; hoc ratio est, quod secundum Varro nomen lapis sint Nymphæae quae et Musæe, nam et in aquas consistere dicuntur, quæ de fontibus manat.” &c. Aristides Rhet. ii. p. 708, Dind., ἀνακηρύσσομεν δὲ τῶν ποτηρίων, ὃτι Νύμφας καὶ Μοῦσας δεῖ τὰς συντηθέσι. So also Heusch, Nymphaei, Moûsai ἔθελι. It is curious that there is no trace of this connexion in Homer; from which however we are not to infer that it was a later invention. See Welck. Gr. Götterlehre, i. 705. By νάμα is meant, not the Ilissus, but the fountain μᾶς ψαρεύς ἔπαρος described 280 b, which flowed into the stream.

c. τοῖσιν ψαρεύς ἐν φυτῷ ἤθος] This distinction is explained by i. regg. 669 b, which the comm. quote: ταῖτ' γάρ
πολιτικοὺς λόγους νόμους δομομάζουν συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν
εἰ μὲν εἶδος ή τάλαθής ἢ συνεθῆς τάπτε, καὶ ἔχουν
βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἔλεγχον ἱν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς
διατόρα τὰ γεγραμμένα φαίλα ἀποδείξει, οὐ τι τῶν
d ἐπωνυμίαι ἔχοντα δεὶ λέγεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ ἐφ’
οίς ἐπιπούδακεν ἐκείνων.

ΦΑΙ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῷ νέμεις;

Σ. Τὸ μὲν σοφόν, τὸ Φαῖδρο, καλεῖν ἐμοιγε μέγα

δρόσι τάπτα κυκάμενα καὶ ἑτὶ διαστάσεως
οἱ ποιηταὶ, τυπεῖν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλο-
λων χωρίς, λόγους φιλούν εἰς μέτα
τῶν τινί, μᾶλις θ’ ἐπὶ καὶ βουλεύων ἄνω
μεγάλης ἡμέρας καὶ μεγάλας προσαγωγοὺς: whence it appears that
the dialogue of tragedy would be ranked
as κόσμος φιλή. In the passage of the
Laws Plato seems to regret the divorce
between poetry and music, as a sign of
decaying Art.

ἐπὶ τινὶ πολιτικοὶ λόγοι] *whenever,
under the form of political discourses,
which he names laws, has composed writ-
ten treatises,* and so committed himself
to an act of authorship. Schleierm.ας
πυλόνας για λόγοις is plausible, but
needless.

λέγων αὐτὸς διατόρα—φαίλα ἀπο-
δείξει[.] *able, by his own εἰς νοεῖ επι-
τομίας, to demonstrate the inferiority of written
speech to oral.* Previously (277 b) one
condition of a first-rate (i.e. a philos-
ophical) writer was stated to be a dis-
position to disparage writing: καὶ σύνεχα
πάντα λέξεις—μεγάλης ἡμέρας συνεχάς
γραφήμα. The meaning is not that the
philosopher will give a formal proof of
the inferiority of writing, but that, by
the skill with which he conducts a εἰς
νοεῖ inquiry, he will leave that im-
pression on the minds of his hearers.
Stall, quotes in illustration of this use
of ἀποδείξει, Phaed. 78 c: τελευτώτα
πάντα λόγου τῶν ἔκθεσεν ἀποδείξειν,
οὐ τι τῶν—ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ οίς ἐπιπούδακεν
ἐκείνων[.] He who fulfills the conditions
last enumerated, who employs no terms
which he is not prepared to define, and
makes no statements which he cannot
defend, &c., must not on any account
receive a designation proper to any of
the above-named pursuits, but must be
named after those which form the serious
business of his life. In other words, he
is not to be placed among λόγους συγγραφεῖ,
with Lysias, as ποιητής with Homer, or

as μνημογράφος with Solon, but with the
sincere investigators of truth as a Phil-
osopher. The former names may serve
for the author who has nothing in him
greater or more glorious than the phrases
which he has put on paper, or delivered
in the form of a set speech, whatever
pains he may have taken in the arrange-
ment and combination of the parts.

D. Τὸ μὲν σοφόν—θείῳ μόνῳ πρέπειν

The comm. quotes Parmen. 136 c, οὐκόν
εἰσπράττομεν ἀλλ’ ἀπό συνεισφέρεις μετέχει,
οὐκ ἃ τις μάλλον θὰ χρῄζει ἡ φαίλα ἔχειν
τῆς ἀπεικονίσεως έπιστήμης. The terms
φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία are tradition-
ally said to have been invented by Py-
thagoras (Cl. Tusc. Qn. V. 3). At what
time they came into general use in
Athens may be a question. Probably,
however, not before the time of Socrates,
from whom Isocrates may have con-
ceived the idea of appropriating them, as
he frequently does, to himself and his
occupation. Of the comic poets Aristox-
enes is the first who uses φιλόσοφος,
but in a late play, the Ecclesiasticon (v.
407, Dind., is illustrative of the his-
tory of the word, and indirectly of the
passage before us. He protests against
the restriction of the term to any par-
ticular class or sect of thinkers or writers,
maintaining that in the best times φιλο-
σοφία meant φιλοσοφία τις καὶ διάτυπη
περὶ λόγους, καὶ οὐχ ό νῦν τράπεζον ὀστας,
ἀλλὰ παῖδεις κοινώι. This general sense,
he says, is attested by "Demonsthenes and
thousands of others," including Plato
himself, who uses the term both in its
popular and its restricted acceptation.
The same passage reviews the history of
the word σωφρίτης, which in the days of

* Where, however, W. Dindorf pro-
poses φιλοδοχος, metri cara. Meineke
adheres to the received reading, which is
much more suitable to the context.
είναι δοκεῖ καί θεωρομένη πρέπειν τὸ δὲ ἡ φιλόσοφον ἡ
toioiouton τι μᾶλλον τε ἀν αὐτῷ ἀρμότοι καί ἐμελεστήρας
έχει.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τὸν μή ἐχοντα τμιωτερα διν συνε
θηκεν ἡ ἐγραφεν ἀνω κάτω στρεφών ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸς
ἀλληλα κολλῶν τε καί ἁφαιρῶν, ἐν δίκη που ποιητὴν ἡ
λόγων συγγραφέα ἡ νομογράφου προσερεῖς ;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν τὸ ἐταίρο φραξέ.

ΦΑΙ. Τί δὲ σύ ; πῶς ποιήσεις ; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν
σον ἐταίρον δεὶ παρελθεῖν .

ΣΩ. Τίνα τούτον ;

ΦΑΙ. 'Ἰσοκράτη τῶν καλῶν. ὃ τί ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὃ Ἐώς
κρατεῖς ; τῶν αὐτῶν φησομεν εἶναι ;

ΣΩ. Νέος ἐς, ὃ Φαίδρε, 'Ἱσοκράτης ὁ μεντοῦ μαν
τείομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἔθελον .

the Empire had lost much of its invincible meaning. Lyssias, we are told, called not only Aeschines Socrates, but Plato himself, a Sophist (possibly in his speech against the former, of which we have a short but curious fragment). Isocrates, too, not only calls the Eristics τὸν πρῶτον τῆς ἐρίαν Sophists, but those too who would have called themselves dia

lecticians. Plato, says Aristides, τὸν

σοφιστὴν δοκεῖ μὲν πῶς καταίσκει δεῖ, καί

ὅ γε δὴ μάλιστα ἑκατάκτως τὸ ὄνομα

Πλάτων εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ . "The cause of

this was his contempt for the vulgar, and

for his own contemporaries generally ." Yet even Plato, he says, on one occasion could use this invincible name as a title of honour, "when he called the God of all wisdom and truth a τέλεως σοφιστής ." The plain truth seems to be, that when σοφιστής had become a term of reproach, φιλόσοφος or some equivalent became in

dispensable . 'Philosopher' was then, as it has remained to this day, a prided and honoured name, and no sect or profession, literary or scientific, willingly renounced the pretension to wear it. The subsequent recognition of the superior claim of the speculative sects was owing partly to the imposing character and vast ability

of Plato and Aristotle; partly also to

the extinction of political life, which im

paired the value of rhetoric in public estima
tion .

ἐν δίκη So Bk., though the Bodl. and others give δίκη without the pre

position. But it is doubtful whether δίκη alone can have the force of the Lat. 'jury,' and the prep. may easily have been absorbed by the preceding word .

Β. 'Ἰσοκράτη τῶν καλῶν ." The epithet in cases like the present does not imply personal beauty: Epist. ii. 314 c, Ἱσοκράτης νῦν καὶ καλῶν γεγονότος .

Nor youth: Athen. 565 ε, ἦσεν ἦν ὁ καλός τε καὶ κρασίων Προσταγ—where Plato is the supposed speaker. In the instances quoted by Heind., on Hipp. i. init., it is applied to a variety of persons —Philebus, Callias, Euthydemus, Critias —who seem to have had nothing in common but the taste for letters or philosophy. 'Gentle' or 'accomplished' would convey something like the same associations. The reading 'Ἰσοκράτης is in the Bodl. and other first-rate cods. Vulg. 'Ἰσοκράτης . So 'Ἰσοκράτης . Pro
tag. 328 b.

Νέος ἐς ." Isocr. was six or seven years older than Plato, hence thirty-five or thirty-six at the death of Soer. (B.C.)
ΦΑΙΡΟΣ.

Τὸ ποίον δὴ;

Σ.Ν. Δοκεῖ μοι ἁμένων ἣ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Ἀντίαν
eῖναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἐτι τε ἦθει γεννικωτέρῳ
ekεκράσθαι ἀοτρὰν νῦν ἡγεῖτο βαθματῶν προϊόντος
tῆς ἠλικίας εἰ περὶ αὐτοῖς τοὺς λόγους, ὡς νῦν ἐπι-
χειρεῖ, πλέον ἡ παίδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώποτε ἀμφασίων
λόγων, εἶτε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρῆσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μεῖζῳ
[ἐδε] τις αὐτὸν ἄγοι ὧραμ θεοτέρα. φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε,
ἐνεστὶ τις φιλοσοφία τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ. ταῦτα δὴ

399. The dramatic or fictitious date of the Phaedrid, falls after the return of
Lysias from Thurii (B.C. 411); and we may therefore suppose Isocrates to
be under thirty when the remark is sup-
posed to be made. He was two and
twenty years the junior of Lysias.—This
entire passage is translated by Cicero in
the Orator, xiii. 41: Est enim quasi in
extrema pagina Phaedridi ipsius verbis
loquens Socrates: "Adolescens etiam
nunc, ο Παθερί, Isocrates est, sed quid
de ilio angurer, habet diecere. Quid tan-
dem?" inquit ille. "Majore mihi ini-
genio videtur esse quam ut cum oratio-
nibus Lysiae comparetur. Prasterea ad
virtutem major indele: ut minime mi-
rum futurum sit, si, quum aetate pro-
cesserit, aut in hoc orationem genero cui
nunc studet, tantum, quantum pueros,
reliquis praestet omnibus, qui unquam
omnem attingerunt: aut (et), si con-
tentus est hie non fuerit, divino aliquo animi
motu maior concipiscat. Inest enim
naturae philosophia in hujus viri mente
quendam." Haec de adolescentε Socrates
angaturat. At ca de seniore scribit
Plato, et scribit aequalis, et quidem,
exagitator omnium rhetorum, hunc mi-
ratum nunc. Me autem, qui Isocratem
non diligit, una cum Socrate et cum
Piatone errore patientur.

279. ἐπὶ τε ἢθεὶς γεννικωτέρῳ κεκράσθαι.
The phraseology is borrowed from the
medical writers and their doctrine of
temperament. "The elements were
kindlier mixed" in Isocrates than in Lysias.
Comp. Epist. vii. 326 c,  ơn ὁ ἄνθρω-
ποματὴν φύσιν κραθήσεται, where φύσις,
as in the clause preceding this passage,
refers to intellectual endowments, not
moral (φύσεως). Legg. x. 629 a, εἰδίκε
τοῦ τοιοῦτον μὴ γράφειν ἢθεὶς κεκρα-

πλέον ἡ παίδων διενέγκοι] Epist. vii.

326 c, prosergi: πλέον ἡ παίδων τῶν Ἑλ-
λον ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν.

ἐτι τε αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρῆσαι] Vulg. ἐτι
tε. I have restored to the text the
reading of the Bodl. and first Vatican,
supported by several other cod. of note,
and by Cicero, l. l., who omits in his ver-
sion the δε of the following clause. This
omission is not noticed by Spengel, who
was the first to call attention to the
importance of the variant adopted in
the text. (See Appendix II.) Socrates
would not be surprised if Isocrates
should either, as a speech-writer, dis-
tance all his rivals in that profession, or
should be dissatisfied with this his pre-
sent employment, and borne by a diviner
impulse to higher things. Herrm., μὴ
ἀποχρῆσαι ταῦτα, τούτην, τὸ λογο-
γραφεῖν, ἀλλὰ τραπεζή καὶ εἰς θεομαν-
τα εἰς φιλοσοφίας. In other words,
two courses were before him: that of
persevering in his present employment,
in which case Isocrates angers that he will
throw all other logographers into the
shade; secondly, that of abandoning the
rhetorical and adopting the philosophical
profession. Isocrates, as we know, chose
the former alternative.—If the Vulgate
reading ἐτι δε be retained, the meaning
will rather be, that Isocrates will add to
his eminence in the λόγος δε νῦν ἐπι-
χειρεῖ some further accomplishments of
a higher kind; that without ceasing to
be a λογογράφος, he will infuse into his
rhetorical exercises an element of phi-
losophic speculation. A favourable critic
might say that the prediction, thus
understood, was verified in his practice.
But it is difficult to believe that the
shreds of philosophy with which Isocrates
pamphlets his orations would have excited
the admiration of Plato; and the less so,
as the rhetorician omits no opportunity of
disparaging that very science of dia-

2
οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν παρὰ τῶν βεβαίως ἡμῶν ὡς ἐμοὶς παιδικοῖς Ἰσοκράτει ἐξεγγέλλω, σὺ δὲ ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοῖς Λυσία.

ΦΑΙ. Ταῦτα ἐσται. ἄλλα ἱομεν, ἑπειδή καὶ τὸ πνεύμον ἐπίστρεφες γέγονεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένω πρέπει τοῦτο πορεύεσθαι;

ΦΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἡ ὁ πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇ μεθοί θεοῦ, δούσετε μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τάννυσθαν ἐξεῖδεν δ' οὖσα ἔκω, τοῦ ἐντὸς εἴναί μοι φάλλει. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζομεν τῶν σοφῶν, ὁ τὸ δε χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἰσὶ μοι οὖσον μὴτε φέρετε μὴτε ἀγιω δύνασθαι ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων.

Ἐτε ἄλλον τῷ δεόμεθα, ὃ Φαίδρε; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ἐνδέκαται.

ΦΑΙ. Καὶ ἐμοί ταῦτα συνεύχομαι καὶ καὶ γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἱομεν.

Ictio, which it is the object of the Phaedr. to exalt above all others.

v. τοίσδε] Of course to the theoi and δαίμονες ἐνέπειν (262 b), to Pan, Achilles, and the Illissian Muses or Nymphs, whose ἄγλαμα are mentioned in the opening scene, p. 230 ν.

dούσετε μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τάννυσθαν] Socr. prays—(1) that he may be made beautiful in the inward parts; (2) that such outward advantages as he possesses may not interfere with his soul’s health; (3) that he may count the wise wealthy; and (lastly) that the amount of gold at his disposal may be such as the temperate man, and he only, can bear and carry. The last clause of the prayer is ambiguous, for the temperate man, the man of well-regulated mind, can bear and carry more gold than another without injury to his moral being; he can also dispense with money and money’s worth better than others. And this ambiguity is, in fact, the point of the prayer, viz., that Socrates neither prays for wealth with the worldly, nor deprecates it with the Cynic. Both the sentiment and language of the petition derive illustration from a fine passage of the Critias, there, in describing the spirit and temper of the citizens of his Atlantis, Plato says, διὸ πλὴν ἄρειθα πάντα ὁπερώστας συμφέρων ἐνεύσαντο τὰ πόλεμον, καὶ μανᾶς ἐφέροντες τὸν ἄχος τῶν τοῦ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ἄγων, ἀλλ’ ἐν μέθοντες ὄπω τριψις διὰ πλούσιον ἀκράτωροι πάντων ὅσει ἐσφάλλοντο (p. 120 ν). The Commentators seem to me to mistake Plato’s drift, when they quote as in point the speech of Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Banquet iv. 34. The Cynic thinks that Aristotle once in the place of the πλούσιον καὶ τὴν πενίαν ἐσχεν ἄλλ’ ἐν ταῖς φυσικαῖς, and so far agrees with Socr. in the text; but the remainder of his speech is an ἄγων πενίας going far beyond the moderate views of Plato. Of the phrase ἄγων καὶ φέρων used sensu bono, as they say, Heid. gives one other instance from Plato, Legg. 817 λ.: τῶν τινων (τῶν περὶ τραφαίναν ποιητῶν) ἐσπαρτήσωσιν ὡντος πως ’ ἄξιον, πότερον φαινόμενον ἔσχεν τὸν πόλιν τοῖς καὶ χάραις η ἢ καὶ τὴν ποίησιν φέρῳν τα καὶ ἄγωμεν; ἢ, ἢ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν μετέχειν καὶ ἐν καὶ ἑνεχθεῖν. Both senses are to be distinguished from the much more familiar usage of ἄγων καὶ φέρων in the sense of plundering or “hurrying” an enemy’s country, or “sacking” a captured town.
APPENDIX I.

ON THE EROTIC DISCOURSES OF SOCRATES.

THE FIRST DISCOURSE OF SOCRATES.

Of the two speeches put into the mouth of Socrates in this dialogue, the first is a homily on the evil effects and inherent baseness of the practice of παιδηστία as it was understood by Lysias and followed by the Athenians of his day. The arguments adduced by Lysias had all been founded on considerations of expediency: the ἔρωμενος would gain more in fortune and lose less in reputation by complying with the entreaties of a suitor who had no real affection for him than he would by yielding to a truly impassioned admirer: he is advised, in short, to consent to dishonour for the sake of worldly advantage. Socrates artfully suppresses his indignation on hearing sentiments so cynical and immoral, pretending to have paid attention only to the style and arrangement (τὸ ῥήτουρμα) of the discourse, without heeding its subject-matter. His own counter-speech is confined to establishing the first of Lysias’s topics, “that it is not good to show favour to a suitor who is in love.” His arguments, like those of his predecessor, professedly appeal to self-interest, but to a self-interest more enlightened comprehensive and far-sighted. The vulgar ἐραστὴς is, he insists, of all companions the most disagreeable and the most pernicious. By yielding to his importunities the ἔρωμενος will deliver himself body and soul into the power of a jealous and capricious, a selfish and brutal tyrant: he will surrender all he holds most dear without an equivalent either of pleasure or profit. The pleasure, such as it is, will be reaped by the ἐραστὴς alone, while the consequences to the ἔρωμενος will be the probable wreck of his worldly prospects and bodily health, and the certain deterioration of his mental culture, “the thing which is of all most precious in the eyes
of gods and men,” 241 c. Incidentally, and as if unintentionally, Socrates paints in the blackest and we may add the truest colours that passion which was the bane of Athenian society. In Athens the list of “things, of which it is a shame even to speak,” was briefer than with us; and Socrates would have been untrue to his calling had he been deterred by prudery or fastidioseness from approaching a subject of which poets sang, men of letters wrote, and fine gentlemen in their “noctes coenaque deum” delighted to reason. The sanctity of Socrates is not the less to be acknowledged, because unalloyed with sanctimoniousness; and those who are inclined to be sceptical as to the unblemished purity of his sentiments and teaching upon this to us offensive subject, ought to have their doubts dispelled when they find the literal and not over-refined Xenophon uniting his testimony with that of Plato. Xenophon was under no temptation to represent his master as a loftier thinker or purer moralist than he really was: if his picture of Socrates is unfaithful it is either because he purposely throws into the shade the more unpopular of his characteristics—those qualities in fact which stood in the most marked contrast to the maxims and usages of his time and country: or because he occasionally sacrifices general effect to accuracy of detail. It is the more satisfactory that in the discourse on Love, put into the mouth of Socrates in Xenophon’s Banquet, we find arguments which so strikingly resemble those in the speech under our review, as to make it very likely that in both we have the actual sentiments of Socrates represented—we may even say reproduced—by his rival disciples. From both we rise with the feelings expressed by the

1 c. viii. There is this difference between the two speeches that Plato’s is addressed to the ἐρωμένος, Xenophon’s to Callias, who was in the condition of an ἐραστής. But allowing for this, the train of reasoning is substantially the same, and the resemblance in certain passages striking. Compare, for instance, the following:

Xen. § 21, οὐ μὴν ὅτι γαὶ ἀραίος ἀδήμος οὐδέ ήτι γαὶ καλὰς οὐκέτι καλὶ καὶ έρωταί: οὐκ έρωταί ἀμελεῖ, φιλίστη τιτινῖς.

§ 23, ἤλε γάρ τοι προσανατόν καὶ προσ-θεμένων ἡ φιλίας τούτην ἡ ἄλλη τούτων φυλακηφήματος παρακολουθεῖ.

§ 33, δι’ ἐνεν φιλίας συννοσία αδελφοί διάδοχοί πάντες ἑπιστάμεθα ... τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμώντων πολλαὶ μεγαλύτεροι τοῦ ἐρωμένου ... καὶ μὴν ἐν μὲν τῇ τούτοι σώματος χρῆσθαι ἓνεκτὶ τις κόρος, ἠμεν ἀνω καὶ πρός τὰ στίγματα πλησίων ταῦτα ἐκδώχη καὶ πρὸς τὰ παράκατα πάσχειν.

Plato, 240 c, λειτήρω γάρ πρεσβύτερος συνώς, κτλ. Πμ. δ. ἀρωταί μὲν δὴν πρεσβυτέρους καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑμί.

Πμ. δ. ἀρωταί ἀκόλουθοι: ἀπομονών καὶ πάντων αἰσθήσεως αἰσθανόμενων τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὅτε μεθ’ ἠδονῆς ἀφρότοις αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν.

241 c, παρά το ὅπι χρῆ, δι’ ταῦτ, ἐνυμοῦς καὶ οἴκια καὶ ἐκδικαία τῆς ἐραστῆς φiliak, δι’ οὐ μετ’ εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίω τρόπον χάρων πληρομοησίως . . . ὅλοις ἐροι ἀγαπῶν ἀπαθῶς καὶ παθὰς φιλοῦν ἐραστῆς.
Lycon of Xenophon (c. 9. 1), νή τήν Ἡραν, οὗ Σώκρατες, καλὸς τε κάγαθος δοκεῖς μεῖν άθρωπος εἶναι.

Concerning this first discourse of Socrates, we may further observe, that it is accompanied with a brief prefatory exposition of the Passion of Love. This preface, it must be allowed, does not either in matter or manner harmonize with the impressive exhortation which follows it. This Plato seems to have felt, for he has separated the preface from the main body of the discourse by a dramatic interlude. Its purpose is, however, clear. Plato meant to intimate that the ἔρως of which the first discourse treats is the son not of Venus Uranis, but rather of Venus Pandemos. It is an appetite for pleasure combined with a sensibility to beauty just sufficient to create a personal preference, but insufficient to elevate or purify the compound emotion of which it is an ingredient. Itself feeble, the Love of Beauty derives its strength and fire from its baser but more powerful companion. It is when the delight in beauty is thus alloyed with appetite and strengthened by the alloy, that to the irresistible passion resulting from the combination the name of Love is ordinarily assigned. This is probably the meaning of the very obscure etymological definition of ἔρως which concludes the prefatory exposition referred to (p. 238 c).

We have seen that Socrates in this speech confines himself to one of the two topics handled by Lysias. He proves convincingly ὅτι ἄρη τῷ ἐρῶτι χαράκεσθαι; but he omits to show ὅτι ἄρη χαράκεσθαι τῷ μη ἐρῶτι. His motives for this omission are to us obvious, but it is not his way to explain his true motives. Accordingly he affects an exceeding horror at his own impiety, and deep contrition for the wrong he has done to one of the Immortals. "Is not Eros," he exclaims, "a god and a son of Aphrodite?" "So we are told," replies Phaedrus. "Lysias does not tell us so, nor does that discourse which fell indeed from my lips, but represents your views of the nature of Eros rather than my own, for you bewitched me, and I spoke under a spell." In other words, your views of Love and those of Lysias are unworthy and ignoble: there is another and purer passion of which you reckon not, a passion alone entitled to the sacred name which you abuse.

1 Compare Xen. Symp. c. viii. §§ 9, 10.
2 This passage conveys a bitter reflection upon the ἔρωτικον λόγον of Lysias, and perhaps upon other popular compositions of the day. Whether it is fair to read in it a sweeping condemnation of the so-called sophists is another matter. So far as we know, Lysias was the first to commit to writing discourses of this description, and it is an injustice to Protagoras and Procles and Hippias to make them accomplices in the offence. That the speech of Lysias is in a very legitimate sense of the word sophistical we may freely grant; but that Plato produces it as a specimen of
This sudden outburst of pious remorse will surprise no one who has studied either the Socrates of Plato or the Socrates of Xenophon. Though something of irony is mixed with it, it is not wholly ironical. Socrates never affected to have shaken off the religious prejudices of his time and country; he even added to them some private fancies of his own. Though the δαιμόνια, the voice or inward monitor of which he often speaks, was not, as later and particularly Christian writers have assumed, a natal Genius or familiar Demon, he doubtless supposed it to come from some external and supernatural source. And as regards the god Eros in particular, he repeatedly avows himself his servant and votary. On this point his language is so strong as to have laid him open to grave misapprehensions on the part of his contemporaries. In Xenophon’s Banquet he calls himself άθεαδός of Eros, an adept in all Love’s mysteries, and declares that he cannot remember the time at which he was not in love with some one or other—οὕτως έρως χρόνον εἰπεύν ἐν φ' οὖσκ έρως τινος διατελά. In the Theages again he tells us that the only science he is thoroughly acquainted with is the Erotic (συμμαραί τινος μαθηματικος)—“a poor thing, but his own.” Neither must we forget the eloquent peroration of his speech in Plato’s Symposium—καὶ αὐτός τιμώ τα έρωτικα, καὶ διαφερόντως ἄσκω, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρακελεύσαι, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ ἀλή ἔγκιθοι τίνα δύναμιν καὶ ἀνθρείαν τοῦ έρωτος καθ' ὅσον οἷος τ' εἰμι. In the same dialogue he names Alcibiades as the object of his then ruling passion. We know how Alcibiades had misunderstood him, and how he had been undeceived. No one nowadays puts so gross a meaning upon the words of Socrates, but there is another misconception against which we shall do well to guard. The έρως of Socrates is not that mystical emotion which Plato paints in the highly imaginative mythical discourse which we shall presently consider. If less exalted and poetical, it was more unequivocally pure. It was not the beauty of Alcibiades, but his splendid mental endowments, his great capacity for good or for evil, which excited the admiration and the solicitude of Socrates. Οἱ εὔφραγοντες μάλλον φιλοτιη τῶν εὔφραγονον is the deep and true remark of Aristotle; and it was the memory of what he had done and suffered for his brilliant but erring friend which warmed the heart of Socrates towards Alcibiades, and prompted him to ever greater efforts in his behalf. This affection was not diminished by

the general teaching of those whom he would have styled Sophists, is an assumption which none but loose or prejudiced thinkers will be disposed to make. The bearing of this last observation will be intelligible to those who have been in the habit of reading their Plato by the light of Stallbaurn’s notes.

1 Xen. Conv. vili. 2. 2 p. 128. 3 p. 212 b.
the grievous faults in the character of its object, and would have remained equally strong had Alcibiades been as ugly as a Satyr; as indeed Theactetus, another of his ἔφανεν, seems to have been. For an attachment like this, φιλία seemed and was too cold a word. Socrates could find no other name for it than ἔρως, and he represents himself as the ἐραστής of Alcibiades accordingly. In like manner, Euripides does not scruple to denote by the same terms the passionate love of a son for a tender and noble mother—

ἐραστὴς μητρὸς παιδεῖς, οὐ γὰρ ἄστρ ἔρως
tou ρωτὸς ἄληος ὅστις ἡδίων ἐραστὴς.

That Socrates was to this extent serious in professing himself the votary of Eros there can be little doubt. But with this seriousness was mixed in large measure that humorous affectation of qualities the opposite of his own which the Greeks knew as the εἰρωνεία of Socrates. Intellectually the acutest man of his age, he represents himself in all companies as the dullest person present. Morally the purest, he affects to be the slave of passion, and borrows the language of gallantry to describe a benevolence too exalted for the comprehension of his contemporaries. He is by turns an ἐραστής, a προφυγός, a μαστροπάς, a μαστικός, disguising the sanctity of his true vocation by names suggestive of vile or ridiculous images. The same spirit of whimsical paradox leads him, in Xenophon's Banquet, to argue that his own satyr-like visage was superior in beauty to that of the handsomest man present. That this irony was to some extent calculated is more than probable; it disarmed ridicule by anticipating it, it alloyed jealousy and propitiated envy; and it possibly procured him admission into gay circles from which a more solemn teacher would have been excluded. But it had for its basis a real greatness of soul, a hearty and unaffected disregard of popular opinion, a perfect disinterestedness, an entire abnegation of self. He made himself a fool that others by his folly might be made wise: he humbled himself to the level of those among whom his work lay that he might raise some few among them to his own level: he was "all things to all men, if by any means he might win some." "Of you who are present," says Alcibiades in the Symposium, "there is not one who understands Socrates: but I will unfold to you his true character. You all see or think you see that Socrates is a pas-

7 Theaet. 143 ζ. How austere his view of the duties of an ἐραστής we see from Lysis 240 ε, τατεινοῦσα καὶ συστέλλωντα, κ.τ.λ. He is to "minish and keep low" his παιδία.
8 Eroth. 960. 9 Xen. Symp. iii. 10. 1 Theaet. 161 ξ αλ.
9 Crat. v. 2 p. 216 c, foll.
sionate admirer of beautiful persons, that he is ever in their company, and professes to be enslaved by their charms: again, his ignorance is boundless—he knows absolutely nothing. Yet all this is counterfeit: it is but the grotesque Silenus-mask which conceals the features of the god within: for if you remove the covering, how shall I describe to you, my friends and boon companions, the excellent virtue you will find within. I assure you that if a youth be ever so handsome, his beauty is nothing to Socrates: he looks upon it with a contempt you cannot fathom. So too if a man be rolling in wealth, or be remarkable for any other attribute which the vulgar admire and envy—all such advantages he counts as dross, and their possessors as mere cyphers. Thus does he spend his whole life dissembling and playing with the rest of mankind. Whether any of you have seen him in his serious mood, when he has thrown aside the mask and disclosed the divine features beneath it, is more than I know. But I have seen them, and I can tell you that they seemed to me glorious and marvellous and truly godlike in their beauty."

This splendid éloge⁴, artfully put by Plato in the mouth of Alcibiades, doubtless represents the feelings with which Socrates was regarded by the philosopher himself. But his picture of Socrates as a man was more faithful than his picture of Socrates as a philosopher. Plato was not content, like Xenophon, with reproducing from memory or from written memoranda, the doctrines which actually fell from his master’s lips. When Socrates died, the philosophical education of Plato had but completed its first stage. The acquaintance with other more ambitious systems which his travels enabled him to acquire or to perfect⁵, though it never disturbed his reverence for the teacher of his youth, greatly enlarged his views of philosophy and the philosophic calling: and as, in his earlier compositions, Socrates had ever been the νος τῆς διαρμήθες⁶, the ruling and informing spirit of the dialogue, he continued in his later writings to credit his first master with all the results of thought and study with which his own researches or the conversation of others from time to time enriched him. The alternative course would have been to have spoken in his own person or in that of some other philosopher. And this he has occasionally done, as in the Timaeus, where a Pythagorean, and in the Sophistes and Politicus, where an Eleatic Philosopher conducts the dialogue, to say nothing of his

⁴ I have ventured to call it so, in spite of the foolish and ill-natured remark of Theodoret, δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐν τῷ Σωκράτους ἐφανε τῷ Πλάτωνι μὲν ἐγουραθεὶς, ἐγὼ δὲ φείδοι τὸν Σωκράτους εἶν τὸς ἀντίκεισες. De Virt. activ. p. 174.

⁵ A locus classicus on this subject is Cíc. de Repub. i. 10. 16.

⁶ The terms by which, as is well known, Plato denoted the young Aristotel.
latest work, the Laws, in which Plato himself appears in the thin
disguise of a “Stranger from Athens.” But these are exceptional
instances; and in the majority of the works written during his
maturity, Socrates occupies the same place of honour as in the more
juvenile dialogues.

THE SECOND DISCOURSE OF SOCRATES.

This Discourse is a striking instance of the “quidlibet audendi
potestas” which Plato assumed in his character of a philosophic
artist. The doctrines it is intended to convey were specially and
exclusively his own; they are not only non-Socratic, but they are
precisely those in which the distinction between Platonism and pure
Socraticism is to be looked for and indeed is affirmed by Aristotle
to reside. The imagery under which those doctrines are conveyed
is drawn from the most various sources, Eleatic, Pythagorean,
Orphic: but the doctrines themselves are his own, and may be
traced with sufficient distinctness through the many-coloured veil
of their allegorical presentment.

In endeavouring to analyze this speech, we should perhaps con-
sult clearness by taking the philosophical before the mythical, the
thing signified before the sign. The two are, however, so interwoven
that it is no easy task to keep them entirely apart. It was Plato’s
design in this discourse to construct a psychological theory of the
passion of Love: to analyze it into its constituent elements, and to
refer each of such elements to that region of the human soul to
which it rightfully belonged. In order to this, he presents us with
a statement of the divine origin and antecedent as well as prospective
existence of the soul; of its threefold nature, and of the relation
de jure as well as de facto of the inferior to the higher faculties.
Plato’s Ethical theory is based upon Psychology, as indeed all sound
Ethical science must be: it was therefore in his view impossible to
consider Love in its moral until it had been viewed in its psycho-
logical aspect; and as it was not his way to isolate the various
branches of philosophy, but rather to consider them in their vital
connexion with each other and with their common root, we must not
be surprised if we are presented at an early stage of the discourse
with a concise exposition of the nature and true conception of
the soul or vital principle. This investigation is prefaced by a dis-
cussion on Madness. It had been assumed in the former speeches
that the Lover was mad. The position is granted, but that, it is

7 At a later stage of the discussion Plato represents Socrates as attributing
the speeches he had uttered to the direct inspiration of the local deities, &c., καὶ Ἔγωγε
ὁ Φ. αἰτίωμαι τοὺς ἀποτομοὺς θεοὺς, κ.τ.λ. 262 d.
ON THE EROTIC

urged, is no reason for slighting the Lover in comparison with his cool and sane rival. Madness is not per se an evil. There is a madness of heavenly, as there is one of earthly origin: one which raises a man above, as well as one which sinks him below his normal self. There is a madness of the seer, a madness of the priest, a madness of the poet, and from these three manifestations of madness have flowed the choicest blessings to mankind. Love too is an ecstasy, a sacred rapture, a madness inspired by heaven. Its origin is divine, its result the highest bliss. This, says Socrates, it will be our business to demonstrate, and our proof will be such as to satisfy the educated philosopher, however it may fail of convincing the disputer of the law courts or the wrangler of the schools. But a proof satisfactory to the philosopher must not rest on mere popular principles. Love being a condition of the Soul, we must first inquire what soul is, and what are its ἐργα καὶ πάθη, the functions, active and passive, of which it is capable.

In the theory of Love hereafter to be developed, the antecedent immortality of the Soul is postulated. This position accordingly Socrates begins the second part of his discourse by affirming. His reasoning is σοφοὶς πιστῆ, in other words it would have been accepted as satisfactory by minds trained in the loftier schools of Grecian speculation, as in that of Pythagoras, from which the technical terms employed seem to have come. It is assumed, as self-evident, that soul or life is the first cause of all motion, matter its opposite being capable of receiving and propagating, but not of originating, motion. But if it is the first cause of motion, Soul moves itself, otherwise we must assume a cause of motion earlier than the first, which is a contradiction. Moreover, motion or activity being of the essence of Soul, it cannot cease to move without ceasing to be. And if it cease to be, the course of Nature must stand still. Neither, as γάνεις is a form of κάρης, can Soul ever have come into being. It is ἄγεννος as well as ἀδιάφθερος, antecedently as well as prospectively immortal. To sum up its definition (οὐσία, λόγος) in brief,

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1 p. 244 a. 2 p. 245 b.
1 εὔστοχει τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαίη μανία διὰθεου. 245 b.
2 ἄνωθεν μὲν ἀποτόμως συνόφοις δὲ πιστῇ. 245 c. The word ἄνωθεν is applied both to the βάργῳ and the eristic sophist—and here perhaps includes both. It denotes cleverness without wisdom, talent without insight, acuteness without depth. ἄνωθεν is moreover a term perpetually applied by Plato to his opponents, philosophical or otherwise, and perhaps in this place is equivalent to the 'plebeii philosophi' of whom Cicero speaks in his well-known comment on this passage. Tusc. c. 23, Licet concurrant plebeii unus philosophi, sic enim il qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia disident appellandì videntur.
3 ἀντικειμένος is found in the fragments of Philolas, who also defined the soul as an ἀντικειμένος ἀρθμός. It may be observed that the remains of this Philosopher's writings are accepted as genuine by most historians of philosophy, all the Pythagorean fragments besides his being either certainly or probably spurious.
Soul is an essence self-moving and self-moving, without beginning and without end of existence.

This argument, oracular in its tone and dogmatic in its method, is not, as Plato admits, sufficient of itself to convince the gainsayer and skeptic. It assumes, on the part of the reader, a familiarity with such dialectical investigations as we meet with, for instance, in the Phaedo. To an audience thus prepared, the σοφοί of whom he speaks, this argument, he thinks, is convincing. We must therefore regard it as a résumé of principles and results, thrown into the form of an à priori demonstration, of which the premisses are assumed rather than proved. But with this allowance, there is nothing to which exception can fairly be taken. The brief authoritative tone is an echo of the earlier philosophers, such as Anaxagoras and the Pythagoreans, and the exordium is pitched in the same key as the sequel of the Discourse. In such compositions, which “fill up the intervals of severer investigation,” Plato himself tells us that analogy and probability (the εἰκότων μιθῶν ἰδέα) are admissible: and if we interpret ψυχή to mean Soul in the abstract, the animating principle of the universe, most persons will accept both to the premisses and the conclusion of the argument.

But between the eternity of the animating principle and the individual immortality of the Souls of Gods and men, there is plainly a wide interval, which Plato cannot be said to have bridged over, at least in this Discourse. The steps that are wanting seem to be supplied in a passage of the Laws, though after a fashion not satisfactory to the modern mind. From this curious passage, occurring in the gravest and most dogmatic of his works, we gather Plato’s deliberate opinion, that the rational soul by which the material universe is informed and governed is distributed into a number of distinct divine personalities, to each of which is assigned the government of some one or other of the heavenly bodies. Whether these divine or “angelic” souls are linked each to its own material body, or whether, unfettered by matter, they guide the stars in their orbits by the exercise of some marvellous powers transcending human analogy, is an alternative which the philosopher proposes without determining. He seems however in this place of the Laws

4 Timaeus 59 c.
5 Book x. 896 σ, where the λόγος ψυχῆς is said to be, ἡ δυναμένη αὐτή αὐτὴν κυρίων κυρίοις.
6 At least the opinion of his old age; for in the Laws the mythical matter of earlier dialogues is recast in a dogmatic form. Dialectic and Poetry seem to blend in Metaphysics, losing their vitality in the process. The Myths of Plato’s mature life thus forms a transition from his early dialectical scepticism to the dogmatism of his declining years.
7 899 a, ἡ τρίτη, αὐτή ψυχή σώματος οδον (ἡ ψυχή) ἐξουσία δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερβαλλομένα τὰ όματα ποθεῖν. 
to lean to the latter supposition, and what is more curious still, we find him attributing to un-bodied Soul the possession of passions and feelings, to the exercise of which, from other parts of his writings, we should rather have inferred that he deemed a corporeal investiture indispensable.

However this be, the tripartition of the Soul into νοῦς θυμός and ἐπιθυμία which is lucidly set forth in the *Republic*, and is here figured by the charioteer and his pair of steeds—is predicated both of the Divine Spirits who lead, and of the as yet in one sense unbodied Souls who accompany them in the heavenly journey. Neither the created Gods, nor the souls formed in their image, are pure intelligences. Both are the subjects of analogous passions, both moved by anger and desire, by impulse and appetite, for by these terms the θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, figured by the two horses, may in their greatest generality be most aptly denoted. But as we gather from the mythical account of the Creation given in the *Timaeus* (p. 30 foll.), the Gods were the handiwork of the supreme Artificer of the Universe, who delegated to these subordinate deities the task of forming the inferior orders of the rational creation. To this end God, we are told, created a certain definite number of Souls or distinct personalities, which he “sowed” (ἴσπευρε) among the stars⁴, assigning to each soul its proper habitation. The God to whom each particular heavenly body belonged, attached these souls to perishable bodies, endowed with organs of sense, and with limbs capable of moving in all directions through space. The souls of men and animals, it would seem, have all at one time animated a celestial body, which they are enabled to re-enter after the completion of a millennial cycle, and so to return εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου ὀξύντων ἀστρον¹.

The Platonic doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul is thus, we find, a doctrine of Metempsychosis, derived possibly from Oriental sources by Pythagoras, but at any rate reaching Plato through Pythagorean channels⁵. The personal identity is unaffected by the successive incarnations, but the personal consciousness is liable to a periodic eclipse, at any rate to serious obscurations in the passage of

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⁴ *Laws*, p. 807 δ, where to Soul *before* it is linked to body, not only will, reflection, opinion, &c., are attributed, but also joy and sorrow, courage and fear, love and hate.
⁵ *Tim*. 42 ν, ἴσπευρε τοῦς μὲν εἰς Ἡλίου τοῖς δὲ εἰς Ξελήνων, τοὺς δὲ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ὄντα ὑπὸ ἀφυγμαχον.¹

¹ A notion this, it may be observed, very different from that of emanation and absorption, with which some interpreters are inclined to identify it.
² This he intimates plainly enough, when he makes Timaeus, a Pythagorean contemporary of Socrates, the mouthpiece of these doctrines. A like intimiation is conveyed in the *Phaedo*, by the introduction of the Pythagoreans Cebes and Simmias, of whom the former is mentioned in the Epistles as one of Plato’s Italian intimates.
the soul from one tabernacle to another. The Gods of the Mythus are twelve in number; but Plato in the Timaeus knows but of seven planets, the sun and moon included, for, as is well known, the earth was the centre of the planetary system in the eyes of most astronomers from Plato to Copernicus.\(^3\) In explanation of the number twelve, a later Platonist\(^4\) supposes the heaven divided by twelve concentric spheres, the outermost being that of the fixed stars, ἡ ἁπλανὴς σφαῖρα, next to that the sphere or orbit of Saturn (Cronos), then those of Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, the Sun and Moon, after these the sphere of Fire, of Air, of Water, and last of all the Earth, also ἁπλανή, though revolving, as Plato taught, upon her axis.\(^5\) It is not impossible that he may have intended this twelvefold distribution in the mythus before us, but as his purpose is not cosmical but moral, it was not worth his while to explain his meaning fully. It is however more than probable that by the αἰφανοῦ νόσου (247 c), towards which at fixed periods the heavenly procession moves, he meant the outer surface of the sphere in which the fixed stars (the ἄστρα proper) are situated, and in the fields of space above he has placed the eternal Ideas on which the Gods and the more favoured of their mortal attendants feed their gaze. This part of the tale must be taken as purely figurative. The ideas were in Plato’s view exempt from all conditions of time and space. They are the objects of pure intelligence, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνο θεοτά ὑπό, “spiritual and spiritually discerned,” and therefore stand in no relation to the fixed or any other stars. In truth, whatever may have been Plato’s cosmical or astronomical theories, too much stress should not be laid upon the physical details, which belong, for the purposes of this mythus, entirely to the poetical investiture, the “machinery” of the tale. Nor are the discrepancies between this mythus and that in the Timaeus (quoted above) of any real importance. Whether, for instance, we regard the number of the twelve Gods as denoting the number of the spheres, or as introduced in mere accommodation to popular belief, is of little moment. Nor are the names of such of the twelve as Plato condescends to name,—Jupiter, Apollo, Mars, Juno, and Vesta,—to be pressed into accordance with any statements, Pythagorean or otherwise, which we may elsewhere

\(^{3}\) The Pythagoreans made the earth a planet, as well as the sun, moon, &c., and conceived them all to revolve round a central fire, their Hestia.


\(^{5}\) Tim. 40 π, γῆς δὲ τοιοῦτον μὲν ἡμετέρω, ἐλλοιμένην δὲ περὶ τὴν διὰ πάντας πόλων τοσάτην. Aristotle understood εἰς. to mean revolving (κυκλώμενη). The later Platonists interpret στριγγλώμενη, but this sense would have required the perfect participle. V. Arist. de Caelo, 2. 13, εἰς αὑσθαναι καὶ κινεῖσθαι. Aristoph. Nub. 761, μὴ πέρι περὶ σωλῶν εἶλαι τὸν γεώμεν δέ. Hestia, who in the Phaedric mythus μέτει ἐν τοῖς ὁλοῖς μόνη, will in this place represent the Earth.
meet with; for even in the Timaeus, a professedly physical work, Plato speaks lightly of the received nomenclature of Olympus. The really important feature in the mythus, and that for the sake of which its gorgeous machinery was constructed, is the doctrine of the divine original and subsequent fall of the human soul. The souls which follow in the train of their respective liege lords are called in one place ἓληκοντες. They hold a subordinate rank in the heavenly hierarchy, being united to bodies of spiritual or ethereal substance, similar to those of the Gods themselves, but seemingly alloyed with baser matter. The teams of the Gods obey the reins, and travel with equable and evenly poised motion (ἰσοφρόνως εὐήρα ὀντα πορεύεσθαι, 247 τ.) but those of the attendant spirits are thrown out of balance by the greater weight of the steed which “partakes of baseness” (τὸς κακὸς μετέχει). Hence their ranks are disordered, their cars collide, and their plumage is ruffled and broken, insomuch that, a few favoured spirits excepted, they fall from sphere to sphere, lighting finally on the earth and there entering for the first time into tabernacles of human flesh. All souls, on their first descent from the empyrean, are incarnated as men, for all have had some glimpse of the eternal Ideas, and it is the prerogative of man to see the Idea as revealed in the objects of sense, the One in the Many—διὰ πολλῶν ἑαυτοί αἴσθησεων ἐὰν ἐν λογισμῷ κατοροίμενον, 249 τ., a privilege of which the irrational part of creation is ex vi termini incapable.

But the destinies of these fallen Souls vary, it seems, in a kind of compound proportion to the greatness and excellency of the heavenly Power in whose train they have followed, and to the clearer or more imperfect manifestations which have been afforded them of the supercelestial verities. Those who have been enrolled under Jove (Zeus), and with him have gained the upper surface of the spheres heavens, after their fall—a fall occasioned in their case partly by some fatal mishap (ῥοτχιγι τω), and not wholly by the pravity of steed or driver—enter the body of some man of the highest, that is of Jovial, temperament, and lead a life answerable to their glorious antecedents. They addict themselves to the pursuit of

7 Even Aristotle thought that the heavenly bodies were composed of a substance purer and more divine than any one of the four elements—earth, water, air, or fire. This he denotes as the Fifth Substance or Essence, πνεύμα ὄλα, whence the Latin quinta essentia and our quintessence. It is not until their fall to our earth that the souls in this mythus are invested with an earthy body (σαῦρα γενίσκαν λαβοῦσαι). Yet from the first there is some mixture of evil in their composition, and in the Timaeus we are told that their union with the "spiritual body" they receive even in their original abode is dissoluble: whereas the souls of the created Gods are ἀληθή τοῦ γε ἐκλεύτου. 248 τ. c.
8 This follows from 232 τ., οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλα ἄλα τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἐνακτῆντες γιγάντων τῆν ὑπεραυλὴν τῶν ὁπ' ἄμπερ ἱππάμενον, where the comm. refer to Philib. 30 τ.
Wisdom or of Beauty, or, finally, they indulge the passion for beautiful youths in a pure or philosophic spirit—παιδεραστών μετὰ φιλοσοφίας.  

What then is this Platonic παιδεραστία, as set forth in the Phaedrus? It has been said already that it is a passion less free from alloy than that ἐρως with which Socrates was inspired by the young men of genius with whom he associated in the course of his missionary labours. In the first place the Platonic ἐρως is excited by the aspect of corporeal beauty. All beauty of face or form is according to Plato a copy or reflection of that perfect or ideal beauty which the Soul beheld in the heavenly places before her incarceration in the flesh. Beauty it is true is not the only 'Idea' thus incarnate. Wisdom, and we may suppose Virtue and Good too, have each their appropriate material antitypes; and if the eye could see them, as it beholds the beauty of outward form, they would stir the soul with "throes of direst love." But as none of the bodily senses can vie in distinctness with that of sight, which brings the mind as it were face to face with its objects—and as of all the great archetypal forms Beauty is the only one which has access to the soul by this channel—we cannot wonder that warmer emotions are excited by it than by any other embodied Idea. It is the privilege of Beauty, says Plato, to be at once ἐσφαράγματος and ἐραυμάτως—most manifest and most lovable (250 d). The aspect of Beauty, however, works diversely on different natures. Those from whose souls, by lapse of time or contagion of the flesh, the memory of the glorious imagery they once beheld has faded, are stirred by no sacred awe at the aspect of beautiful forms, nor are they carried back in spirit as into the presence of the primal Beauty: they are flushed with brute desire, and not ashamed or afraid to abandon themselves to pleasures from which Nature revolts. Whereas the true ἀλταπτης, he in whose soul the memory of the unveiled images—more august than those which the Elensian hierophant discloses to the trembling mystae—still lives fresh and undimmed, is smitten with a sacred horror akin to that which he felt when face to face with the divine archetype: he worships its image here below, and

1 249 a compared with 248 d.
2 ὅταν δυνατέν πρόσωπον ἅγιον κάλλος ἐν μεμηματόν, κ. τ. Λ., 251 a.
3 Λέοντες ἄδεια τοῦ ἐρωτηματικοῦ, κ. τ. Λ., 250 d.
4 250 e, οἷς ἀλλὶς ἐνθεύς ἐκεῖσθε ἔρεται πρὸς ἅγια τὰ κάλλος ... ἢ δόγμα τὸ ἀριστερόν, διὰθερόν παραδοσεῖ καὶ ἂνα ἐφορμῇ προσωπομολόγων ἰδίων ἐλειασθῇ παρὰ φόρον Ἕλληνι διότι.

VOL. I.
but that he fears to be counted mad, would offer sacrifice to the idol of his heart.\footnote{6}

In this passage and in the sequel we have no difficulty in discerning the two Loves, the \textit{σκοῖας} and the \textit{δίκης \textit{φιλία}}, which, according to Plato, it is the chief merit of this Erotic Discourse to have set forth\footnote{7}. In both there is a sensuous element, which in lower natures gains the mastery and so gives character to the whole complex passion; whereas in those whose organization follows a higher type it is subdued or even absorbed by those emotions which are the natural allies of the reason. True Love is not therefore, according to Plato, a mere \textit{φιλία} or friendly regard, warmed and heightened by congeniality of temper or pursuit; it is a passion which absorbs the whole complex nature of man, which carries him out of himself, causing him to spurn all restraints of convention or worldly expediency, to overlap every barrier, except those which his own reason and conscience erect, between his passion and its object. This, were that object other than is here supposed, would be a picture as philosophically true as it is vividly portrayed; in fact no philosopher has trodden this, the debatable ground of morality, with so firm a step before or since. No man can quarrel with Plato for refusing the name of \textit{φιλία} to any passion from which the physical element is excluded: the dark spot in his theory is the direction which that desire is supposed to take. But to have represented the other sex as the object of a refined and exalted passion is more than was to be expected from an Athenian of the fourth century before Christ. Even Plutarch, who elsewhere shows a juster feeling on these subjects, in his Eroticus speaks disdainfully of what he calls the Love of the Gymnasion\footnote{8}. This perversity of sentiment has been traced partly to the institution of the Gymnasium, and partly to the semi-Oriental depression to which the female sex, at least in Athens and the Ionian States, was condemned. Such women as Aristophanes depicts were certainly ill-fitted to inspire a lofty or virtuous affection; and passion being thus forbidden to flow in the channels Nature had marked out, it became of necessity erratic and perverse. This state of manners and sentiments caused to Plato the deepest solicitude; and in the Laws he speaks in terms of unequivocal reprobation of the passion alluded to, while he places

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{6} πρῶταν μὲν \textit{φιλία} γαὶ τῇ τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτῶν διείσταν, εἰτα προσορῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ὑφέται, κ.π.λ. 251 Α.
\item \footnote{7} 265 D, 266 Δ.
\item \footnote{8} Plut. \textit{Erot.} 750 C, ἔρωτος ἀληθινὸν οἴδεν τὴν γυναικεικήν ὑπέεστιν, οὐδὲ \textit{ἐρως} ὑπὸς \textit{γυναῖκ} ἀφηλεῖ \textit{φιλία} προσκυνεῖται ἐκ παθένου. Πάντως, \textit{ἔρως} ... εὐφυοῦς καὶ ἄπαθής \textit{φιλίας} ὑφάμενος εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλίας τελειώτη.\end{itemize}
restraints on the commerce of opposite sexes far more stringent than any legislator before his time had thought practicable or even desirable. It is satisfactory to find that, before the close of its course, so great a mind had thus run itself clear of taint. In the Republic,—the work of his mature, as the Laws was the offspring of his advanced age,—his views on these subjects are expressed with something of hesitation; and though it is clear in what direction his moral instincts pointed, in one place at least he makes concessions which we must lament to the popular sentiment of the day.

These remarks may serve to throw some light on the concluding portion of the Erotic Discourse, that portion of it which stands most in need of apology. But in judging of this passage we must not leave out of account a consideration which Plato himself suggests to us in other parts of the Dialogue. We have already seen that this entire Discourse is intended as a pattern of philosophical Rhetoric. Now, one condition of a true Rhetoric is, that it shall adapt its arguments to the character of the hearer: thus it shall know ὃς ὑπ' ὅλων λόγου πείθεται (271 B). The hearer is in this case a man of passionate and excitable temperament, of tastes genial but imperfectly refined, and of faculties rather receptive than original. For Phædrus’ sake, Socrates tells us, he has been compelled to use a diction more poetical than was meet (διότι μετὰ ποιητικότερος τειν ἔφαγασκαμένος διὰ Φαίδρου χρῆσθαι); and for Phædrus’ sake, as we may well suppose, he has ventured into regions which might else have remained untrod. That this is no mere fancy, appears from Plato’s language in another place (265 B)—a passage which sums up in brief nearly all that is worth saying on this subject. After a short résumé of his theory of madness in its human or morbid, and in its divine aspect, he proceeds thus:—“Of all these manifestations of madness, the Erotic we pronounced the best: we then gave a figu-

9 τὸ τῶν ἀλβίων πάμπαν ἀφελομέθ’ ἂν, τὸ δὲ γυναικῶν, κ.τ.λ. Legg. viii. 841 b.
1 By this I would not be understood to favour the idle calumnies which anti-Platonists like Athenaeus invented or propagated. I think the tradition preserved by one of his biographers more probable than these: Πλάτων δ’ ἐφαιδρός λέγεται μὴ γάμον τινὰ μὴ δείξῃ διήλθην σώματος καθάπατ άναγέλθαι. Hesych. Miles. Vit. Plat. Init. The epigrams attributed to Plato, even if they are his, prove nothing; and some of them, among the rest that to Archelaus, have been attributed with greater probability to other authors. Nor, had not his character been free from stain, would Aristotle have spoken of him as of ἀνθρόπῳ ὁδ’ οὖν οἶνῳ τοῖς κακοῖς θέματι.
2 See Republ. v. p. 498 b.
3 p. 255 foll.
4 It seems impossible that Plato can seriously have entertained the paradox, that the ταῖς ἐρωτωκιας was a necessary step towards moral perfection. All that can fairly be gathered from his words is, that those who struggle victoriously with appetite, will come out from the conflict stronger and happier than they were before it commenced—that the trials of the soul are the occasions of its triumphs. Compare A. Butler’s Lectures, ii. p. 238.
rative description, which I know not how to characterize, of the
madness of the Lover, in which I doubt not we obtained some hold
of the truth, though it is probable enough that in some directions we
went astray: and so on the whole we concocted a Discourse not
altogether unimpressive or unconvincing, and may flatter ourselves
that we have gratified our Lord and Master Eros with a mythic
hymn disfigured neither by want of skill nor want of piety.

There remain two points which need further elucidation: the
“tripartition” of the Soul, and the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. We have
seen that the charioteer and his two steeds figure to us the three
principles (εἰσθήσεις) which Plato in the Republic designates as λόγος or
τὸ λογιστικὸν, θυμός or τὸ θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμία. Of these the first
and last are easily intelligible; but a few words on the second of the
three may not be out of place. The author of the Magna Moralia
attributed to Aristotle, presents us at the commencement of that
treatise with a very concise sketch of the history of antecedent
ethical speculation. Moral Philosophy, he tells us, originated in the
Pythagorean schools; it was then taken up by Socrates, whose
doctrines were modified and greatly improved by Plato. The Pytha-
gorean theory, he says, was mixed with much alien matter. They
conceived that the virtues were so many numbers. For instance,
Justice was with them a square number (ἀριθμὸς ἱσάκος ἵσος). The
doctrine of Socrates, though less fantastic, was not less arbitrary;
for he insisted that all the virtues were but modifications of Science.
For instance, Temperance (σωφροσύνη) was the knowledge of what was
really pleasant or painful; Valour (ἀνδρεία) was the Science of what
was really formidable or the contrary; Justice, of that which might
or might not lawfully be done (τῶν νομίμων τε καὶ μὴ). These three
examples are given us by Xenophon in the Memorabilia: but the
critique which follows is Aristotle’s. “In this way,” he observes,
“Socrates ignores and virtually annihilates sentiment and passion”
(which are of course essential ingredients in human nature). This
error, according to Aristotle, Plato saw and avoided; for he took
pains to distinguish the rational from the irrational part of man’s
nature, and he assigned to each of these two principles their appro-
priate Virtues (ἀντίμενον ἑκάστῳ τάς προσηκοστάς ἀρετᾶς). In the
Allegory of the Phaedrus, the charioteer is of course the rational

5 τάχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλασε παραφέρόμενοι.
6 That of Lysias was neither μετρος nor εὐφημος. It was coarse in sentiment
and feeble in execution.
7 This Socratic paradox was revived by the Stoics. Compare Galen, Hipp. et
Plat. T. v. p. 515, Kühn. And ib. p. 595. Both these passages, as so much else
in Galen, are highly interesting to the student of philosophical opinion.
DISCOURSES OF SOCRATES.

(τὸ λόγον ἔχον), while the two steeds divide between them the irrational principle, under its twofold aspect of θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία. It has been usual to translate θυμὸς by the word 'irascibility,' and θυμοειδῆς by 'irascible' or some equivalent Latin term. Hence Bacon, who apparently read his Plato in a Latin interpretation, censures him for using a term of too restricted meaning. Plato ought rather, he says, to have used a word equivalent to the Latin 'animositas.' Now it so happens that Plato's θυμοειδῆς is better translated by 'animositas' than by 'ira' or 'irascibilita;' in fact, 'animositas' represents the meaning of the Greek better than any Latin word which we can imagine; and Bacon, who thought to censure Plato, has merely translated him. Anger, it is evident, is only one of many manifestations of the passionate or impulsive principle; and though in the Fourth Book of the Republic, p. 440 seq., where the theory is first expounded, anger or irascibility is the manifestation chiefly dwelt upon, it is evident from other passages in the same work that Plato intended by his θυμοειδῆς a much more comprehensive principle. Thus in B. vii. p. 548 v. we find φιλονεκία and φιλοτυμία, emulation and ambition, expressly referred to this principle (ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδῆς κρατοῦντος φιλονεκία καὶ φιλοτυμία). An irascible man is not necessarily ambitious or a lover of distinction, though it may be true that a capacity of anger is an element in an ambitious man's constitution. But in p. 553 c, βαιμάξει καὶ τιμάω, are mentioned among the functions of the very same principle. Now, if we turn to the Phaedrus, we find the nobler courser characterized as τιμῶν ἔραστης μετὰ σοφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ ἠλπισμὸς δόξης ἐπαίροι: predicates evidently very inappropriate to the mere passion of anger, but agreeing perfectly with the attributes just cited from the

8 This is one of the dichotomies which Plato so greatly affected. We have—

ψυχὴ

τὸ λόγον ἔχον

τὸ ἔλογον

δίσων

διάνοια?

θυμὸς

ἐπιθυμία

Comp. Heraclitus de Alleg. Hom.

9 "Sentientia introducta a Platone, qua intellectus in cerebro, tanquam in arce collocatus est; animositas (quae ille satis irascendum vocavit, cum tumori et superbia sed propria in corde; concupiscencia autem et sensibilitas in jedynoc, necque prorsus contemptam est necque cupida recipienda."—Bacon Ang. Sc. 1. iv. c. 1, extr. Plato gives us the rationale of his own nomenclature in Repub. 580 e, τὸ ἔλογον δὲ πολυείδειαν, κ.τ.λ.

1 Compare Arist. Pol. vii. c. 7, ὁ θυμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλοτυμεῖν, αἰτὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ὑ ἐν τοῖς φιλοτύμοις.

2 In the Timaeus, a dialogue in which the psychology of man is treated in connexion with his physiology, Plato divides the body into three regions, corresponding
Republic. We shall therefore, I conceive, be justified in enlarging the term θυμός so as to include, not merely anger, but all the passions and sentiments which prompt to energetic action, and which are thus the natural counterpoise to the appetites, of which either sensual pleasure or mere bodily repletion (πληρομογή) is the object. To descend to a more minute classification would lead us beyond the limits of the Platonic psychology, which, though sound as far as it goes, was undoubtedly imperfect, so far at least as its nature is to be made out from his written teaching. At the same time it is not difficult to divine the reasons which induced Plato to put anger as it were in the front rank of the impulses which ally themselves with the Reason in the inward struggles of the soul (δύο λογιστικών ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῇ ψυχῇ στάσει, Rep. iv. 440 e). It is not too much to say, that without the capacity of being angry, moral disapproval becomes impossible. The very terms by which we denote such disapprobation prove this. We speak of certain actions as vile, odious, abominable. But this is the language, not of pure intelligence, but of passion; it denotes that we have within us a principle which enables us to feel anger, indignation, hatred, at the spectacle of certain actions, or in the contemplation of certain states of mind in ourselves or in other men. The stronger our disapprobation, the more intense the language in which it is expressed; and the emotions of anger, hate, or scorn which prompt to the use of such language, are intense in the same proportion. But the actions to the three main divisions of the soul. The νοῦς, or rational principle, he places in the head, or citadel (ἀκρόπολις), the approach to which is guarded by a narrow isthmus, the neck, which separates it from the thorax—and this as it were ensures the safety of the governing powers above. In the thorax, a region parted in its turn from the lower region by the diaphragm, as by a wall, he plants that part of the soul which partakes of ἄνδρας and θυμός, which here again he designates as φλέβιον—contentious or quarrelsome. The object of this arrangement, he tells us, is that those faculties, being within hearing of the reason, may help it in its warfare with the lower appetites, the ἐνθυμομ., which, as we should expect, are relegated to the inferior regions, the φάδες or diaphragm serving to divide the living dwelling-place of the soul, just as in a Greek house a cross-wall separated the ἄνδρας from the γυναικοκοῦντις, the apartments of the male from those of the female inmates.—Tim. p. 70 a foll.

3 There is therefore no ground for the suspicion expressed by Van Heusde, that “Plato cum Phaedrum scribere nondum videtur notionem θυμομον ætis sibi distincte proposuisse.” Init. P. P. iii. p. 26. See Repub. iv. 441, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πάλαι ξενίτιον ἀυτῆν τρία γένη, χρηματιζωμένοι ἐπικοινωνίας βουλευτικῶς, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρέμων, τούτῳ ἔστι τὸ θυμομόν, ἐπικοινωνίας τῷ λογιστικῷ φόρμῃ, ἐὰν μὴ ὅπειρα καὶ εἰς τρόφης διαθεραμ. Compare the τροφή δόξατη χρώματι of Phaedr. 248 b.

4 In a MS. of the late S. T. Coleridge (hitherto, so far as I know, unpublished), I remember, many years ago, to have seen a distinction between the Appetites and what the writer proposed uncountly, but expressively, to call the "Impetites." The details I am unable to recall, but the distinction seemed to me at the time to correspond pretty exactly to the Platonic distinction of ἐνθυμομ. and θυμός, a correspondence of which Coleridge himself was apparently unconscious. The MS., I may add, was lent to me by the late Mr. John Sterling.
DISCOURSES OF SOCRATES.

or appetites which are the natural objects of such emotions, of this purified and well-directed anger, are mostly those which originate or reside in our lower or bestial nature: these appetites are powerful incentives to action, whereas Reason, in and of itself, has no tendency to produce or restrain action, and would therefore be powerless in contending with the appetites, were it not allied with some more energetic principle. Its success in the conflict will depend, not on its own strength or clearness, but on the steadiness and intensity of the resistance which its ally opposes to the common enemy: in other words, our self-control will be proportionate to the anger we are capable of feeling towards all that is odious or evil. A well-directed irascibility is thus, we find, an indispensable element in the moral nature. We could not be moral, were we incapable of being made angry. To this extent it is true that anger is the natural ally of the reason. Of course it does not follow that anger is the only or even the principal ingredient in the moral faculty. The power of hating certain qualities presupposes the power of loving or admiring their opposites; hence Plato is perfectly consistent with himself when he places wonder and reverence (τὸ τιμῶν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν) in the same region of the soul with the malevolent emotions, and when he makes the θυμοειδὲς μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, the impassioned or emotive principle, include both the one and the other. And in the existing state of philosophical language, it does not seem that he could have selected a more expressive term than that which, as we have already observed, Bacon, with unconscious accuracy, represents by the Latin animositas.

In the struggle with the refractory horse, Plato represents the nobler one as helping the driver. This however takes place only in the case of the well-trained philosophic nature, in which the sentiments are in harmony with the reason. The charioteer reminds his willing steed of that eternal beauty which they beheld together in the regions above the stars, being himself reminded of it by the spectacle of its incarnate antitype in the person of the beloved. (πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σοφροσύνης ἐν ἁγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβαιωσάν). This, if rationalized, might be understood to mean, that the intellect acts

5 Compare the following passage in Sir J. Macintosh's Ethical Dissertation (Works, i. p. 324, Whewell). "When anger is duly moderated—when it is proportioned to the wrong—when it is detached from personal considerations—when dispositions and actions are its ultimate objects—it becomes a sense of justice, and is so purified as to be fitted to be a new element of conscience," with the context, and with Plato, Republic iv. p. 440 foll.

6 In the parable of the chariot, it is the business of the nobler steed to drag the soul upwards—not merely to contend with his baser yokemate. He therefore represents the love of excellence (τὸ φιλόκαλον) as well as the principle which resists appetite.
upon the sentiments through the medium of the imagination. It has however a more special meaning, which may be thus illustrated. The Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence or Suggestion (ἀνάμνησις)—Platonic in the strictest sense, for it was Plato's peculiar invention, and seems to have been dropped by his immediate successors—is briefly this: The mind is capable of apprehending certain ideas which experience alone is incapable of furnishing. Such, in particular, are the fundamental ideas of Geometry, which, though suggested to the mind by the senses, transcend in clearness and certainty the notions which reach us through the channels of sight or touch. Such, to borrow the instance given in the Phaedo, is the conception of equality, which, though originally no doubt suggested by the observation of apparent equality in the size of visible objects, would remain clear and certain, though it should be as demonstrable as it is probable that there are no two things of precisely equal dimensions in the universe. In modern phrase, there is in our perceptions of mathematical truth a rational as well as an empirical, an à priori as well as an à posteriori, element; or, to adopt a more antique phraseology, outward things partake of invisible realities, which are to be apprehended only by the eye of the mind—οὐσίας μετέχει ψυχής κυβερνήτη μόνον θεάτης νη. In the Meno, Socrates is represented as giving an experimental proof of this doctrine: the experiment being tried upon a slave-boy whom Meno lends for the purpose, and in whose untutored mind the operator produces, to the entire satisfaction of his master, an à priori of a well-known proposition in Geometry. Whatever we may think of the conclusiveness of this particular experiment, the general doctrine it was intended to illustrate is still maintained to be sound doctrine by many modern metaphysicians: in fact, had Plato stopped here, many would be of opinion that he had proved his point. But he did not stop at the fact, as at an ascertained ultimate fact of consciousness. He first extends the principle from the ideas of mathematical to those of moral or metaphysical relation, and then invents an hypothesis to account for the phenomenon in both cases. The great moral generalizations denoted by the words Good, Beautiful, and the like, he conceived, like the primary intuitions of Geometry, to contain an à priori element, for the existence of which experience is unable to account. These ideas, he argues, are not born with us—they are not "innate ideas," in the sense in which Locke and his followers use the phrase—a sense which Plato disavows as clearly as Locke himself. Not being born with us, whence do we obtain them? They are not to be found in the notions of the

senses, for the senses tell us nothing about justice or goodness, but only about hot and cold, white and red, and the like. Neither can we obtain them by reflecting on the phenomena of sensation, for reflection can only arrange existing materials, it cannot enrich the mind with fresh matter. It remains then either that these ideas came to us at our birth—a supposition already rejected—or that, having been ours in a state of existence prior to birth, we have been reminded of them subsequently by experience. The antecedent existence of the human soul is thus, we see, an inference from a fact or supposed fact of consciousness; in other words, an hypothesis to account for such fact. The doctrine and the hypothesis are succinctly stated in a well-known passage of the Phaedo (72 e). “There is another theory of yours, Socrates,” says Cebeus in that dialogue, “which, if true, proves the antecedent existence of the Soul: a theory I have frequently heard you propose. It is to the effect, that what we call Learning is neither more nor less than an act of recollecting (ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει ὁσα); if this, I say, be true, we must have learnt at some previous period the truths of which in this life we are from time to time reminded; but that would be impossible except on the supposition that our souls existed before they entered a human form: so that from this point of view also, the soul would appear to be immortal.” On this hint Socrates speaks, and presents his hearers with an inductive proof of what he had shown experimentally in the Meno. It is remarkable that in both passages he rests the proof on the nature of mathematical conceptions, and asserts without proving, that his argument holds good of moral ideas also.

* οὗ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὅ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἄγαθον καὶ δικαίου καὶ δουλοῦ, καὶ ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οἰκειορρηγείζομα τίνος ὁ ἐστί, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρετήσεις ἐφαρμόζει καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκορύφοις ἀποκρύφοις, διότι ἀπαγόρου ἡμῖν εἶναι τούτων ἀπάντων τὰς ἐκποτήματα ζητοῦ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Phaed. p. 75 d.
APPENDIX II.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ISOCRATES, AND HIS RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.

[Phaedrus, p. 278 & foll.]

There are few writers whose reputation has passed through so many vicissitudes as that of Isocrates. The ancient critics are divided in opinion as to his merits: Cicero, persuaded perhaps that it is his duty to err with Plato, is hyperbolical in his praises of an orator extolled in the Phaedrus; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, though in some points discriminating, is still on the whole highly favourable\(^1\); and the same may be said of Quintilian, and the grammarians and rhetoricians generally, whose esteem for Isocrates is significantly shown by the comparatively perfect state in which they have handed down his text. On the other hand, with the philosophers, from Aristotle downwards, he is by no means a favourite\(^2\); and the last, though not the least of Greek critics, the author of the treatise \(\pi\rho\iota\sigma\varphi\iota\sigma\varsigma\), speaks of him in terms bordering on contempt\(^3\). Descending to modern times, we find Isocrates in high favour among the literati of the Renaissance. The easiness of his Greek, the admiration of Cicero, the orthodoxy, apparent rather than real, of his ethical sentiments, combined to recommend him to the teachers of that day; and the same causes have helped in our own time to make him a favourite in quarters where Greek learning is still in a backward

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\(^1\) Dionysius extravagantly compares Isocrates to Polycletus and Phidias. His remark that Lysias is graceful, Isocrates would be, is much more happy: \(\pi\rho\iota\sigma\varphi\iota\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma\iota\varphi\iota\nu\epsilon\nu\iota\ \nu\ \Delta\nu\sigma\ion{io}{

\(^2\) The 30th Socratic Epistle, written apparently by a Platonist, is one proof of this.

\(^3\) § 38. 2, 'Ο γάρ 'Ισοκράτης, ὥσπερ ὅδ' ἄπεις, παιδὸς πρᾶγμα ἐκαθε, διὰ τὴν τοῦ πάντα ἀληθικῶς ἔθελεν λέγειν φιλοσοφίαν, κ.τ.λ.
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ISOCRATES, ETC. 171

state. But in proportion as Thucydides, Plato, Demosthenes, and the real representatives of Greek intellect come to be appreciated, we find that the reputation of Isocrates has invariably declined. Our own Dobree, who has done as much as any modern scholar towards the criticism and elucidation of his text, is at no pains to conceal his unfavourable opinion of the author whom he knows so well; and he concludes his ungrateful labours with the pathetic exclamation, "Tandem eluctatus sum taedium, quod summum fuit, relegendi et annotandi. Deo gratias!" If from England we turn to Germany, we find the most intelligent scholars of the same mind with Dobree. Niebuhr, as might have been expected, had no respect for Isocrates, either in his literary or his political character. "He is a thoroughly worthless and miserable author, and one of the most thoughtless and poorest minds. It is inconceivable to me how the ancients could so much esteem and admire him." In another place he calls him a thoroughly bad citizen and an ineffable fool; strong language it must be confessed, but hardly more than the due of a publicist who traces all the misfortunes of his country to her naval supremacy; and who wrote a letter of congratulation to Philip after the battle of Cheronaea.

But with the literary or political merits of Isocrates we are not at present concerned. The passages in his writings to which attention will now be directed, relate rather to the literary history of his age and to his relations with other literary celebrities, especially Plato and other members of the Academy. At the same time they incidentally illustrate the personal character of the writer, and throw light on what we now call the "educational" notions of a period of high intellectual culture and refinement. They are also useful as showing the amount of egotism and self-praise which was tolerated by a Greek public, and put us in a better position for pronouncing on the curious question—Whether Plato's portraits of the earlier "teachers of wisdom" are in these respects caricatures of their originals?

Plato and Isocrates were in the strictest sense contemporaries. Isocrates was but seven years older than Plato, and outlived him.

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5 See the Oratio De Pace (n.c. 356) passim.
6 Niebuhr apparently believes in the traditional story that the death of Isocrates was caused by the news of this disaster (Phil. Mus. i. 492). But the 2nd Epistle to Philip (Ep. iii.) bears every mark of genuineness; and so far from showing any trace of mortification or alarm, it ends with an expression of thankfulness that the writer had been spared to see the fulfilment of his political aspirations: "καὶ μὲν ἔναν διοικούμενον καὶ γράφον καθελεῖν ἐν τῇ τῷ παραγωγῇ λόγῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς σὲ περιθεῖν, ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἣδη γιγανθενεῖ διὰ τῶν σωμ ἐφορών πράξεως, τὰ δ' ἐλείζον γενόσευσιν.
only about ten years. Unlike as they appear in character and genius, both were educators of youth, and in that capacity exerted a greater influence on their contemporaries than any other Athenians of their epoch— that is to say, than any of the numerous teachers of Eloquence and Philosophy who flourished in the interval between the death of Socrates and the battle of Chaeronea. They professed, moreover, to belong to the same calling, for Isocrates insists strenuously on his right to be styled ‘philosopher,’ and speaks perpetually of ἦς ὕβις φιλοσοφία. This claim is to a certain extent admitted by Plato in the Phaedrus—ἐνστὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ τις τῇ τοῦ ἄνδρος διανοίᾳ—possibly not without a reference to the reiterated assertions of Isocrates himself. Of the celebrities of the epoch, there was hardly one who had not at some period of his life studied under either Plato or Isocrates, and some are mentioned as having been pupils of both. Each seems to have taught on system, and their writings enable us to form a reasonably distinct idea of their respective methods of procedure.

At first sight it would appear that no two systems could be more directly opposed. The antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic, between the art which seeks only to persuade and that which professes to be satisfied with nothing short of conviction, represents pretty faithfully the relation between the methods of Isocrates and Plato. Yet their teaching may have had some elements in common. Isocrates, e.g., acknowledges the educational value of geometry and astronomy *. Those, he says, who apply themselves to the accurate study of these sciences, and are thus forced to fix their attention on obscure and difficult subjects without allowing their thoughts to wander, have their minds sharpened by these exercises and are enabled to learn and appreciate things of greater dignity and moment. By these more important things Isocrates means first the power of speaking and writing, and secondly the gift of political discernment and statesmanlike sagacity, as exemplified in his own political discourses. See, inter alia, Antid. § 196, 290, from a comparison of which passages we obtain a complete notion of what Isocrates means by “philosophy,” a combination of the accomplishments of the ῥήτορ and the πολιτικός. But in other respects Plato would have found little to object to in this view, for he too speaks of geometry and astronomy rather as parts of a proposed entire discipline than as sciences deserving to be cultivated for their own sake. I have no doubt that the passage quoted from the Antidosis refers specially to Plato and his followers.

* In Antid. 318, he says, that it had been objected to him that he had a larger number of disciples than all the philosophers put together.
AND HIS RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 173

who in the vocabulary of Isocrates are denoted as οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἐν τοῖς ἐριττικοῖς λόγοις. The instructions of these eristic dynasts, these Lords of Disputation, he proceeds to say, "are beneficial rather than injurious to their pupils, not to the extent they themselves pretend, but more than the public at large imagine," § 280. For the candour and tolerance implied in these expressions, Isocrates takes great credit to himself. These Eristics, he tells us, had dealt with him far less gently. They had blasphemed his favourite art (§ 276) as offensively as the lowest of the populace could do (βλασφημοσών ὁπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν), not, he charitably adds, for want of knowing better, but in the hope, if not of drawing away his pupils, at any rate of exalting their own pursuits by comparison. He might, if so inclined, speak as bitterly of them as they had done of him—perhaps even more so; but this course he disdains. The men were harmless, though not so useful to the community as others whom he could name (ἄρτον δ᾽ ἐπίρων εὐεργετῶν δυναμίους).

This passage indicates great soreness; and we naturally ask, Whence these tears? The answer is not far to seek. In a dialogue such as the Gorgias, written partly to show the shallowness of the culture imparted in the rhetorical schools, passages occur which could not fail to offend the susceptibility of so vain a man as Isocrates. It is indeed probable that the compliment passed upon him at the conclusion of the Phaedrus would be looked upon as but poor amends for the stinging sarcasms showered so profusely on his art and its professors in other parts of the dialogue. But the Gorgias contains no such propitiatory phrase; and though the master of Isocrates is treated respectfully by the philosophic satirist, the fool Polus and the libertine Callicles in effect represent between them the two elements, rhetorical and political, of which, as we have seen, the φιλοσοφία of Isocrates consists. Here, too, as in the Phaedrus, much contempt is poured upon the figures of rhetoric, those ίδεας λόγων, the use of which Isocrates inculcated on his pupils both by precept and example. There are also passages in the Gorgias containing distinct

9 In the Epistle to the young Alexander, he says, ἀκοῦσε σε ... τῶν φιλοσοφῶν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζειν μὲν οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ... alluding to the lessons of his tutor Aristotle. Throughout, Isocrates is the only φιλόσοφος: the philosophers are mere ἐριττικοί, wranglers, word-splitters, and so forth. The impudence of so nick-naming the Aristotelian philosophy is remarkable, but it does not diminish the interest of the notice.

1 Thus, in Panath. 233 n, he boasts that his orations, πολλὰ μὲν ἐπιθυμημένα γράμματα, οὐκ ἔχων δὲ ἀντιβάσεως καὶ παρασύνεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεων τὰ ἐν τοῖς βητορείαις διαλαμποῦν καὶ τοῦ ἀκούσας ἐπιστημοῦνται καὶ δορυφόροις ἀναγκαζοντος, "abound in the figures which light up a rhetorical composition, and extort the applause of an audience," where the word διαλαμπούνων reminds us of the so-called λαμπάδες of Gorgias. So L. § 196, ὡς περὶ φιλοσοφῶν δυντε τὰς ίδεας ἀπάσας ἀνί τοῖς λόγοις τυχάναι χρόνους διεξίχθησαι τοῖς μαθηταῖς.
verbal parallelisms with corresponding passages in Isocrates. Who, for instance, can doubt that when Socrates speaks of rhetoric as ἐπιθέματα ψυχῆς στροχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνθρείας (Gorg. 463), he is thinking of the boast of Isocrates, that to become an accomplished speaker is a matter requiring much study, καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνθρείκης καὶ δοξαιστικῆς ἐργον εἰναι. Still less can we hesitate as to Isocrates' meaning, when he says in a very late oration, that of two bad things,—inflicting evil upon others and suffering it ourselves,—the infliction is much less bad than the endurance. For instance, if the choice were offered to the Athenians of unjustly tyrannizing over the Spartans, or submitting to their unjust domination, no sensible man would scruple to prefer the former alternative, though it is true that if you consult the self-styled philosophers, some few would maintain the opposite opinion, ἀλβος δὲ ἂν τινες τῶν προστοιουμένων εἶναι σοφόν ἐρωτηθέντες ὡς ἂν φήσαμεν. The reference to the noble paradox of Socrates in the Gorgias, ὅτι κρείττων ἄδικεωθα ἢ ἄδικως, is not to be mistaken, nor in the 'pretenders to philosophy' can we fail to recognize the followers of Plato. On the other hand, when Calliades (Gorg. 484) is made to express a patronizing approval of philosophy as a pleasant and profitable employment for the youthful mind, but as deadly in its effects on the character if pushed too far, we are struck by the similarity of the sentiment to a passage in the well-known Antidosis of Isocrates, which, written late in the life of the orator, contains a statement and defence of the views which he had advocated during the whole of his professorial career. "I should recommend our younger men," he says, "to spend some time on these branches of education, but not to suffer their genius to waste and shrivel while they pore over unprofitable subtleties."

In the Helenae Encomium, a scholastic exercise written apparently in rivalry of his master Gorgias, Isocrates begins his discourse with

2 Contra Sophist. 294 d. This was an early oration, Antid. § 206, where ἐπιθέματα ψυχῆς στροχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνθρείας in the preface to I. S. is a rhetorical device, λόγος διδακτική γράφες, κ.τ.λ.

3 Panath. p. 257, § 117. The Panath. was written after the death of Plato, and when Isocrates was ninety-four years of age.

4 § 287, Bekk. διατρίβης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὰς παιδείας τοῖς χρόνοις τῶν θυμομελόσιμων τῶν εὐθυδύτων, μη μέσοι περιέχει τὴν φύσιν ἀϊδίων κατασκευασθείσας ἐκ τοῦτος. § 288, δίδα μη τοὺς προφήτας τινας βουλαμένους καὶ τῶν λόγων τοὺς μαθηταίς καὶ τῶν πράξεως τὰς πρᾶξιν πρὸς τὸν θεον φρόνιμους ἀναπηρίας ἤ άκαστο καὶ τῶν διατριβῶν. It is remarkable that among the authors of λόγοι μαθητῶν he mentions his own preceptor Gorgias, referring however to his metaphysical speculations, not to his rhetoric. So too in the Hel. En. 208 o, ἡ Γοργία τῶν τολμήσαντα λέγειν ή διδάξειν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν. It is highly probable that this passage is but a new version of remarks occurring in the earlier speech against the Sophists, which, as we have seen, Plato had probably read, and of which we have only a fragment remaining to us. Isocrates himself quotes his earlier speech in the Antidosis, and styles himself a little on the consistency of his youthful and later opinions. Far from collating the well-known 'inconstancy' of Plato, it is evident that during a long of teaching he had "learned nothing and forgotten nothing."
a formal attack upon the leaders of the three principal Socratic sects. The attack is, so far as appears, entirely gratuitous, for it is not pretended that either Antisthenes, Plato, or Euclides, had breathed a word against the fame of Helen. Socrates, indeed, in the Phaedrus, alludes in complimentary language to the well-known poem in which Stesichorus had attempted to restore the tarnished reputation of this heroine; and Isocrates intimates very plainly that it would have been better for his followers had they devoted their powers to the discussion of equally edifying topics. There are some, he gravely complains, whose vanity is gratified if they can succeed even tolerably well in defending an absurd and paradoxical thesis; he is acquainted with persons who have grown grey (καταγεγράμματος) in arguing that it is impossible to say that which is false, to contradict an adversary, or to hold two opposing arguments on the same theme; others who have spent a long life in defending the paradox, that Valour, and Wisdom, and Justice mean all the same thing, that we possess none of these virtues by nature, but that there is one science which includes all. Others, again, pass their time in eristic disquisitions which answer no end but that of giving trouble to their pupils. Trifling like this, he proceeds to say, has not even the merit of novelty, for it is well known that Protagoras and Gorgias, that Zeno and Melissus had in their day maintained still more startling paradoxes in books even more unreadable. It is clear from this passage that Isocrates is writing at a time when Socrates and the so-called Sophists had passed away, and when the ground was occupied by the now mature Socratic sects; and it is strange that the author of a Critical History of the Sophists should have maintained that the Helenae Encomium is an early work. The passage shows considerable satirical ingenuity; and its writer probably prided himself on the happy expedient of interpolating Plato between two rivals, with one of whom the philosopher had been engaged in brisk controversy, while he looked upon the second as a well-meaning but somewhat narrow-minded brother in the faith.

5 Hel. Enc. init., Εἰς τινες οἱ μεγά φρονοικοί, ἣν ὑπόθεσιν παράδοξον ταὐτογιγνομενον περὶ ταύτης ἄνεκτώς εἰκὼν δυνηθήσεται.
6 οἱ μὲν οἱ φάσοντες οἶδαν τῆς ψευδῆ λέγειν σωθὲν ἀντιλέγειν σωθὲν δίδο λάγον περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντικεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξόμενοι ἦσαν ἀδιάφορα καὶ σωφρά καὶ δικαστικά ταύταν ἔστιν, καὶ φάσει μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μὲν δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀπάντων ἐπιλογικὸς ἐλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἔρωτας διαπρῆσον, κ.τ.λ.
7 Geel, in an Epistle to Welcker, Rh. Mus. 1839. Antisthenes died at the age of sixty-seven, n.c. 367. The perfect καταγεγράμματος implies that both he and Plato were still alive; and we cannot therefore be far wrong if we fix n.c. 370 as the approximate date of the speech in question. At that date Plato would be fifty-nine, and Antisthenes about sixty-four.
8 Euclides of Megara.
Equally well aimed is the bolt shot at Antisthenes, whose well-known dialectical paradoxes are refuted in more than one Platonic dialogue; and who, by the way, is said to have written a reply to one of the speeches of Isocrates.

Another reflection upon Plato seems to lurk in a passage of the Antidosis, § 303, where Isocrates complains that the epithet εὐφράγις is much misapplied. People call those εὐφράγες, he says, who indulge in ribaldry, and have a talent for jesting and mimicry, whereas the word ought to be used to denote natural goodness of heart. This, it may be said, is perhaps intended rather for the comic poets, who did not spare Isocrates. But the poets of the middle comedy do not seem to have risen above mediocrity, and it is more likely that Isocrates had been vexed by hearing the epithet applied to Plato—the εὐφράγες, or man of genius κατ' ἐχώμην of his day, one too, whose mimetic powers far transcend those of the poets referred to. In another passage he betrays vexation at the popularity of the Socratic dialogues, which he spitefully alludes to as τῶν διαλόγων τῶν ἐφράττοις καλομενῶν, in which young men took far too much delight, but which their seniors could not endure: οἷς οἱ μὲν νεότεροι μᾶλλον χαίροντι τοῦ διάλογος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβύτερων οὐδεὶς ὄστιν ὅτι αὖν ἀνεκτὼν αὐτῶν εἶναι φόρμῃ. Panath. § 29, p. 238 b. This passage also points principally to Plato, whose dialogues far surpassed all others in popularity.

We have seen that Isocrates asserted his right to be called a philosopher, and that this claim was to a certain extent conceded by Plato, as it may have been by others. But this limited concession did not satisfy the vanity of Isocrates. His teaching was not only a philosophy, but the philosophy. All other professors, whether of rhetoric or dialectic, he qualifies with the dreaded name of σοφισταὶ. Not even Plato is excepted, when he is speaking by name of his two greatest works. If we ask what are the characteristics of the "philosopher" according to the Isocratic pattern, we shall find them the precise antithesis of those insisted on by the orthodox schools.

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9 Diog. Laert. in vita Antisthenis. L. vi. 1. 15.
1 Ammianus. εὐφράγες λέγεται παρ' Ἀττικοῖς δὲ σκαπτικὸς.
2 Plato is called εὐφράγις by Lucian in the Anthology.
3 Philipp. 84 b. ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων δικοὶ τεχνάνουσιν ὥσπερ τοῖς ράμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις. The Philippus was written 340, Plato died circ. 348. The passage is remarkable as proving that the Laws were in general circulation within two years of Plato's death—a fact, it seems to me, quite decisive of the genuineness of that work. See the 30th Socratic Epistle, where the reference is recognized. If this is true, as with Spengel I believe it to be, it refutes the current tradition that the Laws was a posthumous work.
AND HIS RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 177

We know the pains taken by Plato in distinguishing between δόξαι and ἐπιστήμη; between the popular and the scientific way of handling a subject. This antithesis, which is admitted by all philosophic writers, however they may differ in its application, was by no means ignored by Isocrates. But he stands alone in claiming for the man of opinion, δοξοστικός, the title appropriated to the man of science. Those, he says, I call wise men, σοφοί, who are able to strike out the most probable opinions, and those I hold to be ‘philosophers’ whose studies enable them most readily to acquire this branch of wisdom⁴. He is aware that this opinion is paradoxical, and that he stands alone in maintaining it. In that wonderful effusion of senile self-complacency, the Panathenaicus⁵, he boasts that his genius, though ill-fitted for the management of public affairs, and indeed for public speaking, enables him to arrive at the truth by the way of opinion far better than the pretenders to so-called science, δοξάσαι περὶ ἐκαστοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμόν τῶν εἰδέναι φαινόντων. And in a passage already quoted he extols rhetoric as the proper employment of a mind δοξοστικής καὶ ἀνδρείας, vigorous and fertile in opinion. Still more plainly antisocratic is a passage in the speech κατὰ τῶν σοφοστῶν, in which he says that he finds much more agreement among those who are content with δόξαι than among those who profess to be in possession of ἐπιστήμη."⁶ In this description it does not appear that Plato is necessarily included, for the persons he alludes to are paid teachers, who have undersold Isocrates in the education market. He speaks of them as poor men (ἀναίες πολλῶν δεόμενοι), who took small fees from their pupils—three or four minae only for a complete course⁷; a meanness of spirit, he thinks, much to be reprobated, and standing in disadvantageous contrast to his own more magnanimous practice⁸. Neither the poverty nor the fees are Platonic; but some of the minor Socrates are probably the offenders complained of⁹.

⁴ Antid. § 290. ⁵ p. 234 d sqq. ⁶ 292 c. ⁷ 7b. 291 d. ⁸ Isocr. is said to have received 10 minae = 1000 drachms from each pupil. Plut. Vitae X Rhet. 838 c. His pupils were numerous. His course frequently lasted three or four years. Antid. § 93, Bekk. At the end of that time, when his pupils were about to depart (ἀπελθόντες), they took leave often with tears. Ibid. 1000 drachms seems to have been the stated fee for a course. Demosth. adv. Lucr. p. 938. ⁹ The speech against the Sophists was written at the beginning, the Antidosis towards the end of the professorial life of Isocrates. In the former there is no passage which points to Plato, who had probably not yet come forward as the head of a school which was destined to throw all others into the shade. But the scientific aim of the teachers described, coupled with their moderate earnings, and contempt, genuine or affected, of ‘filthy lucre’ (ἀργυρίων καὶ χρυσίων τῶν... VOL. I.)
But it would be tedious to quote all the passages in which Isocrates gives expression to the jealous feelings which rankled in his mind. Those already referred to are sufficient to illustrate the opposition between his school and that of Plato, and to show that of the two rivals, if we may so call them, one at least was unfavourably disposed towards the other. It remains to ascertain, if possible, how far these feelings were reciprocated by Plato. And here it cannot but strike us as singular that the only passage in the Platonic dialogues in which Isocrates is named should be one in which he is favourably contrasted with a rival Logographus, in which his claim to be a philosopher is partially conceded, and he is pronounced to be capable of eminence in a still higher sphere of literature. This too at the end of a dialogue in which the Sicilian school, which Isocrates represented more truly than any other Attic writer, is assailed with mischievous rillery; insomuch that if no names of contemporaries had been mentioned, it would not have been unreasonable to suspect that he and not Lysias was the orator at whom Plato's censure was principally aimed. For in the extant orations of Lysias we look in vain for any traces of the affectation which Plato ridicules; whereas the show-speeches of Isocrates are full of them. Of this difficulty the ancient critics do not seem to have been conscious. Cicero, who records in more than one place the feud between Isocrates and Aristotles, believes that Isocrates and Plato were the best of friends. Nor was this, according to Cicero, a mere youthful friendship. Such too seems to have been the traditional opinion of the schools. "The philosopher," says Laertius (iii. 9), "was a friend of Isocrates, and Praxiphanes has written a dialogue in which they are represented as conversing περὶ ποιητῶν in Plato's country-house, where Isocrates was a guest." This Praxiphanes was one of Aristotle's successors, and as a Peripatetic would not be prejudiced in favour of either of the illustrious disputants.

Nor is it easy to find any trace of a contrary opinion, if we except...

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1 Compare in particular Phaedr. p. 267 Α, τά τε οὖ ξυμερά μεγάλα καὶ τά μεγάλα σμικρά φαίνεται πολύσιν διὰ δόμων λόγων, καινά τ' ἀρχικοὶ καὶ τά ένεελαν καινοὶ, κ.τ.λ., with Paneg. § 8, where Isocrates boasts: ὅτι οἱ λόγοι τοιαύτην έχουσιν τήν φόςιν, ὡς οὖν τ' είναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάχων έξηγήσεθαι, καὶ τά τε μεγάλα ταπεινώ ποίησι καὶ τοῦ μικράδε μέγεθος περισθέναι, καὶ τά πολλά καὶ καινά διδαξαν καὶ περὶ τῶν νέων γεγονόντων ἀρχικῶν κείτων. Plato seemingly attributes this boast to Tisias and Gorgias: Isocrates adopts it as his own in perfect seriousness. The date of the Panegyricus is m.c. 380.

2 "Exagittator omnium rhetorurn hunc miratur unum. Me autem qui Isocratem non diligere una cum Socrate et Platonc errare patiuntur." Brut. xiii. 42.

3 "En de seniore scripsit Plato et scripsit aequallis." Ibid.

AND HIS RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 179

a passage in that one of the Socratic Epistles, the XXXth, which
alone has any pretension to authenticity. Had the tradition of a
“simultaneous” between Plato and Isocrates reached the ears of Ath-
eneus, he would probably have made the most of it, for his learning
was equalled by his virulence and love of defamation. We cannot
therefore be surprised if some recent expositors of Plato have adhered
to the old tradition, not reflecting that until recent times little or
nothing had been done in the way of exhuming the allusions to
contemporaries which lie beneath the surface of the Socratic
Dialogues.

One of these personal allusions it is now time to discuss. In the
Dialogue called Euthydemus occurs a passage in which Heindorf,
Schleiermacher, Spengel, Dobree, and the Dutch scholars generally,
see a distinct reference to Isocrates. The dialogue at the end of
which this passage appears is a curious one. Socrates relates to his
friend Criton a conversation between himself and a couple of
foreigners, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus. These were sophists of
the Eristic or Contentious sort, formidable in word-combat, and
capable of refuting any proposition δημιούς ήν ψυχής ήν τε ἀληθείς ἡ.
The narrated dialogue consists of a series of quibbling arguments of
the paltriest kind, and is apparently designed to bring into contempt
a certain class or school of philosophic or pseudo-philosophic dis-
puttants. The motive of its publication by Plato it is not difficult to
divine. We know from the passages already quoted from Isocrates
that the epithet ἔριστικός was used by the rhetoricians as a convenient
term of reproach to designate the stricter schools of philosophy; not
only the minor Socratic sects and the obscurer pretenders to
logical prowess—all in short who preferred the closed fist of logic
to the open palm of rhetoric—but also Plato, Aristotle, and the
professors of the Academy generally. Now Plato, in exalting Dialectic,
which he represents as the prima philosophia, and its professors as alone
philosophers, takes great pains to distinguish this queen of sciences
from her spurious counterfeit, Eristic. This distinction is brought
out with technical clearness in that masterly dialogue, the Philebus,
and it affords the key to much of the subtle argumentation of the
Sophists and Politicus. But these are dialogues beyond the popular
comprehension; and the Euthydemus seems to have been written to
make the distinction palpable to ordinary minds. The rhetors had

5 An Epistle purporting to be addressed to K. Philip, Ἰσοφράτης ἢ ὡτε πλά-
tωμοὶ ἐν τοῖς πρᾶς ἐν τεµενθι ἱόροις ἀπείχοιται.
6 Is Dobree the first Commentator on Isocrates who suspected the anti-Platonic
allusions?
7 p. 17 a, οἷς διακεχάριστο τὸ τε διαλεκτικός τάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικός ἡμᾶς
τοιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλους τοὺς λόγους.
 vexed the Socratics by calling them Eristics. See, says Plato, what an Eristic is, and how little he has in common with us or with our Master. Our contempt for verbal quibbles is as strong as yours, and far more intelligent; we know the false principles on which the Eristic art is founded, and are besides able to hold it up to ridicule with a force and humour of which you are incapable. Of this design Plato gives us a plain intimation—first, in the model dialogue between Socrates and Clinias, p. 278 E, which is meant by way of foil to the quibbling arguments of the two strangers; and secondly, in the concluding conversation between Socrates and Criton. After he has finished his recital of the performance of the two sophists, Socrates ironically suggests that his friend would do well to join them; for among other recommendations they boasted, as other quacks since their day have done, that their course might be pursued without any interruption of ordinary business, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ χρηματίζεσθαι φατον διακαλεῖν οὐδὲν μὴ οὐ παραλείπειν ὁπωσον εὔπεπος τὴν σφέτεραν σοφίαν. In declining this proposal, Criton takes occasion to offer to Socrates a respectful remonstrance. It seems ridiculous, he says, that I should admonish you, nevertheless I will tell you what somebody said of you in my hearing, a person who was actually present during the interview which you have just described. The person, he goes on to say, was one who had no mean opinion of his own wisdom—one in fact of those who composed speeches for the law-courts with ability and success (Ἀνὴρ οἴμας πάνω εἶναι σοφὸς, τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν). After ironically expressing his surprise that Criton had not thought it worth his while to listen to wisdom such as this, this person had proceeded to express in no measured terms his contempt for philosophy, of which, as he professed to think, the two strangers were among the most eminent professors, and to intimate his surprise that a man like Socrates should have lent himself to so absurd an exhibition (τάν ἄν σε οἷμα αἰθοῦσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ σεμεροῦν ἐκλίρου ἀυτοῦ ἦν ἀτυπός ἐθέλον ἐναίδεων ἐπέκειν ἀειθωρίως οἷς οὖν μέλει ὅ τι ἦν λέγομεν, παντὸς ἐν ἰδίατος ἀντέχοντα). The fact was, the study and its professors were alike worthless and ridiculous. Now, says Criton, though I entirely dissent from this estimate of philosophy, I do think the critic was right in censuring you for condescending to dispute in public with two such charlatans as those you have described.

Now this passage, it may be said, though probably intended to account for the confusion in the mind of a superficial observer between the Dialecticians and Eristics, contains nothing which compels us to think of Isocrates in particular. Why should not Lysias stand for the original of the picture, or why may not a class or school be meant rather than any particular individual? With
his usual address, Plato has contrived to put in a touch which enables us, as I think, to answer these inquiries. What did you think of the discussion? said Criton to the anonymous person of whom he speaks: Τι δὲ ἄλλο, ἦ δὲ, ἦ οὐν περ ἂν ἂι τις τῶν ποιοῦντων ἀκούσαι ληροῦτες, καὶ περὶ οὐδενός ἄξων ἀναζιάν στοιχήν ποιομένων. I am quoting, says Criton to Socrates, the very words this person used, οὕτως γάρ πως καὶ ἐπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι. This is an intimation that some one in particular is meant, and that the reader is expected to recognize the author by his style. The antithetic turn of the last clause, περὶ οὐδενός ἄξων ἀναζιάν στοιχήν ποιομένων—a false antithesis by the way—the smoothness of the rhythm, and the frequent alliteration naturally suggest Isocrates. This impression is strengthened when Criton tells Socrates that his critic “was any thing but a speaker; in fact,” says he, “I doubt whether he ever got up in court in his life, though they do say that he is thoroughly well acquainted with his profession, and that he writes capital speeches.” It is added that “he is one of those whom Prodicus described as dwellers on the debateable land between the Philosophers and the Statesmen” (μεθώρα φιλοσόφου τε ἄνδρος καὶ πολιτικός), a really happy description of Isocrates, but as little fitting Lysias as it would fit Isaeus or any other mere barrister or chamber-counsel of the day.

Socrates further observes that his censor is one of a set of men who deem themselves and are doomed by many others far the wisest of all. They flatter themselves that but for the philosophers their claim would be universally allowed, and that if they could destroy the reputation of their rivals, the palm would be unanimously awarded to their own profession. It is impossible to describe better the feeling which animates such speeches as the Panathenaicus and Antidosis, and when we are further told that these men μετρίως μὲν φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν μετρίως δὲ πολιτικόν, we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the Phaedrus as one in whose genius ἐνετή τις φιλοσοφία. The finishing touch in the picture—ἐκτὸς δὲ δότης κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων καρποῦθαι τὴν σοφίαν—agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the Antidosis. We may add that it is not appropriate to the metopes Lysias, whose abstinence from public affairs was owing not to choice but to necessity.

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8 Lysias did on one memorable occasion plead his own cause. The excellent speech κατὰ Ἐρασίθαιον was delivered by him during his brief tenure of the Athenian franchise. While at Thurii he took an active and leading part in the local politics.

9 Lysias was a clear-headed practical man, and seems to have made no pretension to philosophy. For this, among other things, he is rebuked in the Phaedrus.

1 See especially §§ 156-9, Bk. 569. With καρποῦθαι τὴν σοφίαν compare the synonymous phrase ἀπολίθωμα τοῦ πράγματος, Antid. § 206, Bk. 569.
In fact the combination of a smattering of philosophy, a measure of political knowledge, great talent as a writer of forensic speeches, and a boundless and intolerant vanity, is one which we find in the writings of Isocrates and in no others of that epoch.

The rebuke with which Socrates dismisses his anonymous critic is moderate and dignified. We ought not, he says, to be irritated by such pretensions to superiority, ill-founded as they are; for we have no right to quarrel with any man who can teach us anything holding of wisdom—any one in short who works at his literary calling diligently, and expounds his views manfully, with vigour and perseverance (πάντ’ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπῶν δοσίς καὶ ὅπων λέγει ἐξόμενον φρονήσεως πράγμα, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐπεξεργάζεται). The perseverance with which Isocrates inculcates—the ingenuity with which he amplifies—the very few ideas he possesses, is one of the most remarkable features in his writings.

On the whole, I think it will be agreed that there is a high degree of probability in the supposition that the passage commented on refers directly to Isocrates; and that if so, the tradition of his friendly relations with Plato is erroneous. Plato could scarcely have failed to resent the querulous and contemptuous remarks upon himself and his school, with which, as we have seen, the speeches of Isocrates abound. But that his resentment amounted to enmity we have no reason to infer from this or any other passage; in fact, the remark of Socrates just quoted was apparently designed to calm the irritable feelings of Plato’s admiring followers, who doubtless were exasperated by these attacks upon their master.

If we now recur to the passage of the Phaedrus, we find a flattered likeness of the same original. In both we read of a successful speech-writer; in both of a speech-writer with some pretensions to philosophy. But in one of the two pictures shadows are put in which are wanting in the other; and the inference seems natural that Plato’s feelings towards Isocrates had undergone a change in

2 The forensic orations of Isocrates are his best. They are free from the affectations of his show-speeches, and are thought by Dion. Hal. superior in some respects to the speeches of his rival Lysias.

3 At a later period of his life Isocrates expresses great soreness at the prevalent opinion of his arrogance and intolerance of other literary men. He says he had been told that three or four Sophists of the rank and file (ἄγελασε οὖν) had been discussing him in the Lyceum: and that one of them (τὸν τοξομικότατον) had said, ἄν τις πάντων καταστροφῆς τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τόσο τῆς φύλαξ τάς ἁλλακτικάς καὶ τᾶς παλαιὰς ἀνάδος ἀναίρετο, καὶ ὕστερον λαχνῆς πλὴν τούτων μετασαχιστής τῶν ἐνθεύσεως. This he says surprised and distressed him, for he had always thought himself remarkable for modesty and humility, and a sworn foe to vanity and ostentation in other persons (ὁμοιόμορφης ἐνοπλευρίας ἐνοπλευρίας ἐνοπλευρίας. Μᾶλλον δὲ παραμερίζων).

4 Isocrates calls his own philosophy a φρόνησις in Antid. § 290.
AND HIS RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 183

the interval between the composition of the two dialogues, whichever
we assume to have been written first.

But it is well known to persons conversant with recent Platonic
literature that the passage of the Euthydemus is a main argument of
those who support the old tradition that the Phaedrus was the first-
written of the dialogues. The date of the Euthydemus we have
absolutely no means of determining, and if we set aside tradition,
that of the Phaedrus may be said perhaps to be equally uncertain.
Under such circumstances, we may venture, I think, to recognize
in the portrait given in the Euthydemus the orator whose features
are so faithfully portrayed, without thinking it necessary on that
account to reject such internal indications of a later date as we may
discover in the Phaedrus. I say nothing of the consideration, that
the complimentary phrases put into the mouth of Socrates may have
suggested to the readers of Plato a comparison between the pro-
phesy and its fulfilment, neither favourable to the subject of the
prediction, nor altogether undesigned by its author.
APPENDIX III.

THE EROTICUS OF CORNELIUS FRONTO.

The following speech, though of little intrinsic value, is sufficiently curious to deserve a place in an edition of the Phaedrus. It was written as an imitation of the erotic discourse of Lysias; and, if it had no other use, might serve by way of foil to a composition, the literary merit of which is certainly underrated by Plato. But it is further entitled to notice on account of the circumstances under which it was written. Fronto, as is well known, was the tutor of the imperial philosopher, M. Aurelius, and seems to have written this speech for his pupil's delectation. The Latin letter which follows it was written by the young Caesar, who addresses his middle-aged friend in terms borrowed from the vocabulary of the lover. The "erotic" language, which in this case it is fortunately impossible to misinterpret, illustrates what has been said above respecting the use of such phraseology by Socrates and his followers; and enables us to avoid misunderstanding an expression in that one of the Platonic Epigrams which has perhaps the best claim to be accepted as genuine. It is also worthy of note, that neither Fronto nor Aurelius seem to doubt that the speech in the Phaedrus was really written by Lysias. In the lists of this orator's works preserved by pseudo-Plutarch and other grammarians, we read of both ἐπιστολαὶ and ἐρωτικοὶ; and it is quite possible that specimens of either kind may have survived to Fronto's time. What may have been the precise difference between an "erotic speech" and an epistle it is hard to say. Fronto, though his speech is called ἐρωτικός, uses the verb ἔπετέλλω at its commencement, and speaks of τὰ

1 Appendix I. p. 152.
2 That which ends with the line: ἡ ἑλποὶ ἱκυράς ἑμὴν ἐρωτέ ἄλων. Diog. Laert. iii. c. 23.

μεν . . . εραν . . . δι πα . . . επικ . . . το το κατακ . . . κο . . . πλην ε μη τη αθηνα ε αδικειας.

Μη αργοε και και δικαιειας αυτος και ενδρεμενας αυτι μεταξυ της την νενα, το απαντα ειδειαν τι και φανερω αυτοι διαλεγεσθαι, ότι σον ειδεια δοει αρατης φαινεις δε και πριν της των τυχων πραξι, τον μηκε της της πραξεως επισημειως.

Καλουη γαρ και σε οι πλευρες των ανθρωπων των τυχων ερωμενοι εγα δει σοι διαφυλαξω τον καθαρον και ανιβρουτον. Καλος γαρ αυτι έρωμενοι το γε και δει ευνωμαινησει. Ει δε τοιτεν ας δικαιω του κριθαι ναι, ότι μαλα και μεν επιθυμω λοιπων, λοιπων επιμελους.

Τα πευματα και τα εμποδια μαλαιτα απειδοειδει και αποθωμαιναι, ότι αναδεικνυται και επεξεταναι. Τονος μεν αυτω και τα θηρια επιστηται φιλεια μαλαιτα παντων τους κυνηγεται, και τα πτυμα τους θηρινατα. Και πλην δε τα ζευτα τους μαλαιτα εκτρεπονται τους μαλαιτα ενδιωνουται και διωκονται.

Ει δε τις οιτει ενδοξατερον και αντιπατερον ελον το καλλο δι τους εραστες του τουτο διαμαρταιε. Καθυσυνετει μεν γαρ και και και και τους καλους της ες τους άκοιμοις πιτεους δια τους ερωμενοι [μετεχεικε;], δει έμαι δε τους άλλους βεθεμενων την δοξαν κατηπει. Ει γονις της των μηδετων σε θαρακιων πυθουνται, ουτως σε εις την δοξαν, αμειπαν ήμαν έπω τοις πιτεουνται, μαθων ότι σε πιτεουνται. Ει γαρ αυτων άλλων θεραπευουσα η των κατε εραστηκη κληται και αναβηκαν προσωνων. Συ δε εις τους τους καλους σε εις έσθε δι να πιτεους παεον υπ ερωμενοι. Οιλον γαρ άνων δενται σενε οι μη εραστες. Αρχειοε δει τις εραστες τους δυσεσ και ουδεν άνων έπω των δικαιων επαινοουμενοι οι καλακες. Αρετη δε και δοζα και ακρο και κερδους. Καβομεν θαλαττη μεν ναεται και κυβερνηται και τριμεσθον και ζουον και οι άλλοι πλεονειε.

"Ωστερ ουν ρειων και θυσιας, ουν και του βιον τους ερωμενους ελογιας μαλαιτα πρει[εται ετειλευθαι] . . . τους τους . . . εις εαυτουν αδοξα εις ντο δε χρητους εραστες έξουν ει . . . πετυν και . . .

νεο ν . . . τους τους οπισθας τους . . . τους . . . δε και γαρ οι ερωμενεις δια των τυχων θαρακιων ουκειον τιμων, αλλα αυτους αλαεινουμενει τε και ιπτεινουνται, και ουκ ετειν εφορουνται των έρωτα. Συγραφει δε, άφω δασιν, α γαρ οι εραστης έρωσε των περι σενε εννυμενατα, ουν τοτεν δη

6 αιτιους μεν. N.
THE EROTICS OF CORNELIUSFRONTO. 187

μάλιστά σε δελεάσων καὶ προσεξόμενος καὶ αἰρήσων τα ὑπὸ ἐστὶν αἰσχρὰ καὶ
νοεῖθα καὶ βοή τις διὰ λαόστος ὕπ' οὕτως προσπεμπομένη, ὡς ταῖς ἐν θηρίων ἡ
βοσκημάτων ὑπὸ ἂρωτος βρυχωμένων ἢ χρεμετιξόμενων ἢ μικρομένων ἢ
ἀφικμένων. Τούτως ὕσει τά τῶν ἀρώματος περίπλοτα. Εἰ γοῦν ἐπιτρέψαις
σαῦτον τῷ ἔραστῇ χρήσθω διὸν καὶ ὄποτε βούλοιτο, οὔτ' ἂν καρφὸν περι-
μεινας ἐπιτῆδειον, οὔτε τόπων, οὔτε σχολῆν, οὔτε ἐρημίαν, ἀλλὰ θηρίον
δέχθη ὑπὸ λάπτης εἴθις ἐκεῖον ἂν καὶ βαῖνει προθυμοῦστε μηδὲν αἰδοίμενος.

Τούτῳ ἐτί προσεξεὶς καταπαύς τὸν λόγον, ὅτι πᾶντα θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ἔργα
ὅσα ἐς ἀνθρώπων χρείαν τε καὶ τέρψιν καὶ ἀφέλειαν ἀφίκται, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν
πάντα καὶ πάντῃ θέαι, γῆν φιλιμι καὶ οἴραν καὶ ἕλιον καὶ θάλαται,
ὕμνων μὲν καὶ θαυμάζεων πεφύκαμεν, ἐράν δ' οὐ, καλῶν δὲ τίνων φαυλοτέρων
καὶ ἀτυμωτέρας μοίρας τετυχόσων, τούτων ἡ ἔρασις φθόνος καὶ ἔρως καὶ ἔκλη
καὶ ἤμερος ἀπῆτα. Καὶ οἱ μὲν τίνες κέρδους ἔρωτοι, οἱ δὲ ὄμοιοι οἱ, οἱ
δὲ οἴνου. Ἐν δη τῷ τοιῷδε ἀριθμῷ καὶ μερίδω, καθιστᾶται τὸ κάλλος ὑπὸ
tῶν ἀρώματος, ὑμοὶ κέρδει καὶ δυσφο καὶ μέθη ὑπὸ δ' ἡμῶν τῶν βοσκη-
μάτων μὲν, μη ἄρωματον, δὲ, ὑμοὶ ἕλιον καὶ οἴραν καὶ γῆ καὶ θαλάττῃ τὰ
γὰρ τοιαῦτα παντὸς ἔρωτος κρέττει καὶ ὑπέρτερα. Ἐν τῷ σιν φράσο πρὸς
tούτος, δὲ καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγων παίδε, πιθανὸς εἶναι δόξεις.
Εἰκὸς δὲ σε ἡ παρὰ μητρός ἡ τῶν ἀνθρεφαμένων μὴ ἀνήκουν εἰναι, ὅτι
τῶν ἀνθρῶν ἠστὶν τὶ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἔλιον ἐπὶ καὶ πάσχει τὰ τῶν ἀρώματος, ἀνα-
τέλλοντος ἐπαιρόμενος καὶ πορευομένου καταστρέφομεν, δύναντος δὲ
περιστρέψομεν· ἂλλ' οὖθεν γε πλεῖον ἀπολαλείπει', οὔδε εὑρημενετέρῳ περισταῖ
tαῖν ἂρωτα τοῦ ἕλιον. Ἀτυμώτατον γοῦν ἀπιστὴν φυτῶν καὶ ἄνθων οὔτε
eis ἄρωματων θαλαῖς οὔτ' εἰς στεφάνους θεῶν ἢ ἄνθρωπως παραλαμβα-
νόμενον. Ἑσουκασ, δ' χαί, τὸ ἄνθος τοῦτο ἐδέιξα εἴθελεν, ἂλλ' ἐγώνη σοι
ἐπιδεῖξο, εἰ εἴθις πρὸς τὸν ἑλιοῦν ἅμα ἄμφω βαθοσμαίμεν.

Supersunt novem versus, quorum scriptura prorsus evanuit. Nihil
apparet praeter correctoris subscriptionem:

Feliciter.

HAVE MI MAGISTER OPTUME.

Age perge, quantum libet, comminare, et argumentorum globis
criminere: nunquam tu tam erasten tuum, me dico, depulseris:
nee ego minus amaro me Frontonem praedicabo, minusque amabo,
quo tu tam variis tamque vehementibus sententias adprobaris minus
amantibus magis opitulandum ac largiendum esse. Ego herculce te
ita amore deperece neque deterrebor isto tuo dogmate: ac si magis
eris alieis non amantibus facilis et promptus, ego tamen non minus te
[tuosque] amabo. Ceterum quod ad sensuum densitatem, quod ad

7 Naber gives ἄνθρωπος, which has no meaning. Cod. ΑΠΟΛΑΤΣΕΙ, originally
perhaps ΑΠΟΛΑΤΣΕΙ. But the present is required by the context.
inventionis argutiarum, quod ad aemulationis tuae felicitatem adtinet, nolo quicquam dicere, [nisi] te multo placentis illos sibi et provocantis Atticos antevenisse.

Ac tamen nequeo quin dicam; amo enim, et hoc denique amantibus vere tribuendum esse censeo, quod victoriis τῶν ἐρωμένων magis gaude[rent. Vi]cimus igitur, [vici]mus inquam. Num . . . . . praestabilius . . . ubique eam sub . . . trapae . . . tram promsi . . . ei quo . . . adsis . . . disputari utra re magis caveret. Quid de re ista [oro] . . . mam tulerit an quod magister meus de Platone?

Illud quidem non temere adiuravero: si quis iste revera Phaeder fuit, si umquam is a Socrate afuit, non magis Socratem Phaedri desiderio quam me perisse [sines] . . . duo menses . . . arsisse . . . in . . . amet, nisi confessim tuo amore corripitur. Vale mihi maxima res sub caelo, gloria mea. Sufficit talem magistrum habuisse. Domina mea mater te salutat.

* Buttm. argutiam.
INDEX I.

A.

ἀγανακτιών, 63.
ἀγείκαι εἴρειν, senses of, 148.
ἀδημονεῖν, ἀδήμονεστερός, 65.
ἀδολεσχία, 121.
Ἀδραστείας θεσμός, 62.
Ἀδάνδος ἡπτοῖ, 139.
ἀεικιστατος, 166 note.
ἀγουπταίζειν, 137.
ἀίρεσι βίων, 54.
ἀκοπα, 3.
ἀληθεῖας ἴδοι, 94.
——— στίγμιον, 52, 81.
ἀληθική δόξα ( ἀληθής δόξα, 72.
ἀλλά γὰρ = ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ, 5.
ἀλλασσιν, 144.
ἀλλότρια χρώματα, 30.
’Αμοῖς, ’Αμοῦ, Egyptian name of Zeus, 135.
ἀμφιβολίσμα, 100.
ἀν double, 140.
— omitted, 49.
— omitted by transcribers after ὄμαι, ὀμίξε, &c., 19, 1119.
— ἐς after relative, 29.
ἀναβολέσσαι, 75.
’Ανίγκη, 52.
ἀνακρίνεις, 63.
ἀνακρίσις, 143.
ἀναλύσαι, 107.
ἀνάμνησις, 55, 58, 168.
——— theory of, xviii.
ἀναπεπτάμενος, 32.
ἀναπληρώσας, ἀναπτερώσας, ἀνατο-μώσας, 78.
ἀναποδόθη, 88.
ἀνταρασίας, ἀναρεσις, 111.
ἀνάθη = ἀνάθης, 10.
ἀνοικτος, 81.
ἀνταπόδοιος, 23.

ἀντίρος, 78.
ἀντιλογική τέχνη, 96.
ἀπεστηρικός, 33.
ἀπηγή, 82.
ἀπεινα, with accus., 129.
ἀπόβλητος, 91.
ἀποδείξει, 145.
ἀποδείξεσθαι cum gen. rei, doubtful, 129.
ἀποδοδόσαν, 26.
ἀπόδειγμα ἐπὶ, 66.
ἀπολαύειν cum gen. rei, 78.
ἀπολύεσθαι διαβολήν, 116.
ἀποσκέψεις, 114.
ἀποφάσις, 62.
ἀποστεύμαναρ, 109.
ἀποτραπέσθαι, 28.
ἀποφυγή, ἀποψύχῃ, 35.
ἀρέτη and ἱερεία, parallel between, 123.
ἀριθμός, arithmetic, 135.
ἀροῦν for σπείρειν or φυτεύειν, a poeticism, 139.
ἀρτελης, 62.
ἀσίμαστος, 60.
— ἀσθαν and —ςαθαυ confounded, 13.
Ἀσκληπιαδός, medical caste, 123.
ἀστρα, fixed stars, 159.
ἀτελῆς, 51.
ἀτεχνία, 134.
ἀτεχνης τριβή, xvi.
’Ατης λείμων, 52.
ἀτ’ οὖν, position of ἄτε, 50.
ἀτριμή, 60.
ἀτύχηλα λέξεις, 119.
ἀτύχεια, 22.
ἀτυχηκανος ἀρήμος, 166 note.
ἀθένηοι Μουσών ὄψας, 43.
ἀτ’ ἵπτεν ἐν’ ὄλκθ, 92.
Ἀφροδίτην for ἐρωμένη, 65.
ἀψις, 48.
INDEX I.

Β.

βίθρον, 74.
βανανοία, 121.
βλαστόμος, 67.

Γ.

Γαμωμήδης, etymology of, 177.
γάνες, 50, 55.
γλυκά γάκων, import of, 83, 84.
γυαθί στενεύ, 8.
γυαμολογία, 115.

Δ.

daíμονες, 47, 54.
—— εντόσπιον, 148.
daíμοναί of Socrates, 36, 152.
—— confused with daímon, 36.
di in the apodosis, 128.
deí, deí, deí, deí, 62.
deíttomai, 43.
dekkóinai, dekkóinai, 6.
dekvós, 156 note.
dekvós, 72.
demostíkos, 58.
demostíkos, 53.
dépote for δή ποτε, 77.
diábázeímenos, 76.
diaíresis, xx, 107, 110.
diaíresis, not 'analytic,' 107.
—— μέθοδοι, 107.
dialegómenos, dialagómenos, 23.
dialektíkos in antithesis to antílógi-

κός or ἀντιλογί-

κός, 110.
dianevé, 102.
diaíriomai, dióriomai, 26.
diaíriomai, 71.
diaíriomai, 133.
diaíriomai, xx, 126.
diaíriomai, xx.
diaíriomai, frequently transitive in the

medical writers, 117.
diaíriomai, diaíriomai, 71.
diaíriomai and diaíriomai, used indiscrimi-
nately, 109.
diaíriomai, 48, 64.
diáforos, 117.
diaírëíaíthetai (paradiáreíthetai, 112.
diaírëíaíthetai, 111.
diaírëíaíthetai, 72.
—— 68.
tírma, 55.

díkaioloi (συμβολευτικοί, 95.
díkë, 146.
diaspasiología, 115.
díka témine, 109.
dókë for dokei, 5.
—— κατακείσθαι, κατακείσθαι, 12.
dóxai and éπιστήμαι, opinion of Iso-

crates respecting, 177.
dóxai melektikós, 92.
dóxastikós, 177.
dórfos, dòrfos, dòrfos, 111.
dórimos, 3.
dóros kai pteras, 137.
dusiptóriaí, 37.

Ε.

eën eírethi eípë, 144.
eíxhímen, 64.
eíthies, 62.
eíthies, 11.
eípòs, 56, 71.
eípòs, 56.
eí kai lókos émõsthës, 150.
eíkë smaphorímenos, 72.
eiknologià, 115.
eiknologià, 112.
eíktòs móðhòn ìdà 157.
eíkësthë, ékësthë, 80.
eíkësthë, 159 note.
eíkësthë in the sense of ἰδιοσθαί, 138.
eíkësthë, á, ê, á, 117.
eíkëstha, Socratic, 121, 153.
eís dýnámës, eis τó dvosthá, 183.
eísm tê x, 147.
ékënes, 13, 15.
ékënes, 58.

'Eileástikos 'Elaqmonídes, 97.
'élygchos, 112.
élev, constr. of, 16.
éleusologià, éleusologià, 129.
éleusologià, 116.
émbrìkë, 67.

en diex, 146.
énkë, 130.
—— and énке the only forms in

Attic prose, 90.
en kai pollass, 65, 104.
—— pollass, pollass én, 110.
énthetëmëns, active, 48.
en òdhi s. kath òdhos gráfës, vol

sperës, 140.
enëph, a doubtful form, 86.
esiarrhë, 42.
eí ërëvøvòs, 107.
edìssias, 102.
INDEX I.  

H.

- after διαφέρειν, &c., 6.
- ἄνευ, with genitive, 29.
- ἓν ὄνομα, 31, 144.
- ἕ διόνυσοι for ἕ ὄνομα, 136.
- ἢδος et, 103.
- ἦρα τοῦ θεοῦ, 70.
- ἥραν, 71.
- ἠθεία, 105.
- ἡμέριον, 117.

Θ.

Θ and 5 confounded, 110.
- Θεία, 135.
- Θεία κυριαρχεία, 133.
- Θεός, 68.
- θηρίον, not ϑηρίαν, 99.
- Θεσαλών, 152.
- Θρίαμβος, 94.
- θρήνοι, 5.
- θυμοειδές = animositas, 165.
- θυμός, 45, 165, 166.
- wide signification of in Aristotle's view, 165 note.
- and ἐπιθυμία, figured by the two horses, 168.

I.

- ἰδέα, 26, 45.
- ἰδέα λόγου, 153.
- ἰδίαν σὺν λόγῳ, 95.
- ἰδίως, 126.
- (ποιητής, 87.
- ἰδράτες θηρίον, 30.
- ἰερα μυστικά, 59.
- ίμερος, 63, 64, 77.
- ἱσοκράτης, ἱσοκράτην, 146.

Z.

Zeus, the symbol of intelligence, 47, 69.
Zeus θεωμένος, the Zeus Ammon of the Greeks, 135.
Ζῶον συνεστός, xxi.

K.

- καθεξής, 6.
- καθορία, intrans., 89.
- καθαροί, 42.
- καὶ μὲν ἢ καὶ, 16.
- καπνολόγια, 113.
- καὶ δὲ, 85.
- κακόν κόρακες κακοῖ δέν, 132.
INDEX I.

καλιμβείσκαί, 82.  
Καλλιόπη, 90.  
καλλιπαίσις, 94.  
κάλλος, 67.  
καταγγύναι, 108.  
καταγγώγη, 9, 89.  
καταγγύγιον, 89.  
κατακεκραματισμένα, 60.  
kατασχόμενο, passive, 42.  
kαταστάτος, καταστάτοπος, 32.  
κερασθάν, 147.  
κεράσαντες, 106.  
κηκίς, 63.  
κλέφε, κοτ κλέε, 64.  
κόλαξ, 31.  
κόραι, 10.  
κοψά της τέχνης, 111.  
κρατεῖ, 129.  
κρισπορόσωσοι, 135.  
kυλινθομαι, 82, 138.

Λ.

λαβαί, 23.  
λαδεῖς, λατεῖς, 33.  
λαμαίνειν λόγον, 18.  
λαστέκαφος, 72.  
λέγονται, 91.  
λελογυγμένοις, 46.  
λήθη γύρας, 140.  
πεδίον, 52.  
λίγυρ, 25.  
λεκυμοίων, λεκυμνείων, 115.  
λειστάτων, 75.  
λογογράφος, 86, 141.  
— discredit attached to,  
— xxvii.  
λογοθείας, 112.  
λόγον ἔχον ( ἐλογον, 122.  
λόγος personified, 139.  
| ἐπίθεσις and λόγος προφο-  
| — ἐπίθεσις and λόγος προφο-  
| — ὑστερος ζώον, 103.  
| λόγου ρήματα, 130.  
| λυκοφίλα, 34.  
| λυσία, 121.  
| λωφάι, 64.  

Μ.

μέγενα, 108.  
μάκαρ, 59.  
μαντικος βίος ἡ τελεστικός, 53.  
μάντις, false etymology of, 40.  
μεθέξεις, 51, 58, 69.
INDEX I. 193

παιδί, 131.
παίς, παιδία, 6.
πεισθεῖς ὅσ εἴσομεν, 43.
πειμπτῇ οὐσίᾳ, 160 note.
πεπαιδεψαί, πεπάχθαι, 106.
πεπάτηκα, 131.
περί, how abbreviated, 129.
περιβάλλεν, περιβαλλόμενος, 130.
περιμένειν for ἵπτομεν, 60.
περὶ ὄψεως, author of, quoted, 129.
περὶ πεθαίνον ἔχον, 124.
περὶ πεθαίνον ἔχον, 110.
πιτεῖς, xx.
πίστωσις, 112.
πλέον εἴλατι τινι τινι, 128.
πλέον ἡ παιδών, 147.
πλημμελουμένοι, pass., 138.
πόδος, 65.
ποιητεῖς ψηλῆ, 144, 145.
ποιητῆς ὡς ῥήτωρ, 19.
ποιητικά δόρατα, 45.
πολλάκις, after ei, εἶ, ἐν, μι, &c., 28.
πολυμένους, 136.
πολύς, 72.
πολυτράχυλος, 73.
πολυποιμή, 137.
ποῦ transposed, 85.
προδάλλεις, 35.
προσείᾳ, 12.
προσεποίησεν (προσεποίησατο, 115.
προσεποίηθαι for προσέκαθι, 76.
προσηγοροὶ βρίσκε, 137.
προσλαμβανόμενη οὐ-ος, 90.
προσπαίζεις, 99, 106.
προσπαραγόμενος, 85.
πρός των εἶναι, 56.
πρός τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, 82.
πρός τοῦτον, 68.
προσφέρεις, 92.
— λόγους, 125.
προτείνομενος, 110.
πτερόν, used symbolically, 47.
πτεροφύτορα, 67.
Πυθαγόρας ἄνθρωπος τῆς οὐσίας φωνῆ, 90.

P.

ραφαήδουμένοι, 143.
ῥώδε, aorist of in Attic, 63.
Ῥηματικῆ πειδῶν δημιουργία, 95.

Σ.

Σαμική λαϊκά, 84.
Σαμίων ἀνθή, 84.

VOL. I.
INDEX I.

στεφάνια, contrary to analogy, 75.
συμπρώπωσης, 73.
σπείρα, τα δε δεξιά, 109.
σφιγγή, 146.
σφοδρός, ironical, 91.
σφοδρός (δείκτης, 43.
σπυρόδεξιος, 23.
σπάσις, 35.
στάσις, σταθμίες, said of mental struggles, 27.
στύγματος, political application of, 85.
στύγματος πολιτικός, 143.
συμμαχία στάμα, 30.
συναγωγή, 107, 110.
συναμοιαζόμενες, 126.
συνθετική μέθοδος, 107.
συνεδριακή, 69.
συνεργάς, 107.
συντομία λόγων, 114.
συντομία, 109.
συνφυγή, 64.
συναίσθημα, 64.
συναίσθησις, 89.
συμπαθία, 72, 73.
συμπαθητικώς, 72.
συμμαχία, 60.

Τ.

τάλλινα, τα λευκά, 34.
τά προ τραγῳδίας, 118.
τάχει, 80, 109.
τάνιμον, 35.
τεθρακων, πεθρακων, 99.
τεθρακώς, 111.
τεθρακώρυξ, 121.
tέλος, 66.
tελεφύ, 71.
tελειός, 61.
tελείωμα, 79.
tετελεσμένος (middle), 109.
tετελεσμένος, 79.
tετελεσμένος, 61.
tέχνη, 96. 
tεχνη, 96.
tεχνη, 114.
tεχνη ψυχική, 61.
tεχνη ευ ευ του, 92.
tεχνη, τοι κριν, 107.
τέχνη, 121.
tεν πολλά, τα πολλά εν, 124.
tεν αυτοίν, τον εμί, 85.
tερωστία, 19.
tεν τοι λύκου, 130.
tεφανικός ανήρ, 63.

Υ.

διθρευ προσωματικήν, 61.
διθρευτικήν, 66.
δισκο και δισκο, 143.
dισκο και δισκό, 116.
δισκολίτησι, 75.
dισκολόγες, 87.

Θ.

φαρμακία, 117.
φάρμακος, 11, 136.
φάσματα, 59.
φατιν ή Λάκης, 94.
φθιώς, attributed to the divinity, 49.
φθιώς, 103.
φθιώτικος, φθιώτικος, 145.
φθιώτικος, 89.
φιλετέος, θεοτέος, 87.
φιλετεία, θεοτέος, 66.
φίλος, dual, 71.
φίλος, 67.

Χ.

χαλεποί ἐξενεβίως, 137.
χαλεποί δοξος, 114.
χατέν, 30.
χαράτος εἴ, 103.
χάρης, 103.

Ψ.

ψιλώπος, 99.
ψιλώπος λόγος, 99.
ψιλός, 99.
ψυχαγωγείν, 96.
INDEX I. 195

Ψυχαγωγία, 127.
Ψυχή, the vital principle, 44.
Ψυχής δοξαστικής, στοχαστικής, 174.

Ω.

Ω, introduction of, at Athens, 41.

ἀρ, om. after τυγχάνει, &c., 101.
ἀν for ἀς, 134.
ἀπα, age denoted by, 17.
ἀτ ἀν, with optative, 12.
ἀτ γε, 10.
ἀτ—ἀς, 10.
ἀφ, φιλότης, 6.
INDEX II.

A.

Abstractum pro concreto, 6, 65.
Accusative absolute, 16.
Achelous, 10.
Adrastia, epithet of Ἀδραστή, 52.
Adrastus, 119.
Advocatus diaboli, 130.
Aeschines Socrates cited, 70.
Agnus castus, 10.
Alcibiades and Socrates, 162.
Amon or Amn, 135.
Anachronisms of Plato, xxviii note.
Anachlothia, 57, 125.
Anaxagoras, his βαθύς quoted, 122.

    —— ροῦς καὶ ἄρους of, 122.
Anaximenes, supposed author of Rhetor. ad Alex., 96.
Animositas, 165.
Annus magnus of the Egyptians, 54.
Anteros, 78.
Antilogica of Protagoras, xxiv.
Antiphonus, 119.
Antisthenes, his dialectical paradoxes, 176.

    —— wrote a reply to Isocrates, 176.
Aorists, use of, 75.
Apologue in the Protagoras, xxvi note.
Apophthegms, Doric, paraphrased in Attic, 94.
Appetites, 166 note.
Archon’s oath, 21.
Aristides Rhetor quoted, 42, 145.
Aristippus, saying of, 136.
Aristotle, 173 note.

    —— borrows from Plato, 103.
    —— made the heart the centre of the consciousness, 126.

    —— περὶ φύσης λέγεις, xxi.
    —— quoted, 95, 112, 122.

Aristotle says that the style of the Phaedrus was adopted ironically, xxiii note.
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, its relation to the Phaedrus, xx.

    —— quoted, 114, 116, 126.
Aristoxenus, date of, xxiii note.
Article, affects nouns relating to different subjects, 74.

    — prefixed to personal pronouns, 85.

    — in Theocritus, 85.
Ascelpiades, their maxims, 123.
Astrological interpretation of Plato’s mythical psychology, 69.
Asyndeton, 49.

B.

Bacchic women, illustration from, 70.
Bacon, de Augmentis quoted, 165 note.
Badham’s emendations, 42, 44, 61, 64, 65, 89.
Beauty one of the Ideas, 57.

    —— Platonic theory of, 161.
Bentley on Phalaris quoted, 144.
Bribery, punishment of, 21, 22.

C.

Carew quoted, 87.

    —— Chariot, allegory of, 45.
Cicero, Acad. quoted, 137.

    —— Brut. quoted, 127.

    —— his translations from the Phaedrus, 44, 147.

    —— Orat. quoted, 122, 147.

    —— translates Plato, 61.
Clairvoyance in antiquity, 42.
INDEX II. 197

Classification, natural not arbitrary, 108.
—— of professions, 52.
Cobet, C. G., viii, 7, 64.
Coleridge, S. T., 166 note.
Collection and division, 107.
Cope, Rev. E. M., quoted, 112.
Corax, mocking allusion to, 132.
Cornarius, conjecture of, 115.
Cornelius Agrippa quoted, 68.
Cratylus, peculiarities of the dialogue so-called, 40.
Creation, mythical account of in the Timaeus, 158.
Cypselus, 22.

D.
Dante and Plato compared, 80.
Dareius Hystaspes, a revolutionary legislator, 86.
Date of Phaedrus, 36.
Dat. plural in -στι, 31.
—— Bentley on, 144.
Demetrius, περὶ ἐπιγραφιῶν quoted, ix.
Diareas, 109.
Diaseretic method, 108.
Dialectic and Eristic, distinction in Philebus, 179.
—— teaches to define "per genus et differentiam," xvii.
—— the highest science, 50.
Dialectical exercises, educational effect attributed to, 110.
Dicaearchus, censures style of the Phaedrus, xxiv.
—— date of, xxiii note.
—— quoted by Cicero, xxiv.
Dichotomies suggested by the συντάξεις of the Pythagoreans, 109.
Dichotomy, Plato lays stress on, 100.
Diction of the love-speeches, Aristotle's account of, 25.
Diogenes Laertius, xxiii.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, his criticisms, 47.
—— compared with Aristotle's, 25.
—— praised by Cicero, 170.
—— quoted, ix, 113, 116.
Division, method of, applied to Rhetoric, 127.
Dobree, his opinion of Isocrates, 171.

Dolls as votive offerings, 11.
Druids forbade writing, 136.
Dryden quoted, 117.
Dual, Attic, 71.
Duals and plurals in the same clause, 80.
Duplication of vowels or diphthongs, 21.

E.
Earth made a planet by the Pythagoreans, 159 note.
—— revolved according to Plato upon her axis, 159.
Effeminacy, Greek and modern notions of, 30.
Egotism tolerated by a Greek public, 171.
Egyptian metempsychosis, 54.
Elastic Logic antithetic to Platonic, xxii.
Eleusinian rites, phrases borrowed from, 59.
Ellipse of ῥὰ μὺν, 109.
Emanations, theory of, 62.
Empedocles, 54, 62.
Enthusiasm, 57.
Epicrates quoted, xxi, 3.
Epigram on the tomb of Midas, 104.
Epigrams attributed to Plato, 163 note.
Eristic, term applied to Plato and Aristotle by Isocritus, 173.
Erotic discourse characterized, xviii, xix.
—— Pythagorean matter in the, xxvi.
—— phraseology, use of by Socrates, 184.
Etymologies in Plato, 9, 35, 40, 60, 63.
Euphorion, date of, xxiii note.
Euripides quoted, 135.
—— Ereth, quoted, 153 note.
Euthydemus of Plato, motive of its publication, 179.
—— emended, 128.
—— the brother of Lysias, the Sophist, and the son of Diocles, not to be confounded, 83.
Evenus, 112.
INDEX II.

F.

Faraday quoted, 46.
Freedom and necessity, mythical mode of reconciling, 56.
Fronto (Corn.), his Erotics, an imitation of the Erotic discourse of Lysias, 184.
Future Indic. after ἔστως, ἔτοιμος.

G.

Galen, Comm. in Hippocr. quoted, 123.
—— de Hippocrate et Platone, 45, 107, 127.
—— quoted, 74.
Generalizing process, 55.
Genitive of time, 54.
Gods, Plato's conceptions of the, 47.
—— whether corporeal, 48.
Golden statues in Delphi, &c., 21, 22.
Gorgias, 111, 113.
—— allusion to, 93.
—— author of rhetorical precepts, 96.
—— accompanied by Tisias on the occasion of his visit to Athens (A.B.P. 4), 113.
—— dictum of, 93.
—— λαμπρὰς of, 173.
—— represented by Nestor, 96.
—— the, allusion to in Phaedrus, xvi.
—— contains parallelisms with passages in Isocrates, 173.
—— when probably composed, xvi.
Grote, Mr., quoted, 123.

H.

Helena of Euripides, 38.
Heraclitus, 72.
—— quoted, 137.
Hera, symbol of practical intellect, 70.
Hermann, C. F., his view of the Phaedrus, xix.
Hermann's, Godf., conj., 17, 93.
Hermeias, anecdote related by, 136.
—— emendation from, 92.
Hermes Trismegistus, 68.
Hermopolis the city of Thoth, 135.
Herodicus, 4.
Hestia, 56.
Hippocrates, his method, 124.
—— his theory of the human body, 123.
—— phrases borrowed from, 3, 42, 63, 64.
—— physical and physics combined by, 53.
—— Plato familiar with, 107.
—— quoted, 117, 129.
Hippocratic Lex., its genuineness open to suspicion, 120.
Hirschig's emendation, 92.
Homeric allegories, 72.
—— usage, 89.
Homoeotelaleus in the speech of Lysias, 13.

I.

Ideal theory, phraseology of, 58.
Ideas, 68.
—— innate, denied by Plato, 168.
Ilissus, 9.
Ionicisms in Plato, 75.
Ironical formulae, 103.
Isocrates, xxiv, 93, 170.
—— φιλοσοφία of, 173.
—— an aristocrat, xviii note.
—— and Aristotle, feud between recorded by Cicero, 178.
—— and Plato contemporaries, 171.
—— Antidosis of, 177 note.
—— quoted, 120.
—— attacks Antisthenes, Plato, and Euclides, 175.
—— his anti-Platonic allusions detected by Dobree, 179 note.
—— his claim to be a philosopher partially conceded in the Platonic dialogues, 178.
—— his consistency contrasted with the inconstancy of Plato, 174 note.
—— his course lasted three or four years, 177 note.
—— his educational theory, 172.
—— his forensic orations the best, 182 note.
—— his jealousy of Plato’s reputation, 176, 178.
—— his opinion of Gorgias, 174 note.
INDEX II.

Isocrates, his pupils numerous, 177 note.
   —— his querulousness, 95.
   —— his show-speeches, 178.
   —— his speech against the Sophists, 177 note.
   —— his writings characterized, 182.
   —— in high favour at the Renaissance, 170.
   —— "laudator temporis acti," xviii note.
   —— named in only one passage in the Platonic dialogues, 178.
   —— no favourite with the philosophers, 170.
   —— passages in, parallel with corresponding passages in the Gorgias, 173.
   —— why preferred by Plato to Lysias, xviii note.
   —— quoted, 113.
   —— received ten minae from each pupil, 177 note.

Phaedrus, 182.
   —— represented the Sicilian school, 178.
   —— 2nd Ep. to Philip genuine, 171 note.
   —— Socrates's opinion of, 147.
   —— twenty-two years the junior of Lysias, 147.
Isocrates's allusion to minor Socrates, 177.
   —— epistle to the young Alexander, 173 note.
   —— Helenae Encomium, approximate date of, 175 note.
   —— written in rivalry of Gorgias, 174.
   —— Panathenaicus characterized, 177.
   —— references to Plato, 172, 176.
   —— speech against the Sophists, probably known to Plato, 174 note.

L.

Laches, the, characterized, xxvi.
Laconian ποιμανής, Athenians fond of, 194.
Laws (the) genuineness of, 176 note.
   —— in circulation within two years of Plato's death, 176 note.
   —— most dogmatic of Plato's works, 157.
Layman, 87.
Libethrides, 144.
Lycymnian names, 115.
Lycymnus, 114.
Literature, use of, 140.
Lobeck quoted, 69, 66, 115.
Love, 105.
   —— sinister, 109.
   —— symbol of the philosophic habit of mind, 57.
Lupus in fabula, 130.
Lustral rites, 42.
Luther quoted, xvii note.
Lymph, Lymphia, 28.
Lymphathii, 28.
Lysias, 3.
   —— a considerable personage at Thurii, xxvii.
   —— a metoe, xxvii.
   —— characterized, 181 note.
   —— first to write ἐπιστολή, 151.
   —— his age at death, xxvii.
   —— left Athens for Thurii, xxvii.
   —— member of a wealthy family, xxvii.
   —— not one of the Socratic circle, xxvii.
   —— on one occasion pleaded his own cause, 181 note.
   —— prayer in behalf of, a satire, 82.
   —— returned to Athens, xxvii.
   —— speeches of spoken by others, xxvii.
   —— whether a technographe, 100.
Isocrates's 'Erotic speech,' whether an epistle, 184.
   —— fame as a logographus acquired late in life, xxviii.
   —— opinion that Rhetoric "observationem quandam esse non artem," 101.
   —— oration against Eratothenes one of his best, xxviii.

J.

Jovial, 68.
Justice, what according to Plato, xvii.
### INDEX II.

Lysias's erotic speech, an example of rhetorical insinuation, 103.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M.</th>
<th>P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madness, 40, 42, 106.</td>
<td>Panaetius, date of, xxiii note.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— God-given, 80.</td>
<td>—— a Platonizing Stoic, xxiii note.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— morbid (divine, 106.</td>
<td>Pan and the Nymphs inseparable, 144.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— the philosophic, 57.</td>
<td>—— statue of, brought from Acropolis and now in Cambridge, 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magna moralia, 164.</td>
<td>Parian sophists, 112.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical phraseology, 147.</td>
<td>Participle used adverbially, 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meno, the, 58, 168.</td>
<td>Pericles, character of his oratory, 121.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metempsychoeis, 52.</td>
<td>—— his superiority to διευθυν-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodic (Empirical, 123.</td>
<td>μοία, 122.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morychian house, 3.</td>
<td>Phaedrus, the, a dramatized treatise on Rhetoric, xiv, xix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musae Ilissides, 9, 28.</td>
<td>—— called by Mure an eloquent mystification, xv note.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— were river-nymphs, 144.</td>
<td>—— date of, xv, xxiii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysteries, Plutarch on, 59.</td>
<td>—— different headings prefixed to the, xiii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— possessed no philosophic meaning, 59.</td>
<td>—— dramatic date of, 147.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— Warburtonian theory of, 59.</td>
<td>—— early composition of the, 82.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mystae at Eleusis, a type of the philosopher, 56.</td>
<td>—— its relation to other dialogues, xiii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myths, rationalized by Metrodorus, 7.</td>
<td>—— known to Aristotle, xiv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— resembles the Symposium, xxv.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— scope and purpose of the, xiii.</td>
<td>—— superior to the early dialogues, xxv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— supposed juvenile character of, xxii.</td>
<td>—— tradition of its early date unknown to Cicero, xxiv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— tradition of its early date known to Aristotle, xiv.</td>
<td>Phenomenal, the, 58.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— quoted, 88.</td>
<td>Philebus, diatrietic method in, applied to grammar, 127.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— Philolaus, remains of, genuine, 156 note.</td>
<td>—— quoted, 88.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— Philosophic and theological standard of purity, 80.</td>
<td>—— initiation said to be μακρομνήτηρ, 59.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— initiation said to be μακρομνήτηρ, 59.</td>
<td>Philosophy, what Isocrates means by, 172.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— Philotimic lovers, case of, 80.</td>
<td>Physiognomists, early Greek, 72.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— Physiognomists, early Greek, 72.</td>
<td>Pindar, a borrower from Orphic and Pythagorean sources, 54.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—— Planetary influence, 68.</td>
<td>Planetary influence, 68.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Names, significant used by gods, un-meaning by men, 66.

Nestor, name of Isocrates, 96.

Niebuhr, his opinion of Isocrates, 171.

Nominative, absolute, 108.

Nymphs and Muses identified, 28, 144.

Occult science, 68.

Oligarchic spirit in Plato and Aristotle, 88.

Onomacritus, composer of poems ascribed to Orpheus and Musaeus, 66.

One in Many, xxii, 124, 127, 160.

Origen quoted, 63.

Orpheus and Musaeus forged by Onomacritus, 66.

—— parodied by Plato, 52.

O.
INDEX II. 201

Plato, a borrower from Euripides, 39, 42.
    —— called ἐσστοχος by Lucian, 176 note.
    —— called the κυκών ὅρθοστέλεως, 116.
    —— emendations of, 56, 92, 128.
    —— ethics based upon Psychology, 165.
    —— his doctrine of the Soul, 126.
    —— his opinion of Euclides, 175.
    —— his philosophical education, 164.
    —— his portraits of the earlier sophists, 171.
    —— his view of the use of mythical compositions, xxi.
    —— preferred dialectic to poetry and eloquence, xxii.
    —— Rep. ix. 573 c, emendation, 56.
    —— sympathizes with Hippocrates, 124.
    —— travels of, 154.
    —— vindication of, 163 note.
    —— whether a friend of Isocrates, 178, 182.
    —— Comicus emend., 33-4.
Platonic πανδροστία, 161.
    —— dialogues, the best substitute for oral διάλεξις, 141.
    —— doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, 168.
    —— epigrams, 184.
Plato's Laws, 163.
    —— characteristics of, 157 note.
    —— Pleasures, distinction between pure and mixed, 88.
    —— Pleonasem, 40.
    —— Plume of the Soul, 62.
    —— Plural for dual a common error in MSS., 75.
    —— Plutarch quoted, 59, 162.
    —— Poetic frenzy, 42, 43.
    —— Poetical diction in prose, 25, 34.
    —— Socrates's apology for, 82.
    —— Poetry, in what sense a branch of rhetoric, 127.
    —— Polemarchus, ὁ φιλόσοφος, 83.
    —— brother of Lysias, a member of the Socratic clique, 82.
    —— Politicus, the work of Plato, 83.
    —— style of, xxv note.
    —— Polus, written τυρνιος of, 96.
    —— Porson, Bodl. M.S. examined by, 72.
    —— Praxiphanes, his dialogue πρι πονητῶν, 178.
    —— Preposition omitted, 54.
    —— Priestesses at Dodona and Delphi, 40.
    —— Prodicus and Hippias, 151 note.
    —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— pedantry of the Sicilian school, 114.
    —— Prolep sia, 118.
    —— Proper names significant, 39, 40.
    —— Protagoras, injustice to, 151 note.
    —— —— —— wrote a work on grammar, 115.
    —— Proverbs, 31, 70, 83, 84, 92, 93, 130, 132, 137, 139, 140.
    —— Psychology, a branch of general physics in Greek philosophy, 123.
    —— Pure and mixed pleasures, xix note, 88.
    —— Pythagorean astronomy, 48, 159 note.
    —— —— fragments, except those of Philolaus, spurious, 166 note.
    —— Pythagoreans, influence on Plato of the, xxvi.
    —— Pythagorisms in Plato, 90.

Q.

Quinta essentia, quintessence, 160 note.
    —— Quintilian, his esteem for Isocrates, 170.
    —— —— Inst. quoted, 136.

R.

Reminiscence, Platonic doctrine of, 188.
    —— Rhetoric, an off-shoot of dialectic, xvii.
    —— —— at its best inferior to dialectic, 141.
    —— based on Psychology, 123, 125.
    —— —— cannot be taught as an art without dialectic, 111, 133.
    —— —— course of cost 100 drachms, 177 note.
    —— defined, 95.
    —— —— final cause of, according to Plato, 123.
    —— —— forensic subject of, τὸ δικαίως; deliberative, τὸ διάδοχον, 100.
    —— —— ideal, 127.
    —— —— how spoken of in the Politicus, xvi.
    —— —— investigation of a true, 90.
    —— —— Laco nian dislike of, 94.
    —— —— species of, which seemed to Plato desirable, xviii.
    —— —— third part of evaded in the Phaedrus, xx.
Rhetoric, third part of, how handled by Aristotle, xxi.
——— treatises on, 95.
——— true purpose of, xviii.
Rhetoric ad Alexandrum, 196.
111, 112.
——— its author has preserved traditions of more ancient schools, 112.
Rhetors unaware of the importance of strict definition, 119.
Ritualist, the, rank of in Plato’s estimation, 53.

S.
Saturnine temperament, 69.
Scene of the dialogue, 9.
Schleiermacher, his view of the Phaedrus, xix.
Science of truth implied in the science of seeming, 97.
Second Socratic Discourse, a pattern of philosophical rhetoric, 163.
——— imagery in, drawn from various sources, 155.
Servius ad Virg. quoted, 144.
Shakespeare, 68.
——— description of horse by, 72.
Shilleto, Rev. R., 17, 21.
Sibylla, 5.
Sidney (Sir Philip) quoted, 87.
Simmias of Thebes, 35.
Socrates, ethical theory of, 164.
——— first discourse of, 151.
——— second discourse of, 155, 163 al.
——— his assumption of humility, 20.
——— his favourite haunts, 11.
——— his spirit of paradox, 153, 174.
——— laid himself open to misapprehension, 162.
——— not to be taken at his word, 137.
——— the ἰδραυγή of Alcibiades, 153.
Socratic Epist. XXX., 176 note.
——— alone has pretensions to authenticity, 179.
——— written apparently by a Platonist, 170 note.
Socratic paradox revived by the Stoics, 164 note.
‘Sophist’ applied by Lysias to Plato, 146.
Sophist, the, xxiv, 97.
Sophists, 83.
Soul, pre-existence of, 156, 169.
——— before its fall ranked among the ἑραμοῦς, 54.
——— definition of, 156.
——— its destiny after death, 53.
——— its first genesis, 54.
——— tripartition of, 126, 158, 164.
Speech-writing, when disgraceful, 142.
Spenser, 68.
Statue, Eleusinian, preserved in Cambridge, 60.
——— of Gorgias at Delphi, 22.
Statues erected to Eros and Anteros, 78.
Stesichorus, 37, 39.
St. Paul quoted, 79.
Suppressio veri, instance of, 131.
Synesius quoted, 5.

T.
Technicalities, 111.
Technographers, 95, 96.
Thamus, 135.
Theagoras, a spurious dialogue, 36.
——— quoted, 152.
Theodoret misrepresents Plato, 80.
——— quoted, 44, 164 note.
Theodorus, 111.
——— inventions of, 112.
Thesmotheotea, business of, 85.
Theuth, or Thoth, the Egyptian Hermes, 126, 135.
Thrasymachus, 110, 111.
——— represented by Ulysses, 96.
——— wrote Ἄλεος, 116.
Timaeus, psychology of, 165.
——— quoted, xxii note.
——— referred to, 125.
Timocratic type, 80.
Tiaias, 131.
Tripartition of the soul, 45, 158, 164.
——— discarded by the Stoics, 126.
Truth, familiarity with, a necessary condition of successful deception, 98.
## INDEX II.

### V.
- Veri-simile, province of the rhetor, 130.
- Versus cancrini, 104.
- Via et arte, 100.
- Virgil, description of horse by, 72.
- Vowels, elision of, viii.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Written speech, inconvenience in, 138.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### X.
- Xenophon agrees with Plato, 150.
- —— faults in, 150.
- —— Sympos. quoted, 148, 150, 153.

### Z.
- Zeno represented by Palamedes, 96.
- —— the father of the Eristic sects, 97.
- Zeno's paradoxes, 97.
- Zeus the symbol of reason, 59.

---

**THE END.**

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